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Introduction 
Peter Larmou r 
During the 1990s 'governance' has become part of the language of 
negotiations between aid donors, banks, and developing countries. 
The word was first introduced in this context by the World Bank when 
it  identified a 'crisis of governance' in Africa in 1989 (quoted in World 
Bank 1992:5) .  The Bank defined governance as 'the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and 
social resources for development' (World Bank 1992 :1 ) .  
Most donors now believe that  development depends on governance. 
It includes public sector management, accounta.bility, the legal 
framework, and transparency and information. They have incorporated 
statements about governance, or 'good government' into donor reports, 
discussion papers, and ministerial statements. Typically, a report of the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD concludes that the 
'investment of resources in democratic governance will contribute to 
progress in development goals' (OECD 1997:3). 
The Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs defines good governance 
as 'open, transparent, accountable, equitable and responsive to people's 
needs' (DFAT 27 August 97). Aid, he says, can contribute by providing 
legal training that enhances accountability, by supporting non­
govemment organisations which increase participation, or by 
strengthening institutions that promote human rights. Similarly, 
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Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA) links good 
governance with participatory development, democratisation and 
economic liberalisation (Takasugi 1997:3). 
This book is about issues of ' governance' and 'good government' in 
the South Pacific, a region of small developing countries which are still 
relatively dependent on foreign aid. Issues of good governance are 
prominent in the recent unrest over the Sandline mercenaries contract 
in Papua New Guinea and in the review of Fij i's constitution that led 
to its readmission to the Commonwealth. They are also expressed in 
the increasing international pressure for public sector reform. 
Some of the chapters report on recent unpublished research on 
governance and reform in the region. Others put that research in a 
wider comparative or theoretical context. Research contributing to 
Macdonald's opening chapter was sponsored by the British Overseas 
Development Administration, and considers the applicability of good 
governance criteria to the region . Research for the chapters by 
Kavanamur, Kubutaulaka, Dinnen, Nanau, Sepoe and So'o was 
carried out for Master and PhD degrees. Their research illuminates, 
and in many cases anticipates, current policy concern with 
conditionality, forest mismanagement, law and order, decentralisation, 
gender and election financing. Burton's chapter is based on extensive 
consultancy work in Papua New Guinea. Ivarature writes as a full­
time researcher at Papua New Guinea's National Research Institute. 
Smyth brings a media s tudies focus to bear on governance issues. 
Good governance is also a global issue, linked to the end of the 
Cold War, and globalisation. Macpherson explicitly addresses global / 
local links. May makes comparison with Africa. While the word 
'governance' is being applied to developing countries, i t  is also being 
used to refer to changes in public administration in developed 
countries. Rhodes (1997) distinguishes four such uses. Governance 
sometimes refers to reducing the size of the state. It is used to refer to 
the role of boards of management in large corporations. I t  is associated 
with the 'New Public Management', which favours professional 
management, concern with clients, competition and contracting out. It 
refers to relations between organisations when there are many centres 
of power, and the state is no longer supreme. 
Some of these changes, such as the New Public Management, are 
now being copied by, or imposed upon, developing countries. Ideas 
about governance are useful in understanding countries with so-called 
weak states, while studies of stateless societies contribute to the 
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understanding of the role of communities in developed societies 
(Larmour 1996b, 1 997a) .  
The phrase 'good government', now often used interchangeably 
with governance, has a distinct history, going back to debates about 
colonial administration, and municipal reform in the United States . 
A 'Good Government League' was founded in Louisiana in 1912, 
part of the politics of corruption and reform that produced the 
populist Governor Huey Long, and consisted of 
a col lection of patrician and b usiness leaders devoted to honest 
government largely centred in New Orleans (Wi l l iams 1970:3). 
In Britain 
Good government became a s logan in colonial a ffa irs because it 
impl ied tha t 'self government' meant incompetent ad ministra tion (Lee 
1967:5) .  
The 'good' in good governance is a traditional concern of political 
theory. Concern with 'good governance' involves general questions 
about the universality of ideas, the bases of social order, and 
development. Is one form of governance applicable everywhere? Is a 
state necessary to maintain social order? What drives the process of 
development? 
Governan ce as practice 
Who does 'good governance'? In developing countries, the 
ombudsman, auditor general, and the courts report and speak out on 
'good governance' issues. Independent newspapers and radio stations 
report what they say, or m·ake their own inv·estigations of corruption 
and mismanagement. Developing country non-governmental 
organisations, trades unions and opposition politicians speak out on 
good governance issues. Local banks and chambers of commerce urge 
public sector reform, while local law, advertising and accounting firms 
profit from processes of privatisation. 
Aid agencies and multilateral banks try to institutionalise 'good 
government' assessments as part of their aid and loan programming. 
The longest pressure for 'good governance' has come from non­
government organisations like Oxfam or Community Aid Abroad. 
Like bilateral government donors, they came to realise that 
development projects were failing because of bad governance. Their 
fund raising activities made them sensitive to popular suspicion that 
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aid was simply going to shore up authoritarian regimes. Unlike 
government donors, they were freer of diplomatic inhibitions against 
criticising foreign governments. 
A number of non-government organisations now deal directly with 
governance issues, without attaching them to traditional concerns 
with development projects. Transparency International promotes anti­
corruption activity. The Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) promotes electoral reform. International Alert and 
Conciliation Resources engage in various kinds of preventive 
diplomacy. 
There is also a growing private sector 'good governance' industry, 
in banks and consultancy firms that provide political risk analysis, 
among consultants to aid agencies on governance issues, and among 
the legal, accounting and advertising firms handling privatisations. 
Governance as pol icy discou rse 
To make sense of governance, we need to distinguish three loosely 
connected levels of theory, policy and practice. The theories associated 
with 'good governance' come from different parts of the social 
sciences: institutional and neoclassical economics, company law, 
political science and economic sociology. 
The policies are produced by negotiations within and between 
governments, and embodied in statements that, taken together, add up 
to a discourse with a life of its own. 
The practice is the activities of officials and contractors dealing 
with their counterparts and clients in developing countries . There is 
no necessary connection between these three levels. 
Talk about 'governance' is sometimes criticised for being vague, 
incoherent, based on false assumptions, 'just words', or simply 
common sense. Those on the receiving end sometimes complain that it 
is overbearing, selectively applied, and insensitive to local differences. 
These criticisms are instructive for understanding the character of a 
policy discourse. 
Vagueness 
'Governance' is now often used interchangeably with 'government', 
with or without the 'good' .  Critics say it  is merely fashionable. Rhodes 
complains that governance has ' too many meanings to be useful'  
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( 1997: 15). Similar complaints used to made about the use of 'the state' .  
However, deliberate vagueness is a useful tactic in policymaking. 
'Governance' was a polite way of raising awkward issues of 
corruption, incompetence, and abuse of power. Evasive language was 
forced on the World Bank by i ts Articles of Agreement which 
'explicitly prohibit the institution from interfering in a country 's 
internal political affairs' (World Bank 1994:vii) . 
Incoherence 
Parts of the 'good government' agenda sit uneasily with others: 
democracy, for example, with unpopular economic reform. Statements 
about governance do not necessarily 'add up'. Such incoherence is a 
by-product of the processes of accommodation and compromise that 
go into negotiating agreement on a text. 
False assumptions 
The link between democracy and economic development is unproven. 
True, countries with higher per capita GDP tend to be democratic, but 
systematic comparisons between many countries in many periods, and 
attention to the flow of causation leads to more tentative conclusions. 
Thus a careful study by Lane and Ersson (1996) finds few strong 
correlations between various measures of democracy and 
development. The strongest is a positive relationship between 
democracy and quality of life (Lane and Ersson 1996:66 ). All they can 
conclude is that democracy is 'not an obstacle to economic growth or 
fair income distribution' (Lane and Ersson 1996:67). In any case, it is 
not clear which causes the other. A study of democracy in the South 
Pacific concluded that  existing democratic institutions were probably 
threa tened by development (Larmour 1996a:245) .  For policy purposes, 
however, while the link between democracy and development is 
unproven, it is at least arguable, and apparently plausible. 
Just words 
Much public policy activity consists of negotiations around the content 
of speeches, memoranda, reports, and so on. Chinese officials, for 
example, have been critical of the Asian Development Bank's 
'governance' policy. The word, they say is 'too political' .  China prefers 
'development management' (Emerging Markets 2 May 1996). Words 
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matter; in deciding between loan applications and project proposals, 
the Chinese have been concerned that it will make borrowing 'much 
more complicated' .  
Simply common sense 
Common sense is an achievement, not a criticism, for policy discourse. 
If something controversial can be presented as common sense then 
half the policy battle is won. Thus the chair of the Australian 
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, Ian Sinclair, on corruption 
and aid in Papua New Guinea 
It is difficul t  to determine what good governance is. It is not for us to 
lay down the form of government in a country. But I think we ought to 
encourage principles whereby those who are in power don't  abuse the 
responsibi l ities they have. And to the degree we can direct our a id 
program to achieve that  end I think its worthwhi le (Radio Austra l ia  
News Summary, 1 3  J une 1 997) . 
Nothing new anyway 
The World Bank links its new concern with governance to its long­
standing engagement with public sector reform. Other agencies link, 
or fold it into their own distinctive, standing discourses. The UNDP 
links 'Public Sector Management, Governance and Sustainable Human 
Development' (UNDP 1995) .  The OECD links 'Participatory 
Development and Good Governance' (OECD 1977) . Institution 
building has been a long established form of aid. Everyone, it seems, 
has been doing 'good governance' already, under a different name. For 
a policy discourse, to show that  nothing is new may be a way of 
reassuring doubters. 
Overbearing, selectively applied, and insensitive 
While donors talk about dialogue, recipients often hear lectures. Thus 
China's delegation to the Asian Development Bank warned, ' [t ]o  
impose conformity irrespective of the country differences and the 
willingness of developing members is not likely to work'. It  argued 
that the Bank's governance policy should be more even handed, as 
only developing countries were criticised (Emerging Markets 2 May 
1996) .  
Policy discourses are not open, equal conversations. Their silences 
on some matters are as eloquent their garrulousness on others. The 
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ability to set the agenda is a form of power, but it is not absolute. The 
good governance criteria have some potential to be used against 
donors . Corruption in developing countries has been abetted by the 
tax exemptions for bribes that some developed countries have given to 
their companies. Aid programs may be mismanaged. Developed 
countries find their own human rights records under international 
scrutiny, as Australia has found over gay rights in Tasmania, over the 
aboriginal 'stolen children', and over the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. Governance is no longer just a word used by the North 
against the South: Thailand's Nation newspaper, for example, recently 
blamed the Southeast Asian smog crisis on 'poor governance' in 
Jakarta (quoted in The A us tralia, 30 September 1997) .  
Policy discourses are a product of negotiation and compromise 
within governments, and between them. The process leads to 
vagueness and incoherence. Plausibility, common sense, and 
continuity with existing discourses matter more than strict standards 
of intellectual consistency and proof. The content reflects the power of 
the participants: some agencies and governments are more successful 
a t  getting ' their language' embodied in the text than others.  That 
power provokes resistance, and the text  also creates possibilities for 
retaliation, as when 'good governance ' arguments are turned against 
donors. 
In some ways, and particularly in 'governance' the content of the 
words matters less than that they are now being spoken. 'Everybody 
knows' for example about corruption. There has been a substantial 
body of scholarly theory dealing with it at least since the 1970s (see 
Heidenheirner 1970) . And paying or resisting bribes has been part of 
the day to day practice of aid. What is new is its eruption into the 
policy discourse. A kind of 'outing' has taken place, as previously 
'open secrets' have become part of the policy discourse. 
There are leads and lags between the policy discourse, theory, and 
practice. There is no single direction of flow, up from practice to policy 
to theory, or down from theory through policy to practice. The 
emerging, often vague and incoherent, discourse of policy draws, 
sometimes indiscriminately, on theory and practice. Flows of ideas 
between levels are embodied in grants, appointments, promotions, 
and attendance at conferences. In some ways the policy discourse on 
'good governance' has run ahead of academic theorising. 
As part of such a to-and-fro process, the British Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA-now called Department for 
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International Development) held workshops with academics in Sussex 
and Canberra in order to get ideas about putting 'good governance' 
criteria into day to day practice. The Canberra workshop asked if and 
how ODA's Good Government agenda might apply to countries in the 
South Pacific (Larmour 1995b) .  It led agenda to Macdonald 's research 
on Kiribati, to research by Taafaki and Oh on governance in Tuvalu, to 
research by Duncan, Larmour and Hunt on trust funds in Kiribati and 
Tuvalu, and to research by Larmour on corruption in the region 
(Macdonald 1996; Taafaki and Oh 1995; Duncan, Hunt and Larmour 
1995; Larmour 1997b) .  It also contributed to the inception of a larger 
Australian National University research project on 'State Society and 
Governance in Melanesia', of which this publication is part. 
The publ ic sector in  the South Pacific 
Two types of public sector in the South Pacific can dis tinguished 
according to their size and source of their revenues. Bertram and 
Watters ( 1985) coined the phrase 'MIRAB' economies to characterise 
the dependency of the smaller islands in the east and the north of the 
region on migration, remittances, aid and bureaucratic employment. 
Among the larger islands to the west of the region the public sector is 
much smaller in rela tion the population, and the public finance 
depends heavily on fluctuating natural resource revenues: minerals, 
timber, and fisheries. A country like Kiribati, with a small population 
and a large Exclusive Economic Zone, shares the characteristics of 
both types. 
Both types, however, have been affected by budget crises which 
have led their governments to seek loans which have been made 
conditional on public sector reform. Cook Islands, with a population 
of 18,000, is an exemplary MIRAB economy. About 18 per cent of the 
population were employed by the government, as a means of ensuring 
political support. Public expenditure constituted about 86 per cent of 
GDP. In 1996 it turned to the New Zealand Government and the Asian 
Development Bank, which helped in the preparation of draconian 
plans to reduce the number of public sector departments from 55 to 
22, and reduce public service employment by 60 per tent (Keith-Reid 
1 996). 
Papua New Guinea, with a population of nearly four million, is the 
largest resource boom economy. I ts public service constitutes only 2 
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per cent of the population, smaller than the average for developing 
countries, and much smaller than the developed country average 
(Larmour 1995a:41) . A fall in the price of oil exports, and delays in 
some mining projects forced the government to devalue, and then to 
go to the Australian government, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank to fund its budget shortfall . The conditions 
included reductions in public sector employment, and the negotiations 
are described in Kavanamur 's chapter. 
In both cases, electoral competition has driven governments to 
overspend . In Papua New Guinea, where public employment is 
relatively small, the expenditure benefited rural voters. In Cook 
Islands, most of the population became dependent, in one way or 
another, on public employment. Other democratic governments in the 
region face similar pressures, either from unpredictable or finite 
resource revenues, or from reductions in aid, or both. 
Public sector reform 
Until the 1990s, the main issues in public sector reform were 
localisation, decentralisation, and the relationship between politicians 
and officials. Localisation was part of the process of decolonisation 
that took place between 1 962 and 1980, and involved the replacement 
of colonial by local officials, or short-term consultants. Advocates of 
decentralisation pointed to the islands' dispersed populations, uneven 
development, and the concentration of services in the capitals . Many 
people identified with precolonial units of government that were even 
smaller than the states introduced by colonial rule . In the contest for 
power between elected politicians and appointed officials, ministers 
pressed for greater control over senior appointments. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a sharper international 
consensus in favour of privatisation, smaller government, and more 
liberal trade .  Australia turned from grants to Papua New Guinea's 
budget to support for particular programs in health or infrastructure. 
Australian ministers referred to their own country's public sector 
reforms in order to urge reform on others. New Zealand 's radical 
reforms of its own public sector showed up the unreconstructed 
character of the public services in its former colonies, Niue and Cook 
Islands. Britain had tapered off budget support to former colonies, and 
began to murmur about 'good government'. The territories still 
dependent on the United States became vulnerable to Congressional 
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budget cuts, while the French colonies (New Caledonia,.French 
Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna) may become vulnerable to budget 
pressures in Paris. 
During the 1990s, the pressure for public sector reform has come 
externally, from banks and aid donors, though some governments like 
Vanuatu's have anticipated them. It has targeted the size of 
government, rather than its composition, centralisation, or lack of 
accountability to elected leaders. It has been occasioned by budget 
shortfalls, but justified in wider terms of efficiency. For example, 
earlier reformers would have criticised public enterprises for 
employing foreign managers, for failing to provide services to remote 
areas, or for ignoring ministerial directives. Now, reformers see 
privatisation of public enterprises as a way of raising revenue for the 
budget, and reducing the need for further subsidies. Allowing private 
competition, greater managerial autonomy, and the threat of 
bankruptcy might also make them become more efficient. 
The South Pacific Forum-a regional organisation of island 
governments plus Australia and New Zealand-has begun 
exchanging ideas about public sector reform among its members. A 
meeting of Forum Finance ministers addressed what it called 
'structural reform', which it recognised as an issue of 'high political 
sensitivity' .  Among the issues it identified were 
• mechanisms are needed to protect the reform process from 
being undermined by temporary improvements in economic 
circumstances' 
• determining the appropriate roles and size of the public 
service is fundamental to successful reform' (South Pacific 
Forum 1995) . 
What the chapters say 
Macdonald's chapter begins by explaining why the World Bank and 
other aid donors have become more insistent about 'good governance'. 
He questions the internal coherence and universal applicability of 
their assumptions. External support for democracy, for example, may 
contradict external pressure for unpopular economic reforms. Local 
history, conditions, and cultures make imported institutions work in 
unexpected ways. Structures of government in the South Pacific are 
generally democratic, and donors have been more concerned with 
economic performance, and government capacity ( though he notes the 
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Commonwealth pressure on Fiji to reform i ts 1990 constitution). He 
argues from his research in Kiribati against a checklist approach to 
assessing 'good governance' .  Following the World Bank's list of issues 
under the heading of 'governance', he found a high level of 
participation and accountability. Human rights were respected, 
though there were traditional restraints on womens' participation in 
government and politics. Public sector management, however, was 
weak because of a shortage of skills and cultural traditions that 
discouraged individual initiative. The private sector was tiny. 
Politicians were elected for their personal qualities, and a high 
turnover of candidates made them reluctant  to tackle difficult issues. 
He concludes that the democratic character of government in Kiribati, 
combined with local culture and circumstances, made it very difficult 
to develop and implement coherent policies, particularly the economic 
reforms now urged by donors. 
Papua New Guinea had good economic prospects, and sound 
economic policies at Independence. I t  also had a low skilled but 
highly-paid workforce, a large public sector, and a high rate of 
population growth. New mining projects did little more than replace 
the revenue that had been provided by Australian aid and (after 1989) 
the Bougainville mine. Ron May's chapter analyses the political 
reasons behind Papua New Guinea's inability to benefit from its 
natural resources, and its early economic policies. Comparing Papua 
New Guinea with countries in Africa, he blames two forms of 
'corruption' :  the use of state office for private gain; and the transfer of 
resources from the 'civic' to the 'primordial' realm of locality, clan and 
kinship. The latter is expected of politicians, but is also achieved 
directly, when (for example) local landowners exact compensation for 
land needed to provide public services. 
Small Pacific islands have become increasingly dependent on 
migration, remittances and aid to fund the widening gap between 
their imports and exports. Economic restructuring in New Zealand 
and Australia, and political changes in Europe have reduced 
opportunities for migration, reduced the amount of remittances that 
migrants can afford to send home, and reduced the flow of aid, while 
making it more conditional on 'good governance' .  Macpherson and 
Macpherson' s chapter analyses how the government in Samoa, and 
Samoans are responding to the dilemmas posed by these changed 
global conditions. Samoa meets the human rights and multiparty 
criteria of ' good governance',  particularly since universal suffrage was 
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introduced in the early 1990s. However, donors would have been 
concerned about the suspension of the Auditor General, and about the 
mismanagement detailed in his report. There has been suspicion of 
corruption in the sale of passports .  However, the Ministry of Finance 
has 'bit the bullet' in reforming its economic management. 
Individuals and families also face a parallel d ilemma, though some 
still may believe it is only temporary. Scepticism about government 
exhortations may make people reluctant  to make up for lost 
employment opportunities, and remittance income, by expanding or 
diversifying cash crop production. 
Kavanarnur 's chapter asks why countries adopt, and then sustain, 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) .  He does so by systematic 
comparisons of three SAPs adopted by Papua New Guinea in 1981,  
1 990 and 1 994. Each was a response to a balance of payments crisis. In 
1981,  the government reformed itself without going to the IMF, and 
the reforms survived a general election, and change of government in 
1982. In 1990, after the loss of revenue from the Bougainville mine, the 
government borrowed from the World Bank and the IMF. But the 
economy quickly stabilised itself, and the government relaxed the 
restrictions it had imposed on public expenditure, bank lending, and 
wages. It went on to implement measures aimed at encouraging the 
growth of the private sector, including lower taxes, lower minimum 
wages, and higher spending on education and training. Budget 
deficits grew after a general election in 1992, and in 1994 the 
government started to negotiate another SAP with the World Bank, 
IMF and other donors. This time there were protracted negotiations 
over a long list of conditions, including controversial proposals to 
register customary land. Kavanamur concludes from his comparison 
with a list of conditions for SAPs to be sustained, including consensus 
between local officials and ministers on the need for reform, and local 
capacity to design and implement reforms. He is concerned that the 
public service has become less competent and able to withstand 
political pressure, while ministers have become preoccupied with re­
election. The self-stabilising character of the PNG economy has also 
reduced pressure for reform. 
The Solomon Islands government has become heayily dependent 
on revenues from the forest industry. However, rates of exploitation 
exceed estimates of what is sustainable, while increased rates of 
exploitation have been accompanied by falls in revenue. International 
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financial institutions, bilateral donors, particularly Australia, and 
domestic and international NGOs have pressed the government to 
reform its forestry policies, so far without success. Tarcisius 
Kubutaulaka's chapter looks at the domestic sources of forestry policy, 
arguing that the state itself is only one of many stakeholders in the 
industry, and it has a limited ability to influence decisions by the 
leaders of local landowners. There are also widespread suspicions that 
government policy has been compromised by bribes to politicians, 
officials, and local leaders. 
Several governments in the region encourage mining and other 
natural resource exploitation in order to fund public expenditure on 
development. The unspoken assumption is that governments are 
capable of applying these funds to development purposes. Burton's 
research finds that provincial and local councils in the Western 
Province of Papua New Guinea were unable to get development value 
from the relatively high level of mining revenues they spent: money 
disappeared into incomplete and unsustainable projects, while health 
indicators-particular female to male survival ratios-remained 
relatively bad, or worsened . Burton distinguishes his micro-level 
approach from the more familiar macro-level accounts of the PNG 
economy, and he indentifies particular ways in which Melanesian 
cultural values may contribute to difficulties in devoting public 
expenditure to development: the process of 'designating' grants and 
handing cheques over in public ceremonies creates an expectation that 
the money will be handed to fund local projects rather than provincial 
services; and people that give grants are traditionally reluctant to 
make demands, such as accountability, on the receivers. 
Gordon Nanau's criticism of the system of decentralisation in 
Solomon Islands is based on research he carried out in two provinces. 
He sets out the arguments commonly made for decentralisation, and 
its links to ideas about democracy and development. He describes the 
succession of a ttempts to devise a system of decentralised government 
in Solomon Islands, under the colonial government, shortly after 
Independence, and most recently under the Provincial Government Act 
1996 (which has come under consti tutional challenge). His research 
found a lack of transparency and accountability in provincial 
government decision-making, inactive area councils, suspicion of 
people from other provinces, and resentment at the basis of allocating 
government grants according to population. Yet he is critical of the 
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reforms proposed in 1996, citing an absence of accountability at 
provincial level, lack of provision for election at local level, and the 
likely exclusion of women. 
Henry Ivarature describes the political crisis that unfolded in 
Papua New Guinea after the government was revealed to have made 
contract with foreign mercenaries to defeat the Bougainville rebellion. 
The whistle was blown by the commander of the PNG Defence Force, 
who had been involved in the negotiations. Pressure from the army, 
parliament and popular demonstrations eventually forced the Prime 
Minister to 'step aside' while a Commission of Inquiry investigated 
how the contract had been made. The process seems to have been 
reckless and secretive. It was driven by ministers with the 
acquiescence of senior officials. Ways were found to avoid normal 
requirements to put projects out to tender, or to get prior 
parliamentary approval for expenditure. There were suspicions of 
corruption. The consequences, according to Ivarature, include a 
divided and demoralised army. The events also showed the PNG 
government's vulnerability to political pressure from Australia, from 
international financial institutions, and from popular demonstrations 
organised by non-government organisations. 
Dinnen's chapter deals with the pervasive breakdown of law and 
order in Papua New Guinea, and hence the role of the state in 
providing, or frustrating, 'good governance' .  He starts from the 
manifest failure of existing police responses-curfews, raids on 
villages and settlements, and the use of elite forces. Such increasingly 
intensive policing has only produced more violent responses. The state 
has become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution, and 
reformers are increasingly turning to community based, non­
government organisations to sustain law and order. Dinnen's 
argument turns on a distinction between retributive justice, which 
seeks blame and punishment, and restorative justice, which is more 
concerned with restoring victims, and offenders, to where they were 
before the offence took place. It includes, for example, making amends 
to victims, and reintegration of offenders into society. Dinnen 
describes the results of his own research into the mass surrenders of 
self-professed criminals in Papua New Guinea, and so-called 'gang 
retreats' involving dialogue between gangs and national leaders. 
Though limited to offenders, rather than victims, they provide exits 
from crime, and demonstrate the possibilities, and limits, of non-state 
approaches to good governance. 
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Orovu Sepoe's chapter is concerned with the role of women in two 
levels of politics, elite and grassroots, and at the relationship between 
the two. She finds women severely underrepresented in the legislature 
and public service, and national poli tics to be oblivious of issues of 
concern to women, such as family and reproductive health. She writes 
as an advocate as well as an analyst, urging the educated women who 
have been lobbying for greater national representation to embrace 
community politics. Community politics is open to the majority of 
women, and can be empowering in itself. The two levels are not 
inconsistent. National politics can provide resources and legal 
protection for local organising, while community politics provides a 
means for women's concerns to be brought into national and 
international focus. 
Asafou So' o documents the formal and public way in which 
candidates have in the past d istributed food and cash in order to get 
elected, and re-elected in Samoa. He studied a candidate who first 
won in 1982. To ensure re-election in 1985, the candidate d istributed 
salt beef, tin fish, cattle and cash publicly and equally to the councils 
of the six villages in his constituency. So'o estimates the total cost at 
about WS$16,000, or seven times the average wage. The money came 
from the candidate's salary as a member of parliament, and earnings 
from his stores. On election day he had to pay for his supporters' 
transport, accommodation and food. Afterwards he had to pay the 
members of his organising committees. These expenses amounted to 
another WS$15,000, on top of the WS$16,000 distributed on one day 
among the six villages. And as a member of parliament he faced 
continuing requests for loans, money for constituents to pay school 
fees, and contributions to repairs on churches. When Samoa adopted 
universal suffrage, the expenses increased as other village 
organisations than the council expected to receive gifts directly. So' o 
finds the impact of these payments complex. People decide between 
candidates on the basis of their efforts, and personal relationships with 
voters, rather than on issues and party membership. Increased 
competition for votes has weakened the influence of village councils, 
and forced candidates to take into account popular opinion. However, 
having spent  their own money to get elected, the successful candidates 
then feel justified in making their own decisions about which party, 
and prime ministerial candidate, to support in parliament. 
The media are often celebrated as instruments of accountability, 
and a free press taken as a sign of 'good governance'. Rosaleen Smyth 
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takes this argument further, showing how traditional diplomatic 
exchanges between governments are being supplemented by each 
side's attempts to influence the other indirectly, through the media in 
the other 's country. Both her examples refer to the issue of 'good 
governance', and to the role of the media in achieving, or (depending 
on your point of view) derailing it .  In the first part of the chapter, she 
describes how the Australian government has sought to influence 
public opinion in the Pacific islands, and how the PNG government 
has used media to attract sympathy among Australian elites, as well as 
its own domestic opinion. In the second part she describes the almost 
' text book' way in which student activists in Papua New Guinea used 
the media to mobilise domestic, and international opinion, to stall one 
part of the structural adjustment programme the PNG government 
was negotia'ting with the World Bank. In addi tion to newspapers, 
including the increasing government use of paid advertisements, 
Smyth notes the growing uses of electronic mail and the internet to 
mobilise international opinion. Cyberspace has become a medium of 
global governance. 
Concl usions 
These chapters are based on research originally carried out for 
different unrelated purposes. Nevertheless, some common themes 
recur, and come into focus through comparison. What can be learned 
by sifting through these cases? 
Decentralisation 
Burton and Nanau paint alarming pictures of the poor performance of 
the provincial governments they studied. In both countries, 
governments have since introduced reforms that aim to bypass the 
provincial level, and so central governments deal directly with local 
bodies. But there is little reason to believe, from Nanau's account, that 
such bodies would be more transparent, accountable, suspicious of 
outsiders, and resentful of the basis on which grants are allocated. 
There is also li ttle reason to think that  pressures that Burton describes 
acting at a provincial level to divert money into a myriad of 
unsustainable 'proje�ts' would be any less at local level. 
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Use of resource revenues 
The chapters by May and Burton, which deal with mining revenue, 
and Kubutaulaka, on forestry, cast doubt on the strategy of using 
natural resource revenues to fund provincial and local development. 
Kubutaulaka finds the Solomon Islands government increasingly 
incapable of capturing revenues, which go directly to politicians, to 
local leaders, or foreign timber companies. The development impact is 
thus entirely private, local, or offshore. Burton finds the provincial 
government unable to apply relatively large grants it  gets to 
infrastructure, public health, or sustainable local economic activity. 
Cultural explanations 
Macdonald finds cultural traditions in Kiribati restraining individual 
initiative, and making it  difficult for managers to correct subordinates. 
Burton offers ingenious cultural explanations for fractioning of the 
provincial budget into grants for particular places and purposes, and 
the reluctance of central government to enforce conditions. 
Absence of women 
Several chapters note the exclusion of women from elected office. 
Nanau is concerned that further decentralisation will exclude women 
from local level bodies. Sepoe' s chapter urges a turn to community 
politics which addresses issues of concern to ordinary women. Burton 
shows chillingly how the manner in which money is budgeted in 
Western Province has led to a deterioration in health services which in 
turn means women are less likely to survive than men. 
Local ism 
The chapters show strong local pressures on MPs in general, and 
ministers in particular. The pressure is enforced by a high turnover of 
candidates in elections. May distinguishes these pressures from the 
strictly corrupt use of public office for private gain. The public, formal 
payments made by candidates to village committees in Samoa, for 
example, are different from bribes to ministers though the expenses of 
re-election may make ministers more vulnerable to corruption once 
they are in office. Burton shows how intense localism prevents the 
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supply of 'public goods' like roads, and health, in favour of small 
projects that fizzle out. Macdonald describes how such electoral 
pressure makes ministers in Kiribati reluctant to tackle difficul t  issues, 
though So' o finds, paradoxically, that MPs in Samoa feel that having 
paid for their election, they are justified in making their own decisions 
about which party or policies they should support. 
T he role of the state 
Writing about 'governance' tends to move the state away from the 
centre of its analysis, in favour of markets and communities. Public 
sector reform in the South Pacific is sceptical of the role of the state, 
and seeks to reduce the size of the public sector. The chapters tha t  
follow are divided about the possibility and desirability o f  state action. 
Macdonald describes the strong influence of local non-state 
institutions, l ike the churches and tradi tional leaders, on governance 
in Kiribati. For Kubutaulaka the state is only one actor, and not 
necessarily a strong one, in forestry management. Sepoe urges elite 
women to make a political choice in favour of non-state institutions. 
Smyth notes the power of student activism, and the media. Dinnen's 
chapter paints an optimistic p icture of institutional innovation outside 
government, which provide mass exits from crime. 
While some of these chapters simply describe weaknesses of the 
state, others reject the state for reasons of analysis (Kubutaulaka) or 
political choice (Sepoe). But other authors are more reluctant to 
abandon the idea of the state. May and Burton both regret the absence 
of commitment to the idea of an impartial state, resisting local 
pressures on behalf of a broader 'public' or 'national' interest. 
Ivarature also seems less willing to give up on the s tate. His concerns 
with the consequences of the Sandline affair include its effects on the 
morale and coherence of the army, a core state institution, and concern 
at how easy it  was mobilise a crowd against public institutions. 
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'Good' governance and Pacific is land 
states 
Barrie Macdonald 
The emergence of the good governance agenda in the early 1990s did 
not have a single point of origin. Within the World Bank, for example, 
there was concern over the high failure rate of projects and 
restructuring initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa and, in particular, over 
the unwillingness of private investors to become involved even in 
those developing countries that were implementing market-driven 
policies and addressing the problems of debt (World Bank 1989). The 
Bank identified failures of governance as a decisive barrier to 
sustainable economic policies, and drew particular attention to 
authoritarian regimes, corruption, and abuses of human rights as 
undermining the prospects for both the introduction of (or a return to) 
participatory democracy, and the formulation and implementation of 
sound policies for economic restructuring and growth. 
Advocacy of good governance by major donors like the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Japan, also dates from the early 1990s, 
but has broader origins. In part, i t  can be related to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War. With the ending of Cold 
War competition over aid distribution and the need for investment in 
Eastern Europe (a higher priority than Sub-Saharan Africa in both 
economic and security terms), the principles of aid distribution were 
re-examined. Western donors moved to place less emphasis on 
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political expediency and security imperatives in the allocation of 
overseas development assistance and, at the same time, gave a lower 
priority to military assistance and the purchase of arms (Economist, 10  
December 1 994; Moore 1993a) . 
Although this 'good governance agenda', as it has become known, 
has been widely debated in the development literature, and has 
become implicit in the aid policies of bilateral donors and 
international agencies, it has had only limited impact on relations 
between donor and recipient nations in Oceania. The major aid donors 
for the region have begun to focus on 'governance', with a number of 
explicit programs in this area with, for example, emphasis being given 
to improvements in public sector management and the judicial 
process, promotion of the rights of women and the development of 
civil society, especially through an enhancement of the role of non­
government organisations. Moreover, the element of specific 
conditionality which became a feature of Western aid programs in 
Africa from the late 1980s has assumed greater prominence. 
The development of a good governance emphasis in aid 
relationships has not featured prominently in the academic literature 
on Pacific Islands development. Although the issue has surfaced from 
time to time in the examination of postcolonial politics, it has seldom 
done so in a manner that engages the broader debate (see, for 
example, Lal and Nelson 1995). This chapter will examine and 
question some of the major assumptions underlying the good 
governance agenda, consider the applicability and increasing applica­
tion of governance criteria to the countries of Oceania, and explore an 
alternative approach that might introduce greater sensitivity and 
effectiveness into the relationship between donor and recipient. 
The emergence of the 'good governance' agenda 
A 1989 World Bank assessment of development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is now seen as a founding landmark on governance issues, and 
precursor to major changes in policy emphasis by OECD governments 
(Leftwich 1993:610; Moore 1993c; Barya 1993: 18) .  Although the World 
Bank is prevented by its Charter from political involvement, and it has 
not explicitly addressed the nature of individual political regimes in 
its reports, its s tance on governance is implicitly concerned with the 
political nature of a government, as well as their capacity to formulate 
and implement 'sound' economic policies and to manage both the 
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country 's resources and any aid funds provided. As a consequence, 
the Bank has taken a leading role in promoting discussion and 
defining the terms of the debate (World Bank 1991, 1992, 1993; see also 
Goetz and O'Brien 1995; Stevens and Gnanaselvam 1995) . 
The World Bank defines governance as ' the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and 
social resources' (World Bank 1992: 1 ) .  More specifically, the Bank has 
identified three key areas of concern 
• the form of political regime 
• the process by which authority is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources 
• the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and 
implement policies and discharge functions (World Bank 
1992:58) .  
In a series of World Bank reports, and in policy statements from 
OECD governments, the characteristics of ' good governance' or 'good 
government' have been more clearly identified as 
• the legitimacy of government as reflected in multi-party 
participatory democracy 
• the rule of law 
• protection of human rights 
• transparency and accountability of government process 
• the expansion of civil society, effective and efficient public 
sector management. 
Underpinning all of these themes is an assumption that democratic 
political process is not only a desirable end in itself but is the key to 
good governance and, in tum, to economic development and social 
justice. As a corollary, the World Bank and other agencies have 
invoked good governance criteria in decision-making and, both 
explicitly and implicitly, have introduced a new form of political 
conditionality into donor-recipient relations, especially when major 
economic restructuring is planned. 
Faced with changing security requirements, and public 
disenchantment over the allocation of development assistance to 
demonstrably corrupt and oppressive regimes, Western leaders were 
quick to review and redefine national positions (Moore 1993c; 
Johnstone 1995:5-6). For Western governments in a post-Cold War 
world, it was necessary to define a new philosophy and moral 
rationale for the provision of development assistance to the Third 
World (Lancaster 1993: 14) .  That moral dimension, which can be traced 
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even further back to the efforts of President Carter in the mid-1970s, is 
important for the electoral accep tance of overseas development 
assistance. In a climate of economic restraint at home, public 
endorsement of development assistance was less easily obtained by 
governments which, none the less, have to maintain an international 
stance that serves national economic, strategic and political interests. 
In some respects the new orthodoxy turns on its head earlier 
development theories that assumed that stable democracy could only 
be established on a foundation of economic development and national 
civil institutions and values. According to this view, economic 
development and democratisation might well prove incompatible, in 
which case democratisation must necessarily be subord inated to 
economic liberalisation and structural adjustment (Monshipouri 1995). 
As Leftwich has observed, what was new about the good governance 
agenda was ' the proposi tion that democracy is a necessary prior or 
parallel condition of development, not an outcome of it' (Leftwich 
1993:605) .  While the World Bank's charter precludes its direct 
involvement in political issues, its governance polices are predicated 
on a free market economy as a precondition not only for economic 
development but as an integral component of the broader governance 
agenda. This agenda has also taken on a wider currency, with some 
attempt to argue for the application of governance principles to the 
international order (Held 1995) and for a greater role for non­
government organisations (Gordeneker and Weiss 1995). non­
government organisations are also acquiring greater significance 
because they are seen to reflect institutional pluralism and to develop 
civil society, both of which, because of their capacity to act as a 
restraint on government, are integral to the broader governance 
agenda (White 1995:33-4; Robinson 1995) .  
Other explanations for donor advocacy of  good governance have 
also had some credence and should at least be considered . Among 
recipients, there is a suspicion that the good governance agenda has a 
sub-text of a reduction in aid flows to the Third World, partly because 
of the conflicting demands for investment in Eastern Europe, partly to 
reduce aid flows overall. The notion of 'good' governance also 
suggests a judgemental approach, a return to the d istinctions between 
deserving and undeserving poor and, perhaps, an attempt to impose 
neocolonial controls. 
It has also been suggested that  the World Bank turned the spotlight 
on to governance issues as least partly to emphasise the difficulties of 
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project implementation-because of a lack of capacity in recipient 
countries and the constrain ts imposed by corrupt and authoritarian 
regimes. The Bank's stance, which suggests that poor governance is a 
major cause of economic failure, can also be interpreted as an attempt 
to allay concerns that poor development performance might be caused 
by fundamental flaws in the economic policies advocated by the Bank 
itself. Is it an attempt by the World Bank to shift the blame for a 
generation of economic failure in Africa and parts of Asia? 
Some would go further and argue that, following the collapse of 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, there was an underlying 
agenda not only 'to crush once and for all the ideology of socialism 
and to replace it  unambiguously with the ideology of free enterprise 
worldwide', but that good governance is the means by which Western 
hegemony might be implemented and justified (Barya 1993: 16) .  The 
existence of such a conspiracy has yet to be proven. It might be 
questioned even if only because Western or capitalist governments 
have seldom demonstrated the capacity to define and pursue such a 
common cause. Nevertheless, it is the case that the political conditions 
attaching to aid have shifted significantly in the 1990s. 
What is noticeable about the current trend is its widespread 
acceptance among donors, and the consistency of approach . Although 
the Cold War had a major effect on aid distribution in the developing 
world, it is also the case that issues now identified as integral to the 
agenda were formerly integral to the decolonisation process adopted 
by most of the Western powers. Constitution-making from the 
independence of India onwards was based on metropolitan models 
and assumed a broad-based franchise and political freedoms. New 
states, by joining the United Nations, accepted the Human Rights 
provisions of its Charter. This, too, raises interesting issues concerning 
the ex tent to which good governance represents a new initiative or, 
rather, a return to earlier principles that were, to some extent, set aside 
by the imperatives of the Cold War. Even before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the international sanctions applied to South Africa 
implied a tougher mood by developing countries as well as by major 
Western donors. Here, the strength of African opinion was a critical 
factor; that opinion, reluctant to criticise one of its own as in the case 
of Uganda in the 1970s, has now moved to a new phase with its 
condemnation of human rights abuses in Nigeria. 
The recent emphasis on good governance also represents a further 
stage in the long-running debate on the role of the state in economic 
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growth. The new orthodoxy would have the state providing a market­
friendly environment. The good governance agenda presupposes that 
representative democracy will encourage the growth of a market 
economy while providing accountable government. In adopting the 
tenet that good government is by definition democratic and the only 
path to economic growth, governance proponents are rejecting the 
statist argument that democracy does not necessarily provide the 
discipline necessary to promote economic development and alleviate 
poverty. In this regard, they are also rejecting the empirical evidence of 
the industrialising states of East and Southeast Asia (Leftwich 1993; 
White 1 995). Beyond that, they are also endorsing the cultural bias of a 
program that is predicated on economic models that have worked 
only imperfectly in the Western economies that gave rise to them. 
The interrelationship of economic liberalisation and 
democratisation in generating good governance is asserted, but is by 
no means proven. Implicit here is the expectation that good 
governance will make the targeted developing countries more like 
their donors in political structure and economic structure and 
direction. Quite aside from the questions that might be raised by poor 
economic performance in some of the donor cquntries, the issue of the 
relationship between politico-economic models and national cultures 
is given scant recognition. 
Governance and cond itional ity 
Leverage exercised by donors has long been a feature of aid 
relationships whether expressed in the exclusion of a rival power, 
access to primary resources, or international alignment. Generally, the 
benefit of such conditionality accrued to the donor; under the 
governance agenda, however, it is argued that there might be long­
term advantage to the donor(s) ( 'more like us'), but that the major 
beneficiaries of the leverage would be the people, rather than the 
government, of the recipient country. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
then, the World Bank and similar agencies introduced economic 
conditionality as part of 'adjustment' packages that bailed out the 
economic disasters of the developing world. Under that strategy, 
as the price required for despera tely needed a id, African governments 
have been obliged to submit to conditions which effectively remove 
their capacity to manage their own economies. The basic ingred ients 
a re fami l iar  enough: currency devaluation, cuts in government 
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spend ing, including the red uction of state employment and the 
remova l of subsidies, priva tisation of parasta ta l corpora tions, and so 
forth (Clapham 1 993:431) .  
External pressure for reform implies conditionali ty, however it is 
presented, and engenders resentment of, and resistance to, pressure 
that is interpreted as being neocolonial in its intent and politically 
subversive in its effect (at least for the government in power) (Burnell 
1994; Robinson 1993) .  Inevitably, conditionality is seen as an implicit 
attack on sovereignty and as a mechanism for neocolonial control. The 
effectiveness of the conditionality approach, however it is packaged, 
can also be questioned. While there is some evidence that 
conditionality may have some impact in the short term, it is of little 
lasting benefit unless there is united pressure from donors over a 
sustained period-a condition that may be undermined because other 
political or economic factors may weaken donor resolve. Why should 
the Pacific experience differ from that of Africa? There, as Clapham 
noted 
the actua l  effect of external ly imposed economic reforms is nonetheless 
cri tica lly influenced by the government that  is responsible for 
implementing them. Many regimes have understandably committed 
themselves to reform in principle, in order to gain access to the 
structura l adj ustment loans tha t  accompany i t, whi le doing their best 
to avoid implementing the reforms with the rigour tha t would be 
needed to make them effective. Wherever possible, understandably 
aga in, governing groups will try to manage the domestic pol i tics of 
structu ral adjustment in such a way as to protect their own interests, 
while ascribing the blame to external financia l  insti tutional institutions 
(Clapham 1993:431) .  
On the broader international scene, the somewhat crude imposition 
of political conditionali ty seen in the early 1990s has 'given way to a 
range of interventions in which sanctions have been replaced by 
positive aid measures and less threatening inducements to political 
and administrative reform' (Robinson 1995), but the intent and effect 
remain largely unchanged. 
There is a degree of incompatibility between the pressure for 
economic restructuring and the encouragement of democratisation. To 
be sustainable in the longer term, reform measures must be accepted 
and promoted by a government that must seek re-election. As Barya 
has noted : ' [F] reedom and liberalisation from autocratic rule as well as 
democracy and accountability cannot be decreed.  They must have a 
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social basis in which they arise, are nurtured and sustained'(1993 : 17) .  
Market-driven economic 'reforms' which impact on the poor will be 
unpopular both with the victims of change and a government that  
must face its voters. Conditionality may force the hand of  government 
in the short term, but without deep-rooted public support it will not 
necessarily generate long-term, sustainable reform. Indeed, the 
benefits of externally generated change may be 'captured' by elites or 
interest groups which, as a consequence, may then stand in the way of 
further change. Policies which encourage participation and the 
development of private organisations may inhibit the impetus for 
reform if the proposed measures are not fully understood by the 
electorate and the necessity for it broadly accepted. 
The World Bank's view of the responsibility of governments to 
maintain a market-friendly economic environment has not passed 
unchallenged. Political scientists, in particular, have remained 
suspicious of neoclassical economics and have generally argued that 
the state itself is a significant player in economic development.  The 
World Bank approach, emphasising that the failure of adjustment 
packages lies in deficient governance and fettered markets rather than 
its own p olicies, has yet to address the claim that 
no examples of good or susta ined growth in the develop ing world 
have occurred under condit ions of uncompromising economic 
liberal ism, w hether democra tic or not. From Costa Rica to China and 
from Botswana to Thai land, the state has p layed an active part in 
infl uencing economic behaviour and has often had a significant  
materia l stake in the economy i tself (Leftwich 1 993:613). 
Much of the debate is based on claims that it is ei ther the role of the 
state, or free-market economics that makes a d ifference. But does it 
have to be one or the other? A recent analysis of Asian economies by 
Clark and Chan suggests that neither approach-alone or in 
partnership-can explain the relative success or failure of Asian 
economies over recent decades. Their analysis suggests that 'recourse 
is necessary to additional variables', leading them to a call for 
'bringing society back in' (Clark and Chan 1994:333). This means not 
just social factors in general, but the structure and values of societies 
in particular, because the current World Bank approach takes little 
account of cultural diversity and lacks the subtlety to cope with 
mechanisms for participation and transparency that may not meet 
strict 'democratic' criteria but may work in a specific cultural context. 
Underlying the governance agenda is a Western assumption that the 
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basic principles of good governance are sufficiently universal to be 
universally applicable-an assumption that seems to take little 
account of local circumstances. 
The chal lenge to sovereignty 
At a more fundamental level, too, the exertion of external control over 
a national government seems remarkably at odds with the promotion 
of democratisation, transparency, participation, and accountabili ty. 
Ex ternal demands for human rights, multi-party democracy and 
economic liberalisation creates an artificial electoral contest in which 
the poli tical parties cannot compete for votes on the basis of economic 
policy because that has already been determined by major donors. 
Moreover, a government that endorses an economic package from an 
external agency might undermine its own credibility and lay itself 
open to anti-nationalist charges. 
In effect, the World Bank now seeks to enter into a contract with a 
government in which assistance is conditional on acceptance of a 
given set of policies, a compromise which restricts the options of a 
democratically elected government. In such circumstances, the 
advocacy or effective imposition of 'democratic' or economic reforms 
can be seen as an attack on sovereignty and as an assertion of 
neocolonial control (Hawthorn 1993:26). This raises the broader 
question of the level of justification required for one or more states or, 
indeed, an international agency to seek to exert influence over, or to 
intervene in, the affairs of another. Similarly, it might be argued that 
pressure from the World Bank is not only an infringement of the 
sovereignty of a nation, but that the unstated political agenda denies 
national choice of a political structure and economic policy. The Bank, 
having advocated a particular course of political action, or made such 
a course a condition of aid, remains at arm's length from the 
consequences of such policies (Lancaster 1993: 12) .  
Aside from international disputes where the United Nations has 
endorsed intervention (I do not wish to discuss 'cross border ' disputes 
here) there is no clear definition of when a government has 
irretrievably broken the fundamental compact between the governors 
and the governed through the abrogation of human rights. There is no 
easy definition of the point on the spectrum at which poverty, 
corruption or military dictatorship becomes oppression justifying 
intervention which represents, in effect, conditionality in its most 
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extreme form. Indeed, the ending of the Cold War and Security 
Council deadlocks has opened the way for UN intervention into the 
domestic affairs of member nations. In recent years, that line has also 
effectively been defined through international sanctions imposed on 
South Africa, on Fij i after the 1987 coups or, more recently, in the 
suspension of Nigeria from the British Commonwealth. 
N i geria and the Commonwealth 
The Nigerian case is of relevance here, because the 'Harare 
Commonwealth Declaration' issued by the British Commonwealth 
Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) in 1991 established a clear 
code of practice to which Commonwealth members subscribed. The 
Declaration reaffirmed the Commonwealth as an association of 
independent sovereign states, and the responsibility of each for its 
own policies . It then went on to the affirmation of 'fundamental' 
Commonwealth principles which reaffirmed a commitment to 
democratic process and the rule of law, fundamental human rights, 
equality for women, an end to racism, universal education, sustainable 
development and the alleviation of poverty (including a commitment 
to ' the central role of the market economy'), environmental protection, 
support for small states and the promotion of world peace. 
However, the Harare Declaration did not include any mechanism 
for monitoring standards or for sanctions or any other means of 
enforcement. The deterioration of the political situation in Nigeria in 
the months leading to the Auckland CHOGM in November 1995, and 
the imprisonment of political opponents of the regime, ensured that 
Nigeria would be a major focus of attention despite Australasian 
attempts to give French nuclear testing top billing. Any chance that the 
conference would give strong counsel but take no action disappeared 
when, as the Conference opened, the Nigerian government carried out 
the execution of nine Ogoni activists including writer Ken Saro-Wiwa.  
The Conference was forced to address the issue and suspended 
Nigeria from Commonwealth membership. The sanction of 
Commonwealth suspension, symbolic rather than affecting trade or 
aid, has proved a more powerful weapon than many observers 
expected. 
The same is probably true in the case of Fiji, where the transition 
from constitutional monarchy to republic after the 1987 coups meant  
that Fij i  would have to reapply for membership of  the British 
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Commonwealth .  Knowing that unanimity is necessary on matters of 
membership, and unwilling to face the probability of denial at the 
hands of India, Fij i  chose not to reapply until 1997 when its new 
constitution was in place. Australia and New Zealand, which 
contemplated intervention after the first coup, and were critical of the 
1990 constitution favouring ethnic Fij ians, nonetheless restored full 
diplomatic and military relationships before Fij i's re-entry to the 
Commonwealth. 
Nigeria represented an extreme case, even for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and was essentially challenged on the nature of its political regime 
and the process by which authority was exercised-in essence, the first 
and second areas of governance concern identified by the World Bank 
in 1992. The link to the Pacific was established by the holding of the 
CHOGM meeting in Auckland, the reporting of the Conference in the 
region, and the fact that ten South Pacific Forum members are also 
members of the British Commonwealth. The 1995 CHOGM reaffirmed 
the principles of the Harare Declaration on human rights, political 
issues and sustainable development and, in a more formal way, 
established conditions for Commonwealth membership and 
procedures for dealing with states which broke the fundamental 
principles of Commonwealth membership as defined at Harare.  By 
implication, it  would not only be the extreme cases that might come 
under Commonwealth scrutiny. 
In its handling of the Nigerian case, the Commonwealth is 
following in the path of the policy statements of the OECD leaders and 
the World Bank and, at the same time, continuing the tradition by 
which the Commonwealth handled the South African situation. 
Commonwealth action in both cases has not only taken account of the 
strength of international feeling but also, perhaps, reflects a 
recognition of earlier weakness in tackling the corrupt and dictatorial 
Amin regime in Uganda and the failures of democratic process that 
have been endemic in post-independence Africa. Where the 
governance agenda has moved a stage further is the imposition of 
conditions not merely where the regime is repugnant, but also where 
public sector management or economic policy are held to be 
unsatisfactory. Whereas political and economic conditionality might 
win international support in extreme cases of oppression and human 
rights abuse, its application in other circumstances is open to question 
on grounds of long-term effectiveness as well as principle. If, at the 
end of the day, the good governance agenda is about sustainable 
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economic development and social justice then the short-term, blunt 
instrument approach represented by conditionality seems to have little 
future.  
The World Bank approach implies specified characteristics of good 
governance, leading to a 'report card'  type of assessment which sees 
the potential recipient measured on a check-list of criteria for good 
governance that may produce a description of political and economic 
activity but little more. In the World Bank approach, there is li ttle 
room for an analysis of either cultural values or political process-that 
is, the process that produces the characteristics being described and 
which, in the interests of good government, i t  is desired to change. 
This blinkered view reflects the fact that the debate, such as it  is, has 
largely been conducted among the governments and agencies of the 
OECD with little participation by recipient governments. When the 
logic of the governance agenda may not always be evident to 
recipients, or its impositions represent a threat to those in power, then 
the pursuit of good government will remain largely a coercive process 
with little more than incremental gains to show for the longer term. 
To date, the governance debate (and policy statements from 
donors) has concentrated largely on the defining characteristics of 
good governance and on the difficulties that lie in the way of 
implementing such an agenda, however it is defined.  There have been 
check-lists of good government, but little progress in defining a path 
forward beyond the use of funding pressure to secure reform-an 
approach that requires a unified approach by donors and, in any case, 
tackles problems only when they are of major proportions rather than 
creating foundations that might avoid problems in the future. 
From World Bank policy documents, and donor guidelines, a 
template of good governance characteristics could be defined and 
applied to a given country to produce a measure of good governance 
(Macdonald 1995:23-4) .  The difficulty with this approach is that it is 
overly dependent on the assessment of characteristics in the present 
and takes insufficient account of cultural diversity, historical context, 
local economic circumstances or the dynamics of political process 
(Aberbach and Rockman 1992: 137). A template of this kind helps to 
define what a government is, and how it behaves, and might be used 
to assess the quality of its governance and to give it  a score on a report 
card . What it will almost certainly not explain is how a political 
system actually works. Economic policies or development strategies 
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will be pre-programmed to fail if they do not take sufficient account of 
the local cultural environment and political process. 
All of this suggests that, however well intentioned, the governance 
agenda is methodologically flawed, theoretically inconsistent, and it  
has yet to be seen whether it will  achieve its objectives in the longer 
term. In particular, the dependence on formulaic economic 
prescriptions, the denial of diversity, and the unwillingness to explore 
political process and take account of local history, jeopardise the 
chances of reform through a mechanism that ultimately depends on 
conditionality, however explicitly it is defined.  The examination of 
specific cases from Oceania suggests, rather, that better governance 
and sustainable development may require more patience, and more 
understanding of local circumstances, than aid donors are generally 
prepared to allow. 
Governance i n  Oceania 
The governance debate, which has now been in the international arena 
for nearly a decade, has had a growing effect on the policies of aid 
donors in Oceania though it  has seldom been the subject of explicit 
debate. To date, and with a small number of exceptions, the emphasis 
seems to be upon the 'pre-governance' phase of economic 
conditionality rather than embodying any requirement for political 
reform. For this, there are a number of explanations. Most obviously, 
Pacific islands governments generally have democratic structures 
already (Larmour 1994a) .  Even if democracy might be seen as 
constrained, in Tonga or Fij i  for example, by the standards of Sub­
Saharan Africa there are no authoritarian regimes. Governments win 
or lose elections and there are mechanisms for constitutional change. 
Moreover, most Pacific islands countries retain close links with their 
former colonial powers through aid, immigration, fisheries 
surveillance, military assistance and, in a significant number of cases, 
by formal constitutional ties. To satisfy the United Nations and to meet 
nationalist and regional expectations, the administering powers of 
Oceania facilitated decolonisation through independence settlements 
and aid policies that not only recognised the sovereignty of the newly­
independent or self-governing nations, but dignified their 
independence by aid-granting mechanisms that allowed island 
governments to set priorities (and even, in countries like Papua New 
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Guinea and the Cook Islands, provided budget subventions for 
recurrent expenditure). Here, through the granting of program aid, 
Australia and New Zealand respectively effectively allowed the island 
governments to control their expenditure without the necessity of 
identifying individual projects. 
I t  is also important that in the post-colonial period the Pacific 
islands region has not only been generally politically stable, but 
politically aligned with the region's major aid donors-the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France and, 
more recently, Japan. There is a definable community of interest, and 
common understanding encouraged through regional organisations, 
notably the South Pacific Forum and the South Pacific Commission. It 
might  be argued that this close relationship, and an underlying 
assumption that sufficient aid will be provided for a modest 
improvement of services, insulated Pacific island leaders from some of 
the harsher realities of aid funding and external leverage. There is 
occasional tetchiness, as in the independent fisheries and foreign 
policies pursued by Tonga, Kiribati and Vanuatu in the 1970s and 
1980s, in differing perspectives on the South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone, trade access, or complaints over the priorities and paperwork in 
aid delivery, but these are more like family squabbles than 
fundamental differences of principle. Former colonial powers, now 
major aid donors, have derived generations of commercial and 
strategic advantage from Oceania and, in return, have provided 
national boundaries, immigration opportunities, colonial-based 
administrative systems and, more recently, aid and technical 
assistance-notably in such areas as urban services, educational and 
health support, radio and television broadcasting-that have in many 
ways turned island nations into cultural as well as economic and 
political client states. 
Historical relationships, the small amount of aid required, political 
compliance (even quiescence) in regional and international affairs 
have meant that the region's major aid donors generally helped to 
maintain basic services and improve living standards for the first two 
decades of independence. In more recent times, however, there has 
been a d iscernible decline in social services, a worsening of urban 
living conditions, a substantial decline in the quality of public sector 
management and administration, and a growth in corruption (see, for 
example, World Bank 1996). Examples of the latter are readily found in 
Papua New Guinea, over forestry in Solomon Islands, and over the 
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Bank of Fiji .  Opposition parties complain about the alleged 
mismanagement, dishonesty and partiality of governments and 
ministers but it is worth remembering that oppositions are tolerated, 
opposition groups are heard, and that those who are alleged to abuse 
office have generally been voted into it . What this means, returning to 
the three areas of World Bank concern, is that the form of the political 
regime is unlikely to be the basis of imposed conditions on 
development assistance, and that the process by which authority is 
exercised is likely to attract only limited attention . It is the third area of 
World Bank concern, the capacity of governments to design, formulate 
and implement policies and discharge functions that is attracting 
attention to the current weakness of governance in Oceania. 
This raises the question of whether this weakness of capacity, 
which has been clearly identified by bilateral donors and international 
funding agencies, will become the subject of conditionality in the 
name of good governance, and hence place impediments on the 
freedom of governments to govern and, by implication, extend 
neocolonial control. Philosophically, few would question the right, 
indeed responsibility, of donors to ensure that aid funds are spent for 
the specified purpose and within designated standards of 
effectiveness. Donor governments have an obligation to their own 
citizens to ensure that tax dollars are spent effectively. On the other 
hand, the right of the elected governments of independent and self­
governing states to govern according to electoral mandate is hard to 
challenge. There is an inev itable tension between the two; the 
indications are that  donors are becoming more selective in their 
grants, more insistent on maintaining control, and more inclined to the 
imposition of conditions. The effect of this heightened tension has a 
significance wider than the attachment of conditions to specific 
projects. It raises the question of whether Big Brother, resented but 
tolerated, will return to being the heavy handed paternalist of the 
colonial era. 
The growing interest of donors in the good governance agenda 
(whether defined in those terms or not) can be briefly illustrated. 
Perhaps the most obvious sign of the arrival of conditionality on the 
Pacific islands agenda was at the 1994 South Pacific Forum when 
Gordon Bilney, Australia's Minister of Pacific Islands Affairs, and 
Prime Minister Paul Keating delivered a tough warning to the 
assembled leaders. The main focus was on the sustainable exploitation 
of natural resources by foreign companies, but the context had been 
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set by discussion of poor economic performance over the preceding 
decade and, more specifically, on overlogging and underpayment in 
the forestry industry, low returns from commercial fishing, 
environmental degradation, heavy losses on civil aviation, increasing 
corruption and poor bureaucratic performance. It was made clear that 
Australia's aid to the region would not increase and that priority 
would be given to those governments seen to be addressing structural 
problems. The scene had been set for this approach two months before 
the Forum meeting when Bilney, in a public address, had signalled 
something of a shift from the 'constructive commitment' policy set by 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in 1988. Bilney used World Bank data 
to highlight 'disappointing' economic performance, and concluded 
I n  short, whatever pol icies we've been fol lowing in the South Pacific . .  
. a re demonstrably not working. 
I would contend that the policy frameworks adopted in the region 
have often retarded the prospects for long-term sustainable growth. 
No a mount of regional  and international assistance will b ring about 
susta inable development in the South Pacific  unless the countries of 
the region themselves p lay the leading role through the adoption of 
such national  policies, including public sector reform and private 
sector development. . .  
Island countries may need to ask themselves . . .  whether some old 
social  and economic habits and a ttitudes might need to be adapted, or 
even abandoned, i f  posi tive and beneficia l  change is to be secured and 
longer term socia l  and economic aspirations met (Bi lney 1994:2-3) .  
It was at the Forum meeting that the Australian government went 
the additional step of indicating that future funding could depend on 
a willingness to grasp the nettle. The election in 1996 of a Liberal­
National coalition government committed to reducing the budget 
deficit  will almost certainly mean a reduction in the overall aid vote 
and pressure to ensure that aid is 'better spent', which implies more 
rather than less conditionality. A review of aid policies may also 
produce a reordering of priorities (Callick 1996a). 
Even at the 1994 Forum, i t  was clear that Papua New Guinea with 
i ts inability to cope with the Bougainville crisis, difficulties over 
forestry policy, widespread urban violence, corruption in government, 
and serious problems in public sector management and administration 
would be the early recipient of outside advice. Already, Australia had 
moved away from the 'program aid' that allowed the government of 
Papua New Guinea wide discretion in the expenditure in the use of 
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Australian aid. The Chan government's floating of the kina saw the 
currency devalued by 40 per cent through international correction; 
inflation was 19 per cent in 1995, and GDP fell by 4 .7 per cent. In 
August 1995, the need to restructure public debt, and negotiate an 
'economic adjustment' package presented the World Bank 
(representing a consortium of the International Monetary Fund, the 
Asian Development Bank, Japan and Australia) with the opportunity 
to address a wide range of issues. The outcome was a classic structural 
adjustment package, with a continuation of annual aid (about 400 
million kina a year, mostly from Australia) and a bail-out allocation of 
some 450 million kina-the latter not predicated on political 
conditionality but certainly carrying conditions in key economic and 
administrative areas. The government was to implement sustainable 
forestry and fisheries management, accelerate the rehabilitation of 
Rabaul, reduce tariffs, promote infrastructural development through a 
shift in the balance of recurrent to capi tal spending in social and rural 
services, allow an enhanced role for non-government organisations, 
and rationalise rural services following the abolition of the provincial 
governments. In April 1996, the World Bank indicated that, unless 
more progress was made in meeting those conditions, the second 
instalment of some 210 mill ion kina might be withheld. The 
government rejected the Bank's approach on two grounds-first, i t  
claimed that  implementation of  the conditions was more advanced 
than the Bank acknowledged; second, that the Bank's approach 
represented an assault on the ' integrity and sovereignty' of Papua 
New Guinea. Sir Julius Chan, then Prime Minister, claimed that  the 
Bank had 'destroyed many countries' (Callick 1996b :24) . It was only 
after a sustained stand off, and Papua New Guinea's revision of its 
1996-97 Budget, that the World Bank indicated its willingness to 
continue to fund the country's economic reform and recovery (Dorney 
1996). 
In recent times, the Cook Islands has staggered from one financial 
crisis to the next .  First there was the I talian hotel venture that has been 
mired for years, then a 'letters of credit' scandal which, together with 
profligate government spending, left the government perilously 
exposed to financial disaster. There also was evidence at New 
Zealand's 'Winebox Inquiry' into tax fraud suggesting the complicity 
of Cook Islands officials and politicians in tax evasion deals. Quite 
aside from all this, the Cook Islands government had been spending 
beyond i ts means for several years and was on the borders of 
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bankruptcy for months. It is some NZ$120-180 million (US$80-120 
million) in debt, has defaulted on the repayment of a loan from Nauru, 
could not pay the interest on international borrowing and, for a time, 
was unable even to pay its own p ublic servants. Early in 1996, the 
public service numbered some 3100, of whom more than a thousand 
filled positions created since Sir Geoffrey Henry became Prime 
Minister in 1989 (Dreaver 1996:21-2). 
The Cook Islands has had to abandon its own currency, and throw 
itself on the mercy of its major donors. The bail-out package, put 
together by the Asian Development Bank, will see the Cook Islands 
civil service reduced by about 60 per cent, and the salaries of the rest 
halved-no one has suggested that this will seriously affect the scope 
or efficiency of civil service activity. The salaries and very generous 
allowances paid to ministers and members of parliament will be 
reduced, many government services will corporatised or sold, and the 
government will be under significant restraint and 'guidance' in 
managing its affairs. After some initial rumblings, Sir Geoffrey Henry 
remains in office having refused to test his position by calling a 
general election. New Zealand has taken a low profile in the 
restructuring, leaving the Asian Development Bank to make most of 
the running, but, like Australia with Papua New Guinea, it  has moved 
from program aid to project funding and, in reaffirming its usual aid 
allocation resisted demands from its own politicians to cut aid unless 
the Cook Islands government cooperate with the Winebox Inquiry. 
In the cases of both Papua New Guinea and the Cook Islands, there 
is no doubt that impediments have been placed on the power of 
elected governments to manage their own economies and to propose 
economic policies that differ significantly from those imposed from 
outside.  In both of these cases, the failings of the government are in 
the area of capacity, and the failure is bringing with it conditionality 
imposed by international agencies. This amounts to a constraint on 
sovereignty, and it  is no less neocolonial by virtue of being imposed by 
an agency than by a bilateral donor. This raises the question of 
whether economic weakness can remain a national responsibility 
when the means of overcoming it require not only national 
commitment and political will but substantial resources from outside. 
For donors, there is the question of maintaining accountability while 
meeting the broader objectives of overseas development assistance. 
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We might also consider the case of Solomon Islands, where under 
the Mamaloni government there was an acceleration of export logging 
and allegations that ministers and senior public servants are involved 
in corrupt relationships with foreign logging interests. Logging 
exports were running at 850,000 cubic metres a year, well above the 
sustainable yield which is now estimated to have fallen to 275,000 
cubic metres per year (Pacific Report, 23 October 1995; 20 November 
1995). The government has allowed tax discounts to some exporters, 
including a company associated with the Prime Minister. Australia, 
ci ting the Solomon Islands government's failure to establish a sound 
forestry policy leading to a sustainable industry, has withdrawn a 
A$2. l million forestry aid project (Pacific Report, 22 January 1996) . 
The cases of Papua New Guinea and Cook Islands demonstrate the 
importance of a crisis in allowing donors to maximise leverage. Both 
countries faced the combined pressure of creditors and donors giving 
them little choice in acceding to donor conditions. In the case of Cook 
Islands more than Papua New Guinea, the recent crisis has led to a 
public appreciation of the issues involved and of the necessity for 
reform. It may also have generated acceptance that the ways of the 
past cannot be the ways of the fu ture; the opportunities created for the 
private sector, in particular will create a future discipline for the 
government. In the case of Papua New Guinea, the potential for 
overseas earnings from mining and forestry, in particular, will weaken 
donor conditionality once the immediate crisis has passed. Solomon 
Islands, though suffering from unstable governments and weak public 
sector management, is generating high revenues from forestry exports 
and is unlikely to face a similar financial crisis until available forestry 
resources are exhausted, perhaps within a decade. Internal recognition 
of crisis or near crisis, as in Fij i  after the coups, can also provide the 
political will and public acceptance needed for a program of economic 
reform (Akram-Lodhi 1 996) .  This all suggests that the implementation 
of the good governance agenda, however well-intentioned, may well 
depend on a further worsening of economic conditions, living 
standards and failings of civil society before the conditions will exist 
to make possible the exertion of sufficient leverage to ensure the 
acceptance of good governance provision as the condition for 
development assistance. It also suggests that a longer term view that 
depends less on a formulaic approach to economic development, and 
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more on a recognition of local circumstances and cultures, may offer a 
better chance of achieving the good governance agenda .  
An alternative approac h :  the case of Kiri bati 
If the primary concern of donors about the Pacific islands is not so 
much the form of political regimes as the failure to expand civil 
society, secure economic growth and develop sound public sector 
managemen t, there is li ttle evidence to suggest that conditionality will 
succeed where the efforts of national governments have failed . Indeed, 
some recent research along these l ines using the Republic of Kiribati as 
a case study suggests that the twin goals of participatory democracy 
and economic liberalisation may be in conflict with one another-not 
just as a matter of short-term priorities but at a more fundamental 
level. 
In a project funded by British Aid, I was invited in mid-1995 to 
undertake a study of governance and political process in Kiribati .  
There was no limitation on the scope of the research, and no restriction 
on publication of the findings (Macdonald 1996). The intention was to 
apply some of the more academic debates to a case study to see how 
far they might be applicable to small Pacific island states. For the 
project, templates on governance and political process were produced 
and used to structure reports on Kiribati's politics, society and the 
economy since independence. The first template explored issues of 
governance as they have been defined by the World Bank. The second 
template focused on the underlying political structure and process and 
sought to explain the nature of government, policy formation and 
administration in Kiribati. The research demonstrated the way in 
which the openness and accountability of political process is 
inextricably tied not only to Kiribati's political experience but to 
fundamental values in I-Kiribati society. The findings suggest that 
fundamental tensions exist between ' the government' and 'the people' 
and that these are both constrained and mediated through the 
electoral process. These tensions, which help to ensure that  the 
government remains responsible, responsive and accountable, also 
create barriers to the formulation and maintenance of long-term 
policies, the reform of public sector management, and the privatisation 
of the economy. 
From a governance perspective, then, Kiribati would score well for 
its participatory democracy and the accountability of i ts government. 
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The constitution of Kiribati, which was prepared with wide public 
consultation, is a blend of Westminster principles and I-Kiribati 
perceptions of the role of governmen t and the appropriate relationship 
between politicians and people. The electoral system is based on 
universal suffrage and broad geographical representation. There are 
high levels of participation in the electoral process though, in practice, 
women play little part in the formal political system. Urban dwellers 
are under-represented on a population basis. Alongside the formal 
constitution and local government structures, the traditional elite of 
elder males still exercises considerable power through informal village 
and island councils . Political parties are emerging but they represent 
coalitions of politicians rather than mass politicisation. There is a 
strong emphasis on accountability and responsiveness to public 
concerns in the electoral system, parliamentary procedures, and in the 
broadcast of parliamentary debates. These principles are being 
reinforced through a constitutional review and wide public 
consultation and discussion. The allegations of ministerial misconduct 
which brought down Teatao Teannaki's government in 1994 proved on 
investigation to be no more than a claiming of expenses for home 
islands visits according to accepted understandings of the schedule of 
allowances if not the letter of the law. A small group of ministers were 
asked to repay sums totalling some A$5,000. 
Human rights are guaranteed by the constitution and are respected 
in practice. Almost all I-Kiribati are Christian and churches play a 
significant role in education which has been universal at primary level 
for generations, thus providing for a high level of literacy. There are 
few specific protections for women's rights, and no formal 
discrimination, but the traditional concentration of power in men's 
hands, and the expectation that  women should adopt a supporting 
role, means that women are under-represented in politics and in 
salaried employment despite making a significant contribution 
through the subsistence economy and domestic responsibilities. While 
I-Kiriba ti leaders might place a priority on the protection of 'custom', 
such de facto discrimination might pose difficulties for donors who see 
improvement of the status of women as a matter of human rights, a 
central governance issue. Inevitably, there has been some tension 
between the two, especially in the area of education policy and the 
allocation of scholarships. 
In the areas of capacity, especially economic policy and public 
sector management, Kiribati would score less well against the World 
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Bank criteria. The public sector is small in absolute terms but large as a 
proportion of the economy and in terms of the work to be done. Public 
sector management is weak because of serious skill shortages, 
especially in financial areas, and cultural restraints on management. It 
is difficult, for example, for an I-Kiribati to ask a subordinate more 
than once to complete some task, to ask if it has been done, or to 
cri ticise if it has not been done. These difficulties also limit the 
effectiveness of the audit process.  Public preference and government 
policy stand in the way of further privatisation of the economy and 
major public service reform. It follows that the capacity to formulate 
and implement policy is limited, and that there are delays in response 
at all levels of the Public Service. There is more a sense of minimal 
compliance than of public service; although the situation is changing, 
especially for young graduates; however, most individuals are 
reluctant to seek responsibility or to exercise it for fear of being 
thought 'shiny', and being seen as regarding themselves as 'above' 
their fellow-workers. 
In the past decade, Kiribati has experienced little economic growth. 
In real terms, per capita incomes and standards of living have steadily 
eroded over the past decade . Overall GDP growth was only 1 per cent 
per annum between 1984 and 1993 which has meant a decline in real 
per capita terms of almost 2.5 per cent per annum. With the impact of 
earnings from the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (invested 
revenues from the now defunct phosphate mine at Banaba) and 
remittances, however, GNP per capita for the same period grew at an 
annual rate of 0.4 per cent (Fairbairn 1992). (More than a thousand 
merchant seamen working overseas account for 10 per cent of wage 
employment; collectively, they remit some A$5 million a year to 
families in Kiribati . )  A 1995 economic review put per capita GNP at 
A$1060 and per capita GDP at A$617, the latter being the lowest 
among the small Pacific islands states. 
All of these factors impose barriers to the achievement of the basic 
macroeconomic goals of improving economic growth, diversifying the 
economy, reducing aid-dependence and improving standards of 
l iving. Kiribati relies heavily on official development assistance, 
mostly for capital investment which is concentrated in the areas of 
infrastructure, administration, health and education. Aid flows 
account for nearly half of GDP. About 25 per cent of the adult 
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population is engaged in some form of cash employment, compared 
with nearly 50 per cent working only in the subsistence sector. 
A feature of the past decade has been the emergence of small 
businesses on South Tarawa. Small village stores and various bus 
operators compete for business and, more recently, there has been a 
strong growth in the local fishing industry. Some of these businesses 
are owned by individuals and some by families. Collective ownership, 
which is rather more in tune with traditional preferences towards 
cooperative economic activity (a particular trait in the southern Gilbert 
Islands), is also present with island associations on South Tarawa and 
both major churches being significant players. At the 1990 census, only 
9 individuals (as distinct from companies or voluntary organisations) 
listed themselves as employers, and most of these would have been 
among the non-I-Kiribati section of the population. These same trends 
towards commercial development are also evident on the outer 
islands, though not to the same extent. Alongside the growing retail 
sector, there are a number of local businesses in construction and 
vehicle maintenance. There is a high casualty rate among these small 
businesses, many of which operate without bothering to secure a 
trading licence from the government. A policy of corporatisation 
(leading to privatisation) introduced by governments in the 1980s and 
early 1990s has been marked by a lack of success with serious 
management and financial difficulties facing several state owned 
enterprises. For political rather than economic reasons, the new 
government elected in 1994 has abandoned this policy, despite the 
concern of donors, and has declared a preference for government­
owned corporations though with an accompanying commitment to 
stronger management and greater efficiency. 
The Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, supported from 
phosphate earnings from 1956 until 1979, is intended to provide funds 
to supplement the budget. Standing at A$68 million just before 
independence, it increased rapidly in the 1980s through a strategy of 
investing for capital growth (in part prompted by the restrictive terms 
of the financial settlement made with the United Kingdom at 
independence) and minimising drawings to support the recurrent 
budget. The value of the fund stood at A$255 million early in 1992 and 
then grew steadily to exceed A$350 million by the end of 1993. 
Reflecting world share market trends, i t  dipped to A$318 million in 
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late in 1994 recovered strongly to have a value of A$360 million at 
June 1995 (Duncan, Larmour and Hunt 1995; Kiribati Government 
1995c) . 
In modern Kiribati, wealth and direct political power is 
concentrated in the hands of the Western-educated politico­
bureaucratic elite which is generally concentrated on South Tarawa. 
Behaviour within this elite, like personal activity and the performance 
of government, is constrained by cultural norms and values which are 
in tegral to I-Kiribati society. In particular, there is an expectation that 
individual interests will be subordinated to those of the family and 
community, and a high value is placed on conformity to community 
norms. Individual displays of wealth, personal aggrandisement, or 
leadership by direction will lead to community censure. 
These values associated with te katei ni Kiriba ti ( the Kiribati way) 
are reinforced informally, and through the formal political process, by 
the un imane (the old men), who have traditionally led I-Kiribati society. 
Informal island councils of uniniane still have significant influence in 
the election of Members of the House of Assembly and the President, 
and remain a powerful  force in local government. Community leaders 
seek to maintain the ultimate control over the shape and direction of a 
central government which is often viewed with some suspicion and 
perceived as having interests and impulses which are fundamentally 
at variance with those of 'the people' .  There is widespread public 
understanding of the political process; moreover, the broadcasting of 
parliamentary debates stimulates public interest and generates a 
widespread understanding of both issues that face the government 
and those that divide the politicians. 
The most fundamental principle of Kiribati elections is that 
politicians are elected on the basis of personal achievements rather 
than as representatives of any party, organisation, policy, class or 
ideology. Political parties may reflect common positions among 
politicians, but they fundamentally exist as creations by and for the 
politicians themselves. The 1994 presidential campaign, which saw a 
commitment to policies to increase the copra price and to abolish some 
school fees, was the first occasion on which such specific policy 
commitments had been made in the course of a presidential election 
and may represent a new phase in I-Kiribati politics. 
Ideally, in I-Kiribati society, leadership is consensual, avoiding 
confrontation or the public criticism or embarrassment of others. 
Leaders should be seen as expressing a community view. Because 
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leadership was tradi tionally exercised by men, women seldom speak 
in public meetings and only three have ever been elected to 
parliament. The absence of a Westminster-style party system forces 
individuals to rely on personal quali ties to secure election and then 
governments are formed by negotiation among politicians. In recent 
elections, however, parties have assumed increasing importance, 
especially in the selection of the candidates for the national 
presidential election by the Members of the House of Assembly. Here, 
a comparison with Solomon Islands is instructive. In both countries, 
party structures are weak, and power lies with politicians who 
negotiate coalitions. In Kiribati, a post-election coalition of interests, 
once negotiated, is expected to retain stable membership and a 
majority until the next election or, in exceptional circumstances, until it 
is defeated on a vote of no confidence . In Solomon Islands, by contrast, 
there may be a constant reshaping of the ministry and the basis of its 
support without reference to the electorate (Steeves 1996). 
In Kiribati, the dependence of individual politicians on a volatile 
electorate-some 45 per cent of politicians have lost their seats at 
recent elections-generates a hesitation about tackling contentious 
issues. This hesitation, together with the absence of a formal party 
structure or any driving principle or ideology within government, 
limits the commitment of governments to policies. There is a more 
common tendency to 'sell' the qualities of the leader and a broad 
approach to government issues (van Trease 1993; Macdonald 1996) . 
Such a socio-poli tical structure poses difficulties for policy 
formation and implementation. The decolonisation and post­
independence years have seen the development and consolidation of 
protocols and structures that reaffirm the constitutional pre-eminence 
of ministers over public servants. Most policy formulation, however, 
involves third parties as well as politicians and their advisers. In 
particular, and to some extent by default, aid donors play a significant 
role in policy formation to the extent that 'ownership' of a given 
initiative, policy, or project may effectively pass to the donors. 
Moreover, the limited policy-formation capacity of the Kiribati 
government, and the requirements and conditions imposed by donors, 
effectively erode I-Kiribati participation and undermine the 
effectiveness of the development process. 
Because Kiribati is composed of scattered coral islands, with small 
populations and minimal resources, government has traditionally had 
a dominant role in the economy and the provision of services. It 
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follows that the public sector is the dominant source of salaried 
employment. As the largest employer within Kiribati, the Public 
Service is perceived as a source of safe employment, an agency for 
wealth distribu tion and, in effect, of welfare prov ision. This 
perception, together with I-Kiriba ti attitudes to employment, 
management and the role of government, and the centralised nature of 
the former colonial regime, have left a powerful heritage in the form of 
a Public Service which is hierarchical, status conscious and tends to 
explore and administer policy initia tives from above (ministers) and 
outside (aid donors) rather than developing alternatives from within. 
Managerial capacity is affected by cultural restraints which make it 
difficult for managers to manage. This factor, together with the 
smallness of the bureaucracy and critical skill shortages, means that 
the government often finds it  difficult to provide service in more than 
a minimal way, and that government-owned 'commercial' activities 
have difficulty in defining strategic objectives, making profits, or 
operating efficiently. 
While land ownership remains largely individual, there are strong 
traditional preferences for cooperative economic activity both on outer 
islands and through island associations and the major churches on 
South Tarawa-the latter providing a mechanism for the development 
of private, but collective, commercial enterprise that is slowly opening 
the way for individual entrepreneurs. Similarly, there is li ttle 
enthusiasm for individual saving despite, or perhaps because of, the 
development of a strong tradition of community savings. There is an 
inevitable tension between external pressure towards the privatisation 
of the economy and I-Kiribati preferences for collective economic 
activity and cultural restraints on individual wealth and 'efficient' 
management. 
Public service reform, l ike a change in the practice of policymaking, 
is inextricably tied to more fundamental issues of political structure 
and process, and to underlying public attitudes towards the nature of 
government, the role of government in the provision of services and as 
an employer, and in the perceptions that 'the people' have of 'the 
government'. A significant factor in the defeat of the Teannaki 
government in 1994 was the widespread belief that its austere 
economic policies had become too 'hard' on the people, and that it had 
ceased to serve their interests. This suggests that, despite the changes 
in form and process that  have occurred since independence, the basic 
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principles remain unchanged as does the public perception of, and 
attitude towards, politicians and the political process. 
While the politico-bureaucratic elite might seem to live in a world 
far removed from that of the majority of the population, and to wield 
power disproportionate to its numbers, there are significant  
mechanisms that maintain accountability. The most important of these 
is the power of the traditional elite, most obviously manifest in the 
power of the un imane, the old men, both in their control of community 
affairs and their role in the electoral process. The smallness of the 
population, the tightly integrated nature of village communities, and 
high levels of literacy are also important in maintaining the 
transparency of the political process and the accountability of those 
who assume public office and enjoy i ts rewards. The personal qualities 
expected in those seeking public office, the expectations that the 
people have of their politicians, cultural restraints on individual 
wealth and asset accumulation, and the inherent suspicion that 'the 
people' have of 'the government', create tensions that are both 
con trolled and mediated through the national electoral process. 
Moreover, these same tensions, that help to ensure that government 
remains responsive and accountable, also create barriers to the 
formulation and maintenance of long-term policies, the reform of 
public sector management, and the privatisation of the economy. In 
this case, at least, the twin pillars of neoclassical economics and 
participatory democracy, which support the World Bank's approach to 
governance, seem to be leaning in opposite directions. 
Conclusions 
These conclusions · have major implications for aid donors and 
development advisers. They suggest that current approaches are 
inadequate because they are based on assumptions formulated outside 
the cultural and political context of Kiribati and take insufficien t 
account of local conditions that make it difficult for I-Kiribati officials 
and ministers to formulate and implement policies that might have 
donor approval under current regimes. Kiribati has open, democratic 
government that, in traditional cultural terms, has strong safeguards 
and mechanisms that ensure that politicians remain accountable. But 
there are difficulties in applying the 'good government' criteria to 
economic policy and public sector management. An understanding of 
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these apparent contrad ictions is crucial to the development process. 
The sense of frustration apparent among aid donors, generated by the 
difficulties of sustained policy implementation and even project 
completion, is understandable but can be explained only partly in 
terms of the limited technical capacity of the Kiribati government to 
sustain major projects. As important, especially in the longer term, is 
the sense that 'ownership' of projects (and even, sometimes, of 
policies) has passed from I-Kiribati to donor interests and that the 
bureaucratic requirements of donors create significant barriers to 
implementation. A stronger donor presence in recipient countries, and 
a willingness to understand local condi tions and values in the 
formulation of policy and the design of projects, seem logical starting 
points for more effective aid deli very and, in the longer term, might 
prove more effective than imposed conditionality. 
These conclusions have broader implications. First, they raise 
fundamental questions over the assumptions that democratic political 
process and improved economic performance are necessarily 
compatible goals. While it  might be demonstrated historically that 
increased economic participation and the encouragement of capi talism 
has usually generated demand for increased political freedoms and 
participation, it can still be argued-at least if East and Southeast 
Asian economies are any guide-that state intervention and some 
restraint on democratic process produce higher levels of growth . This 
is not to advocate one approach or the other, merely to observe that 
the linkages between democratisation and economic development are 
more subtle and more complex than economic models and political 
ideology allow. The second fundamental implication is that the 
formulation and implementation of policy (for economic growth or in 
other areas), in developing countries must take account of social 
foundations and political process . A failure to do so, is likely to be as 
great a cause of under-achievement as the inadequacy of the policy or 
the incapacity of the government to implement it .  I t  is this failure to 
recognise the importance of social foundations and political process 
which undermines local 'ownership' of development initia tives, and 
limits their effectiveness. These factors are as important as weakness 
in the public sector management, the fragmentation of political 
groupings, and the volatility of political life in limi ting the capacity of 
governments to ma�e and implement policy for the medium and 
longer term. 
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Note 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Pacific History 
Association Conference, Hilo, Hawai 'i, in July 1996. I am grateful to 
Peter Larmour and Cluny McPherson for discussion and comments on 
the issues raised. 
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From promise to crisis : a political 
economy of Papua New Guinea 
R.J.  M ay 
The island of New Guinea was one of the last parts of the globe to be 
subjected to European colonisation, 1 and when the eastern half of the 
island became independent as Papua New Guinea, in 1975, the extent 
of colonial penetration remained limited . 
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century there 
was some land alienation and development of European plantations in 
the territories that were to become Papua New Guinea, principally in 
the New Guinea islands (New Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville) 
and along parts of the north and south coast. Much of the commercial 
interaction between Europeans and the Melanesian population, 
however, involved trade: principally the exchange of copra, pearl and 
trochus shell, and bird of paradise skins for European goods. 
Following the First World War there was some further plantation 
development, primarily by big companies, and a system of head taxes 
on Papua New Guineans encouraged them to produce copra and to 
engage in wage labour. In the 1920s, discoveries of gold brought a new 
influx of prospectors and by the early 1930s gold had surpassed copra 
and coconut products as the territories' major export. At the outbreak 
of the Second Worlq War, however, the European presence was still 
largely confined to the New Guinea islands and a thin coastal fringe; 
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the populous highlands, which in the postwar years became the main 
focus of the colonial administration's development efforts and a 
reservoir of labour for coastal plantations, had only recently been 
contacted by miners, missionaries and government officers, and was 
still largely unknown territory to Europeans. 
After World War II the pace of development accelerated. The 
colonial administration was gradually reestablished and extended into 
more remote areas.2 Prewar copra, cocoa and rubber plantations were 
at least partly rehabilitated and new plantations, largely in the hands 
of Australian settlers, were established. Much of the new development 
took place in the highlands, where coffee ( 'brown gold')  was the main 
crop . 
In the new political climate, however, government policy was 
directed more specifically to ensuring that economic development 
benefi ted the Papua New Guinean population. In presenting the Papua 
New Guinea Provisional Administration Bill 1 945, Australia's Minister for 
External Territories told the Australian parliament 
[ t ]his Government is not satisfied that sufficient interest had been 
taken in the Terri tories prior to the Japanese invasion . . .  the 
Government regards it as its bounden d uty to further to the utmost the 
advancement of the natives . . .  In future, the basis for the economy of 
the territory wi l l  be native and European industry w ith the l imit of 
non-native expansion determined by the wel fare of the natives 
general ly (Austra l ia  1 945) . 
Settler plantations, on leased land, were seen in part as a means of 
stimulating Papua New Guinean smallholder cashcropping, and by 
the mid-1960s smallholder production of coffee exceeded plantation 
output. Government expenditures on education, health and physical 
infrastructure expanded markedly, cooperatives and local government 
councils were established, and steps were taken to identify and assist 
Papua New Guinean entrepreneurs. 
In 1950 the first of a series of UN visiting missions came to Papua 
New Guinea to review Australia's performance of its mandate in New 
Guinea. It called for increasing participation of Papua New Guineans 
in the economy and in politics. A Legislative Council was established 
the following year. Shortly after this the Australian government 
commissioned a team from the Australian National University to 
review the development needs of Papua and New Guinea; their report 
recommended that priority be given to the development of 
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smallholder agriculture, the establishment of a road system, and fiscal 
reforms; they also endorsed the administration's policy of limiting 
land alienation (Spate, Belshaw and Swan 1953). 
Development proceeded on a broad front during the 1950s and 
1960s, though there was considerable ambiguity about the objectives 
of Australian policy, with many in Australia and Papua New Guinea 
believing until well into the 1960s that incorporation of Papua New 
Guinea as a seventh state of Australia was a serious option, and that 
economic self-sufficiency must precede political independence (Parker 
1970) .  In 1962 another visiting UN mission criticised Australia for its 
lack of clear forward planning (although an initial five year plan had 
been drawn up the previous year) . Partly in response to this criticism 
the Australian government invited the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to carry out an economic survey of 
the territory, and this was done in 1964 . Another outcome of the 
mission's report was the establishment of the University of Papua 
New Guinea, which commenced teaching in 1966. 
The so-called World Bank report of 1964 (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 1965) became a major focus for 
debate (Curtin 1 968; Coombs 1965; Schaffer 1965) about Papua New 
Guinea's economic future. In essence, it supported a development 
strategy based on maximising the growth of areas of greatest export 
agricultural potential, through the provision of infrastructure, credit 
and extension, and the encouragement of foreign private capital. It 
also urged investment in human capital, and advised that the level of 
government services (which largely reflected Australian standards) be 
geared to local conditions. Little was said about either mining or the 
possibility of industrialisation. 
Although the World Bank report provided a more comprehensive 
review than had been previously attempted, its recommendations 
suggested no real substantive change of direction in existing policy. 
Following the appointment of an Economic Adviser (Bill McCasker) to 
the administration in Port Moresby, in 1967-68 two major economic 
policy papers were produced (Papua New Guinea 1967, 1968, 1971 ) 
which, in effect, sought to provide a basis for implementing the 
administration's economic development strategy in broad conformity 
with the World Bank report. These documents provoked a lively 
debate, particularly among academics in Port Moresby and Canberra, 
progressives within the Reserve Bank of Australia's Papua New 
Guinea Department, and Papua New Guinea's emerging nationalist 
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eli te (Wilson 1968; Curtin 1965, 1968; Crocombe 1968, 1969; Kaputin 
1969; Arnd t, Shand and Fisk 1969; Epstein 1969; Reay 1969) . 
The existence, in the late 1960s, of an articulate nationalist group 
was itself a manifestation of the increasing pace of political 
development.  From the largely administration-dominated Legislative 
Council, Papua New Guinea had progressed to its first national 
elections in 1964 and its second in 1 968. Although the first two 
parliaments continued to be heavily influenced, and sometimes clearly 
dominated, by appointed and elected expatriates, and although a 
sense of national purpose was still embryonic, the lead-up to the 1968 
election saw the emergence of Papua New Guinea's first major 
political party, the Papua and New Guinea Union (PANGU Pati), and 
growing demands for increased Papua New Guinean participation in 
politics and the economy, and for early independence. Expectations of 
political change were further stimulated by the 1969 visit of Australian 
parliamentary opposition leader Gough Whitlam, who promised that 
if elected he would grant Papua New Guinea Independence. By the 
late 1960s, also, construction had commenced on one of the world's 
largest gold and copper mines, at Panguna on Bougainville. Though 
there was opposition from local landowners, the Bougainville mine 
promised to give the young nation a degree of economic security 
substantially greater than was implicit in dependence on export 
agriculture. 
In 1972 Whitlam became Prime Minister in Australia The same 
year Papua New Guinea's third national elections brought to office the 
territory 's first truly Papua New Guinean government, a coalition 
headed by Pangu Pati's Michael Somare. The following year Papua 
New Guinea became self-governing and in September 1975, in the face 
of some opposition from leaders in the more recently-contacted 
highlands (who feared economic and political domination by the 
better educated coastals), it achieved independence. 
Within Papua New Guinea the transition to independence, from 
around 1969 to 1975, was a period of intense debate and, relative to 
the preceding decades, very rapid change. Increasing political 
awareness, and rising levels of education (the University of Papua 
New Guinea produced its first graduates in 1970) was reflected in 
widespread discussion of Papua New Guinea's development options, 
including alternative models of economic development from Tanzania 
and China (Clunies Ross and Langmore 1973; May 1973). Following 
Somare's election in 1 972 as Chief Minister (a position which in 1975 
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translated into Prime Minister) the office of the economic adviser was 
closed and a new Central Planning Office established. The same year a 
team led by Michael Faber from the Overseas Development Group, 
University of East Anglia, was contracted by the IBRD to report on 
development strategies over the next five years. 
The Faber Report (Papua New Guinea 1973) marked a departure 
from the comparative orthodoxy of previous reports . Its opening 
paragraphs stated 
The model of  development proposed, and the balance of development 
strategies recommended wi l l  be seen to be d ifferent from those 
incorporated in the last progra mme of the Papua New Guinea 
administra tion. This should not be regarded as a criticism of the last 
programme so much as a recognition tha t the situation has changed 
profoundly, both economically and politica l ly  . . .  whatever the merits 
of the past programme, the consultants . . .  found tha t the need for a 
marked change in emphasis was now widely recognised by those in 
public l i fe and in  the publ ic service both within the Papua New 
Guinea ad ministra tion and within the Commonwealth government 
(Papua New Guinea 1 973:2). 
As reflected in its recommendations, the main elements of this 
change in emphasis were 
• increased indigenous control of the economy and 
indigenisation of many forms of economic activity (including 
the public service) 
• increases in opportunities for employment, especially 
income-genera ting self-employment 
• emphasis on ' projects and policies that will directly increase 
the incomes of PNG nationals, and of the poorest sections 
amongst PNG nationals' 
• greater emphasis on rural development, including food 
production and the development of urban-centres in the 
countryside 
• a progressive reduction in dependence on aid and, 
ultimately, foreign capital .  
Underscoring the change in emphasis, the authors said: 
'Maximisation of the growth of Papua New Guinea's domestic 
product has not, of itself, been set as a long term objective . . .  we 
believe that the emphasis of the next plan should be on localisation / 
indigenisation, rather than growth'  (Papua New Guinea 1973:4, 1 3) .  
Other recommendations included procedures to  release land for 
development, removal of a wide range of regulations -'imposing 
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western-style standards of design, safety, etc. ' on small scale 
operators;,broadening of the tax base, a 'regional development 
package' (which included strengthening local government and 
cooperatives, decentralization of service centres and development of 
growth points in less developed areas, and the promotion of self-help 
at vil lage level) and a review of the Bougainville mining agreement. 
The Faber Report resonated the predominant nationalist economic 
discourse of Papua New Guinea in the early 1970s. The approach was 
endorsed in late 1972 by the Somare government's eight-point 
'Improvement Program' .  The government's eight aims were 
1 .  a rapid increase in the proportion of the economy under the 
control of Papua New Guinean individuals and groups and 
in the proportion of personal and property income that goes 
to Papua New Guineans 
2.  more equal distribution of economic benefits, including 
movement toward equalisation of incomes among people 
and toward equalisation of services among different areas of 
the country 
3. decentralisation of economic activity, planning and 
government spending, with emphasis on agricultural 
development, village industry, better internal trade, and 
more spending channelled to local and area bodies 
4 .  an emphasis on small scale artisan, service and business 
activity, relying where possible on typical Papua New 
Guinean forms of business activity 
5. a more self-reliant economy, less dependent for its needs on 
imported goods and services and better able to meet the 
needs of its people through local production 
6. an increasing capacity for meeting government spending 
needs from locally raised revenue 
7. a rapid increase in the equal and active participation of 
women in all forms of economic and social activity 
8. government control and involvement in those sectors of the 
economy where control is necessary to achieve the desired 
kind of development. 
The eight aims were subsequently incorporated in the five 
'National Goals and Directive Principles' included in the preamble to 
the Constitution of the independent state in 1975 
1 .  integral human development 
2. equality and participation ( ' . . .  all citizens to have an equal 
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opportunity to participate in, and benefit from the 
development of our country') 
3 .  national sovereignty and self-reliance ( '  . . .  Papua New 
Guinea to be politically and economically independent, and 
our economy basically self-reliant') 
4 .  national resources and environment ( '  . . .  national resources 
and environment to be conserved and used for the collective 
benefit of us all . . .  ') 
5. Papua New Guinean ways ( '  . . .  to achieve development 
primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean forms of 
social, political and economic organization') .  
They also provided the basis for a new economic plan, Strategies for 
Nationhood, published by the Central Planning Office in 1974. 
While the emphasis on localisation, equitable distribution, and 
decentralisation addressed issues of real and practical importance in 
the early 1970s, it also served broader political ends. As one who was 
closely involved in policy development in the early 1970s later 
commented the statement of the eight aims 'was probably the closest 
the ministry came to expressing a general ideological stance . . .  [ though] 
like the Bible, the Eight Aims could be quoted in support of almost 
any proposal' (Lynch 1981 ) .  There was, clearly, an element of 
romanticism in elaboration of the new development strategy, as there 
was in the broader contemporary philosophy of ' the Melanesian Way' 
(Narokobi 1980); and it was frequently observed that the eight aims 
did not provide a specific guide for policy formulation and even 
implied conflicting directions. Moreover, McCasker and others could 
rightly point out that the extent of change in policy objectives was 
often overstated, since issues such as localization, equitable and 
regionally balanced development, and priority to rural development 
had long been recognized in policy documents. 
Nevertheless the strong endorsement of these values in the lead-up 
to independence was important, and the rhetoric was given concrete 
form in a number of new institutional arrangements in the 1970s 
(Gamaut 1981 ;  Downs 1980) .  These included the publication of 
'Investment Guidelines' in 1973 and the creation of a National 
Investment Development Authority (NIDA) to regulate the d irection 
and level of foreign equity investment; the establishment of a Village 
Development Task Force and an Office of Village Development; the 
funding of a Rural Improvement Programme to support development 
initia tives by local government councils; a feasibility study of regional 
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growth centres; the crea tion of a National Cultural Council and 
provision of funding for regional cul tural activities; and the 
promulgation of a Leadership Code and creation of the office of 
Ombudsman. 
Responding to demands by Bougainvillean politicians and the 
advice of the Faber Report, and influenced by the high level of 
Bougainville Copper 's early profits, the government in 1974 
renegotiated the Bougainville mining agreement, securing what was 
generally accepted as a better formula for the government. At the 
same time a Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund was created, to even 
out the impact on the budget of fluctuations in the flow of revenue 
from the mine. 
On independence, then, Papua New Guinea could count, on the 
positive side: a reasonably diversified, and generally healthy, export­
based agricultural industry; one of the world 's largest copper and gold 
mines already in operation, and other mining and petroleum projects 
in prospect; a framework of soundly based policymaking and financial 
institu tions; a healthy subsistence economy; and an ideological 
commitment to an open economy-though with some provisions to 
increase local participation in business-and to policies of inter­
personal and inter-regional equity in the distribution of benefits from 
development. The negotiation of a five-year development assistance 
agreement with Australia also gave the independent government the 
initial security of fa irly generous budgetary support. 
As against this, among a number of negative factors, Papua New 
Guinea inherited a workforce which was, relative to other countries in 
the region, low-skilled and highly paid (making industrialisation a 
difficult development option) (Mannur and Gumoi 1994), a large and 
mostly inexperienced public sector workforce and a level of 
government service provision which could not be sustained without 
external assistance ( in 1975 /6 28 per cent of government income came 
from the Australian aid grant, and in 1976/7  39 per cent), an economy 
heavily dependent on commodity prices over which Papua New 
Guinea had no control, a high population growth rate (around 2.4 per 
cent per annum between 1970 and 1975), and an emerging problem of 
maintaining law and order. 
During the first decade or so of independence, although adversely 
affected by international oil price rises, economic performance was 
generally satisfactory: increases in real GDP were small (averaging 1 .4 
per cent over the period 1976-85) but, except for one year, positive; 
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there was a gradual diminishing of dependence on aid; and, under the 
government's 'hard kina' strategy (Dahanayake 1982; Garnaut and 
Baxter 1983), economic management was sound. In 1982 a second 
large gold and copper mine had come into production at Ok Tedi, and 
further mining and petroleum prospects were being developed or 
investigated at Porgera, Mt Kare, Misima, Lihir, Kutubu and Hides. 
Notwithstanding this, the rate of growth in real GDP declined each 
year from 1987, with negative growth rates in 1989 and 1990 after an 
armed rebellion led by landowners in the Panguna area forced the 
closure of the Bougainville mine. GDP then increased strongly in the 
early 1990s before slumping again in 1994. 
In the period of accelerated development between 1945 and 1975, 
the government sector was a major contributor to growth, particularly 
in promoting agricultural development and small business. In 1974/5 
government spending represented 36  per cent of market GDP and 
public sector employment accounted for 28 per cent of the formal 
workforce. Following independence, government spending was 
sustained at what were, by regional standards, fairly high levels by 
development assistance from Australia, mostly in the form of general 
( 'untied')  budgetary assistance. In the early post-independence years, 
consistent both with the Papua New Guinea government's stated aim 
of self-sufficiency and with the policy of the Australian government, 
the level of development assistance was progressively reduced, falling 
from 39 per cent of government revenue in 1976/7 to 25 per cent in 
1985 and 17 per cent in 1988. This was substantially offset by increases 
in taxation revenues, principally from the Bougainville mine, which in 
1988, before i ts forced closure, contributed around 17 per cent of 
government revenue. 
The closure of the Bougainville mine deprived Papua New Guinea 
of a major source of government revenue and export earnings. 
Nevertheless, government spending continued to rise. Already in 1986 
there were warnings about excessive government spending and of a 
bias to recurrent spending at the expense of main tenance and new 
capital expenditure.  Nevertheless, in many rural areas, from the early 
1980s there was a visible deterioration of roads, schools, aid posts, and 
other capital. The effects of this were often exacerbated by destruction 
of assets as a result of tribal fighting, 'payback' for non-payment of 
demanded compensation, or vandalism. Problems of law and order 
had emerged in the 1970s, but reached new levels in the 1980s; the first 
of several states of emergency was declared in the national capital, 
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Port Moresby, in 1984 and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
(PNGDF) was called in to assist civilian authori ties (May 1993). 
In 1985 following a change of government, which brought 
highlander Paias Wingti to the prime ministership, there was also 
increasing politicisation of the public service. This was underlined by 
the introduction of a Public Services (Managemen t) Act 1986, which 
effectively emasculated the quasi-independent Public Services 
Commission and greatly facilitated the government's control over 
public service matters (Turner 1991 ) .  
As  well as  cutting off revenue from the mine, the Bougainville 
crisis made additional demands on expenditure: defence spending 
rose from K40 million in 1988 to K92 million in 1991 ,  and from 4.3 to 
7.7 per cent of total government expenditure; moreover the defence 
budget was repeatedly overspent (by a massive 81 per cent in 1991 ) .  
Notwithstanding this, in  1993-94 PNGDF aircraft and boats could not 
be used because the PNGDF could not pay for fuel and main tenance. 
With expenditure growing in excess of revenue, government 
borrowing expanded. By 1994 debt repayment and servicing 
represented about one third of government spending and the 
government was facing a fiscal crisis (National Centre for 
Development Studies 1995; AIDAB 1993; AusAID 1996). In March 
1994 the government introduced a -'mini budget' and three months 
later negotiated a loan of US$102 million from a group of overseas 
private lenders based in the Cayman Islands, on the condition that 
interest on and repayment of the loan have first call on mining and 
petroleum revenues which would otherwise be directed to the Mineral 
Resources Stabilisation Fund. By this time the government owed 
substantial amounts to local creditors (including members of the 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force) and i ts international credit rating 
was being downgraded. 
In August 1994 a further change of government brought in a new 
coalition headed by former finance minister and prime minister Sir 
Julius Chan. Within weeks of taking office the Chan government first 
devalued and then floated the kina, but persistent fiscal and foreign 
exchange difficulties forced the government in 1995 to negotiate an 
emergency loan brokered by the World Bank. Popular protest at some 
elements of a structural adjustment package attached to the loan was 
expressed in public demonstrations. The following year a World Bank­
led mission visited Papua New Guinea but after an acrimonious 
exchange with Papua New Guinea officials left without completing 
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consultations, and payment of the second tranche of the loan was 
postponed. 
In 1994 Papua New Guinea's per capita GNP was US$1474, about 
three times the level at independence, placing it amongst the middle 
range of developing countries (above Indonesia and the Philippines) . 
However, on a range of social indicators Papua New Guinea was 
ranked among the lower-income developing countries, and in most 
areas covered by these indicators improvements from 1975 were 
modest. 
Given its fortunate resource endowment, i ts early aspirations, and 
its generally sound beginnings, why has Papua New Guinea's 
economic performance been so disappointing, and what are its 
prospects? 
Before addressing these questions at a broader level it  is necessary 
to make an initial point about the principal economic aggregates. 
Although commodity prices generally improved in the early 1980s, 
low levels of growth in GDP, a steady decline in the real value of 
Australian development assistance, a high population growth rate, 
and high expectations on the part of Papua New Guinea's citizens, 
placed severe strains on government financing. Papua New Guinea's 
second largest gold and copper mine, at Ok Tedi, came into 
production in 1982, but because of tax concessions written into the Ok 
Tedi agreement the mine did not make a direct contribution to public 
revenue until 1987. Soon after this the Bougainville crisis took away 
the revenue from the Bougainville mine and imposed new costs of 
maintaining internal security and providing for restoration and 
rehabilitation. As a result, the additional revenue from Ok Tedi and 
other minerals projects coming on stream in the early 1990s did little 
more than fill the gap created by the loss of revenue from Bougainville 
and the continuing decline, in real terms, of Australian aid. In other 
words, the so-called 'mining boom' was largely illusory; the real effect 
of the boost from new mining and petroleum projects was not so much 
to finance new levels of expenditure as (at least initially) to prevent a 
fiscal collapse. 
However, the failure of successive governments to deal effectively 
with an emerging fiscal crisis reflects more systemic factors. As noted 
above, during the colonial period, and especially in the period of 
accelerated development from 1945 to 1975, government played a 
major role in development. It promoted agricultural development 
(especially smallholder development) and marketing; it encouraged 
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small-scale indigenous business; it financed education and health 
services (with continued assistance from the churches), and it 
provided basic infrastructure. 
After independence smallholder agriculture continued to expand, 
though certainly not evenly across the country. But plantation 
agriculture had mixed fortunes: while oil palm production on nucleus 
estates flourished, the traditionally dominant plantation crops-copra, 
cocoa and rubber-languished. In the pre-independence period many 
foreign-owned plantations were run down in anticipation of 
expropriation or sale to Papua New Guineans; many were sold and 
often subdivided. With agricultural commodity prices generally down 
in the latter part of the 1970s, and with frequently inexperienced 
management, many plantations performed poorly (Walter 1 982) . 
Apart from agriculture: for a number of reasons, largely cultural, small 
business ventures, including cooperatives, had very limited success 
(Wilson 1979; Andrews 1975), and manufacturing growth was 
predictably modest. Consequently, while some Papua New Guineans 
prospered as a result of salaried employment, income from small 
business or self employment, rent from urban properties, or 
smallholder agriculture (especially coffee, but increasingly betel nut 
and food crops), most found themselves with low cash incomes, 
increasing demands for cash (such as for education and 
transportation), and, in many rural areas, deteriorating infrastructure 
and diminishing access to government services. Often these problems 
were compounded by increasing pressure on land and growing rural 
and urban lawlessnes�. 
In this context, the prospect of substantial revenue and 
infrastructural development from large-scale mining and petroleum 
prospects, and from the early 1980s from logging, had an obvious 
appeal to a government facing heavy demands for expenditures, a 
weak tax base, and declining real  levels of development assistance. 
For some communities, also, the immediate prospect of payments 
from minerals and forestry projects outweighed considerations of 
longer-term costs. But for those communities which did not have the 
prospect of large-scale resource exploitation, development options 
were fewer; and when government failed to meet their  demands, they 
often turned away from, or against, government. 
In the lead-up to independence there was a general assumption 
that political parties would develop to match the country's essentially 
Westminster-style parliamentary system, and that the emerging 
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nationalism of the early 1970s would provide the basis for a 
developing sense of national identity. In fact, neither expectation was 
fulfilled. While three parties-Pangu (notwithstanding two major 
splits in the mid-1980s), the Peoples Progress Party and the 
Melanesian Alliance-have been significant forces now for about two 
decades, other parties have proved transient. The major parties have 
never been sharply differentiated, nor have they developed a 
substantive mass base; mostly they have revolved around a few key 
individuals and have displayed strong regional biases; party discipline 
has been weak and membership fluid. Since the first Papuan New 
Guinean government emerged from the elections in 1972, every 
government has been a coalition and both 'party hopping' and 
changes within coalitions have been fairly common. Of the seven 
changes of government which have occurred since 1972, three have 
been the result of votes of no confidence precipitated by coalition 
shifts. Moreover, each successive election has seen a larger number of 
candidates contesting. Along with this there seems to have been an 
increasing tendency for candidates not to align themselves with 
parties (or to loosely align themselves with more than one), in order to 
maximise their bargaining power, if successful, in the post-election 
horse-trading that  accompanies attempts to put together a winning 
coalition. Taken in conjunction with the high turnover of members at 
election time (in all  but one election since 1972 some 50-55 per cent of 
members have failed to gain re-election), this has produced a system 
inimical to rational long-term policymaking and is particularly prone 
to politicians seeking short-term advantage. Political candidates 
outlay relatively large sums to get elected and incur debts to their 
supporters; if elected they naturally seek to recoup these outlays, with 
interest, and to reward their supporters. In implicit recognition of this 
in early 1 996 each member was receiving K0.5 million from an 
Electoral Development Fund for discretionary allocation within his 
electorate. 
Popular realisation that most politicians seek election for personal 
and parochial gain, and that those who have ' their ' member in 
parliament stand to do better than those who do not, has encouraged 
the view that politics is a form of bisnis. While this has brought about 
increased (and increasingly confrontational) competition for 
parliamentary office, it has also produced considerable popular 
cynicism about politics and politicians. Such cynicism has tended to 
undermine the perceived legitimacy of the state-a legitimacy and 
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authori ty already challenged by Papua New Guinea 's poorly 
developed sense of nationhood and the continuing political salience of 
parochialism, regionalism (Papuan, Highlands and Islands) and, in the 
case of Bougainville, separatism. 
In 1975 Nigerian scholar Peter Ekeh suggested that the colonial 
experience in Africa had produced 'a unique historical configuration'. 
Ekeh distinguished two public realms in post-colonial Africa: a 
'primordial' public realm, governed by 'primordial groupings, ties, 
and sentiments', and a colonially-derived 'civic' public realm. Most 
educated Africans, Ekeh argued, are members of both these public 
realms. 
On the one hand, they belong to a civic public from which they gain 
materia l ly but to which they give only grudgingly. On the other hand 
they belong to a primordia l  public from which they derive litt le or no 
material  benefits but to w hich they are expected to give generously 
and do give materia l ly  . . .  their  relationship to the primordia l  public is 
moral,  while that to the civic public is amora l .  The dia lectica l tensions 
and confrontations between these two publ ics constitute the 
uniqueness of modern African politics . . .  The unwritten law of the 
dialectics is that it is legit imate to rob the civic public in order to 
strengthen the primord ia l  public (Eken 1975: 108) . 
The effects of this confrontation, according to Ekeh, included 
' tribalism' and corruption. 
The recent political economy of Papua New Guinea suggests that 
the African situation described by Ekeh is not unique. In a recent 
speech in Port Moresby, former finance secretary and central bank 
governor, Mekere Morauta said ' . . .  the most corrosive and intractable 
problem we face now is corruption' .  Morauta went on to talk about ' 
the institutionalisation of short-term ad hoe decision-making and the 
catastrophic decline in the power, status, morale and productivity of 
the bureaucracy', a development which he dated to the mid-1980s 
(Morauta 1996) . 
In the past decade or so corruption has become entrenched, 
notwithstanding the restraining influences of the Leadership Code 
and the Ombudsman Commission. Such corruption takes two forms: 
that in which individuals use their position within the state for 
personal gain, and that in which individuals use their position to 
transfer resources, in Ekeh' s terms, from the civic public to the 
primordial public. The first of these, as Ekeh suggests also for Africa, 
is unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term unless individuals can 
isolate themselves from the demands of their primordial publics. The 
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second form, on the other hand-the transfer of resources from the 
civic to the primordial public realm-is, with some exceptions, 
regarded as corruption only by those who are not beneficiaries. It is 
expected of politicians that they will reward those who voted for 
them, and where a sense of nationhood and of loyalty to the state is 
poorly developed, and expectations of political longevity are low, it is 
accepted that politicians will squeeze as much as possible out of the 
state, and will do so within a short timeframe. Moreover, once this 
pattern of behaviour becomes established among politicians, it is 
likely to spread within the public service: bureaucrats will tend to 
favour their wantoks in the provision of services or to seek special 
favours from those to whom services are provided. Such factors 
largely explain the increasing competition for political office, noted 
above, and the increasing politicisation of decision-making. 
Such behaviour is not restricted to those with direct access to the 
resources of the civic public realm. Across the country, in rural and 
urban areas, citizens demand additional compensation for land 
acquired earlier by government for schools, airstrips, roads, towns, 
and other public facilities, and often threaten violent action if their 
demands are not met. (In one case which I have observed at close 
quarters over a number of years, villagers have claimed large amounts 
of addi tional compensation for land on which a provincial high school 
was built some years ago. They have pressed their claims by attacks 
on the school and its students and teachers, at one stage burning down 
a building. Unable to meet the v illagers' demands, the provincial 
government eventually proposed to close the school and relocate it  
elsewhere. At this stage the villagers-many of whose children attend 
the school-dropped their claims; but following the election of a new 
provincial government the demands were revived . )  In recent years, 
also, the judicial system has upheld the demands of villagers for 
multimillion kina compensation from government for damages 
inflicted by police in raids on villages. 
In a more extreme form, the break-down of law and order is i tself a 
form of challenge to the state. Raskols frequently justify their actions by 
reference to corruption amongst those in power and the failure of 
government to meet the needs of its citizens. The inability of the police 
and defence force to deal with the incidence of crime, ' tribal fighting', 
and the rebellion on Bougainville underlines the weakness of the state, 
and the scale of raskolism (and the occa.sional murder, by his kin 
68 Gove rna nce and reform in the South Pacific 
group, of a raskol who oversteps communal propriety) attests to the 
symbiosis between raskols and their primordial public. 
Beyond the public sector, similar processes operate. In areas of 
large-scale resource development, communities have often, initially, 
welcomed big companies; particularly in remote areas, they tend to 
see them as a source of not only income but also infrastructure and 
development more generally. But they are quick to demand 
renegotiation of agreements if they think they can get a larger share of 
the profits, and have used or threatened force to back their demands; 
the Bougainville mine was the firs t to be forced to close, but others 
have been forced to close temporarily and all are vulnerable to local 
protest action. 
There is a growing literature on 'weak states', 'collapsed states', 
'predatory states', and so on, and attempts, by the World Bank and 
others, to address the problems of such states in terms of creating 
'good governance' .  Papua New Guinea displays the typical 
characteristics of a weak state. This chapter suggests is that unless 
Papua New Guineans acknowledge and respect the legitimacy of the 
state-in Ekeh's terms acknowledge moral obligations to the civic 
public realm which outweigh primordial obligations-the state will 
remain weak and policymaking will be characterized, to use the words 
of Oil Search Ltd chairman Trevor Kennedy (1995), by 'inconsistency 
and lack of discipline' .  Ultimately the unpredictability of 
policymaking and its subservience to primordial interests, and the 
inability of government to maintain a secure economic environment, 
will not only discourage foreign investment but will inhibit 
indigenous enterprise as well. (Already, in some parts of the country 
coffee and cocoa buyers do not go out on buying trips because they 
fear attacks by raskols). 
Judged against the eight aims elaborated in 1975, Papua New 
Guinea's economic achievements have been modest. Though less 
dependent on overseas development assistance, the economy remains 
heavily dependent on imports of goods and services and its major 
industries remain substantially foreign-owned. Inequality in incomes 
and access to government services, both personally and regionally, has 
probably increased. Outside the subsistence sector, women play a 
minor role in economic and political affairs (between 1987 and 1997 
there was not a single woman in the 109-member National Parliament; 
there are now two). And recent changes to the provincial government 
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system appear to be designed to centralise rather than decentral ise 
decision-making. The situation in 1996, twenty-one years after 
independence, has been described by Morauta in the following terms. 
Despite the five-fold growth in government expendi ture and revenue, 
the country's infrastructure is breaking down. Government services 
have declined to the point of being non-existent in many areas. Public 
assets, w hether they be schools, hospita ls, offices, roads or bridges, are 
a l l  in a state of d isrepair. Our exports earn more than three bi l l ion kina 
each year, yet we have an underlying shortage of foreign currencies.  
GDP has grown five times but the d istribution of income is more 
skewed and less equitable than in 1975. Nominal per capita income 
has more than doubled, but 80 per cent of the popu lation actual ly earn 
less than the 1975 average. Corruption, both petty and profound, 
permeates society today. Society is ravaged by crime. There is a 
general inabil i ty to enforce or maintain law and order. Socia l  inequity 
and poverty are rampant (Morauta 1996) . 
Papua New Guinea 's failure to capitalise on its fortunate resource 
endowment and its early promise of sound and equitable policies is 
not just a question of 1Jad management', but reflects the non­
emergence of a sense of national identity and purpose . The persistence 
of predominant loyalties to locality and kin, and the historical image 
of the state in Papua New Guinea as a provider of free goods and 
services, has promoted a political culture in which, as Ekeh has argued 
for Africa, those with direct access to the state tend to use their 
positions to benefit themselves and their primordial publics, and those 
who receive rents from large-scale resource projects continuously seek 
to renegotiate more favourable agreements. Such a situation has all the 
hallmarks of a weak state: policymaking tends to be short-term and 
often capricious; governments have difficulty implementing decisions, 
and corruption and lawlessness are becoming endemic. 
There are, nevertheless, positive elements. Papua New Guinea has 
maintained a robust democracy, there are strong redistributive 
elements in local cultures, and although population growth rates 
threaten the long-term wellbeing of some agrarian communities, the 
country is resource rich. If the present perception of economic crisis 
can precipitate a commitment to rational long-term policymaking 
perhaps the present worrying trends can be reversed. But before tha t  
can happen there needs to  be  a major change in  political perceptions. 
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Notes 
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as 'Des promesses a la 
crise: economie politique de la Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinee', Revue 
Tiers Monde, XXXVIII, 1 49, janvier-mars 1997. 
1 The northeastern part of New Guinea was annexed by Germany in 
1884. The same year Britain annexed the southeastern portion. The 
western half of the island (now the Indonesian province of Irian 
Jaya) had earlier become part of the Dutch East Indies. British New 
Guinea (renamed Papua) was transferred to Australian 
protectorate status in 1906, and German New Guinea was occupied 
by Australia in 1914 and subsequently became a UN Trusteeship 
under Australian administration. The two were administered 
jointly during World War II and continued to be governed as a 
single entity after the war. 
2 Much of the interior was declared 'restricted' until well into the 
1950s, however, and some areas were still restricted in 1970. 
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Creeping paralysis : dependency and 
sovereignty in peripheral Pacific states 
C l u ny Macpherson and La'avasa Macpherson 
Politicians in Pacific microstates have sought to meet their citizens' 
rising material expectations by pursuing policy mixes which include 
the development of domestic primary production, increasing reliance 
on foreign aid (Knapman 1986; Campbell 1992), and migration and 
remittances (Hayes 1991;  Ahlburg 1991 ) .  Adherence to such policies 
has led some economists to characterise these states as MIRAB 
societies: societies which are increasingly shaped, and some would say 
distorted, by migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy (Bertram and 
Watters 1985, 1986) . 
As a strategy, this has been reasonably successful for several 
decades. Politicians have been able to rely on continuing flows of 
resources from migrants and aid donors even when income from 
domestic primary production and revenues from domestic taxation 
were static or failing. Thus, for instance, after major cyclones in 1990 
and 1991, and later when the taro blight devastated the plantations of 
Western Samoa in 1993, politicians were able to depend on aid and 
remittances (Minister of Finance 1997:5) from migrants overseas to 
offset income from lost production and to provide funds for 
rehabilitation. 
Over time, these supplementary sources of revenue have, in effect, 
subsidised the shortfall between what states could have afforded if they 
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had depended solely on domestic revenues and export income and 
what citizens were increasingly wanting. However, what began as 
supplementary sources of revenue have become increasingly essential 
elements of some states' budgets and development programs. The 
problem with this strategy is that states which become dependent on 
these 'subsidies' have to anticipate the timing and extent of disruptions 
to 'supply' to be able to 'manage' around fluctuations. This becomes 
increasingly difficult because the factors which cause them lie beyond 
one's shores and are the consequences of technologies and strategies 
which are in turn constantly changing. Few are, as a result, able to 
anticipate and plan for changes with any degree of certainty. 
As long as resources are available to fund development and 
economic growth, the issue of growing dependency, and of its longer­
term consequences for national sovereignty are ignored by politicians 
until a crisis occurs. Politicians are then forced to acknowledge the 
growth of dependency and to seek to manage the policy mix in other 
ways, or to seek new sources of revenue which may present the same 
problems as those on which they seek to reduce dependence. 
Such crises need not be disasters. They may force interest groups 
within the state to redefine their interests and to look to the state to 
produce new policy mixes. In such circumstances administrations are 
sometimes able to win more broadly-based public support, or at  least 
acceptance, for measures and policies which would not be 
contemplated at other times. This may permit the state to set the basic 
direction for more prosperous and less dependant futures as has been 
the case for instance in New Zealand in the past 12 years. 
Crises may, however, also lead to political paralysis when 
administrations presume that  the 'good times' will return if only the 
government can borrow enough and people can hold out for long 
enough . Where this strategy is pursued, as it was in New Zealand, it  
may simply postpone the inevitable structural adjustment until i t  is 
carried out on terms dictated by external agencies and in circumstances 
in which fewer choices are available. Thus, it can be argued that in 
peripheral states, circumstances may combine to create a creeping 
paralysis which slowly erodes sovereignty. 
The case of Western Samoa 
Western Samoa is one such case although there are many. This chapter 
shows how, in the past thirty years, a series of decisions led to growing 
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dependence on aid and remittances and a loss of meaningful 
sovereignty because the state was weakened to the point where it has 
become possible for larger states, and international agencies controlled 
by those states, to dictate its economic policy in ways which still lessen 
its real autonomy. The chapter outlines some of the factors which 
combine to produce growing dependence and the creeping paralysis 
which has led to the problems currently faced by the state and to the 
loss of economic sovereignty. 
Migration and its conseq uences 
Although the debate on the consequences of out-migration and the 
consequences of depopulation began earlier elsewhere, the debate 
about their impact in Pacific island states started in the 1950s as social 
scientists began to appreciate the significance of internal and 
international movement within the region. 
In 1956 the economist V.D. Stace concluded from a study of the 
Western Samoan economy that as a consequence of labour migration, 
the social and economic organisation of the villages had begun to 
change and that continued out-migration would lead to declining 
population and production and to growing dependence on remittances 
from those who had migrated (Stace 1956). 
In 1970 David C.  Pitt made a detailed ethnographic study of the 
impact of economic development on traditional social organisation and 
reached somewhat different conclusions on the significance of 
migration. He concluded from detailed studies of several villages that, 
' [m] igration does not usually have adverse effects on fa 'asomao society 
or economic conditions generally' (1970: 185) and that 'overseas 
migration does not usually have an adverse effect on the local economy' 
(1970: 186) .  
As the scale of migration from Western Samoa increased and the 
nature of its impact became clearer, these conclusions were challenged. 
In the mid-1970s an American anthropologist, Paul Shankman 
examined some of the economic, political and social consequences of 
dependence of Pacific states on their larger metropolitan neighbours 
(Shankman 1976) .  He concluded that 
[d ]ependence on migra tion and remi ttances, however, is a lso 
symptomatic of continuing underdevelopment.  Futhermore, as 
migration and remittances become more important at both national 
and local  levels, they may perpetuate underdevelopment. That is by 
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more closely integra ting the islanders into a wider poli tical economy, 
the effects of migra tion and remi ttances may prevent economic 
development ( 1976:85) .  
Ten years la ter, Cole and Parry, in an introduction to Selected Issues in 
Pacific Island Developmen t, concluded that 
[ t ]he costs and benefi ts of emigration from the islands of the Paci fic 
have yet to be precisely calculated in socia l  and economic terms, but it 
is clear for the emigrants, as wel l as home and host countries, that 
there are considerable gains ( 1 986:8). 
In the mid-1980s, two major research programs did try to establish 
the costs and benefits of emigration for small island states by reviewin g  
and synthesising a large number o f  studies. These analyses, sponsored 
by the South Pacific Commission/ ILO (see for example, Connell 1983a, 
1983b, 1983c, 1983d, 1983e, 1983f, 1987) and the Institute of Policy 
Studies (see for example Bertram and Watters 1984, 1985, 1986) 
respectively, sought to establish the significance of these studies and to 
determine appropriate policy responses to the continuing emigration. 
Ironically, these studies often made contradictory policy recommenda­
tions (see Hayes 1991 :2). 
An emerging problem 
While interpretations of the empirical studies to which Hayes refers 
may have been contradictory, they pointed to several striking trends 
which are exemplified in the Western Samoan case. These trends were 
static or declining export volumes and income, steadily increasing 
import volumes and bills, steadily increasing trade and budget deficits 
and debt burdens (AIDAB 1994:86-7). More worrying were declining 
per capita food production levels (AIDAB 1994:47) and growing 
dependency ratios (AIDAB 1994:85). These trends would have been 
very serious had it not been for steadily increasing income which was 
available to the government from external aid donors and to the citizens 
from remittances from their migrant kin in New Zealand, the United 
States and Australia. 
While those studying the various consequences of migration in the 
Pacific differed in their conclusions, they shared the belief that 
emigration would continue into the foreseeable future. Much of their 
analysis focused on the consequences of allowing this situation to 
proceed unchecked. Those, such as John Connell, who foresaw the 
consequences of increasing .dependency advocated reducing levels of 
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migration even where incomes were increasing. There is little evidence 
that those involved anticipated the possibility of the global 
restructuring of capital which would lead to the radical restructuring of 
the New Zealand economy and would have profound effects on a 
number of Pacific microstates which had become increasingly 
dependent on that economy. Nor did many foresee the possibility that 
major economic and political transformations and realignments in 
Europe might lead to a recasting of European nations' aid priorities 
and the redirection of aid resources from the Pacific into the emerging 
states of Europe. 
The failure to anticipate these trends should not surprise. In New 
Zealand, one of Western Samoa's major sources of both migrant 
remittances and aid funds, events were managed in such a way before 
the crisis that the seriousness of the economic situation was not widely 
known. The necessity of New Zealand's restructuring was accepted 
only on the eve of the 1984 general election, after many years of 
ignoring economic realities and heavy borrowing to support 
government expenditure. The Western Samoan government could not 
have been expected to anticipate the suddenness or the consequences of 
restructuring which subsequently occurred in New Zealand. 
The breakup of the former USSR and the reunification of Germany 
was similar in that it occurred suddenly and only gained momentum 
after certain initial, and largely unanticipated, changes had taken 
place. Nor could the Japanese debt crisis of the early 1990s which led to 
constraints on the volumes of Japanese aid have been anticipated and 
planned for. As a consequence the factors which caused the crisis 
which now faces the Western Samoan state arrived largely 
unannounced. 
Leadu p  to the crisis 
The external elements of the crisis, that is those which occurred beyond 
Western Samoa's borders and over which the state could exert no 
control, began to be felt after the restructuring of the New Zealand 
economy gained momentum in the late 1980s. The radical restructuring 
of the New Zealand economy which has occurred since 1984 (Britton et 
al. 1992; O'Brien and Wilkes 1993; Roper and Rudd 1993; Kelsey 1995), 
and the less radical, but still significant, transformation of the 
Australian economy had a marked impact on the dependent  
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microstates of the Pacific because both were major aid donors and 
migrant destinations. 
The first was a declining demand from New Zealand business for 
unskilled and semiskilled labour as formerly protected industries were 
exposed to international competition and in many cases failed or were 
closed to avoid failure (Ongley 1991 :21-6, 1996:23). The reduced 
demand for migrant labour was serious because migrants are the 
source of remittances which had become increasingly important in the 
Western Samoan economy and because annual per capita remittance 
levels tend to fall off over time (Ahlburg 1991 : 16-1 7) for a variety of 
reasons (Macpherson 1994) and a continuous supply of new migrants 
is needed to replace those whose remittance levels are falling to 
maintain a given level of remittances over time. 
The signals from the restructuring of the New Zealand labour 
market were only the first warnings. The New Zealand government 
undertook a review of its immigra tion policy as part of the process of 
restructuring in 1986. The new policy, set out in The Review of 
Immigration Policy (1986), signalled a move to a system of migrant 
selection which favoured more skilled, better educated and wealthier 
immigrants. The policy was to be administered to ensure that 
[r]egard will be had in the admission of new settlers to the avoidance 
of additional stress in a reas of constra int such as the labour market, 
housing and community services ( Burke 1986: 11) .  
Significantly, the policy sought to 
[a ]bolish nationa l origin as a factor in immigrant selection and to assess 
appl icants solely on criteria which evaluate personal qual i ties, skil ls, 
qual i fications, potential  contribution the New Zealand economy and 
society and the capacity to settle well in  this country (Burke 1986:15) .  
The net effect of this change was to limit the prospect of permanent 
emigration of Western Samoans to those professionals and 
entrepreneurs who had skills and capital which were in demand in 
New Zealand and to older people joining migrant kin under provisions 
for family reunification. Both of these moves had further potentially 
serious consequences for the Western Samoan economy. The loss of 
professionals' skills and capital was serious for the Samoan economy 
struggling with a shortage of managerial and technical skills (AIDAB 
1994:41, 47, 48, 50) and with a shortage of domestic equity capital 
needed to establish joint commercial ventures under the Enterprises 
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Incen tives Act. The loss of older people meant that funds that had once 
been remitted to Western Samoa to care for them were now spent in 
New Zealand and did not pass into the Western Samoan economy. 
Things were, however, to get worse. Western Samoa was now more 
dependent on existing migrants in New Zealand for remittances. Their 
ability to remit was, however, to be constrained by other New Zealand 
policies. The most significant of these was the Employmen t Con tracts Act 
1 991 which effectively reduced the power of organised labour and 
which led to the deregulation the labour market. This resulted in 
declining real incomes especially for those in lower income brackets 
(NZOYB 1992:223-4) and a consequent reduction in discretionary 
income among expatriate Samoans, many of whom fell into this 
category. These factors made it  increasingly difficult for many migrant 
families to maintain levels of remittances which had previously been 
possible . Even those who were able to remit, however, were more 
conscious that the continuing restructuring of the economy was 
resulting in increasing numbers of job losses and declining job security. 
Personal savings assumed much greater significance than in earlier, 
more prosperous times, and many families found it necessary to reduce 
remittances to meet previous financial commitments. 
The final change was the passage of the State Sector Act 1988 and the 
Public Finance Act 1989 which provided for the restructuring and 
contraction of the public sector. The state sector had been a major 
employer of Pacific Islanders and as state activ ities contracted, first as a 
result of corporatisation and later as a consequence of privatisation, the 
numbers of jobs in these sectors declined rapidly and dramatically. 
The net effect of these structural changes was steadily increasing 
levels of unemployment among expatriate Samoans which rose from 
under 1 per cent to around 22 and 21 per cent for men and women 
respectively by 1991 (Statistics New Zealand 1995:40). The flat demand 
also meant that many young Samoans, both overseas and New 
Zealand-born, were unable to get employment and suffered high levels 
of unemployment: 15-19 year olds experienced rates of 44 and 45 per 
cent for men and women respectively, and 20-24 year olds experienced 
rates of 24 and 26 per cent respectively (Statistics New Zealand . 
1995:40). If those on unemployment benefits are added to those on 
student allowances, 55 per cent of New Zealand-born adults and 49 per 
cent of island-born Samoans were dependent on some form of fixed, 
welfare income in 1991 (Statistics New Zealand 1995:49) . 
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The greater dependence on fixed, s tate-provided unemployment and 
other forms of social welfare benefits led to declining real incomes 
among expatriate Samoans. This situation was worsened by the 
restructuring of social welfare benefi t  payments which occurred in 1991 
and led to reductions in most benefits and the termination of benefi ts 
previously to paid to i llegal immigrants (NZOYB 1990:204, 1992:1 13, 
1995 : 168-9) .  
The net effect of all of these changes was a gradual reduction in the 
capacity of migrants to maintain previous levels of remittances 
(Macpherson 1992) . It was gradual because migrants sought to 
maintain levels as long as was possible by a variety of strategies. Many, 
for instance, borrowed, rearranged accommodation to cut costs, sold 
property and mortgaged other property to ensure that they could 
support kin for as long as possible. But eventually, it was impossible to 
maintain former remittance levels. While some of this remittance 
income could be 'replaced' from the earnings of Samoan migrants in 
Australia and the United States, the restructuring of the New Zealand 
economy, which had historically been a major source of remittances to 
Western Samoa, had a disproportionately serious effect on remittance 
volumes. 
Almost simultaneously, the second source of external funds, 
overseas aid, was beginning to decline. This is, in part, the consequence 
of the declining significance of Pacific microstates in global geopolitics 
and, in part, of the international agencies' growing determination to 
force aid recipients to accept certain fiscal disciplines and policies. In 
the Western Samoan case this decline s temmed from the fact that 
the global  aid cl imate has changed signi ficantly as has the South 
Pacific's stra tegic importance to the major powers. There is a lso a 
recognition that ·externa l aid,  far from promoting greater sel f  reli ance, 
is helping to perpetua te dependence and is encouraging Western 
Samoa to live beyond i ts means (AIDA B  1994: 12). 
Between 1986 and 1993 the levels of aid declined in real terms 
(AIDAB 1994 :12) .  
The final elements in the crisis arrived in the form of two cyclones, 
Val and Ofa, in 1990 and 1991 . These devastated both plantations and 
infrastructure and led to a significant loss of export income as both 
crops and associated processing industries collapsed (AIDAB 1994:88) 
and scarcity of food crops drove domestic prices up. The vulnerability 
of crops which grew above ground was again brought home forcefully 
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to agriculturists and government alike. Copra, cocoa and timber 
produc tion, which was declining even before the hurricanes, fell to 
virtually nothing after them (AIDAB 1994:88). 
The attraction of the root crop taro (Colocasia esculen ta), which grows 
underground, was obvious from the quick recovery of the industry, and 
the strong demand and associated high prices for the product 
particularly among Pacific island migrants living around the Pacific 
Rim. The experiences of the hurricanes led to increased taro plantings 
which, ironically, set the scene for the final and cruelest blow. The new 
and larger taro plantings occurred alongside a decline in the 
production of a range of other agricultural crops (AIDAB 1994:26-9) 
and set the stage for serious setbacks to the Western Samoan economy. 
Increasing export incomes from taro were struck in 1994 by an 
introduced fungal disease which led to the imposition of an export ban 
and a further fall in income for both the state and the agriculturists. 
More recently, the situation of the la tter has been made worse by the 
accidental in troduction of the voracious African snail (sis afelika) which 
is now spreading through productive plantations in parts of Upolu. 
The crisis 
Samoan domestic income dropped as a consequence of ageing copra 
plantations, the depletion of forestry resources, a pair of hurricanes, 
and diseases which struck at its most profitable and quickly 
established export crop. Even under normal circumstances this set of 
circumstances would have been serious. The Western Samoan 
government would have been able to overcome this setback with aid 
which would have been made available for restitution of infrastructure 
and rehabilitation of plantations. Aid was indeed forthcoming but at 
reduced levels and on conditions which limited its use in ways which 
were approved by donors. Western Samoan citizens could in earlier 
times have depended on increased levels of remittances from migrants 
to subsidise family incomes reduced by loss of plantations. But with 
declining incomes among migrants in New Zealand (Macpherson 
1992), these were no longer as readily available. Ahlburg noted that the 
crisis began to emerge in 1989 when remittances equalled 296 per cent 
of Western Samoa's export income, covered 49.6 per cent of its import 
bill and 59.6 per cent of i ts trade deficit (Ahlburg 1991 : 18) .  Similar 
evidence of both a decline in the capacity of Western Samoans to remit 
at the same levels (Macpherson 1992) and of changes in the 
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predisposi tion of migrants to remit (Macpherson 1994) was also 
emerging. 
Thus, in a relatively short time, the real prospect of a decline in the 
standard of living in Western Samoa emerged. This would produce 
potentially serious problems for both the state and for its citizens. Both 
have become accustomed to a level of income and standard of living 
which may be unsustainable. Both aspire to high incomes albeit for 
different reasons. Those who control the state seek resources to 
distribute in ways which ensure their continued hold on power. Private 
ci tizens seek resources to allow them to live an ever more prosperous 
lifestyles to which they have been increasingly exposed by travel, 
cinema, videos, US television programming, and now on the state's 
own television Televise Samoa. In these circumstances, material 
aspirations have risen and both the state and the citizens, who have 
become used to growing 'prosperity' face dilemmas when the funds 
which have underwritten this are suddenly interrupted. 
The state's di lemma 
The state is faced with growing material aspirations among its citizenry 
and no readily available means of delivering these in the immediate 
future. In 1995 the Minister of Finance admitted frankly that 
[ t ]he Western Samoan economy has long been characterised by low 
prod uctivi ty, low growth and a dominant publ ic sector. Three decades 
of development p lans, sectora l strategies, technical assistance and aid 
funded capital  projects have fa i led to p ropel us into a dynamic phase of 
economic growth which would relieve us of our dependency on 
foreign a id, foreign loans and remittances from expatria te Samoans 
(Government of Western Samoa 1995:3) .  
The document went on to spell out ways of moving out of this 
situation but it  is clear that in the immediate future these aid loans and 
remittances will remain important elements of the Samoan budget 
which raises questions about how readily available these will be. 
Some major aid donors such as Europe have signalled their 
intention to restructure relations with the Pacific states. The major 
European aid donors are at present drafting an agreement to replace the 
existing Lome Convention which expires in 2000. Early indications are 
that the conditions will be far less generous than those embodied in the 
Lome Convention. The new conditions will reflect the pressure from the 
World Trade Organisation to eliminate preferential trade access 
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agreements which Pacific states have enjoyed and geopolitical changes 
in Europe which, as the Deputy Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele 
Malielagaoi acknowledged recently, meant that European partners now 
had other preoccupations. In a speech to a meeting of delegates of the 
African-Caribbean-Pacific nations and the 15 European Union states, 
Tuilaepa Sailele acknowledged that members of the African-Caribbean­
Pacific nations had lost their strategic and economic advantages and 
that the group 'must be prepared to face a less hospitable political and 
economic climate' than had been the case when the existing agreement 
was signed some 20 years earlier (Islands Business August 1996: 18) .  A 
parallel loss of interest in the Pacific is evident on the part of another 
historically significant donor, the United States. 
Such aid and development financing as is available will likely be 
increasingly tied by aid donors, lenders and creditors to acceptance of 
the need for structural reforms and will further reduce the income of 
significant parts of the Western Samoan population. Thus, for instance, 
the World Bank is pushing for forms of structural adjustment which 
will reduce the numbers of people in the public sector and increase the 
amount of taxation raised with in Western Samoa. The situation is 
summarised in the following way in a document published by a major 
aid donor. 
Measures to restore macroeconomic stabi l i ty and to tackle major 
constraints to development wi l l  be crucial  for the achievement of the 
country's development objectives. Foremost is the need to reduce the 
fiscal deficit and rebui ld international reserves to more prudent levels. 
As well, a more vigorous effort is needed to further advance the 
process of structura l adjustment reform necessary to remove existing 
structural d istortions and to enhance the country's interna tional  
competi tiveness. Such reforms are essential for raising the level of 
labour productivi ty and efficiency, which are so fundamenta l for 
economic growth . . . .  Financia l  instabi l ity has been endemic since the 
cyclone shock of 1 990 and remains a serious threat to macroeconomic 
stabi l i ty and longer term growth (AIDA B  1994:62-3). 
The Western Samoan state is faced with increasingly cautious 
lenders and aid donors with more clearly focused program objectives. 
The donors are requiring more concisely defined and closely monitored 
outcomes through fiscal discipline ideologies and policies in donor 
states. The lenders with ' good governance' ideologies shaped, at  least 
in part, by public di�enchantrnent with provision of assistance to 
'corrupt' regimes (Leftwich 1993; Williams and Young 1994; 
Macdonald 1996) are looking closely at the s tate's institutional capacity 
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to plan effectively and implement programs efficiently. As Macdonald 
notes 
[i]n a series of World Bank reports, and in policy sta tements from 
OECD governments, the characteristics of 'good governance' or 'good 
government' have been more clea rly identi fied as: the legi timacy of 
government as reflected in multi-pa rty participa tory democracy, the 
rule of law, protection of human rights, transparency and 
accountabi l i ty of government process, the expansion of civil society, 
effective and efficient public sector management ( 1996:3). 
But these are more than rhetorical sta tements about desired states 
for as Macdonald further notes 
the World Bank and other agencies have invoked good governance 
criteria in decision making and have, both explicitly and impl ici tly, 
introd uced a new form of pol it ica l cond itional i ty into donor-recipient 
re la tions especia l ly  when major restructuring is planned (1 996:3). 
How might this new agenda affect Western Samoa's future ability to 
access increasingly conditional aid? 
Western Samoa and the new governance agenda 
A number of issues have raised serious doubts about transparency and 
accountability of the government process and about the quality of 
public administration in Western Samoa in the mid-1990s which could 
influence the government's ability to access funds from tradi tional 
sources. The same sorts of issues had arisen before but in the new 
climate they assumed a greater significance than they had earlier 
because of the questions which they raised about governance. A few are 
set out below to illustrate the forms which they take in different areas. 
Western Samoa has long met the formal human rights and multi­
party participatory democracy requirements embodied in these agenda, 
and has recently replaced matai suffrage with universal adult suffrage. 
Evidence is, however, periodically produced to suggest that significant 
numbers of ' individual' voters in rural v illages are instructed to vote in 
certain ways to honour undertakings made to candidates by their nza tai 
or household heads in return for gifts and assurances of various forms 
of services if they gain a seat in the assembly. This issue would be that it 
would certainly attract attention because of its symbolic significance. 
So too, would the fate of the Western Samoan Controller and Auditor 
General, Su' a Rimoni Ah Chong, who remains suspended because of a 
detailed and highly critical audit report which he wrote in 1994. In the 
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Controller and Chief Auditor 's Report to the Legislative Assembly, 
Period 1 January 1993 to 30 June 1994, he stated that, 'The Audit Office 
was not in a position to be able to issue a clean opinion on the Public 
Accounts' ( 1994: 14) and spent the next the next  eight pages of the 
report detailing shortcomings in the accounts. The report lists three 
qualifications on the accounts 
The Audit Office has not been able to sat isfy i tsel f  that the systems of 
accounting and internal controls covering transactions in the Public 
Accounts have been opera ted satisfactorily by Treasury and some 
major Departments of Government for the period under review, and 
prior periods, to an extent sufficient to ensure, to a materia l  extent, 
tha t the financial  ba lances are reliable (1994 : 14).  
The Audit  office has not been sa tisfied as to whether all  Government 
guarantees, indemnities and other contingent l iabi l i ties that rema in 
outstanding a t  the end of the period are included in the statement of 
contingent l iabi l ities ( 1994: 16) . 
The majori ty of Special  Funds bank accounts were not reconciled and it 
was not possible therefore to form and opinion on the Sta tement of 
Receipts and Payments of Special  Funds ( 1994: 16). 
The Auditor also points to a note in the public accounts which 
reflects Treasury's own reservations about the accounts. 
[ w ]hi le the transactions reflected in the accounts are recorded and 
presented as required by the Public Moneys Act 1964, they do not 
purport to reflect the total activ i ty and position of the Government of 
Western Samoa ( 1994: 16) .  
The bases of  these general qualifications are outlined in a series of 
detailed statements which might be grolinds for concern among aid 
donors and lenders about the state of governance in Western Samoa. 
Of even more concern to such donors would be the Controller and 
Chief-Auditor 's reports of the various departments, statutory bodies, 
corporations and public authorities ( 1994:22-91 ) in which the 
performance of Ministers, Departmental Heads and senior and junior 
officers in the public sector is reviewed and in which a series of serious 
irregularities at all levels in various departments is detailed. 
A commission of inquiry into the Controller and Chief-Auditor 's 
findings confirmed, 'in the main' the irregularities outlined in the 
Controller and Chief-Auditor 's report and the 'disturbing trends of 
dishonesty and unprofessional conduct uncovered . . .  in some 
Departments and Agencies of Government (Commission of Inquiry, 
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1994:74). While the Commission had reservations about the language 
in which the Chief Auditor expressed his findings, and with the 
implication that there is a general state of 'degeneracy' in public 
administration, they found it necessary to recommend, in ter alia, the 
institution of 'measures aimed at discouraging misconduct while 
developing public confidence in the institutions of Central 
Government', and 'legislation establishing a Code of Conduct for 
leaders in Government to be administered by a three-man Leadership 
Commission' (Commission of Inquiry 1994:75). 
The government then attempted to 'solve' its problem by amending 
Article 97 of the Constitu tion to reduce the Controller and Chief­
Auditor 's term of office from the year when he turns 60 to three years 
(Sunday Samoan 8 June 1997) which, irrespective of its intention, must 
seem to outsiders, a decidedly heavy-handed way of disciplining its 
critics. 
Even while the fate of the Controller and Chief-Auditor remains 
unresolved, the government has been hit with revelations of a passport 
sale scam which has seen the suspension of a number of staff from the 
Immigration Department. This is even more serious because the Prime 
Minister is Minister in charge of the Department and has been 
unwilling to provide evidence to show that he is not implicated in any 
way, choosing instead to blame the authorisation of illegal passports on 
previous holders of the office. In the same week he was led to admit in 
the House that the government had helped in the 'upgrading' of his 
family's hotel in Savai'i (Samoa Observer 19 June 1997) .  
In a climate in which aid donors and lenders are increasingly 
advising governments to 'get out of business' and to sell state assets to 
the private sector, the Western Samoan government's determination to 
operate a national airline, Polynesian Airlines, which has consumed 
large amounts of government funding and continued to incur steadily 
growing losses over a number of years would seem likely to produce 
problems (Controller and Chief Auditor 1994:87-91) .  The poor 
economic performance of a number of government trading activities 
would raise questions about both the commercial wisdom and about 
the quality of public sector management should donors, intent on 
'getting government out of business', choose to ask them (AIDAB 
1994:39-47; Controller and Chief Auditor 1994; Minister of Finance 
1997:4) . 
On their own these matters clearly vary in significance. Together, the 
matters referred to above, and others which space prevents us from 
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discussing, point to weaknesses in some areas of legislation, public 
administrative structures and human resources which have allowed 
individuals at all levels in government and the public service to act in 
ways which are contrary to the central premises of 'good governance' .  
These matters could well give a id donors, and lenders, grounds for 
withholding aid or at least making it contingent on demonstrable 
improvements in the government's performance. 
Bit ing the bul let 
Within the Ministry of Finance there is evidence of awareness of, and 
commitment to, the importance of the good governance agenda. In the 
1997-8 Budget Statement, the Minister of Finance noted 
we must a lso aim to become more sel f-reliant.  We cannot expect, and 
should not want, to be a id dependent forever. Our development 
partners have their own budgetary restra ints and many pressing calls 
on their development resources. We must demonstrate our 
commitment to good government and sound economic management 
(Minister of Finance 1997:5-6) . 
Significant moves, such as output-based performance budgeting, 
structural reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of resource 
allocation within the public sector (Minister of Finance 1997:4), a 'New 
Partnership' approach to economic management which 'aims to create 
a transparent, open and consistent framework for policy formulation 
and implementation' (Minister of Finance 1997: 1 )  and targeted 
specialist training programs (Deputy Secretary of Finance, pers. comm, 
18 June 1997), have been mounted, with, significantly, major 
contributions from aid donors, to improve performance and 
accountability and are beginning to have an impact. Significant doubts 
might still be, however, raised about the quality of government 
performance in various areas and in various departments where the 
Treasury's mission has yet to permeate organisational cultures. 
Privatisation of government assets, such as the telecommunications 
system, (Government of Western Samoa 1995: 12; Minister of Finance 
1997:4) and the corporatisation of certain government bodies is also 
planned as government responds to pressure for this structural 
adjustment. 
The government, despite progress with its structural adjustment 
program, remains heavily dependent on its tradi tional 'remedies': 
plentiful aid and remittances from migrants abroad. Without access to 
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these, it would have some difficulties meeting the expectations of the 
citizenry. Such aid as will be available will likely be increasingly 
closely controlled by donors, and will be conditional on acceptance and 
implementation of policy mixes determined by donors. Nor is this a 
temporary situation which will disappear as economic growth occurs 
in donor states and generates new flows of aid and new preferential 
trade opportunities. If anything, the situations will become more 
difficult for Western Samoa. The declining value of aid and loss of 
preferential trade and preferential prices are part of the future. 
The i ndividual 's di lemma 
Individuals and families are faced with similar dilemmas. Over time 
they have had available a series of strategies which they manipulated 
to maintain income streams. Domestic agricultural production for both 
subsistence and sale provided a base income for most Samoans. When 
commodity prices fell, producers could increase production to maintain 
or raise incomes. This strategy is no longer as readily available as long 
as exports of the most profitable of these crops, taro, are banned and 
demand and prices for other commodities are low. 
In the past, when production was interrupted by natural hazards, 
families sought to replace 'lost' income by redeploying labour, typically 
by increasing the numbers employed ei ther in the domestic or overseas 
wage sector. But this mix of opportunities is no longer as readily 
available as it once was. Prospects of deployment overseas have 
declined for many Samoans and the tightening of immigration 
regulations in popular destinations has reduced the possibility of 
'informal' employment. The effective limitation of overseas employment 
opportunities to people with either recognised skills or capital means 
that these are not available to the many Western Samoans who have 
neither. Furthermore, with businesses cutting costs by relying on 
unpaid family labour, the opportunities for redeployment within the 
domestic wage sector are very limited. 
The situation is likely to get worse. Government has acknowledged 
that many of its departments are over-staffed and that there is a 
mismatch of available and required skills (AIDAB 1994:41-2) and has 
moved to reorganise the public service by reducing the size of spending 
departments and increasing the size of revenue collecting ones. The net 
effect to date has been a small reduction in the size of the service from 
4,339 in 1991 to 4,290 in 1994. Further and more significant reductions 
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can be expected as government departments and units are corporatised 
and privatised to reduce government activity, overheads, and 
spending. 
In the past, when income fell, some Western Samoans called on 
migrant kin to replace the 'loss' with additional remittances. This 
option is no longer as readily available as it once was for several 
reasons. The first is that as studies have shown both the capacity as a 
consequence of declining incomes and increased costs which have 
followed economic restructuring in New Zealand and Australia 
(Macpherson 1992); the willingness to remit is falling among certain 
sections of the migrant population (Macpherson 1994) and among 
migrants' New Zealand-born children as a consequence of the 
attenuation of links with their parents' birthplace (Maingay 1995); as a 
consequence of the increasing pressure on discretionary income 
exerted by the participation in fa ' a samoa in migrant communities; and 
because as parents either die, or join their migrant children overseas, 
one of the most powerful incentives to remit is lost. 
Which way out? 
Politicians in Western Samoa tend to be divided between those who 
believe that the shock is what is needed to force Samoans to face 
economic realities and to diversify into a wider range of activi ties and 
to increase both production and productivity and those who believe 
that the present situation is a temporary aberration. The latter tend to 
believe that things will improve as families respond by redeploying 
members in states in which incomes are higher and economic 
conditions are more favourable. The model, which seems to have been 
adapted from the 'transnational kin corporation' model that was 
popular a few years ago, seems to assume rather more choice than is 
available in reality and that economic opportunities for semi-skilled 
and unskilled labour will vary from state to state. 
The most serious weakness of this argument is that the economies 
of the receiving states are being restructured along similar lines but a t  
different speeds. Therefore, moving people from New Zealand, where 
restructuring has led to high levels of unemployment among unskilled 
and semiskilled people, to Australia may raise incomes in the short 
term, but, because Australia is now also restructuring her economy in 
ways which will have similar effects on the labour market, this strategy 
will only postpone the eventual crisis. The second fallacy in this 
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argument is that, as a number of studies have shown (Ahlburg 1991 
and Macpherson 1994) individuals' levels of remittance fell over time 
as they pass through different stages in the family life-cycle and as their 
links with their place of birth change and attenuate:  unless the current 
remitters are replaced by other new ones, which seems unlikely, 
redeployment cannot provide long-term certainty of supply. 
Other politicians, often those involved in development and 
agriculture, argue that the crisis provides an opportunity because it  will 
force people to increase and diversify production to replace falling 
remittance income and government largesse. It provides that most 
favourable set of conditions for the introduction of new, higher-value 
crops, and activi ties because people will be highly motivated to 
experiment with these. This reasoning may, based on evidence of quite 
rapid increases in production in the past, will be shown to be right. 
There is, however, some ground for caution with this line of argument. 
Samoans' experiences, most recently with the dramatic collapse of 
the taro market, have made them caution of 'wonder crop' claims of 
agricultural scientists and extension officers. As a lecturer in tropical 
agriculture noted in an opening address to an open day for farmers at 
Alafua Agricultural College, every failure, for whatever reason, of a new 
crop makes it more difficult to persuade farmers to consider the next 
one and makes them increasingly skeptical about the claims of those 
who promote the crop from the comfort of their offices and laboratories 
and without shouldering any of the risks'. 
The second problem may well be the increasingly skeptical response 
to the exhortations of politicians to increase primary production. When 
prominent politicians recently advised people to cut the cost of living 
by ex tending their plantations and fishing more, they were confronted 
by widespread criticism which seemed to rest largely on the public 
belief that j_t was easy for politicians to make such pronouncements 
because they had the income to allow them to hire others to do their 
plantation work and fishing for them and that they had access to 
government departments' resources and plant to allow them to do so. 
The latter belief stems, in part, from recent revelations of abuses of this 
type but also from a more general belief that people with political power 
will tend to use it to further their own interests. 
The third problem is that the circumstances which lead these 
politicians to be optimistic about increases in production are not 
always obvious to village people. Television projects a nightly message 
of relative prosperity and economic recovery in New Zealand News of 
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reduction in unemployment and increases in the numbers of people 
employed mask the fact that unemployment remains around 5.5 per 
cent and that much of this new work is poorly paid, casual or part-time 
work which carries with it little security. Futhermore, when there is a 
crisis in the village or in the family the migrants manage to provide 
money and food even where this involves huge personal sacrifices. The 
hard economic reality of migrants' life is often masked by their 
apparent ability to continue to give. For many people in the village it 
seems more rational to believe this message and plan on migration than 
it does to plant another crop which may or may not be destroyed by a 
disaster or introduced pest and which may or may not justify the 
investment of effort when it is finally sold . 
The government attempts to promote, with the assistance of aid 
donors, small business ventures as an alternative to agricultural 
activity. The promoters of these ventures often overlook the fact that 
small businesses in small and contracting economies are vulnerable 
because of under-capitalisation and the low incomes of potential clients 
and customers. They also appear to overlook the difficulties which are 
associated with conducting business among kin which have brought 
many small businesses in Samoa to their knees. Until such time as 
incomes rise and culture changes in small businesses seem unlikely to 
make any fundamental inroads into the problem. Even if these small 
businesses were to succeed they will not generate new sources of 
income for the national economy because as economists have noted, 
many of these businesses are in the service sector and 
services ( includ ing government administration) a re not exportable and 
do not general ly act as import substitutes. a weakening of the balance 
of payments could result (AIDA B  1 994:8). 
With certain exceptions, transfers into service sectors have more, 
short-term political benefits than longer term economic ones. 
Conclusion 
What options are available given that the genie is ,  in effect, out of the 
bottle? Medium and longer-term prospects for economic growth in the 
metropolitan economies are good but are likely to be capital, rather than 
labour, intensive. New Zealand wage rates, despite real falls, remain 
higher than those of their competitors in Southeast Asia as are those of 
Australia. This fact will keep pressure on New Zealand and Australian 
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industry to reduce labour costs by adopting automated forms of 
production where possible. Many of the new jobs which have been, and 
will be created, in New Zealand will be part-time ones with low wage 
rates and little protection. Furthermore, the New Zealand government, 
under pressure to reduce 'unproductive' social expenditure, has made 
these 'new' jobs available to currently unemployed residents of New 
Zealand and has put them under increasing pressure to accept these or 
face cuts in their unemployment and other benefits. With a considerable 
pool of 'reserve labour ' available in New Zealand, it is highly unlikely 
that Western Samoan migrants will be needed to fill these positions. 
Furthermore, the conditions which once led New Zealand 
manufacturers to establish industries and to import labour from 
Western Samoa for them have changed as a consequence of economic 
deregulation. There is no longer any obstacle to New Zealand 
industrialists who wish to relocate and to invest in manufacturing in 
low-wage states where they may also find that establishment costs are 
subsidised by governments anxious to obtain jobs and that they enjoy 
access to various markets which might otherwise be less accessible . A 
number of firms have already chosen to relocate operations or have 
formed joint ventures in Fij i, Tonga and Queensland. Thus, the prospect 
of increases in opportunities for semiskilled and unskilled labour in the 
activities which have traditionally employed those workers would 
seem unlike! y. 
Furthermore, the removal of import restrictions and high tariffs has 
meant that it is now as profitable, and indeed sometimes more 
profitable, to import and sell many products as it is manufacture them 
in New Zealand.  As a consequence there has been a significant decline 
in the size of the labour intensive manufacturing sectors that once 
employed many Pacific islanders and this trend seems likely to 
continue. 
One alternative for the Western Samoan government is to encourage 
overseas manufacturers to relocate and to generate employment in 
Samoa. This policy has obvious attractions and, in the case of the 
Yazaki company, which employs around 4,000 Samoans and 
manufactures wiring harnesses for Japanese motor vehicle 
manufacturers, has shown that  manufacturing and assembling certain 
products significant distances from where the components are 
produced and from where the final product is used can be profitable. 
While the wages generated by such businesses are lower than those 
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which have been available to migrants in New Zealand, Australia and 
the United States the incomes of employees are spent in Samoa and can 
be taxed directly and indirectly. 
But, in promoting this strategy, Western Samoa is competing with 
states such as China which have larger populations and low wage 
levels, are closer to Southeast Asian manufacturing sites and markets, 
and have more sophisticated physical and financial infrastructures. 
There are significant risks in becoming dependent on a small number of 
large, overseas companies which can, and may, at any time choose to 
move to other sites where they are offered more favourable terms for the 
deployment of their capital . The economic and political consequences 
of such major disruptions in the domestic labour market are potentially 
very serious. 
Tourism represents an alternative source of employment and 
revenue for Western Samoa but there are significant difficulties in 
developing the market.While the natural and human 'assets'  are in 
place, the costs of promoting these in the high income North American, 
European and East-Asian markets are high and where regional 
resources are pooled in promotions ( Islands Business August 1995:21, 
23-4), Western Samoa has to complete with other Pacific island 
destinations such as Fij i  which have comparable assets, and more 
sophisticated infrastructures. 
The development of tourism has been hindered by the reduction in 
the number of international airlines flying into the region (Islands 
Business August 1995:28). The prospect of a revival of serious 
competition capable of bringing large numbers of tourists into regional 
hubs from which they might go on to Western Samoa is, according to 
airline industry analysts, unlikely. Even if such a development did 
occur, the costs of getting tourists from the hubs to Western Samo·a are 
high because of a deal between the Western Samoan govemment­
owned Polynesian Airlines and Air New Zealand which guarantees 
each a fixed return by effectively eliminating competition on the 
inbound routes and results in some of the highest airfares in the world 
(Islands Business November 1995 :10-11) .  
But  in a sense, dependence on tourism carries with i t  some of the 
same risks as dependence on labour migration. The tourist traffic 
volumes reflect the states of the metropolitan economies from which 
visitors come. These fluctuate for reasons which are beyond the control 
of microstates like Western Samoa and without regard for the amounts 
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of capital invested, and number of people employed in the industry. 
Furthermore, it is likely that cyclical downturns in tourism will 
coincide with fall in the remittances from migrants for obvious reasons 
and may simply mean that the size of the fluctuations will increase. 
In the 35 years since its independence in 1962 Western Samoa has 
moved from a situation in which it  was economically and politically 
independent to one in which the loss of economic sovereignty has led to 
a de facto loss of political sovereignty. Unless the governments manage 
to generate stronger domestic economic growth and to meet the rising 
aspirations of its citizens it will be faced with an increasingly restive 
popula tion. Furthermore, it must do so in a global political climate in 
which it will be difficult to provide shelters for domestic industrial 
growth and to maintain inefficient state-owned monopolies at the 
expense of aid donors. I t  may have to do so without the same levels of 
revenue which it has enjoyed from aid and from the indirect taxes on 
remittances. The deputy prime-minister and minister of finance 
announced recently that the Western Samoan economy had grown a 
respectable 9.6 per cent in 1995 and 6 per cent in 1996 but this is from a 
low base, and it has a long way to go before it can once again enjoy the 
economic strength which will again allow Western Samoan politicians 
to define and control their own political and economic agenda. 
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The politics of structural adjustment 
in Papua New Guinea: some po licy 
lessons 
David Kavanamur 
The spread of stabilisation and structural reform programs throughout 
the developing world during the 1980s was accompanied by a thriving 
debate among economists. The result was a voluminous literature, 
mostly concerned with the virtues and deficiencies of the substance, 
timing, sequencing, or impact of specific policy measures. From the 
mid-1980s onwards a parallel literature on the political d imensions of 
adjustment began to emerge. The literature on the politics of 
adjustment has attempted to provide answers to puzzles such as what 
leads governments to initiate reforms, and why some reform programs 
continue while others are cut short. Since 1985, attempts have been 
made towards theory building using case studies to 'build . . .  on the 
growing theoretical literature on the poli tics of economic policy, to 
forge more explicit connections to the central theoretical debates in 
comparative and international political economy, and to provide 
broader cross-national comparison'  (Haggard and Kaufman 1992:4) . 
These early works include a set of comparative case studies (Nelson 
1990), a collection of policy-oriented essays (Nelson 1989), and an 
attempt to set forth a model of how politics interact with adjustment 
and therefore how best to examine this interaction (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1992). 
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This chapter attempts to provide some answers to two pertinent 
questions on structural adjustment in Papua New Guinea namely: 
what caused the PNG government to initiate reforms and why did it 
persist or otherwise with the reform programs it  adopted? It addresses 
the factors that led the PNG government to initiate the 1981  internal 
structural reforms, and the 1990 and 1994 structural adjustment 
programs under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, and the factors that sustained or failed to 
sustain them. 
It thus provides some policy conclusions. While this paper does not 
aim at theory building (such as Jenkins 1993 using the Indian case), it 
is hoped that it  will nevertheless contribute to such a task, as well as 
towards broader research efforts on governance in the South Pacific. 
Factors in i n itiati ng structural adj ustment programs i n  
Papua New G u i nea 
Papua New Guinea has had three major stabilisation and economic 
reform programs in response to a balance of payments d isequilibrium 
caused by endogenous and exogenous factors: the first in 1981-82, the 
second in 1990 and the current one since 1994. What were the major 
factors behind the adoption of these reform programs? 
T he 1981 internal reforms 
Papua New Guinea experienced its first major and serious balance of 
payments disequilibrium in 1981 .  It had enjoyed almost five years of 
relative macroeconomic stability since monetary independence from 
Australia in 1976. The main causes were what became known in 
government circles as the 'swings, shocks and leaks' .  According to 
Philip Daniel and Rod Sims, two key economic advisors from 1976 to 
1982, 'swings' were t:he cyclical reductions in commodity prices. The 
'shocks', permanent changes in economic factors beyond Papua New 
Guinea's control, were the forecast of lower than expected long-term 
commodity prices for the 1980s (compared with the 1970s ), the decline 
in Bougainville Copper Limited ore grades, increased world interest 
rates and oil prices, and the higher than expected Australian inflation 
during the last two years of the 1976-81 Australian Aid Agreement 
(Daniel and Sims 1986a:73) . The 'leaks' or weaknesses in government 
policy were government overspending 01:1, for instance, three Dash 7 
aircraft for Air Niugini at a cost of K27 million, excessive levels of 
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private sector credit and excessive wage increases (Daniel and Sims 
1986a:73) .  
As the balance of payments continued to deteriorate towards the 
end of 198 1  the idea of borrowing from the IMF was mooted by the 
Bank of Papua New Guinea and by visiting IMF officials. They 
believed it would instil fiscal discipline on the government. The 
Finance Department and the National Planning Office (NPO), on the 
other hand, were deeply sceptical about the virtues of an IMF program 
and feared that submitting to the IMF would constitute admission of 
poor governance. They argued that it  made much more sense first to 
attempt expenditure reduction and then to tackle the real wage level 
directly at a Minimum Wage Board hearing (Daniel and Sims 
1986a:82-3) .  It was pointed out that it was much more suitable, given 
the politics and economics of the time, to resist an inflow of IMF funds 
in favour of obtaining political consent to a tough program of 
retrenchment. The Finance Minister at the time, Sir John Kaputin, who 
earned the reputation of a 'tough Finance Minister ' due to his stand 
against excessive government expenditure, together with the central 
government agencies were firmly of the view that no concerted action 
could be taken until political leaders, other members of parliament, 
the public service and the urban community in general were so well 
aware of the difficulties Papua New Guinea now faced that they 
would consent to a reasonably explicit program of real wage 
reduction. 
In the end, the political leaders, particularly the prime minister and 
finance minister, adopted the view expressed by the Finance 
Department and the National Planning Office. They decided not to 
approach the IMF in preference to internal adjustments. When the 
1982 budget was introduced in November 1981,  it called for two years 
of reduction in real goods and services expenditure and then only one 
per cent a year growth in government expenditure thereafter, staff 
reductions of approximately 1 ,000 be made across all activities, no 
purchase of motor vehicles for government use, increased government 
revenues, shift in expenditure to income-generating projects, control of 
private sector credit, control on real wage levels, and extra levels of 
Australian aid. Although the government of Prime Minister Sir Julius 
Chan did not return in the 1982 elections, the reform measures were 
espoused by the new Somare-led government. 
According to Daniel and Sims (1986a), the reform was successful .  
An expenditure reduction program was successfully implemented and 
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was in fact made still more severe during 1982, retrenchment of 1 ,000 
public servants in 1982 was largely achieved through abolishing 
funded but vacant positions, non-mineral revenues increased sharply 
by some K45 million (of which K30 million could be attributed to the 
various new measures), the government succeeded in obtaining a re­
adjustment within the terms of the Australian aid agreement in early 
1983, and after 1983 there was a gradual 10 per cent devaluation, 
followed by another 5 per cent in 1985. 
In the 1 981 reform program the initia tive to reform emerged from 
PNG politicians, aptly advised by a core of economic advisors. This 
was despite the fact that important elements within the government, 
including the Deputy Prime Minister, ( the late Sir Iambaky Okuk), 
were more inclined to increase spending than to reduce it as the June 
1982 general election was looming. The government had the resolve to 
implement internally designed stringent reform measures rather than 
approach the IMF. And although the Chan government was not 
returned to power in the 1982 election, its loss cannot realistically be 
attributed to the reform measures. The coalition appears to have been 
defeated by the continued fall in commodity prices in the first half of 
1 982, and the growing belief that some members of parliament and 
Ministers were more interested in personal gain than in service to their 
electorates. I t  also reflected the enduring belief that Sir Michael 
Somare had been a successful Prime Minister, but his government had 
been turned out of power not through the ballot box but through 
political manoevouring that had brought the Chan government to 
power after a vote of no confidence (Daniel and Sims 1986a) . 
T he 1990 World Bank/IMF structural adj ustment program 
The country's second major shock arose in 1990 from a very lopsided 
economy, showing increasing dependence on the mineral sector, 
dwindling international reserves, poor economic growth rates, and 
diminishing employment opportunities. It was exacerbated by the 
closure of the Bougainville mine in May 1989 arising from rebel 
activities. The Bougainville copper mine was a major source of 
revenue. Direct revenue to the government from the mine constituted 
about 20 per cent of total revenue via the Mineral Resources 
Stabilisation Fund (MRSF). Moreover, the mine had an annual output 
of about 570,000 tonnes of copper concentrate which generated about 
40 per cent of the country's total export mcome. 
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The Bank of Papua New Guinea towards the end of 1989 had 
projected that in the absence of any policy measures, the balance of 
payments would have recorded an overall deficit of around K270 
million in 1990, leaving foreign exchange reserves at an unsustainably 
low level (Bank of PNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December 1990) . 
Against the bleak economic backdrop, the government was faced with 
no alternative but to finance the deficit. Both politicians and 
bureaucrats were aware of the need to eliminate longstanding 
structural impediments to the growth of the economy. The decision to 
initiate reforms was put to the IMF mission that v isits Papua New 
Guinea annually under Article IV of the IMF Agreement concerning 
consultations. The government was well aware that it could not rely 
on the country 's foreign exchange reserves. Reserves were already 
near depletion. Nor could it possibly attract additional inflows of 
short-term capital given the sudden closure of the BCL mine. What 
was possible under the circumstances, however, was to obtain long­
term concessional loans and grants from the international donor 
community, including the World Bank and IMF. 
To this end, K410 million was hastily obtained in 1990 from the two 
Bretton Woods institutions. Prior to the granting of these funds, the 
PNG government had adopted a set of policy measures that included 
the following 
• a 10 per cent devaluation of the currency 
• a net cu t of KBO million in Government expenditure, of 
which K74 million was determined by a committee headed 
by the Prime Minister 
• a restrained wages policy, including an agreement between 
the government and the Public Employees Association to 
discount up to 2 percentage points from wage increases, as 
determined by the Minimum Wages Board, and 
• a tight monetary policy stance which was nevertheless 
accommodative to the credit needs of the non-mining sector 
(Bank of PNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December 1990) . 
Phase 2 involved medium to long-term structural adjustment and 
development centring on the need to remove long-standing structural 
weaknesses in the non-mining sector. Included in the program were 
the following: human resource development; investment deregulation 
and promotion; trade policy reforms; privatisation and 
commercialisation of government parastatals; encouraging domestic 
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resource mobilisation; simplifying the regulatory framework for 
investment; emphasis on increasing government investment in high­
yielding projects compared to consumption; policies to improve land 
administration; broadening the tax base, including a shift from direct 
to indirect tax; and policies to improve the transportation, 
communication and other infrastructure facilities (Department of 
Finance and Planning 1991 :2-5) .  
How far was PNG's structural adjustment program, initiated in 
1990, implemented? At the outset, it should be noted that the 
government, having realised that the economy had stabilised earlier 
than expected, proceeded to relax the tight monetary and fiscal stance 
it took as a result of the loss of revenue from the Bougainville mine in 
late 1990. In particular, budgetary cuts were less than the anticipated 
K80 million; the lending rate was reduced; reductions in the size of the 
public service were offset by new recruitment; and wage restraint, 
which was to last for two years (to the end of 1991 ), was relaxed 
earlier than planned . In short, the cutbacks achieved in the early part 
of 1990 were more than compensated by the end of that  year. This was 
not welcomed by the private sector as it meant that they were left 
alone to bear the burden of adjustment. 
Nevertheless, the government, in reaffirming its commitment to the 
belief that the development of the non-mining sector depended on the 
growth of the private sector, made sweeping revisions in its policy 
regarding the private sector and the wider economy. One notable 
change was the lowering of corporate tax rates from 30 per cent to 25 
per cent .  This, it believed, would lower the tax burden on companies 
and therefore contribute to making Papua New Guinea more 
competitive vis a vis neighbouring countries. I t  was also an attempt to 
stimulate investment and job creation . 
Moreover, it proceeded to remove taxes on employment-related 
benefits; to standardise retail sales tax rates to a maximum of 2 per 
cent (compared with the previous levels of 1 .5-6 per cent); to eliminate 
taxes on telephone and electricity services; and to introduce a new tax 
collection system for mining and petroleum companies (Economic 
Intelligence Unit 1992) . Against the obvious point that  it  would 
thereby lose substantial revenue, it projected that  mineral receipts 
would assist in covering the tax cuts. In addition, in August 1992, the 
Minimum Wages Board took the decision to cut the urban minimum 
wage from just over K60 per week to K23, which was previously the 
rural rate (Economic Intelligence Unit 1992). Coupled with this, i t  
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decided to discontinue the practice of automatic wage indexation and 
to allow minimum wage rates to be determined by employer­
employee bargaining based on productivity and ability to pay. Having 
reduced the minimum wage, it also undertook to raise the personal 
income tax threshold from K2,400 to K3,000, which relieved an 
estimated 1 7,000 people from having to pay income tax. This is about 
7.6 per cent of the 225,000 persons engaged in wage employment out 
of a potential 2 million labour force. 
In a move to remove some of the constraints on the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors and in response to a shared view by 
investors that government administration and regulations are much 
more prohibitive than the physical and economic constraints (Daniel 
and Sims 1986b), the Government Regulations Advisory Committee 
(GRAC), was established comprising both government and private 
sector officials. It drew up a set of trade reforms, including investment 
deregulation, which replaced the cumbersome National Investment 
Development Authority (NIDA) with the Investment Promotion 
Authority (IPA); land deregulation to solve the current scarcity of 
land; providing easy access to work permits for non-citizens; 
eliminating price controls and subsidies over the medium to long 
term; and removing quantitative restrictions (quotas) and bans and 
replacing some of these with tariffs (Department of Finance and 
Planning 1991 ) . In addition, import duties on inputs to agriculture, 
fishing, forestry, manufacture and tourism were reduced to zero. 
Convinced that the supply conditions in manufacturing are subject 
to increasing returns to scale with higher income elasticity of demand, 
the government undertook to promote industrial development 
vigorously. I ts role, as outlined in the Medium Term Industry and 
Trade Development Action Plan (1991 ), it believed, was merely to 
provide the necessary conditions for the proper functioning of market 
forces. The Action Plan aimed to address some of the long-standing 
problems including a short supply of skilled labour; high labour costs 
and low productivity; high land, housing, transport and utility costs; 
poor information availability and access; inappropriate technology; 
persistent law and order problems; and, due to the terrain of the 
country, a small fragmented market. 
Finally, in response to persistent criticisms of the quality of 
education both from within the country and abroad, despite high 
expenditure since independence on this sector ( 13-17 per cent of total 
government expenditure), the government undertook to work towards 
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providing free primary education; upgrading teacher training; 
endorsing the establishment of the National Training Council; placing 
emphasis on skill-enhancing courses; and upgrading educational 
institutions. Renewed efforts were also made in the way of 
encouraging the private sector 's involvement in the running of 
educational institutions. 
It is difficult to pinpoin t whether the impetus for the 1990 
structural adjustment program emanated primarily from the 
government or the IMF /World Bank. This is because although the 
government was aware of the need to rectify long-standing structural 
impediments to the growth of the non-mining sector, i t  kept on 
postponing necessary painful measures. What is clear, however, is that 
the government was taken by surprise by the shock closure of the BCL 
mine which had been its 'cash cow' since the 1970s and therefore had 
to adopt an IMF /World Bank structural adjustment program. When it 
did so the opposition accused the government of pressing 'panic 
buttons' and that it could have handled the crisis with internal 
adjustments. With hindsight, this may have been true since the 
economy had self-stabilised before the government commenced 
drawing down on the secured loans by the last quarter of 1990 and at 
one stage was accused by the IMF of dragging its feet on loan 
drawdowns (Kavanamur 1997). This, coupled with the prospects of 
large revenues from new resource projects, lifted the sense of crisis. 
However, even if the government had handled the crisis via internal 
reform measures, structural impediments would have remained 
unattended to, as was the actual case until 1994. 
Structural adjustment reintroduced in 1994 
The adoption of the second World Bank/ IMF sponsored structural 
adjustment program in 1994 can be partly attributed to the 
government's failure to implement reform measures fully the 1990 
structural adjustment program. This earlier program was abandoned 
as a result of the mineral and petroleum boom euphoria of 1990, 
among other factors. A widely quoted and reported document in the 
local press unintentionally contributed to this euphoria (Parsons and 
Vincent 1991) .  Although the purpose of this document was to d iscuss 
how best the anticipated increased revenue could be utilised for 
development purposes, it nevertheless generated perceptions in the 
minds of politicians of an influx of potential massive petro-dollars, 
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hence the postponement of painful measures such as public service 
cuts and expenditure restraint. 
After the 1992 national election, a new government was installed 
proclaiming popular policies such as free education and commodity 
price support. Thus by 1993 it was evident that the government had 
lost its grip on budgetary deficits. National departments overspent on 
mainly goods and services, wages and travel by both administrative 
personnel and politicians. Over K91 million was given to the 
commodity stabilisation funds for major tree crops. Huge educational 
subsidies were paid as well as funds given to the village services 
program and the electoral development fund . Funds for the latter 
were raised to Kl00,000 per member of parliament in 1993 and then to 
K300,000 in 1994. Overall, the budget overshot by a substantial margin 
(Table 5 . 1 ) .  
Huge expenditures were not matched by revenue inflows in  the 
1990-93 period. A cash flow squeeze emerged in early 1994 resulting 
in the closure of many boarding schools, drying up of medicine 
supplies, government bills of K200 million not paid, and so on. The 
immediate response was to reintroduce stabilisation measures 
entailing the tightening of monetary and fiscal policies under the 
auspices of the IMF. This was followed by the implementation of 
structural adjustment policies under the guidance of the World Bank 
Table 5.1 Budget deficit, 1 988-97 (per cent of GDP) 
1988 
1 989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1 996 
1997 
Planned 
0.7 
0.3 
1.2 
2.5 
1.2 
3.3 
4.7 
1.0 
1.0 
0.6 
Actual 
0.9 
1. 1 
3.3 
4.6 
5.6 
5 .9  
2 .5 
1.0 
1.1 
Source: Bank of Papua New G uinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, 1 995 Vol . 1 ; 
Department of Finance and P lanning, Budget Papers, Port  Moresby. 
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However, prior to approaching the Bretton Woods institutions the 
government undertook the following internal stabilisation measures 
aimed at tightening fiscal and monetary policies, expenditure 
restraint, and depreciating the foreign exchange rate 
• introduction of a mini-budget in March 1994 aimed at 
trimming expenditure by K545 million and raising revenue 
by K81 million 
• setting up of an Executive Expenditure Controls Committee 
in July 1994 by the cabinet to monitor all government 
expenditure 
• devaluation of the kina in September 1994, eventual 
adoption of a free-floating exchange rate in October 1994, 
and introduction of screen-trading in the kina foreign 
exchange to stabilise the fast declining rate and hence restore 
investors' confidence in the kina 
• raising of the Minimum Liquidity Assets Ratio from 11 to 32 
per cent by March 1995 
• introduction of a Supply Bill for the first quarter of 1 995 as 
the 1995 budget was still pending awaiting negotiations with 
the IMF and World Bank (Mawuli 1995) . 
Benefits from the above measures began to materialise in the first 
quarter of 1 995, including a budget surplus compared to the 
corresponding period of 1994. Neverthelesss negotiations with the 
World Bank for a US$50 million loan were still undertaken since the 
balance of payments crisis was not transitory in nature. Also, the 
extreme reluctance of the international donor community (particularly 
Australia and international commercial banks) to lend money to the 
government without first adopting a World Bank/IMF package was 
all the more reason to sustain negotiations. 
The opposition gave its support to the government's stabilisation 
measures but called for more sacrifices at the political level-a call 
which went unheeded. It argued that tough decisions meant not only 
cutting the size of the public service and wage freeze, but also cutting 
ministries, reducing the number of government departments, 
minimising Vice Minister posts, abolishing members and Ministerial 
allowances, reducing salaries and allowances of departmental and 
statutory bodies heads, and a 20 per cent cut on members' and 
ministers' salaries. The opposition also encouraged the government to 
invite the IMF and World Bank (Post Courier 8 March 1995:6). 
Individuals also called on the government to invite the Bretton Woods 
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institutions. A few non-governmental organisations attempted to 
cultivate support against the engagement of the two institutions, but 
to no avail. 
After many reports that negotiations had reached a stalemate a 
memorandum of understanding was finally reached between the 
government and the IMF /World Bank to establish a framework for a 
standby facility and a structural adjustment program in April 1995. 
This was immediately followed by the release of the first tranche loan 
of US$25 million. However, this was only done after the government 
had succumbed to a total of 27 conditions imposed by the World Bank 
ranging from reaching macro targets to land reforms. The release of 
the second tranche loan was made conditional upon satisfactory 
implementation of these conditions. As it turned out, the second 
tranche of the US$50 million was on hold for more than a year until 
January 1997. 
The loan was put on hold after the World Bank had raised concerns 
over, among other things, logging practices of some companies and 
the power to appoint members to the National Forest Authority being 
vested in the Forestry Minister instead of with the Authority itself. 
This resulted in a 90-day ultimatum issued by the World Bank for the 
government to meet nine outstanding conditions of a total of 27. While 
the government did meet five of the outstanding conditions, the World 
Bank president, James Wolfensohn, had to recommend a waiver on the 
remaining conditions on the grounds that steps had been taken to 
meet them. The stalled payment of the second tranche loan had led to 
heated exchanges between the parties involved, with the Finance 
Minister at one stage accusing World Bank officials of meddling in the 
nation's sovereignty. At another stage, a World Bank review team had 
to cut short its visit as a result of disagreements. Nevertheless, 
immediately after the conclusion of the first loan, the Finance Minister 
took the opportunity to announce the government's intention to 
commence negotiations on the second loan of about US$50-100 
million from the World Bank. 
It was not surprising that the release of the second tranche had to 
be withheld for over a year as many of the conditions that the World 
Bank imposed were politically sensitive. The call for nationwide land 
reform was one of the most sensitive conditions as it called for 
customary land registration, triggering off widespread fears that the 
World Bank and the government were attempting to take away 
people's land. Teams of Unisearch PNG Pty Ltd researchers who 
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conducted a nationwide poverty assessment survey on behalf of the 
World Bank in 1996 reported widespread fears that the survey, 
together with attempts in early 1995 to register land were part of a 
grand process to subject all Papua New Guineans to the World Bank. 
Another group of researchers from the same company undertaking a 
time-use study to ascertain farmer behaviour in the country, 
experienced difficulties in obtaining cooperation for the same reason 
(Levett, Sagir, Kopel and Kavanamur 1997). Some farmers resented 
being followed around by enumerators from when they woke up to 
the time they went to sleep mainly because of the earlier adverse 
campaigns against land reform particularly by non-government 
organisations, university students and trade unions. 
Poor handling of the World Bank-initiated Land Mobilization Act led 
to misinterpretation by interest groups and ultimately village people. 
At the University of Papua New Guinea, students confiscated and 
burnt five government vehicles in protest. In Enga more than 2,000 
people turned rowdy and shouted down the lawyer heading the 
drafting of the proposed legislation as he tried to explain the benefits 
of land registration (Post Courier 18 July 1995) .  The law firm had to 
terminate its provincial tours and the draft legislation had to be 
indefinitely sidelined. 
Clearly, under the proposed legislation customary landowners 
would be able to enter into commercial arrangements once they had 
titles to their land. However, given that ' land is life' in Melanesia the 
government should have taken time to explain the benefits to the 
masses and the World Bank should have been more sensitive. The 
timing was wrong. It came hot on the heels of the passing of the 
reformed Organic Law on Provincial Government- legislation widely 
perceived to have been bulldozed through parliament against public 
opinion. 
The decision to adopt a structural adjustment program in 1994 was 
clearly caused by the cash flow crisis arising from overexpenditure 
since 1991 and the government's postponement of stringent measures 
entailed in the 1990 structural adjustment program. In January 1995, 
the Finance Minister announced that Papua New Guinea was going to 
attempt rescuing itself first .  He said that ' the government is not in a 
rush to negotiate a rescue package being offered by the IMF /World 
Bank' (Post Cou rier 6 January 1995:4). He lamented at the tendency of 
these two institutions to thrust their conditions on member nations. 
However, by April 1995, international reserves had been depleted to 
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only a few days import cover. The Prime Minister was left with little 
choice but to cut into the Australian Prime Minister 's holiday in 
Cairns to request financial support to help prop up the ailing kina and 
international reserves. Indeed, pressure for Papua New Guinea to 
adopt an IMF /World Bank package was exerted by Canberra, the 
opposition, individuals, and the Institute of National Affairs-an 
influential private sector-funded research institute in Papua New 
Guinea. 
To susta i n  or not to sustai n  
Of the three adjustment periods that Papua New Guinea has had to 
contend with thus far, only the 1981 adjustment measures were 
successfully sustained.  The 1994 program has hitherto been sustained, 
but there are doubts about its continued sustainability. 
A number of factors were responsible for making the 1981 reform 
program stick. First, there was a high degree of technocratic consensus 
regarding the need to reform the economy. Key economic advisors 
from the Finance Department, National Planning Office and the Bank 
of Papua New Guinea generally agreed on the need for Papua New 
Guinea to live within its means and to divert resources and efforts 
towards removing supply constraints. This was despite disagreements 
on whether the reforms should be done internally or via the Bretton 
Woods institutions. It is also interesting to note that the technocratic 
elites gave advice without fear or favour reflecting the relative 
independence of the civil service. Moreover, key ministers within the 
government were receptive to the advice rendered by the technocrats 
backed up by a relatively competent public service. In particular, the 
Finance Minister with the support of the Prime Minister insisted on 
expenditure restraint, and disliked conflicting advice from 
technocrats. Furthermore, the opposition in its haste to score political 
points by criticising the government of extravagant spending in its 
1981 Budget speech had locked itself into supporting the reforms 
entailed in the 1982 Budget when it was tabled in November 1981 .  
Second, the 1 981 reforms were internally designed without the help 
of the IMF /World Bank, hence there was a high degree of commitment 
to their implementation. 
Third, the manner of presentation of the reform measures in the 
1982 Budget had a direct bearing on the implementation of the 
reforms. Sentiments expressed by the World Bank in its various 
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reports on the need for developing countries to adjust to new 
circumstances and that such efforts depended directly on domestic 
management were widely used in ministerial briefings on the 
economy. The use of the word 'bankrupt' in government briefs also 
assisted in incubating the right climate for reforms. Hence, the 
decisions on the 1982 Budget were made against the backdrop of an 
intensive program of briefing of the National Executive Council, 
provincial premiers, departmental heads, and the Public Services 
Commission-in view of the commissioners' importance in public 
sector wage questions. The educational process employed written 
briefs and slide presentations depicting the effect on the government's 
debt and the economy's balance of payments of all the possible 
options available and of the outlook of the strategy eventually 
adopted for the 1982 Budget. In fact, the budget achieved unusually 
substantial press coverage. Finally, there was continuity in the 
implementation of the reforms under the new Somare-led government 
that took office after the 1982 election. 
When the 1981 reform program is juxtaposed with the 1990 
structural adjustment program major differences emerge. The latter 
was aborted immediately. It has been noted elsewhere that upon 
realising that the economy had stabilised earlier than expected, the 
government wasted no time in abandoning the more stringent 
measures namely reducing budget deficits (Table 5. 1 )  and trimming 
the 60,900 strong public service. This is not to say, however, that less 
stringent measures including broadening the tax base and investment 
deregulation targeted at stimulating the non-mining sector were 
neglected . 
Unlike the 1981 structural adjustment program, many of the 
adjustment policies in the 1990 program were drawn up under the 
guidance of the IMF /World Bank. And although there was wide 
publicity of the balance of payments crisis and public debate on policy 
options facilitated by the Institute of National Affairs and the National 
Research Institute (Dahanayake 1990), the Opposition was not 
convinced that the government had exhausted all options before 
inviting the Bretton Woods institu tions. 
A number of factors can be ventured for the unsuccessful a ttempt 
to implement structural reforms in 1990. First, the economy had 
stabilised itself before the end of the first year of adjustment .  Second, 
the euphoria of an impending mineral boom generated by an 
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exploration boom in the la tter part of the 1980s lifted the sense of crisis 
(Duncan and Temu 1995; Garnaut 1995) .  Finally, the looming 1992 
elections may have contributed to the lax attitude towards 
expenditure restraint in 1990 as in PNG elections, there is a high 
degree of correlation between electoral success and the volume of 
public money spent. 
Sustaining the 1994 structural adjustment program has not been 
conspicuously satisfactory. As has been alluded to elsewhere, the 
government had initiated stabilisation measures as a prerequisite to 
accessing IMF balance of payments support of K70.9 million in 1995, 
K36.2 million from Japan's Exim Bank, K69.4 million from the 
Australian government, and US$25 million as part of the first tranche 
from the World Bank's US$50 million loan. The second tranche loan 
from the latter was released only after the PNG government had 
struggled for over a year to fulfil abou t  75 per cent of the 27 conditions 
set. Three of the outstanding conditions had to be waived by the 
World Bank president. I t  must, however, be noted that the most 
stringent and politically sensitive measures including the reduction of 
the budget deficit to less than 1 per cent, shedding of 4,568 public 
servants, tariff elimination, privatisation, land reforms, and 
elimination of the reserved business activities list for citizens have not 
been satisfactorily implemented. 
Notwithstanding the 75 per cent success of the government in 
sustaining reforms in the period 1994-96, pressure is mounting from 
within the government to reverse reform measures already 
implemented or to stifle progress made towards implementing the 
more painful measures. A number of examples of this danger exist. 
First, the budget deficit  of 1 per cent achieved in 1995 increased to 1 . 1  
per cent in 1996 (Table 5. 1 )  and i s  likely t o  increase t o  2 per cent in 
1997 when one takes into account the contract with the British-based 
Sandline International for the purchase of consultancy services and 
military equipment for the PNG defence force and the fact that the 
Finance Department is struggling to prevent departmental heads 
including provincial administrators from overspending their budgets .  
Despite warnings issued by the Finance Department in November 
1 996 that it would suspend heads of departments who overspent, it 
was apparent by April 1997 that another budget blow-out was 
imminent (The National 30 April 1997) . Duncan and Temu (1995) have 
commented that penalties have always been in place for departments 
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which overspent but enforcement has generally been lacking. The lack 
of control is reminiscent of the 'weak state' phenomenon that  has been 
used to describe the state in Papua New Guinea (Larmour 1995) .  
Second, progress towards retrenching 7.5 per cent of some 60,900 
individuals on the p1blic payroll has been slow (World Bank Review 
Mission, March 1997:5) .  To date, only a total of 2,750 (4.5 per cent) 
public servants and other public officials have been retrenched . 
According to the Department of Personnel Management, a more 
limited staff reduction exercise would be undertaken in 1 997 (Post 
Courier 24 April 1997) .  The delay was partly due to the diversion of 
retrenchment funds to meet the Sandline contract of K36 million. 
Third, the World Bank has raised concern with the apparent 
deterioration of governance and accountability in the use of public 
resources particularly in relation to a number of questionable 
decisions by the Tenders Board and decisions to write-off the Coffee 
Industries Corporation debt to the state without putting in place 
appropriate measures to prevent future defaults (Hamidian-Rad 
1 997). The move by the Finance Minister to raise US$1 8 million as first 
instalment of Sandline International is another case in point depicting 
lack of accountabili ty. It was revealed to the Andrew Commission of 
Inquiry into the Sandline affairs that the Finance Minister, acting 
against technocratic advice and in direct contravention of the 
Appropriation Act-which allows the minister to authorise re­
allocation up to a limit of K2 million-directed finance officials to 
slash budgetary allocations to a number of departments (PostCourier, 
22 April 1997). 
Fourth, another recent concern of the World Bank is in relation to 
increasing pressures from various government departments to 'reverse 
policy reforms adopted under the first phase of the reform program, 
particularly the tariff reform and the framework to promote direct 
foreign investment' (Hamidian-Rad 1997:2). It appears that tariff 
protection continues to be accorded to selected commercial projects 
such as the Napa Napa oil refinery, and there have been a number of 
departmental submissions aimed at extending the period for 
achieving full tariff liberalisation from 1998 to 2005. The World Bank 
has also queried the re-introduction of investment certification 
function by the Investment Promotion Authority which it  perceives as 
a constraint to foreign investment. Finally, whilst progress has been 
made towards privatising a limited number of public enterprises, land 
reform and the elimination of the reserved business activities lists for 
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ci tizens have been stalled due to the existence of strong poli tical and 
social opinion regarding these two conditions. 
The current structural adj ustment program initiated in 1994 has 
demonstrated that whilst it is relatively easy to stabilise PNG's 
economy, it  is often difficult to sustain structural adjustment for at 
least over a year. The first phase of the cur rent program shows that for 
it to be sustained there had to be constan t monitoring by the World 
Bank to ensure implementation of externally set conditions-evident 
in the 90-day ultimatum issued to Papua New Guinea in 1996. 
Moreover, unlike in the 1980s, the independence of the public service 
has been gradually eroded so that technocrats no longer give advice 
without fear or favour. This has been caused by the downgrading of 
the role of the Public Service Commission resulting in pervasive 
political interference in the appointment of departmental heads and a 
high turnover of departmental heads of the finance department 
despite the introduction of contracts for such officials. A related 
development is that of the tendency for ministers of key ministries to 
disregard technocratic ad vice. For instance, in the area of fiscal 
discipline the Sandline deal revealed that the Finance Minister 
disregarded advice and set procedures outlined in the Public Finance 
Managemen t  Act as well as the Appropriation Act. And reminiscent of a 
weakening administrative layer, key officials could not resist his 
advances, and knowing the potential dangers, provided advice on 
how to manoeuvre around legal and procedural obstacles. 
Furthermore, it is evident from events in 1994-96 that the 
government is prepared to implement conditions which evoke less 
political dissent in order to unlock some immediate inflows of capital. 
This calls for the World Bank/IMF to be more politically sensitive. It 
would be better to delay certain policy changes in relation to, for 
example, land reform and the elimination of the reserved business 
activities list, until the political conditions are right. A recent study of 
the reserved business activities list recommended that whilst the 
government should maintain its stand to remove this list in line with 
the World Bank's wishes, its phasing out should be gradual over a 
period of five years to allow sufficient time for the government, 
reserved businesses and the public to absorb the impact (Darkoh, 
Mawuli and Kavanamur 1996:62). The recommendation was based on 
a survey of 461 enterprises and a total of 381 key informants sampled 
from all the provinces except North Solomon. Indeed, it is ironic that 
with the vast experience of the two Bretton Woods institutions in 
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Africa, South Asia and Latin America, they have not been able to 
identify with some confidence the conditions in which governments 
will make promises to them, but end up defaulting. Encouraging 
governments to adopt politically sensitive conditions on the basis of 
false expectations i� often counter-productive as has been observed 
elsewhere (Harvey 1993) . 
Some pol icy concl usions 
Causes of balance of payments crises in Papua New Guinea have been 
attributed to both internal and external factors or 'swings, shocks and 
leaks' (Daniel and Sims 1986a) .  In 1981 ,  the initiative to reform 
emerged from within, and policy changes were internally designed. 
Although by 1990 both politicians and bureaucrats were aware of the 
need to eliminate long-standing structural impediments to the growth 
of the non-mining sector, complacency led to procrastination in 
implementing policy reforms. The Bougainville crisis may have been a 
blessing in disguise as it provided on opportune time to adjust the 
economy, but lack of political will and polit ical impediments, among 
other factors, prevented sustainment. The decision to adopt a 
structural adjustment in 1994 was caused by the cash flow crisis which 
arose from runaway budgetary deficits since 1991 . Although the 
government implemented internally designed stabilisation measures, 
it became apparent by 1995 that there was a need for externally 
sourced funds to prevent Papua New Guinea's emerging modem cash 
economy from collapsing. 
Both political and bureaucratic decisionmakers must be convinced 
about the utility of structural adjustment programs and should 
prepare their own proposals for policy changes to complement those 
set by the IMF / World Bank. If some of the policy changes are not 
internally designed then the agenda will be set by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. The government will negotiate from weakness and may 
become less than fully committed to the changes. As a result the 
probability is, that the program will be abandoned before any benefits 
accrue. Thus far, Papua New Guinea's experience shows that  
sustained implementation requires 
• a high degree of political and technocratic consensus on the 
need to reform the economy 
• greater technocratic and administrative competence to 
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handle procedural requirements and undertake 
implementation of measures 
• a strong Finance Department 
• receptiveness of key ministers to technical advice 
• in ternal design of aspects of the program 
• sensitivity on the part of IMF / World Bank on measures that 
may evoke widespread political dissent 
• periodic monitoring of the implementation process and 
application of some pressure by the IMF /World Bank. 
Based on Papua New Guinea's struggle to implement the 1990 and 
the 1994 programs we can highlight a number of policy issues. First, 
there has been a decline in the independence of the public service such 
that technocrats are unable to provide advice without fear of 
retribution from their political masters. It appears that the public 
sector has generally deteriorated as a result of pervasive political 
interference in the appointment of departmental heads, a low sense of 
nationalism, compartmentalisation and fragmentation of departments, 
and bureaucratic envy and rivalry among departments at both the 
provincial and national levels. The crucial importance of a competent 
civil service and the development of a corps of economic technocrats 
for policy reform and economic development has been evident in the 
economic success of East Asia (World Bank 1993) . 
Second, there has been a decline in the reputation of the Finance 
Department as ' tough' on fiscal discipline-a reputation it earned in 
the 1970s and 1980s. There has also been a high turnover of its chief 
executives. It has had six different heads since the mid-1980s. A third 
point to be made relates to the high turnover of politicians during 
general elections and hence lack of policy continuity. The 1992 
elections saw a turnover rate of 60 per cent of the sitting 109 Members 
of Parliament (Saffu 1996) . This is likely to increase to about 80 per 
cent in the 1997 elections. Thus, there is little policy continuity as those 
who may have gained valuable experience, and learned important 
policy lessons from past adjustments, lose their seats. And as new 
poli ticians come into parliament, they scramble for whatever public 
resources are available to implement their, more often than not, 
populist policies as guarantees for re-election. Many candidates for the 
June 1997 election were promising voters free education rather than 
fee subsidisation, 75 per cent medical insurance cover for the elderly, a 
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reversal of the user-pay policy in education and health, and so on. 
Hence, it now appears that general elections beget budget blowouts. 
Fourth, because it is relatively easy to stabilise the PNG economy 
quickly during times of balance of payments disequilibrium, the 
pressure for sustaining structural reforms is reduced . One possible 
explanation is that because the economy is heavily dependent on 
imports and that there is a high propensity to consume out of 
disposable income, any shock which reduces income quickly translates 
into a decline in consumption and falling imports (Elek 1991 ;  King 
1996). The same can also be said of government expenditure which is 
mainly on consumption and hence this can be readily adjusted in the 
face of shocks. Other explanations include the points that ongoing 
developments in the resource sector have helped to offset 
macroeconomic shocks by bringing in large inflows of foreign 
exchange; and finally unlike some developing countries, Papua New 
Guinea has not yet been abandoned by the international donor 
community. 
There appear to be inherent difficulties with sustaining 
commitment for structural adjustment programs. There are many 
explanations for this. Many of these can be bundled together under 
the argument that political rationality inherent in liberal democracies 
runs against economic rationality. Thus, well-intended policy reforms 
may be adopted after a balance of payments crisis but these may be 
aborted before general election time. Also, policy reforms are unlikely 
to be immediately implemented by a government that has just been 
voted into power on the basis of populist policies. Perhaps the best 
time to implement reforms is the period that lies between a year after 
election and a year before the next election. The danger, however, is 
that  reform measures already implemented will be reversed. Overall, 
sustainment of structural reforms in Papua New Guinea depends on 
how best policymakers address these political factors. 
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Deforestation and politics in 
Solomon Is lands 
Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka 
The world has become increasingly conscious of the social, political, 
economic, and environmental effects of large-scale resource 
development. Deforestation is a consequence of unsustainable logging 
practices, agricultural expansion, environmentally harmful 
development projects, population growth, and government policies. In 
international fora such as the 1992 United Nations-sponsored Rio 
environmental conference, for example, deforestation featured 
prominently. Following Rio, further discussions have been underway 
in an attempt to set up an international agreement for the 
management of forest resources. 
However, many governments have not translated these expressed 
concerns into practice. Tropical forests continue to disappear at an 
alarming rate. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reported 
that throughout the Third World, tropical forests are disappearing at a 
rate of almost 1 7  million hectares per year. In many cases governments 
play an important role in the destruction of rainforests. In Indonesia 
and Malaysia, for example, where the s tate has control over forest 
resource, the rate of deforestation continues to escalate (Hurst 1990) . 
In the Philippines, deforestation rates are declining merely because 
there are fewer 'forests to deforest '  (Dauvergne forthcoming). In the 
Philippines tropical hardwood trees declined from 15 million hectares 
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in 1970 to only 1 million in 1987. Indonesia, with 10 per cent of the 
world's rainforests, is estimated to be losing approximately 900,000 
hectares of forest each year1 (Dauvergne 1994; Hurst 1990). 
The issue of forest management is especially paramount for 
developing world countries with economies that  are almost entirely 
dependent on the timber industry, and populations that rely on the 
rainforest for medicinal plants, food, timber, firewood, building 
material, as well as other social and cultural needs. In nearly all of 
these countries the social, political, economic and environmental 
effects of forest destruction on local communities and national 
economies have been at the forefront of discussions about resource 
management (Hurst 1990). Pacific island countries 2, for example, are 
so economically dependent on the development of limited resources 
that the issue of proper management becomes especially important. 
Here, rainforest management is often made complex by socio-political 
factors such as domestic political culture, land tenure systems, the 
politics of landowner groups, traditional cultures and customs, 
peoples' perceptions of development and changing consumption 
patterns. Furthermore, forest management is influenced by the nature 
of interaction between the state, corporate powers and civil society. 
This chapter proposes to discuss the politics of resource 
management, looking specifically at the case of the forest industry in 
Solomon Islands. This is an issue which has become controversial in 
recent years because of the country's increasing economic dependence 
on logging, unsustainable logging practices, the involvement of 
politicians and other public officers, and the increasing role of 
corporate powers. Tax evasion by multinationals has resulted in huge 
loss in potential government revenue. Why is it that logging continues 
to escalate despite widespread publicity about its harmful effects? 
• What are the factors that affect forest management in post­
independence Solomon Islands? 
• What is the role of the state and how has that role been 
influenced by state-civil society relations and corporate 
powers? 
• How do factors such as domestic political culture, land 
tenure and cultural traditions affect forest management?  
• Are there similarities or differences in forest management 
between different parts of Solomon Islands, and why? 
The discussion will concentrate on the domestic factors that 
influence the management of the forest industry in Solomon Islands. 
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While international factors such as international trade, the role of 
corporate powers, transfer pricing, and international agreements are 
important, they are not the primary concern of this chapter. Rather, the 
focus here will be on the domestic socio-political and cultural factors 
that influence forest management. I argue that the process that leads to 
unsustainable logging practices in Solomon Islands cannot fully be 
understood without examining socio-political and cultural factors that 
influence the decisions of national and community leaders. There is a 
need to understand the factors that influence Solomon Islands state 
policies and why it is often difficult to implement them. It is the 
domestic socio-political and cultural influences that shape and drive 
the state policies (and how they are implemented) and landowner 
decisions to engage in logging agreements. 
Theorisi ng forest management 
Peter Dauvergne provides an useful discussion of the competing 
explanations of deforestation (Dauvergne 1994) . He places these 
explanations into four broad categories, each of which are different 
critical causes of deforestation: tropical government, environmental, 
developmental, and public policy. The tropical government 
explanation places the blame on indigenous people and their 
traditional farming techniques for deforestation. This states that 
although some deforestation was caused by logging, development 
projects and 'natural' fires, the primary cause of swidden agriculture. 
Hence, it proposes that to halt or slow down deforestation traditional 
agriculture must be reduced. 
The developmental explanation asserts that the main causes of 
deforestation are 'clearing land for agriculture, commercial logging, 
fuel wood gathering, and cattle raising' (Dauvergne 1994:500) . 
Developmentalists claim that the underlying causes of mismanaged 
logging and unsustainable traditional practices (as discussed in the 
tropical government explanation) include 'poverty, rapid population 
growth, ignorance, and to a lesser extent, various public policies' 
(Dauvergne 1994). These arguments are usually found in World Bank 
explanations of deforestation and in the reports of organisations such 
as AusAID in Australia (Duncan 1994). 
Dauvergne went on to state that environmental explanations 
normally focus on destructive logging and large development projects, 
the role of international organisations and foreign companies. 
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Environmentalists strongly disagree with tropical government claims 
that traditional farming is the primary cause of deforestation. On the 
other hand they argue that 'aid agencies, multinational corporations, 
international finance, and Third World elites, motivated by profit 
maximisation and the international market, all contribute to 
destructive forest activities' (Dauvergne 1994:501) .  
The final explanation, according to Dauvergne, is  the public policy 
explanation which blames government policies as the cause of 
destructive logging. This explanation claims that there is a direct link 
between the content of policies made by bureaucratic departments 
and the enforcement of these policies and deforestation. 
Dauvergne's categorisation of the different explanations of 
deforestation is useful as the basis for analysing forest management in 
the Third World. The four conventional explanations he identifies each 
provide some insight to the causes of deforestation and the 
management approach that needs to be taken. However, he claims that 
none of them adequately deals with deforestation processes. He then 
goes on to illustrate with the case of Indonesia that  'political structure 
and process, and the attitudes of the decision-making elite, which are 
shaped and encouraged by relations with developed countries, 
international organisations and international finance, shape and drive' 
( 1994:507) the different factors which encourage the unsustainable 
exploitation of rainforests. 
While Dauvergne's emphasis on political structure and processes, 
and the attitudes of decision-making elites is appropriate in the case of 
Indonesia where the state has control over forest it may prove 
inadequate in explaining unsustainable logging in Solomon Islands 
where about 87 per cent of land is customary-owned and the state has 
limited power over forests in these lands. An explanation of 
unsustainable logging in a country such as Solomon Islands needs to 
go beyond political structures, processes and decision-making elites. 
There is a need to understand the wider society and the factors that  
influence their decisions. 
The discussion of resource management often focuses too much on 
the role of the state. Therefore, when there is mismanagement, the 
state is immediately singled out as failing to function. This approach is 
based on a number of assumptions: first, it is assumed that the state is 
the institution that should be responsible for resource management; 
second, it is assumed that the state wants to manage the resources, and 
third, that the state has both the power and capacity to do it . 
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Solomon Islands forest i n dustry : a background 
Solomon Islands is  the second largest of the South Pacific island 
nations, after Papua New Guinea. In comparison to the Polynesian 
islands to the east, and the Micronesians to the north, this former 
British colony is endowed with relatively rich natural resources such 
as timber, minerals and fisheries. Currently the most important 
resource economically is timber. Most of its 922 islands (six large 
islands, 22 medium sized ones, and hundreds of smaller islets and 
reefs) are clad with thick tropical rainforest which provides food, 
medicine, building materials, and increasingly in the last two decades 
timber for both local and international markets. The tropical rainforest 
covers some 2.4 million hectares of the land. However, only about 
200,000 to 250,000 hectares are exploitable using current logging 
techniques (Montgomery 1995) .  Large-scale commercial logging 
started in the Solomon Islands in the 1960s. Ian Fraser (1997) identified 
two periods: the first is from 1963 to the early 1980s when most 
logging took place on government land or customary land leased by 
government. At that time the timber industry was monopolised by 
Levers Pacific Timber which made up around 75 per cent of log 
production .  The second period of logging began in the early 1980s and 
continues today. This period is marked by a shift from government 
land to customary land (which makes up around 87 per cent of the 
total land area in the country) and an influx of multinationals 
(particularly from Southeast Asia) in the logging industry. Politically, 
this period coincided with the coming into power of the first Solomon 
Mamaloni-led government. The number of logging licences given to 
foreign companies increased fourfold from 1981  to 1983. Log 
production also increased rapidly and by 1981 it had gone beyond 
sustainable level.3 In 1992, it was estimated that about 13 million cubic 
metres of commercial timber was harvestable by current logging 
methods and most of this was rapidly disappearing by the late 1990s. 
This increasing economic dependence on timber has engendered a 
continuing topical and controversial debate surrounding the rates of 
exploitation, sustainability, logging practices, the role of corporate 
powers, and the capacity of the state to manage the forest resource. In 
the last five years timber was being exploited at a rate that 
significantly exceeded the potential sustained yield. Log exports in 
1994 and 1995, for example, were 659,000 and 748,500 cubic metres 
respectively (Central Bank of Solomon Islands 1995) . This is more than 
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double the potential sustained yield. Consequently, it has been 
estimated that if current levels of log production continue, it may see 
commercial trees being depleted in less than a decade (Fraser 1997) .  
That i s  one o f  the major concerns o f  environmental organisations as 
well as international development agencies and aid donors. 
However, the claim that commercial timber may be depleted in less 
than a decade if current logging practices are maintained has been 
strongly disputed by the Solomon Islands Forest Industries 
Association (SIFIA)4• In January 1997, SIFIA premiered a video 
documentary produced for the purpose of what Eric Kes, the 
Executive Director of SIFIA, described as correcting 'widespread 
misconceptions about the Solomon Islands forest industry sector, 
which have often resulted in misinformed and emotion(al) criticism(s) 
of the industry and government, both locally and abroad' (Solomon 
Star 29 January 1 997) .  The underlying argument in the video is that 
while close to 80 per cent of Solomon Islands' land is covered by 
forests, only about 12  per cent is suitable for commercial logging 
operations. Kes stated that 'the often used stereotype of total forest 
destruction is simply untrue' (Solomon Star  29 January 1997) .  
What the SIFIA document does not  state, however, is  that most of  
this 80 per cent of natural forest is not  logged because it  i s  not  suitable 
for logging. The document does not make the important distinction 
between commercially logged forest and forest in general. Also, the 
organisation has manipulated people's ignorance of the differences 
between deforestation and forest degradation .  Hence, it stresses quite 
correctly that the antilogging argument that Solomon Islands will be 
deforested within a decade is misleading. However, this takes the 
debate away from the real issue-commercially valuable forest will be 
degraded if current rates of logging are maintained. This will result in 
economic and social catastrophe because of the high economic 
dependence on log expor�. 
The video documentary also featured the Prime Minister, Solomon 
Marnaloni. The Prime Minister commented on SIFIA's part in 
'formulating forest management measures, training matters and 
expressed his satisfaction with the ongoing dialogue between 
government and the industry ' (Solomon Star  29 January 1997). The 
film also referred to the Code of Practice and expressed SIFIA 
companies' commitment to the principle of sustainable forest 
management. In an unpublished paper released at the film's premiere, 
Eric Kes writes : 'The Solomon Islands Forest Industries Association 
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(SIFIA) is committed to the principle of Sustainable Forest 
Management (SFM)' .  
Whatever truth there is about sustainable level of harvest, three 
facts are undisputable: log production has definitely increased in the 
past .decade (Fraser 1997); Solomon Islands has become economically 
dependent on timber exports; and, despite increasing log export, 
actual revenue has declined .  
The Solomon Star  reported on 4 April 1 996 that although the value 
of round log exports in 1995 increased by SI$16.7 million, the amount 
collected as export duty to the government fell by SI$12.6 million. 
Also, increasing log exports have not curtailed increasing fiscal deficits 
over the last four years. These problems were exacerbated by political 
leaders' reluctance to make dramatic changes to current policies and 
practices. 
The role of corporate power in the Solomon Islands forestry 
industry is significant and must be mentioned. Over the past decade 
the industry was dominated by multinationals, particularly Malaysian 
and Korean investors backed by Japanese and Korean buyers. These 
corporate powers, supported by favourable state policies, landowner 
agreements, as well as poor management and other factors, have, in 
the last five years, helped push log production to more than double 
the sustainable rate. Peter Dauvergne (forthcoming) discussed 
corporate power involvement in the timber industry, especially the 
techniques often used to evade taxes, and maximise benefits from the 
industry. Multinationals often 'pressure governments to develop 
policies that maximise profits, construct complex corporate structures 
that reduce accountability and transparency, and evade taxes and 
timber royalties' (Dauvergne forthcoming:2), and have taken 
advantage of the structural defects in the timber management rules in 
Solomon Islands and have benefited enormously from the industry' .  
There is evidence to show that corporations have used transfer pricing 
and have made informal agreements to ensure they benefit from the 
timber industry (Price Waterhouse 1995:39-40; Duncan 1994). A Price 
Waterhouse consultancy report prepared for the Ministry of 
Environment and Conservation and the Ministry of Finance reported 
that insufficient finance, and the lack of technical and human 
resources to monitor logging operations meant that it is difficult to 
implement state forest policies, especially environmental rules. 
Consequently, many multinationals in the industry break the 
regulations and get away with it. The Solomon Islands Division of 
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Inland Revenue, for example, does not have the financial, technical 
and manpower capability to prevent or counteract corporate schemes 
to evade taxes (Price Waterhouse 1995). The means that Solomon 
Islands has lost out on income from forestry. In 1994 it  was estimated 
that SI$34 million was lost through the government's decision to 
exempt some logging companies from paying export tax (Duncan 
1 994). This was particularly the case for ' locally owned' companies 
such as the Prime Minister 's own Somma Ltd. 
Ian Fraser ( 1997) also found a correlation between the changes of 
government and the rate of timber exports. The rapid increase in 
timber export is a trend which started in 1981 when, under the first 
Mamaloni government, the number of logging licences issued to 
foreign companies quadrupled (Fraser 1997) . However, the increase in 
log production cannot entirely be a consequence of government 
policies alone. The trend also coincided with the opening up of 
customary land for timber extraction. From early 1981 timber 
production shifted away from concentrating on government-owned 
and leased land to include customary land. These demonstrate a 
relationship between land tenure, domestic politics and logging. 
Apart from the unsustainable exploitation of timber, another 
concern centres on the alleged corruption of politicians, public officers 
and community leaders in relation to the forestry industry. In 
November 1995, five government ministers were alleged to have 
received SI$7 million in bribery money from a logging company and 
this has resulted in court proceedings which are currently underway 
(Solomon Star 1 9 November 1995) .  In another case, two government 
ministers were charged for receiving favour from a logging company 
that  was involved in the controversial Pavuvu logging dispute. Also in 
1995, the Solomon Star  newspaper reported that an accountancy firm 
had uncovered an internal report that a Malaysian company had paid 
SI$17 million to government ministers and officials, naming the 
current Ministers for Commerce Employment and Trade, Finance and 
Home Affairs, as well as a former minister and former Secretary to the 
Foreign Investment Review Board (Pacific Report 8 (21 )  November 20 
1995) .  Also, there is increasing concern over the distribution of logging 
revenues and whether it has contributed to socioeconomic 
development in the country. In 1994, Solomon Islands lost about SI$34 
million in tax exemptions and remissions (Duncan 1 994; Central Bank 
of Solomon Islands 1994) .  These issues have brought into question the 
role of the state in logging. 
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The major concern over the forest industry in Solomon Islands 
centres on the government's policies and the unsustainable logging 
practices allegedly associated with these policies. Locally, concerns 
over the government's logging policies have been widely expressed in 
the local media (newspapers and radio) by politicians, 
environmentalists, landowners, and non-government organisations. 
Internationally, institutions such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, European Union, foreign governments, non­
government organisations and others have expressed concern over the 
unsustainable rate of logging. The Australian government, for 
example, has publicly criticised the present Solomon Islands 
government's policy on logging, and to back i ts criticism, in 1996 cut 
back aid to Solomon Islands and stopped funding the Timber Control 
Unit (TCU) of the Forestry Division, set up to monitor the rate of 
logging. The European Union also raised similar concerns in April 
1996 and threatened to stop funding to Solomon Islands (Solomon Star 
2 April 1996) .  However, despite the seemingly strong opposition 
against present logging practices, not much has changed. 
The fate of the forest industry in Solomon Islands has raised 
important questions about government policies towards resource 
management and its implications on the economy. It also raises 
concern over the politics of logging-who makes decisions, where 
does logging revenue go, who owns or has share in logging companies 
and the relationship between landowners and logging companies. As 
in Papua New Guinea, there have been allegations of high-level 
corruption which has resulted in High Court proceedings. If such 
allegations are proven to be correct, then it is important to explore the 
relationship between the state and resource exploitation and whether 
it is the structure of government or a particular nature of Melanesian 
politics that has given rise to corruption. 
However, the concern of this chapter is not merely government 
policies. One of the weaknesses of the current literature on logging in 
Solomon Islands is the fact that they fail to deal with the socio-cultural 
factors that influence the industry, and to a certain extent, government 
policies. For example, most of the current discussions fail to  discuss 
landownership and the cultural factors that influence landownership. 
These are important variables in influencing decisions that affect 
logging policies and practices. 
Most of the existing discussion on the forest industry in Solomon 
Islands is dedicated to either outlining the historical background of the 
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forest industry (Benneth 1995), or stating the likely economic 
consequences of mismanagement (Duncan 1994) . However, only a few 
(Fraser 1 997) have attempted to analyse the socio-political factors that 
affect resource mismanagement, in particular the social forces that 
affect the state's capacity to manage resources. In nearly all the 
literature, the underlying assumption is that the most important actor 
in both the management and exploitation of this resource is the state. 
Although other stakeholders such as traditional landowning groups 
and non-government organisations are mentioned, they are not 
emphasised as the most important. Subsequently, most discussions 
target the state and state policies as the most salient in influencing 
logging practices. Such an emphasis is inspired by a state-centred or 
statist school of thought which emphasises the role of the state as the 
most influential in socioeconomic transformation. However, what is 
limited in the current discussion of the forest industry in Solomon 
Islands is an attempt to come to terms with the role of other 
stakeholders in the management of forestry. In particular, most of 
these discussions fail to explain the impact of civil society which may 
be more prominent than that of the state. The next part of this chapter 
outlines the main stakeholders in the forest industry in Solomon 
Islands. 
Stakeholders i n  Solomon Islands forest industry 
Forest management, or mismanagement, in Solomon Islands has been 
influenced by the various stakeholders who have an interest in the 
industry. These institutions, organisations and groups work to 
maximise their benefit, and subsequently have a significant impact on 
the industry. The stakeholders identified here include the state, 
logging companie�, landowners, non-government organisations, and 
foreign governments and international organisations. 
This section attempts to explore the interests of these institutions, 
organisations and groups and the factors that influence their impact. 
First, I discuss how the state's role in the forest industry is influenced 
by social groups such as tribes, wantok, and regional or island groups. 
The state 
Most discussions of logging in Solomon Islands have focused on the 
role of the state .  This is because of the predominant assumption that 
the state is the most important player. It makes and implements 
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policies. It follows, therefore, that in order to address forest 
management one should focus on the state. This focus-on-the-state 
appro�ch is advocated particularly by economists, aid donors and 
development agencies concerned with maximising the state's 
economic benefit from resource development. Ron Duncan (1994) for 
example, has focused on the present government's unsustainable 
logging policies. The Australian government a lso addressed the issue 
by targeting the state and its policies. 
While it  is true that the state is an important stakeholder in the 
forest industry, in Solomon Islands it may not necessarily be the most 
powerful in influencing decisions about whether or not logging 
projects should go on. In recent years, as a result of political science 
and anthropological studies of the role of the state in Third World 
development, the validity of the argument that the state is the most 
prominent in influencing large-scale resource development has been 
questioned. 
A characteristic of most scholarly d iscussions of the state up until 
the 1970s was the tendency to regard the state and civil society as 
separate, and in some instances, opposing entities competing with 
each other. In the 1980s, however, there was a shift from both the state­
centred and social base emphasis, to that of analysing the state as part 
of society. This was influenced partly by the emergence of new states 
in the decolonised territories of the Third World after the Second 
World War. The complex characteristic and nature of these new states 
created a need to revise many early theories about the state .  Emerging 
from this new scholarly discussion of state is the work of Joel Migdal 
which became important for analysing and understanding the 
relationship between state and civil society, particularly, in the 
developing countries. Beginning from the 1980s, discussions of the 
state in the Third World were dominated by what Migdal calls the 
'state-in-society' analysis. This concept of interactive relationship 
between state and civil society has since been widely discussed in the 
literatures on Third World states. Migdal, for example, argues that the 
state must be analysed and understood in relation to society and not 
as an isolated entity. This is because the state is part of society and 
there is always an important interaction between state and civil 
society. The state, therefore, exists as state-in-society rather than as an 
entity separate from civil society. Here, the mutual interactions of state 
and society is placed as the focal  centre of analysis (Migdal 1988) .  He 
further attests that i t  is possible for civil society to affect states as much 
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as, or possibly more than, states affect societies. He argues, therefore, 
that when societies affect state more, there is a situation of weak state, 
strong society (Migdal 1988) .  
Many contemporary scholars dealing with the state in Melanesia 
used these notions by Migdal in explaining the state's failure to 
manage resources and deliver administrative and development 
services. They view cultural fragmentation and the heteregenous 
nature of society as the cause for weak state in Melanesia. Dinnen 
(1996) argued that the state in Papua New Guinea is unable to control 
crime and violence because of influence of civil society on the 
structures and institutions of the state. Peter Larmour ( 1996a and 
1996b) also used the same idea in analysing the relationship between 
state, society and economy in the South Pacific. He developed a 
triangular model in which he perceives that interaction taking place. 
The underlying assumption in these works is that the state in 
Melanesian is weak because of i ts inability to permeate into civil 
society. The question then is what are these civil society factors that 
affect the power of the state? 
Undermining state power 
Solomon Islands is a country of grea_t cultural diversity. I ts islands are 
spread over an enormous ocean area. It has a population of about 
450,000 people who speak no less than 87 different languages. There 
are further divisions along tribal, ethnic, and geographical lines. This 
century there have been further divisions along church and 
professional lines. This social and cultural hetereogeniety affects the 
powers and capacity of the state .  This section briefly outlines some 
factors that .often affect state-society relations and state capacity in 
Solomon Islands. These include the tribe and kinship groups, wantok, 
and island groups (regionalism) . -
Kinship and tribal �llegiance 
In Solomon Islands allegiance to the tribe and kinship group is more 
important than allegiance to the state. Here, kinship is defined as 
including people of close family or relative ties while the tribe is a 
larger extension of the kinship group and is often referred to in Pidgin, 
the lingua franca, as the line. However, kinship and tribal allegiance is 
a characteristic of societies elsewhere in the world as well. Most 
people anywhere in the world identify with the family and immediate 
relatives in political, economic and social activities. I t  is within the 
family that many businesses are thought out and started. Political 
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alliances are based around kinship and tribal groups before extending 
to the wider community. In elections the foundation for political 
support is the kinship and tribal group. It is a universal feature of 
human social behaviour. So the role of kinship and tribal relations in 
affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the state structure is not 
necessarily unique to Solomon Islands. The same can be said of 
countries and societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
However, what is important to consider in relation to forest 
management in Solomon Islands, is the control that kinship and tribal 
groups have over land and forest resource. This is because around 87 
per cent of land is customarily owned and ownership is protected by 
law, tribal and kinship groups who own the land also have 
tremendous power over the forest on it .  State policies, therefore, are 
often undermined by landowner decisions. While the state has the 
authority to issue logging licences, it has no power to stop landowners 
from signing agreements directly with logging companies. In many 
cases landowning groups and individuals dealing directly with 
logging companies export logs independently of the state. Such land 
tenure system and power bestowed upon landowners (kinship and 
tribal groups) often incapacitate the state in its attempts to manage 
forests, and make it a less prominent party in logging negotiations 
(Fraser 1997; Benneth 1 995; Corin 1992; Larmour 1979) .  This, coupled 
with the government's lack of capital and enough trained forest 
officers, makes the task of monitoring logging practices and the 
implementation of forest management policies difficult. Also, there is 
often insufficient consultation between landowners, the state, and 
logging companies which sometimes results in confrontations between 
the three parties. In some cases frustrated landowners have sabotaged 
equipment and burned logging camps.  Two prominent examples are 
the cases of Pavuvu (Roughan 1997; Rose 1995; Tuhanuku 1995) and 
the North New Georgia landowners demands which eventually led to 
the withdrawal of Levers Pacific Timber (Fraser 1997; Tausinga 1992). 
As Ian Fraser (1997) pointed out, the rapid increase in log exports 
coincided with the shift from concentration of log production on 
government-owned and leased land to customary land. 
In the Solomon Islands timber industry, some individuals have 
become rich and powerful because of their kinship and tribal 
connections to landowning groups engaged in logging. In the Makira 
Province, for example, the family of Prime Minister Mamaloni had 
been influential in provincial affairs and members of the family 
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occupied important administrative and political positions in the 
province for more than a decade. This made it easier for Prime 
Minister Solomon Mamaloni to set up his logging company, Somma 
Ltd, which operates in his West Makira constituency and has become 
influential in winning votes by promising the construction of roads, 
schools, clinics and other developments in the area. The Prime 
Minister also argues that his ownership of a logging company has 
nothing to do with his position. Rather, he is a member of a 
landowning tribe (Solomon Star 1 2  September 1996) .  
Wan tokism, regionalism, and the state 
Other factors that often affect the capacity of the state are wan tokism 
and regionalism. The wantok is a relatively new form of social 
identification which emerged as a consequence of people from 
different language groups coming together in plantations, schools, 
civil service, factories and other institutions and organisations that 
brought together Solomon Islanders. The term wantok literally means 
'one talk' as referring to people who speak the same language. The 
concept of wan tok system or wantokism advocates cooperation amongst 
those who speak the same language. I t  is similar to kerekere in Fij i  
(Ravuvu 1983) andfa 'asamoa in Sampa (Meleisea 1 987) .  
Now the wan tok concept has been used to  identify people of the 
same region and island as distinct from others, even if they speak 
different languages. Wantokism can sometimes be confusing because 
there are no set boundaries or criteria for group identification-it 
changes with the context and who one identifies as being different 
from (Premdas 1 986) . Therefore, two Malaitans in a Gudalcanal village 
will identify with each other as wan toks although they may speak 
absolutely distinct languages . In another context Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Kanaky (New Caledonia) s tudents 
at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji, identify with each 
other as wantoks by virtue of the fact that they all speak Pidgin and 
come from Melanesian countries as compared to students from 
Polynesia and Micronesia. However, in their home countries, a t  
institutions such as the University of  Papua New Guinea (UPNG) and 
the Solomon Islands College of Higher Education (SICHE), they 
would identify with their smaller language group as wan toks. What 
this demonstrates is that the wan tok identity works contextually and 
serves different purposes in different contexts. 
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Wan tokism could serve as an important prism through which 
national consciousness is developed . If used in this way, wantok 
identity could become an important basis for enhancing state power. 
However, at the same time such a discourse could also serve as a 
destabilising factor when people begin identifying themselves into 
smaller wan tok groups.  When that happens, the capacity of the state 
could be severely undermined. To illustrate this, the following 
paragraphs discuss how wantokism often affects domestic political 
culture in Solomon Islands. 
In Solomon Islands wantok identifications are manifested in 
language groups such as Kasi, Ghema, Kula, Tio, Ngoela, Ngwaed, 
Waneagu, Saeagua, Porau, Forau, Gitzz, Kebo, Ko' o, Wale, and others. 
Such an identification creates language and regional consciousness 
more than national identity. In urban centres such as Honiara most 
people identify with their wantok first before other social groups such 
as sports, professional, and worker associations. The wantok identity is 
most important in Honiara where people from different regions who 
speak different languages converge. However, in a specific local area 
where everybody speaks the same language, it loses its significance as 
a basis for social identification. 
Political alliances, particularly in places such as Honiara, where 
people from different language groups come together are based 
around the wantok identity. Also, it is the cause of nepotism in the 
Public Service and the basis for political support and other forms of 
alliances. In the East Honiara constituency, for example, it has nearly 
always been the case that a candidate of Kwara'ae origin (from 
Malaita Province) had better probability of winning general elections. 
This is because of the large number of Kwara'ae speakers who live in 
the squatter settlements in the valleys behind Honiara . The wantok 
identity is also important in influencing discussions of national 
development .  It may also affect political alliances within Parliament, 
especially when it comes to supporting issues that are regionally 
sensitive. As will be pointed out below, wan tokism, like regionalism, 
has had influence over the choice of national leaders such as the Prime 
Minister, the Governor General and the Speaker to the National 
Parliament. 
Wantokism has also fuelled regional consciousness, especially in 
urban centres such as Honiara where many identify themselves as 
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belonging to either Malaita, Guadalcanal, Reef Islands and other 
regions. Examples of the seriousness of such identifications are 
manifested in regional/ ethnic riots in Honiara on a couple of 
occasions. In 1 989, for example, a row between the Malaita and 
Rennell and Bellona residents of Honiara ended in a riot in which 
Malaitans rampaged through Honiara breaking into and looting shops 
and demanding compensation for an incident at the Honiara central 
market where a Rennellese allegedly swore at Malaitans in a message 
written on the market wall. The national government and the Central 
Islands Province later intervened and paid compensa tion of up to 
SI$200,000 and SI$100,000 respectively to the Malaita Province. Again 
in 1994 Malai tans rioted throughout Honiara after the Malaita soccer 
team lost to the national capi tal side (Solomon Star 13 September 1989). 
And in another incident in early 1996, there was confrontation 
between Malaitans and Reef Islanders in Honiara (Solomon Star 26 
January 1996) . Also in late 1996 Malaita soccer supporters rioted 
through Honiara after their team again lost to a Honiara side (Solomon 
Sta r  25 October 1996) .  These often violent confrontations are 
manifestations of continuous strong regional and wantok identities 
despite more than 18 years of constitu tional independence and 
nationhood. 
These regional cleavages can also be found in the country's 
national parliament, which is supposed to be the symbol of national 
identity. For example, because Malaitans dominate the Public Service 
and other national institutions, there has been a conscious attempt by 
Members of Parliament from other parts of the country to ensure that 
Malaitans do not dominate important positions of power such as the 
Governor General, Speaker of Parliament and the Prime Minister. 
There is a conscious effort to share political power between the 
different regions. No Malaitan has so far been elected as Governor 
General despite a number of Malaita candidates being nominated for 
every election. Following independence in 1978, the post was held for 
two consecutive terms by Baddley Devesi from Guadalcanal. He was 
then replaced by George Lepping who comes from the Shortland 
Islands in the Western Province, and the present Governor General, 
Moses Pitakaka, is from Choiseul Province. Also, the p.ost of Speaker 
to the National Parliament has never been held by a Malaitan. The 
first Speaker, Loyd Maepeza Gina, is from the Western Province, and 
his successor, Waeta Ben Tabusasi is from Guadalcanal. The present 
Speaker, Paul Tovua, is also from Guadalcanal. The selection for Prime 
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Minister has also been influenced dramatically by regional cleavages. 
The only Malaita man who has, in the last 19 years of independence, 
been able to become Prime Minister was Peter Kenilorea who led the 
country to independence. He was later replaced by Solomon 
Mamaloni from Makira who has been the country's most outstanding 
and influential politician. The other Prime Ministers are Ezekiel 
Alebua from Guadalcanal and Francis Billy Hilly from the Western 
Province. 
Within the chamber of the National Parliament, regionalism often 
influences the debates and decisions on important issues. This regional 
division within Parliament is something most Solomon Islanders are 
conscious of, but only some are willing to openly admit it, and fewer 
would willingly be engaged in a debate about it. This is because of its 
sensitivity. However, every now and then it flares up on the streets of 
Honiara in the form of riots over a soccer match or confrontation 
between regional groups because of an insignificant brawl between 
drunken youths. These street riots are, in fact, manifestations of much 
more serious and deeper regional divisions within the country. An 
understanding of divisions between social, ethnic, regional, wantok 
and other forms of groupings is important in discussions about 
national development because it  is influential in the process of nation­
building and in affecting people's thinking about national affairs and 
their relations to the state. It affects the implementation of state 
policies and national development. In many cases, allegiance to the 
wan tok group or region becomes more paramount than one's duty to 
the state. This can affect policies relating to forest management. 
'Big-men', chiefs, and the state 
'Big-men' and chiefs often have a significant impact on state power 
and its capacity to deliver administrative and development services. 
Unlike the case of Samoa where the matai system can be identified as 
the traditional leadership system, or the case of the Ratu system in Fij i, 
the monarch in Tonga, and the A riki system in Cook Islands, Solomon 
Islands does not have a single identifiable traditional leadership 
system for the entire country. Instead there are a number of systems 
found amongst the different cultural groups. Also, unlike the 
Polynesia islands to the east, in Solomon Islands no one ruler was ever 
able to rule all the islands. There were many 'big-men' and chiefs who 
ruled small geographical enclaves with relatively small population. 
Anthropologists tend to describe the leadership systems in Solomon 
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Islands by placing them into two general categories: the 'big-man', and 
the chiefly systems (Strathem and Godelier 1991 ;  Sahlins 1970) .  There 
is also the scholarly tendency to assume that the 'big-man' leadership 
system is practised amongst the majority of the Melanesian population 
while the chiefly system is exclusively restricted to the Polynesian 
outliers (Strathem and Godelier 1 991 ;  Sahlins 1970). The truth is that  
the specifics of the leadership pattern differed from polity to polity. 
For this matter, it is not possible to describe a traditional socio-political 
system that would be true for the whole Solomon Islands. The 
culturally diverse nature of the island group is such that there are 
varying political systems. The two main ethnic/ cultural groups, 
Melanesian and Polynesians, have different leadership systems. Even 
this is a generalisation for there are differences even within the groups 
themselves (Benneth1987). 
However, for the purposes of this study we shall place the 
leadership systems into the two broad categories of 'big-man' and 
chiefly systems. The 'big-man' leadership system is found only 
amongst the Melanesian population. This, however, is not to say that 
all Melanesian communities practice the 'big-man' system. There are 
some, for example, in North Malaita, Shortland Islands and New 
Georgia that have a system more like the chiefly system of Polynesians 
(Benneth 1987) . In the 'big-man' system leaders supervise their 
followers with strict traditional codes of behaviour which were 
usually handed down to young people from the elders through word­
of-mouth, experiences and examples. There are no set hierarchies 
which distinguish commoners from nobles or kings. This, however, 
does not deny the existence of a leader. The 'big-man' emerges from 
among the people, proving to others his capabilities to lead, through 
his natural abilities and through his own achievements. The position 
of 'big-man' is not hereditary but is acquired through personal efforts. 
One acquires the position of 'big-man' by accumulating wealth and 
then distributing it to followers. Wealth is measured, not so much in 
what one accumulates, but rather, on what one distributes from what 
is accumulated. And often a 'big-man' is expected to possess other 
skills such as oratory, hunting and/ or fishing, and possess huge 
amounts of information about land tenure, genealogies and other 
knowledge about kastom. He can also be a magician or sorcerer, but if 
he himself is not then he should have access to someone who is. The 
life of a 'big-man' is very demanding because he is always required to 
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prove himself and to keep his dignity (Strathern and Goddier 1991;  
Sahlins 1970) .  There continue to many 'big-men' in Solomon Islands. 
The Polynesians of Solomon Islands generally have hierarchical 
leadership systems that are similar to those found in the Polynesian 
islands of the eastern Pacific. In the Polynesian outliers such as 
Rennell, Bellona, Ontong Java, Tikopia, Sikaiana, there are chiefly 
families who dominate the political arena. The rest of the community 
usually follow the decisions of the chief. 
Although these traditional leadership systems are not formally 
integrated in the contemporary government structure in the same way 
as the matai system in Samoa or the Ratu in the Great Council of Chiefs 
in Fij i, they still have profound impact on the nature of politics. As 
described above, the kinds of expectations voters have on politicians 
today are the same types of expectations people have on a traditional 
'big-man'. Most politicians in turn react to people's expectations as a 
'big-man' would-distributing wealth and participating financially in 
nearly every community affair. The actions of politicians often 
confirms the voter misconception that this is the task of a politician­
as a modem version of the traditional 'big-man' .  It leads, as described 
above, to the poli ticians' vulnerability to bribery and other forms of 
corruption. Indeed most of Solomon Islands' present parliamentarians 
are perceived by voters as 'big-men' or chiefs, traditional leaders in a 
modem political system. In the chiefly societies, these chiefs have 
profound impact on modem politics as well. Chiefs are very powerful 
in influencing public opinion in their communities. They often direct 
who people should vote for in elections and decide for them what 
their opinions should be on issues of national concern. This is also 
similar for senior bureaucrats. However, the expectations of 
bureaucrats is not as enormous as of politicians who were voted into 
office. Bureaucrats are expected to contribute only to family affairs 
while politicians are often expected to contribute financially, with 
goods, time, and ideas to the entire constituency. 
In the forest industry 'big-men' and chiefs play an important  role in 
influencing the decisions of kinship and tribal groups (or landowners) 
in agreeing to logging concessions and in the distribution of the wealth 
accumulated from logging. 'Big-men' and chiefs nearly always are the 
target of logging negotiators . In most cases they make the decisions for 
landowning groups. In this way, they have more power in accepting or 
refusing logging operations than the state and state leaders. 
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The next section discusses other stakeholders in the forest industry. 
These include landowners, non-government organisations, and 
logging companies. 
Landowners 
An argument often used by those defending state policies on logging 
is that in reality the state has little power over forests. The most 
powerful group is the landowners who own the resource and decide 
whether to accept or refuse logging projects. An understanding of the 
land tenure system will enhance our understanding of the politics of 
forest management-the power relations between the state, 
landowners, logging companies and the politics of landowner groups 
as well. 
Large-scale resource development is often made difficult by a land 
tenure system where about 87 per cent of the land is customary­
owned, leaving only about nine per cent to government ownership 
and the rest by individual Solomon Islanders. Also, only two per cent 
of the land is leased to foreigners (Fraser 1997) .  This small percentage 
of government-owned land means that the state has limited access to 
land for the purposes of national development. I t  also means that state 
power over land-based development initiatives can be (and has, in the 
past) been seriously limited. 
To appreciate why a large percentage of land is customary-owned, 
one needs to have an understanding of the traditional value of land to 
Solomon Islanders. For the Islanders, land is much more than a mere 
economic commodity as it  is often viewed in the conventional 
economic sense. In fact, traditionally for most Solomon Islanders, land 
is not a commodity that can be bought and sold like other market 
commodities. Traditionally land is of great significance and indeed the 
most valuable resource. I t  is not only a source of food but it also has 
historical, political and religious significance. The land holds burial 
grounds, sacrificial sites and monuments that are important to a 
society's history and culture .  It is not only a resource for the living, but 
also a vehicle for providing a link with dead ancestors. In this sense 
land has a religious significance which makes it  the most valuable 
heritage of the whole community that is not often lightly parted with. 
It is usually owned by the tribe, or line and not just by an individual. 
Traditionally, land also has a political importance that is embedded in 
the role that it plays in binding together the land-owning tribe or line 
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(Zoleveke 1979). It is a source of political and economic power for 
those who can successfully lay claim over large areas of land. One can 
do so by having knowledge of oral tradi tions relating to 
landownership or successfully manipulating such oral traditions to 
legitimise one's claims over land . In many ways, for Solomon 
Islanders, land is the centre of life . Tradi tionally, land is owned by 
people and not by institutions such as governments, churches, 
companies or councils . People have user rights over land because of 
their membership of a tribe or line. There was no individual ownership 
of land and because of this, land was not a commodity that could be 
bought and sold like other ordinary goods (Zoleveke 1979). In short, 
one can say that the traditional land tenure system was based on the 
close relationship between land and people who, not only own the 
land, but also belong to it. This is similar to the land tenure systems 
found in other parts of Melanesia and the Pacific Islands (Ballard 1996; 
Ward 1996) . 
However, since European contact and the colonisation of the 
islands, land tenure systems have changed. First, was the introduction 
of the idea that land could be owned, sold and bought by individuals. 
Also, in the early days of British colonisation, the colonial 
administration declared a large percentage of the best and most 
accessible land as alienated and thus, the so-called 'waste lands' 
became Crown property. However, in the 1960s the colonial 
government introduced a ' land settlement' program which embarked 
on the survey and registration of customary land rights and 
boundaries. This program was later severely criticised, in the 1970s, as 
being ineffective, too centralised and individualistic. By 1984, only 13 
per cent of the land area of Solomon Islands had been registered, its 
boundaries surveyed, and i ts tenure regulated by statu te.  The rest is 
owned and used according to custom or the pidgin derivative, kastom 
(Larmour 1984; Benneth 1995) . 
The arrangements made during the colonial era have been the 
cause of some present day conflicts over land. The forest industry has, 
in the past, been the cause of many land disputes in Solomon Islands. 
In many cases certain individuals within the tribe or line take upon 
themselves the initiative to make agreements with logging companies. 
This is usually the cause of longstanding disputes amongst 
landowners. Also, the traditional value attached to land and forest is 
rapidly disappearing and land is increasingly becoming a commodity 
exchanged for an economic value. This is  due to people's changing 
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consumption patterns and the increasing importance of monetary 
wealth and the European material goods that money could buy. 
Land disputes emanating from logging can be found throughout 
the country. Land cases taken to court as a result of logging are 
numerous. The cases of the North New Georgia and Pavuvu are the 
most well known. The case of Pavuvu in the Russell Islands of the 
Central Province is the most recent. Here, the British colonial 
government in 1905 leased Pavuvu Island to Levers Pacific 
Plantations. The original owners of the island, the Lavukal people of 
the Russell Islands had, for many years, demanded that the island be 
returned to them. However, their demands were ignored (Rose 1995) . 
On 10 March 1 995, the executive of Central Province granted Marving 
Brothers, a Malaysian registered logging company, a business licence 
that allowed the central government to issue a logging permit for 
Pa vu vu Island. The island 's forest was worth about US$120 million 
(Roughan 1 997). The Lavukal people, assisted by non-government 
organisations such as the Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT), 
Soltrust, Greenpeace and Development Services Exchange (DSE) 
resisted the logging of Pavuvu. Company machines were sabotaged 
and workers were threatened. However, the central government sent 
in police officers to protect the company that is currently logging on 
'government land'(Roughan 1997; Tuhanuku 1995) .  Today, Pavuvu 
Island is still at the centre of intense confrontation between 
landowners, the central government, Central Province and Marving 
Brothers. In November 1995, Martin Apa, a Russell Island anti-logging 
campaigner was murdered. However, so far, police investigations 
have failed to find his killers although many suspect that the murder 
was connected to the Pavuvu Island logging issue. 
This is only one example of disputes over land and boundaries 
now common throughout Solomon Islands, and particularly in areas 
where there are large-scale resource developments such as logging. 
This signifies the need to take landowners and traditional land tenure 
systems seriously when planning national development programs. 
Also, the large percentage of customary control of land has 
implications for the state's capacity to manage land-based resource 
developments. The argument in the logging industry is that the 
government in reality does not have control over landowners' decision 
to exploit the forest resource is to a certain extent true. 
Two things are evident in the case of the forestry industry. First, i t  
signifies the fact that in Solomon Islands the state is  weak in 
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comparison to civil society (Migdal 1988) . The state does not possess 
the kind of power and authority over society as one would find in, for 
example, the hierarchical chiefly system of Tonga. Second, the nature 
of current logging practices in Solomon Islands indicate that 'people's' 
control over resources does not necessarily mean that it  will be well 
managed . In fact, the case of forestry in Solomon Islands proves the 
opposite. 
Non-government organisations 
Since the 1980s non-government organisations have played an active 
role in forest industry, especially in addressing environmental issues 
and, in recent years, in providing an alternative to round log exports. 
These are both local and international non-government organisations 
which include the Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT), 
SolTrust, Iumitugeta Holdings, Solomon Western Islands Fair Trade 
(SWIFT), Greenpeace, and World Wildlife Fund for Nature and 
numerous other smaller organisations. 
The role of non-government organisations in development in 
general has been significant. Since the mid-1980s, that role has shifted 
away from being peripheral to a more central and active participation 
in influencing political opinions and development decisions. Prior to 
that non-government organisations were generally perceived as mere 
relief and project-oriented organisations that were supposed to be 
independent of politics and have no influence over policymaking 
(Roughan 1994) .  This had changed by the 1980s, and in the forest 
industry non-government organisations have become an important 
stakeholder, not only in fighting to slow down logging but also in 
actively working lo provide resource owners with a sustainable means 
of harvesting timber. This changing role also coincides with an 
increasing number of local non-government organisations led by 
Solomon Islanders who believe they have a contribution to make to 
national affairs. 
The largest of the local non-government organisations is the 
Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT) which was first set up in 
1982. The underlying argument by SIDT is that development should 
be defined as 'empowerment' rather than the discredited notion that 
the North/South resource transfer was the solution' (Roughan 
1994:146) . In the forest industry, SIDT has played an active role in 
providing forest resource owners with information necessary to help 
them decide on the best ways to exploit their forest for maximum 
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benefit in a sustainable way with limited damage to the environment. 
I t  organises workshops and other educational programs in villages 
throughout the country and a comic strip newsletter, called Link, 
which targets the majority population who cannot read conventional 
newspapers because of limited education. The organisation also has 
Village Mobile Teams whose dramas address logging and other village 
issues. SIDT has also been active in campaigning to reduce the rate of 
logging. In the Pavuvu case, SIDT was one of the non-government 
organisations helping landowners confront the state (Roughan 1997) .  
Another non-government organisation active in the forest industry 
is SolTrust. This organisation is more concerned with reducing the rate 
of log exports and encouraging local processing of timber. It provides 
forest resource owners with training in 'sustainable logging practices' 
such as the use of portable saw mills. The organisation specialises in 
producing, maintaining and training forest owners to use portable 
(wokabaot) sawmills and buys processed timber from landowners 
before exporting to the international market. The economic arm of 
SolTrust is Iumitugeta Holdings which focuses on finding overseas 
markets for the processed timber. Both organisations emerged from 
the Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific (FSP), an American­
based non-government organisation. Many Solomon Islander forest 
owners are now aware of SolTrust and have made use of its services. 
Churches have also become increasingly involved in the politics of 
the forest industry in Solomon Islands. In 1994, the United Church 
started a timber harvesting project known as Solomon Western Islands 
Fair Trade (SWIFT) . The objective of this project is to organise an 
alternative for signing agreements with logging companies. I t  involves 
the development of forest management plans for village communities. 
These management plans aim at providing small-scale and sustainable 
harvesting of timber resources, thus providing village communities 
with an alternative to large-scale logging. SWIFT also encourages 
landowners to take responsibili ty for the management of their forest 
resource. The aims of SWIFT are: 'to enable (empower) people 
economically (financially) to say 'no' to offers from logging 
companies; to promote sustainable timber production for community 
needs and to facili tate earning a good cash income by selling these 
sawn timbers to local and export markets' (SWIFT Newsletter June 
1996, No. l ) .  The inv�lvement of the United Church in this project 
demonstrates the overall importance of churches as stakeholders in 
the development process in Solomon Islands. 
1 44 Gove rnance and reform in the South Pacific 
Currently, the influence of non-government organisations in the 
timber industry is significant although it may not be as intensive and 
extensive as John Roughan would lead us to believe (Roughan 1994; 
1997) .  However, these organisations will definitely provide an 
influential force in forest management in the not so distant future. The 
state must deal with non-government organisations in making policies 
on the forest industry. 
Corporate powers 
Corporate powers are perhaps the most powerful stakeholder in the 
forest industry in Solomon Islands. They control the capital needed to 
develop forest resources and have the ability to influence state 
decisions and landowners. Their influence in Solomon Islands has 
already been well documented and allegations of bribery and 
corruption of public officers (including politicians) are numerous. 
Although multinationals are not the focus of this study, i t  is nearly 
impossible to discuss forest management without mentioning 
corporate powers. This is because in Solomon Islands logging 
companies have influenced landowner politics, domestic political 
culture, the economy and wide-ranging aspects of society. 
Peter Dauvergne (forthcoming) discusses specifically how 
Malaysian and Korean investors, backed by Japanese and Korean 
buyers have dominated Solomon Islands forest indsutry in the last five 
years and the nature and consequences of their involvement in forest 
management. Dauvergne asserts that corporate interests have 'bribed 
and pressured political leaders and forest management officials' 
(Dauvergne forthcoming:S) and have ignored forest regulations. This 
problem has often been exacerbated by the fact that timber 
management rules in Solomon Islands often have clear structural 
defects, and because of insufficient finance, and the lack of technical 
and human resources to monitor logging operations, state forest 
policies, especially environmental rules cannot be properly 
implemented and many multinationals in the industry, therefore, get 
away with breaking the regulations. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that the Solomon Islands Division of Inland Revenue has little power 
to prevent or counteract corporate schemes to evade taxes (Price 
Waterhouse 1995:39-40; Duncan 1994) . 
Allegations of corporate involvement in bribing politicians and 
public officers are also widespread. Examples include allegations that 
Marving Brothers logging company bribed five government ministers 
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of the former National Coalition Party (NCP) led by Francis Billy 
Hilly. These ministers then left the government causing its collapse in 
1994 and joined Solomon Mamaloni's Solomon Islands National Unity 
and Reconciliation Party (SINURP) .  This was because of the NCP 
government's policy to reduce log experts (Solomon Star 19 November 
1995). In another incident, two government ministers were allegedly 
paid about SI$7 million in order to approve Marving Brother 's Pavuvu 
project (Pacific Report 8 (21)  20 November 1995) .  The Ombudsman's 
report also cited various cases of bribery by logging companies. 
Such practices affect the management of the forest industry and in 
particular the capacity of the state to implement policies. There are 
also other factors that affect forest management. Perceptions of 
development can influence state policies and how people react to 
those policies. The following section discusses perception of 
development and explores the relationship between development and 
the concept of kastom. This section attempts to discuss the forces that 
influence Solomon Islanders' perceptions of development and how 
that in turn affects how they relate to large-scale resource 
development such as that involved in the forest industry. 
Culture,  trad ition,  kastom, and development 
The impact of perceptions about development on forest management 
is also important. These perceptions of development drive people to 
agree to logging concessions. Landowners and the state are engaged in 
logging in a hope that it  will bring 'development' . 
Until very recently, development was viewed as the domain of 
economists. In discussions of development, culture and tradition are 
either regarded as secondary or insignificant. However, this is 
changing. Many development agencies now realise and acknowledge 
the salience of cultural traditions in influencing the process of 
development. 
Here, culture is defined in a very general way as the body of 
shared understandings which governs how members interact with 
each other. I t  includes the rules, norms or customs that regulate 
society. Also, culture involves how these shared understandings are 
produced and sustained through time. Tradition, on the other hand, is 
used here to refer to a model of a past way of life (Hooper 1993). 
However, i t  does not imply something which has existed unchanged 
since contact with the outside world even though it is sometimes 
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represented (particularly in statements of the kastom kind) as being 
eternal. Rather, the term is used here to refer to the set of social 
behaviour and 'ways of doing things' that have emerged and continue 
to have connection to the past (Hooper 1993). Cultural traditions in 
Solomon Islands, as elsewhere, have changed because of contact with 
forces such as colonialism, Christianity, globalisation and other forms 
of outside contact. 
In Solomon Islands the idea of culture and tradition is described 
and conceptualised in kastom, a Pidgin term derived from its near 
English equivalent of 'custom'.  For most Solomon islanders, national 
life can be dichotomised into two general categories: the 'kastom way' 
defined by culture and tradition; and, the 'whiteman way' represented 
by European ideas, material goods and institutions. The concept  of 
kastom often involves an attempt to preserve cultural traditions by 
reviving and re-enacting what are regarded as past ways of life .  For 
most, the term kastom denotes the past as defined by the period of pre­
European contact. Also, kastom as distinguished from the 'whiteman 
way' implies the existence of an uniquely authentic Solomon Islands 
'way'. Consequently, social movements that encourage the revival of 
past ways of life are regarded as kastom movements. The Moro 
movement of Guadalcanal, for example, which encourages the notion 
of 'back to kas tom' (O'Connor 1973) is identified as a kastom movement 
although it emerged as a reaction against colonial subjugation. In 
contemporary politics, this idea of kastom has become useful in forging 
a sense of identity necessary in creating nationalistic consciousness at  
the time of  decolonisation. On the other hand, it could also be a 
disintegrative factor because of the existence of diverse kastoms 
throughout Solomon Islands. 
Kastom is also distinguished from 'modernity', defined by the 
dominance of European ideas, institutions and material goods. 
Institutions such as the state, churches (Christianity), schools, unions, 
professional and sports clubs are categorised as belonging to the 
modem 'whiteman way' of life. State structures and institutions 
represent the modem system of government which is different from 
the 'big-man' or chiefly systems of kastom. Christian churches pray to 
the modern God and condemn ancestral worship as pagan and 
satanic. Schools teach people the 'modem' knowledge and how to use 
new technologies. 
Because kastom is an important aspect of everyday life for Solomon 
Islanders, it must be considered seriously when making national 
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policies. National policymakers and implementors often have to take 
into consideration the sensitivity of each community's cultural 
traditions. In the tourism industry, for example, brochures often warn 
potential v isitors about the kind of dressing that is regarded as 
'culturally insensitive' and where they can or cannot be worn. 
Planners of the tourism industry are often conscious of how the 
industry could affect kastom . That  consciousness has had an impact on 
the development of tourism in Solomon Islands. Many Solomon 
Islanders understand that kastom and development are interrelated, 
and should not necessarily be dichotomised as opposing forces. 
Rather, they could be integrated as they have been in many cases 
already. However, to have a better understanding of the interaction 
between kastom and development, we should first discuss the factors 
that influenced and dominated development thinking in Solomon 
Islands. 
The dichotomisation between cultural tradition (represented by 
kastom) and 'modernity' emerged as a consequence of the influence of 
neoclassical economics which had significant impact on both colonial 
as well as post-independence development policies. The concept of 
development became important in Solomon Islands in the period after 
the Second World War. As a result, since the 1950s, Solomon Islanders 
have not only demanded independence but also attempted to improve 
their social, economic and political well being. From early proto­
nationalist movements such as the Ma'asina Ruru Movement to the 
modern parliament, Solomon Islanders have voiced their desire to 
'develop' .  This is partly a consequence of a worldwide trend in the 
quest for development as well as a result of rapidly changing values 
and needs in Solomon Islands societies. 
However, what has not often been clear are answers to questions 
such as: what is the goal of development, and what are the processes 
and means of getting there. From the past 18 years since independence 
it has become obvious that the values and needs attached to 
development have been greatly influenced by a predominantly 
Western pattern of thought  which has influenced Solomon Islanders' 
way of thinking and defined for them the goal of development, and 
the processes of achieving it. Consequently, since gaining 
constitutional independence, Solomon Islands, like many of its Pacific 
Islands neighbours, strived to emulate the example of its former 
colonial power in the quest to develop. The events of the past 18 years 
have indicated that for many Solomon Islanders, development is 
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mainly an attempt to imitate and become more like industrialised 
Western nations. 
This is despite the fact that at the time of decolonisation many 
emerging national leaders had said tha t  they intended to develop their 
'own way'. A leading Solomon Islander writer, diplomat and public 
servant, the late Francis Bugotu, for example, wri ting about 
decolonisation in 1975 stated that 'the task is to find a design for a 
future which serves our interests, and need not necessarily be 
patterned on western lines, nor serve western strategic, economic or 
political aims' (Bugotu 1975:77) . 
Subsequently, it was assumed that the answer for development lies 
primarily in economic growth and stable public policy. Therefore, 
discussions of development in the Pacific Islands since the 1960s have 
focused almost exclusively on economic growth and public policy 
stabili ty. This economic emphasis on discussions of development was 
influenced by the trend of thinking at the time and the growing 
importance of ideas and development models such as modernisation 
informed and influenced by the classical economic theory prominent 
in the industrialised west at that period . 
The state's engagement in increasing log exports in the last couple 
of years is because of its desire to achieve economic development. 
Forest management, therefore, is a question of finding a way to use 
forest resources to achieve economic growth while simultaneously 
sustaining the resource for future use. 
Concl usions 
Solomon Islands' increasing economic dependence on forestry means 
that a better way of management must be found. This can only be 
done by understanding the factors that  influence the current 
management of the industry. Forestry is an important economic, 
environmental and cultural resource for Solomon Islanders and its 
mismanagement wil l  have both immediate and long lasting impact on 
society and development trends. 
The exploitation and management of these resources has often been 
dominated by a continuous interaction between the state, civil society, 
and other international variables such as multi national companies, 
and international trade. The state is not the only, or necessarily the 
main, player in this game. 
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Notes 
1. Peter Dauvergne (1994) outlines some of the main explanations of 
deforestation. He identified four main explanations: tropical 
government, environmental, developmental, and public policy. 
This classification of explanations of deforestation will be discussed 
further later in this paper. 
2. Most Pacific island countries depend on the extraction of limited 
natural resources for economic development. However, only Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and to a lesser extent Vanuatu and 
Fiji, are dependent on the forestry industry. 
3. For a summary of the history of commercial logging in Solomon 
Islands, see Ian Fraser 1997, Judith Benneth 1995. 
4 .  The Solomon Islands Forest Industries Association (SIFIA) is the 
organisation representing the majority of foreign and local forest 
industrial companies. It was originally formed in the middle of the 
1980s. 
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Mining and maladministration in 
Papua New Guinea 
John B u rton 
The balance sheets of the large mines in Papua New Guinea all show 
substantial returns for the national, provincial and local-level 
economies. At all the projects, highly visible advances in community 
development may now be seen close to the mining lease areas. 
Inspection further afield, however, shows that anticipated improve­
ments in state-provided services and infrastructure have not 
materialised. A decade of production at the Ok Tedi mine enabled the 
Western province to take second place among the country's provinces 
on revenues from all sources in 1992, at about K24 million. However, 
more than a short distance from the project facilities (Star Mountains, 
Tabubil, the corridor of the Kiunga Highway, and the copper-loading 
port of Kiunga) improvements to roads, schools, health services and 
services to primary industry are not detectable . The chief provider of 
health services and primary and vocational education remains the two 
main Church missions with agency functions. The national govern­
ment posts along the Papua New Guinea-Indonesian border have 
been abandoned and the third tier of government, the Local Councils, 
rendered inoperative by constant funding delays. At its low point in 
1992, there was no production at  all in the North Fly rubber 
industry-the longstanding candidate for bringing development to 
rural areas-due to lack of grower interest, low commodity prices, and 
ineffective extension work. 
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The chapter examines the mechanisms through which the windfall 
revenues from mining have been diverted to suit local interests other 
than those conventionally defined by development workers and, 
indeed, by Papua New Guinea's national goals. The 'culture of 
government' is examined, with special emphasis on notable-but not 
necessarily well-understood-pathologies of provincial 
administration. 
M i n i n g  as an instru ment of development pol icy 
A special dilemma for the developing countries with an endowment of 
natural resources like timber and minerals, but with li ttle in the way of 
domestic industry with which to process them, lies at the heart of 
mining policy. Should they persist with low-growth, smallholder­
based agricultural economies and retain the resources for future 
generations? Should they adopt an expansionist strategy of exporting 
unprocessed resources, using the income to finance national social and 
economic programs? 
In the case of the Pacific nations, the decades-old search for reliable 
sources of income to reduce dependency on aid from richer 
neighbours has added a considerable amount of tension to the 
equation. The choice has existed at least since the days of Hubert 
Murray in Papua, and the more aggressive economic policies of New 
Guinea, to protect the vil lage economy, but to be resigned to the 
political dependency that comes with it, or to seek growth as a means 
of finding financial and political independence, yet risking an 
alternate dependency on foreign venture capital. 
In post-independence Papua New Guinea, all governments have 
held to growth as the path to the future, but have varied considerably 
in their defence against 'alternate dependency', ranging from the 
investment-smothering caution of NIDA 1 to almost complete abandon, 
as in the case of the essentially uncontrolled timber industry. The 
softer proponents point out that there is little scope for choice, given 
Papua New Guinea's long-term commitment to its social, educa tional 
and economic programs. These programs have consistently met with 
consensus on all sides of politics. 
In the case of mining and petroleum, all pos tcolonial governments 
have encouraged explorers to find and develop new prospects. Their 
encouragement arises from the plain proposition that all income is 
good, and more of it is better than less, and from the linked 
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proposition that the government's role in development-through its 
social, educational and economic programs-really can be carried out 
better when it  has more funds to expend. Packaged with industry­
specific regulation, these essentially comprise 'mining policy' .  
Some opportunities have already arisen to test these propositions. 
In Bougainville, an active prov incial government and a flourishing 
business sector (at least, compared to what I shall show below) 
appeared to validate the role of mining in sub-regional development. 
This all ended in tears, as we know, for reasons connected with the 
'alternate dependency' I mentioned above-such things as political 
self-determination, Bougainville's share of the income, and the 
manner of its internal distribution. Notably, though, mining itself 
emerged only slightly battered by the Bougainville crisis, and remains 
essentially intact as the income-generating part of the development 
package drawn up for the Papua New Guinea as a whole in the 1990s. 
Since the closure of Bougainville, two other large projects have 
started up in Papua New Guinea, Porgera (gold) and Kutubu (oil), 
with up to around twenty other prospects drilling, confident of 
development, or already in smaller-scale production, like Misima and 
Hides (gas). None of these, however, is sufficiently far advanced into 
the project life to present itself as a definitive new test case of the most 
basic assumptions upon which mining policy is based. At the macro­
level, despite the new gold and oil revenues, the Wingti government 
was forced early in 1994 to bring down a mini-budget and to allow a 
virtual garnishee of its income from Porgera to service debt 
repayments. At the time, blame was laid on low oil prices, low coffee 
prices (until mid-1994), and the continuing revenue shortfall from 
Bougainville. In mid-year, all departmental expenditures were ordered 
to be slashed and newspapers carried daily reports of unpaid public 
servants, unpaid police reservists, and so on. By early October, Central 
Bank reserves were almost exhausted, support for the kina was 
withdrawn and its value fell 25 per cent in a single week. 
Apologists might explain this as a temporary run of economic bad 
luck. Critics are harsher. They ask how it is that the government's cash 
crisis is equal to the worst in i ts history, yet it  has 'never had it so 
good' in terms of mining and petroleum income. They remember that 
only two years ago timber revenue forecasts were so high as to leave 
analysts wondering how the huge income could be spent. The 
chapters by May and Kavanamur offer analysis at the macro level. 
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Nevertheless, I believe that there are genuine limits set on the 
knowability of the Papua New Guinea economy at this level of 
analysis. This is because there is not a sufficient fit between it and a 
conventionally defined 'economy' for basic assumptions about its 
behaviour to hold true. For example, when an economy is said to have 
formal and informal sectors, it is generally reasonable to assume that a 
clear separation can be made. For the analyst, this allows for 
commodities exchangeable only for money to be confined more or less 
to the formal sector, while other commodities-like home egg 
production, voluntary work for neighbourhood groups and family 
duties-can be quarantined off in the informal sector. Obviously, if the 
informal sector grows in to a sizable 'black economy' this can threaten 
the integrity of the formal sector, but legislative restrictions are usually 
judged a sufficien t means of control. 
In Papua New Guinea, writers who deal with the economy-that is 
constitutional lawyers, public administration specialists, historians, 
geographers, anthropologists, j ournalists and others as well as 
economists-always emphasize the size and importance of the 
informal sector. They have to. Papua New Guinea is foremost a 
subsistence-based economy and traditional social formations are 
widely retained, even within urban communities. Culture is frequently 
mentioned in this context, and some may be said to have taken a 
particular interest in the 'culture' of the informal economy grasped as 
a whole (Gregory 1982). Others would like to, but point to a 'dearth' of 
empirical studies of the political economy (Ghai and Regan 1992:72) . 
As few writers have been able to handle the subject-matter in an 
informative and cool-headed way, it may be that gossip and innuendo 
are destined to remain the only sources of information on how 
entrenched 'informal economy culture' has become in the formal 
economy. This is regrettable because, on the political side of things, it 
divorces important  national debates from actuality and because, on 
the economic side, 'informal economy culture' can cause what is taken 
for the formal economy to behave in a pathological way. Ghai and 
Regan note that the first report of the Hesingut Committee of 1990/91,  
in its review of provincial governments, 
. . .  [fa i led] to establ ish cri teria upon which the performance of 
provincial governments might be eva luated in a ra tional  way . . .  There 
is no ev idence of any effort to exa mine the provinces' budgets, grants 
from the national government, taxation, fisca l management, works 
M i n ing and maladministration in Papua New G uinea 1 57 
programs, effectiveness in provision of heal th, ed uca tion, other 
services, public serv ice structures, and so on. 
Instead, the report appears to p lace total rel iance on views expressed 
at the 23 public meetings it held [ in four provinces] . No serious 
attempt was made to evaluate performance (Ghai and Regan 
1992:350). 
It is not true that the means to do this do not exist .  Axline's early 
work on provincial governments provides a good starting point 
(Axline 1986; Appendix). However, the public difficulty of advancing 
debate beyond the level of emotive reaction is a major problem. People 
generally have an interest in the affairs of their own provinces, but few 
have a necessary grasp of the sequences of events, sectional interests 
and key issues in the affairs of other provinces, nor desire to. The more 
recent Micah proposals (Axline 1993) are much more detailed than 
anything seen before, but they are also bound to remain in step with 
political reforms not directly relevant to the general issue of evaluating 
how provincial governments actually work ( that is, in relation to 
threats of secession from the island provinces). 
In summary, it is my claim that high level attempts to understand 
development and economic performance in Papua New Guinea 
founder on ill-fitting lower level assumptions and simply on a lack of 
information on what is happening in provinces. What follows here is a 
micro-analysis of development in one province, with a special focus on 
its usage of mining income. 
The case of Western Province: getting . . .  and spending? 
• On 10 October 1991, under the headline 'Islanders rampage 
through Daru', the Times of Papua New Guinea ran an item 
about the non-release of K8. l million in grants to villages in 
mine-affected areas of the Western Province. Getting no 
satisfaction from the public servants, the crowd 'then became 
angry and threw rocks at the provincial government 
buHding and the Finance and Planning office causing 
widespread damage. '  
• In 1992, the Dam-based provincial rubber coordinator 
reported that: 'It is well noted that 1 991 was once again an 
unsuccessful year for [ the] rubber industry in the province . . .  
Problems contributing to  very poor output were lack of 
financial back up to rubber extension programs, lack of 
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project reviews and poor reporting systems, isolation of 
smallholders and of course the low farm-gate prices' 
(K1lama 1992:9) .  
• On 7 September 1994, an NBC radio news i tem concerned 
the recent donation of KS,000 by a Daru business to the Daru 
hospital appeal fund, for the purchase of urgently needed 
drugs. Listeners were reminded that the fund had been 
launched the previous year, when hospital services had 
reached the point of collapse. 
From repeated reports of this nature, it would seem a reasonable 
conclusion that Western Province was a bankrupt and forgotten 
province with no resources of its own, no bargaining power to obtain 
an adequate budget and no political clout to 'move and shake' in 
national circles. The items are by no means misleading. The visitor to 
Western Province, and to Daru in particular, comes away with a 
profound sense of despair at the decay and hopelessness of the place. 
Jackson, author of the pre-mine National Planning Office-sponsored 
Kiunga developmen t s tudy (Jackson 1977) and lead author of the first Ok 
Tedi socioeconomic impact study (Jackson, Emerson and Welsch 1980) 
recently noted 
Daru town is very l i ttle d ifferent in physical appearance today than 
what it was ten years ago. There are no materia l  signs of any great 
expansion resulting from increased administrative funding (Jackson 
1 993:60) . 
How can this be? Has this mining province had an unfairly low 
share of mining revenues. Has central government taken more than i ts 
due? 
In short, no. Figures given by Jackson show that financial support 
from the national government to the Fly River Provincial Government 
rose from 2.9 per cent of the income for all provinces in 1984 to 7.7 per 
cent in 1991, to give the Provincial Government the highest per capita 
funding of any province in Papua New Guinea .  This rise is a direct 
consequence of the extra revenues generated by mining in Western 
Province, generally termed 'windfall income' (Jackson 1993:59) . 
Fly R iver Provincial  Govern ment fi nances re-examined 
My figures differ slightly from Jackson's but convincingly confirm the 
trend he has picked out (Table 7. 1 ) .  By 1992, only Enga, a far more 
populous mining province, edged out Western for the top spot in the 
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provincial rankings of overall funding (Enga's figure for 1992 was 
K24,711 ,200) . The giant Morobe Province, usually holding the top 
ranking on other measures, received a few hundred thousand kina less 
(K23,530,700 in 1992). 
The story of how this high level of funding came about is not a 
simple one . Royalties make up only a part of the extra money: about 
K3.4 million in 1992. The main point of note is the extraordinary 
proliferation of 'special' income sources. Political crisis has befallen 
the province in the form of two suspensions (1982-1987 and since 
1992) and a renegotiation of royalty arrangements (January 1991 ) .  At 
each point, the national cabinet has approved a new budget line, 
invariably described as top-up funds for this underdeveloped area. In 
reality, i t  has been fear of provincial government interference in a 
venture earning hard currency for the national government that has 
led to these gestures of apparent altruism. 
The result is an unusual number of these special lines. Under the 
Kiunga-Lake Murray Agreement, Kl million was given as an annual 
grant to North Fly from the mid-1980s until 1991 or 1992, originally to 
compensate for the suspension of provincial rule in North Fly. This is 
called the KLM Agreement grant. A Special Support Grant (SSG) has 
been available to the mining and oil/ gas provinces since 1990. In 
Western's case, the SSG began at K3. 1 million and has since risen to 
KS.3 million a year, outstripping royalties as a source of income. I 
should add that, being based on the same measure of exports as the 
royalties but set at one fifth less (1 per cent of f.o.b. vs. 1 .25 per cent of 
Table 7.1 Western Province external funding, 1 984-92 (kina) 
1 984 1 984 1 992 
( 1 984 prices) ( 1 991  prices} ( 1 99 1  pr ices) 
Western Province 8 ,266,904 1 1 ,821 ,673 23,948,200 
Other provinces 1 90, 1 86, 1 70 271 ,966 ,223 31 2,865,500 
(excl .  NSP, NCO) 
Western P rovince, per capita 96 1 37 208 
Other provinces, per capita 64 92 90 
Note: Western Province comprises the Depar tment of Western  and Fly River P rovi ncial 
governments. 
Sources: 1 984: Axl ine 1 986; 1 984 adjusted to 1 99 1  prices: Papua New Guinea 1 99 1 ; 
1 992: Papua New Guinea 1 99 1  a. 
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f.o.b. ), it is puzzling that the SSG should yield almost K2 million more 
than do royalties. 
Border Development grants have been intermittently available 
over the years, bu t have not been paid recently. Timber royalties have 
climbed from a low level to about K360,000 a year. 
The addition of new grants-often made public at a cheque 
presentation2 or other well-advertised ceremonies to announce the 
signing of this or that new agreement-has never been matched by a 
compensatory restructuring of the province's existing accounts. The 
result is an undesirable bulkheading effect in the provincial budget, 
because the lines known to have been added at the public ceremonies 
are hostages to the demands of the public that they be handed over in 
total for village-level projects. This public pressure is not resistable 
when the natural tendency of provincial members is to rubbish the 
public servants charged with running the province, to ignore and 
discourage any work in the area of policy formulation and planning, 
and to place no value on orderly administration in the conventional 
sense. The result is that funds for running provincial divisions and 
maintaining their programs of extension are constantly beggared, 
while the coffers of 'project' lines are constantly and profligately 
swelled. 
The manner in which the SSG is spent is notorious. In 1990, the first 
SSG cheque was used corruptly.3 In 1991 ,  in South Fly Kl . 1  million 
was handed out in KlOOO-KSOOO cheques to a prepared list of village 
groups at a single meeting. In the 1992 Budget, this is documented in 
the form of 'small-scale livestock' projects, divided into 'poultry', 
'piggery', 'crocodiles' and so on, but in no year have progress reports 
for these projects been made and the acquittals that evidently satisfy 
the Provincial Budgets section in Port Moresby simply state the 
proportion of the funds so far expended-not what has been built or 
achieved. In 1993, after the suspension of the Provincial Government, 
the Administrator simply followed precedent and gave away the SSG 
again. 
Lest it be thought that this is a valid way to spend the SSG, it is 
worth recalling that this is a special grant for infrastructure. The cost of 
not spending it as intended is borne by everyone else in Papua New 
Guinea. The 1991 Memorandum of Agreement concerning the revised 
split of royalties between the mining lease landowners and the 
provincial government contained, following the pattern I have 
outlined, another Infrastructure Grant of Kl million for the province. 
Mining and maladministration in Papua New G uinea 1 6 1  
This is of course an addition to the SSG money which the cabinet also 
earmarked for roads, bridges and similar infrastructure .  
The sting is  that the Infrastructure Grant was intended as a one-off 
payment to put against the sealing of Kiunga's and Dam's roads but 
both the revised 1993 provincial budget and the 1994 Budget 
Estimates reveal that the grant has been paid at least twice. The reason 
I was given was that the first million was not enough to seal the roads 
in both towns, so a million was allocated again the next year. It was 
also believed that, as the KLM Agreement expired and was replaced 
by the Memorandum of Agreement in 1991 ,  the KLM grant would be 
discontinued. Not so. Not only are KLM funds built into the 1993 
provincial budget, there was also provision for recovering back­
payments. (I cannot be sure whether the total amount involved, over 
K4 million, was received in the end. )  
In a conventional planning process, with rare exceptions, costings 
are made with an eye to the income stream as a whole, not to 
particular lumps of income. Thus an overall amount of money should 
be set aside for roads and a coordinated program of construction set in 
train. What we in fact see is that the province takes a helping from the 
national pot, actively diverts the money away from the nominated 
task, then goes back to the pot for mnre rather than seeing why the 
task has not been done. 
This can be viewed as incompetency pure and simple, but 
personally I see traditional economic principles at play here. 
Melanesian systems of exchange vary enormously in the detail, but a 
fairly constant feature is that debts accumulate separately and must be 
repaid in the same context as they were incurred. Thus if a man owes 
KlOO to a person who helped him with his brideprice, any casual gifts 
of money by the debtor to the helper-on payday for example-rarely 
count towards extinguishing the debt. The KlOO is a brideprice debt 
and must be repaid � one lump in an equivalent social context, and 
strictly at another brideprice. The same applies to funeral payments, 
pig exchanges and so on. We can say the debt can be repaid neither in 
kind nor in installments because it  is a 'designated' debt. 
It is quite useful to use the concept of 'designation' to view the 
addition of special project money by central government to the Fly 
River provincial budget. From the moment a new grant is announced 
at a public ceremony, a designation is created in the eyes of the voters 
who identify this as 'their road' or ' their chicken project money' or 
whatever. General public service spending, such as new vehicles or 
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outboard motors for agricultural extension officers, or even sufficient 
funds to pay telephone bills and maintain offices, is not seen as 
touching this. In fact, it is quite likely that villagers will  complain of 
the self-interestedness of these public officials who will now be 
accused of driving around in 'flashy cars' and 'not working properly '. 
All things considered, the designation of ever more money in 'special 
grants' is the poisoned chalice of provincial financing. 
Spendi ng patterns in detai l  
Any resident o f  Western Province, and any Papua New Guinean from 
a less well-off province ought to be interested in learning just how the 
windfall revenue from the mine is actually spent in Western. An 
analysis of the 1992 provincial budget showed that about K7.6m was 
available for capital expenditure and development grants (Figure 7. 1 ) .  
I 
Spending on village level projects 
It is an article of faith in reputable development philosophies that 
project funds are most effectively spent at village level .  Certainly, aid 
donors like to see their dollars turned into seeds, vaccine shots and 
clean water supplies that 'small' people can benefit from. Against the 
media representation of the village sector as essentially powerless, in 
Western Province villagers have been very successful in garnering 
resources to themselves. They are far from disempowered. I found 
much of the money dispensed in the form of small grants to village 
business, women's and youth groups with-at best-uneven 
supervision from extension workers. At worst, there was no 
supervision at all. 
Concrete examples of inappropriate village-level spending came in 
the form of livestock projects where repeated grants of Kl ,000 to 
K2,000 were obtained to buy consumable items, such as stockfeed, 
which were treated as direct forms of assistance. Such grants were not 
treated as loans and reimbursed out of sales. At one chicken project 
funded in this way in the Kiunga District, it was possible to calculate 
that the birds received a KS.00 a head subsidy-more than the retail 
price of a store-bought chicken. K2,000 was allocated for a village 
footbridge-but no bridge was built. K3,000 was given to a local cane 
furniture factory-but production is desultory, because no marketing 
has been identified. In Middle Fly, an apparently successful crocodile 
farmer received KS,000 to improve his crocodile pens. I found the only 
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Figure 7. 1 Capital expenditure and development grants, 1 992 
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evidence of this investment was a pile of iron roofing sheets stacked 
under his house and a single SOm roll of fencing wire. In truth he 
needed neither for his farm to be viable. 
The sums of money in quest_ion were not large by the standards of 
conventional rural credit schemes, but they were large in relation to 
the sums available to district-based extension workers and, because of 
this, they caused significant distortions in the hierarchy of 
administration in the province. A very sore point was the non­
payment of the grants to councils, the official and elected third tier of 
government, in 1992. For want  of their K25,000 a year operating 
budgets, all six North Fly councils closed down for most of the year 
while at the same time unelected constituency committees (with the 
exception of the provincial members whose allocations of money were 
d ispensed) sat to divide up K40,000 electorate development funds. 
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Shortly after this, the Fly River Provincial Government was 
suspended, but I do not believe council grants were paid at all. In 
1994, they were being paid again, but extension officers fared no better 
than previously. 
Spending on small contractor construction 
A wide range of secondary roads was approved for funding in the 
1992 Budget, mainly in North Fly. If completed, they would provide 
the area with an ambitious network of roads l inking almost all but 
solitary villages with the Tabubil-Kiunga Highway. This is the sector 
dominated by small, village-based contractors. 
Unfortunately, the success of the construction program is extremely 
patchy. The small contractors are not well organised and, realistically, 
cannot be left to work unsupervised. The Ningerum councillors 
observed in the minutes of one meeting, ' the contract operators . . .  
sometimes don't attend work and claim money only' . In one case seen 
in 1992, the contractor re-gravelled an already gravelled section, put in 
spade-dug side drains, but did not gravel or build up causeways 
across the swampy sections of a road or build durable culverts. The 
result is K30,000 spent on a road that is in much the same state it was 
before.4 
An amazing case concerns the 'second airport' at the village of 
Bosset in Middle Fly. Here a construction 'company'-in reality a 
vil lage business group whose capital assets amount only to the 
manual typewriter used to type up project bids-was successful in 
winning contracts totalling K130,000 to build a new airstrip some 
distance away from the main village, and an access road to it. Reasons 
for needing the new strip are vague but centre on a businessman who 
reportedly promised to service the village with a higher performance 
aircraft were a longer strip constructed . (A reason given to me in all 
seriousness at  Bosset was that dogs wander onto the existing strip. )  It  
is true that, following the departure of Talair, regional air services are 
in a state of flux, but I can say that the one current operator flying to 
strips in the Bosset-Lake Murray area, Southwest, is unlikely to have 
to fight off much competition in the near future. A potential rival, 
Sunwest, services the whole of South Fly with one aircraft. The 
distances involved, low numbers of passengers and small amount of 
freight (heavy freight travels by river) w ill  never change the basic 
equations here.  
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Were it possible to inspect the accounts of the Bosset construction 
group, they would no doubt reveal the disbursement of the contract 
payments in the form of K60 I fortnight wages to labourers and the 
retention of the rest in the form of 'management fees' .  The business 
group's office bearers includes former employees of the Department of 
Works-of which body a standard criticism is that  25 per cent of any 
contract price is charged in management fees, a high margin 
considering salary costs are already met from the public purse . (At 
Bosset, I should mention that the 'management fees' were for nothing, 
since nothing was designed or built . There is no second airstrip. )  
The designs for the winning of contracts for government housing 
and other small buildings are so standard, that there seemed little 
scope for the small contractors to fleece the public purse . This is 
wrong. A very basic house I examined at  Kaviananga in April 1994, 
built for the headmaster of a school, appeared from the provincial 
budget to have cost about K28,000. As I found again and again in all 
parts of Western Province, it was not finished, the plumbing from the 
water tank to taps and a shower not having been connected. In 
August, I met a rival contractor further down the Fly River who told 
me the builder had really received money from two years of budget 
for the same building, a total of K40,000. This puts a new light on the 
matter. I should say that teachers (and nurses, notably) are posted out 
of their home areas and tend to be highly reliant on the goodwill of 
village parent and teacher associations for garden land and housing 
when no permanent house is available. This school had nine teachers 
in all; the other eight lived in bush materials houses. Rationally, for the 
money spent, improvements could have been made to all the houses 
bit by bit, so that  all the teachers received some benefit .  Of course this 
assumes that the spending on smail construction is for the benefi t  of 
those provided for, rather than for the provider. Time and again this 
has proved completely wrong. 
Spending on large contractor construction 
Among several large construction projects mooted in the province in 
recent years, a road from Ok Menga around the Hindenburg Range to 
Olsobip was the most grand. An engineering firm was commissioned 
to write a feasibility study for the Ok Menga road and a provisional 
costing of K14.4 million was given. It is p'ossible that this could be 
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trimmed somewhat, but it is unlikely that a major reduction could be 
achieved, given that the road must find a way to cross extremely 
rugged terrain . Planners must decide whether the investment could be 
justified in terms of both the number of people that the road could 
service and the cost of maintenance in future years. It may be that, as 
most of the inexpensive roads have already been built in Papua New 
Guinea, the only ones left are expensive ones, and it is simply a matter 
of equity to build them, however much the cost. But, in practice, the 
funds are not available for this road under present arrangements.5 
All the same, about Kl00,000 became available in 1991 from the 
'Transport Sectoral Fund' for work on a pilot track for the 'Ok Menga­
Olsobip road ', and work began. A visit to the site in 1992 showed that 
the track had penetrated approximately 1 .5 kilometres towards old 
Migalsimbip up extremely steep grad ients, which are only the foothills 
of the Hindenburg Range, beyond which Olsobip lies . It was passable 
by four-wheel-drive only as far as the 1 kilometres mark. No further 
funds have been allocated since . 
What has been achieved? First, it is misleading to say that 1 .5 
kilometres of the 'Olsobip' road has been built, because the track starts 
off westwards in a detour to old Migalsimbip where the planned route 
headed eastwards. And as none of the possible routes has been 
surveyed, as recommended by the engineering consultants, the only 
valid comment is that heading blind into the bush risks meeting 
against impassable obstacles or creating impossibly steep grades. Thus 
not much has been achieved so far, beyond letting a contract to a road 
contractor. 
On a more encouraging note, one feeder road being built north 
from the Kiunga highway had been constructed, by 1992, to a high 
standard and will eventually link up with a cluster of quite populous, 
but disadvantaged villages around a mission centre at a place called 
Haewenai. It is clearly an intractable problem that well-finished roads 
like this one cost considerable sums of money out of a budget of finite 
size and the norm is for many roads to be half-built all over the area. 
The obvious solution would be to prioritise road projects carefully 
according to some long-term and stable plan. Of course, no such plan 
exists and the majority of construction allocations are made on a 
political whim. By 1 994, further money had not been forthcoming for 
the Haewenai road and a major culvert had washed out, making it 
impassable after only a few kilometres.  
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Soc ial development: health 
Various government agencies appear to lurch from one crisis to 
another in Western Province. This is excusable when there are 
genuinely no funds. It is not acceptable without a very convincing 
explanation when a prov ince is doing much better than the average in 
financial terms. The health sector is perhaps the saddest case of this. 
The impact on the people is masked by the fact that a large part of the 
province's health service is operated by agencies who administer and 
spend much of the province 's rural health budget: notably the 
Montfort Catholic Mission, based at Kiunga, and the Evangelical 
Church of Papua, based at Balimo. Both of these run networks of aid 
posts and Health Sub-Centres throughout the area I investigated . The 
remaining agency of note is Ok Tedi Mining, which operates the 
Tabubil Health Centre and aid posts linked to it. Ok Tedi's health 
services are not widely spread, like those of the two churches, but they 
are well resourced and can provide a high level of care to those in their 
catchment. 
Having said this, on my first visits to remote border villages in 
Ningerum Census Division in 1991,  I came away quite shaken by the 
evident deterioration of health once the main roads and tracks were 
left behind: 
. . .  health patterns remain poor throughout the area, by Papua New 
Guinea standards .. .The key threats a re malari a  and, particularly in 
Ningerum, fi lariasis. What proportion of women receive b irth 
assistance from trained health workers is unknown, but w here travel 
is not d i fficult women are l ikely to go to Ningerum or Tabubil  to give 
birth, otherwise not (we saw a woman at  the ful l  term of her 
pregnancy walking unaccompanied from either Tengkim or Wombom 
to Ningerum). In outlying areas of Ningerum Census Division, there is 
no reasonable evidence that  health patterns have improved since the 
early 1 970s when a sparse network of aid posts was established 
(Burton 1 991 :30). 
None of the aid posts I saw here were staffed or had medicines. In 
a subsequent year, my colleagues and I attempted to locate statistical 
data on health in Western. We found virtually nothing (King 
1993:Table B). Even at Health Centres with doctors, such as the ECP­
run hospital at Rumginae, staff said they had a weak capacity to 
service an area by patrol, to do systematic immunisations, or to 
follow-up patients unless they repeatedly presented themselves. As 
the serious health threats in the study area typically manifest 
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themselves in chronic states of ill-health, only limited in roads can be 
made in dealing with them. Villagers who live more than a short 
distance from the places of treatment are grossly underserviced. 
However, to· demonstrate conclusively how bad this is, is no simple 
matter. 
Female-to-male ratios as an indirect indicator of health status 
Sen (1993) shows how, in the absence of other measures, female-to­
male ratios can been used as indicators of the overall success of health 
care. In world terms, female-to-male ratios6 of 0.91-0.93 are seen in 
populations without good health care and particularly with poor, even 
discriminatory, attention to the health problems of women. Countries 
with a good all round health effort, whether 'developed' or not, 
achieve ratios of 1 .02-1 .04. 
In the Kiunga District, inspection of government figures showed 
that ratios as low as 0.80 are not exceptional in Awin villages. 
Absentees are not accounted for in the figures but, if the 
predominantly male absentees I picked up in interviews were added 
to the village counts, the deficits of females would only become more 
pronounced. I looked at twenty West Awin census units in detail, 
classing them as follows 
• villages with poor access: no aid post in the village or in an 
immediately adjacent village 
• villages with some access: villages with aid posts, villages 
adjacent to villages with aid posts, or with good road access 
to a Health Sub-Centre or Health Centre 
• villages with fair access: villages adjacent to a Health Sub­
Centre or Health Centre 
In practical terms, 'poor access' means that sick people cannot get 
chloroquin easily or have sores treated. Mothers frequently give birth 
unassisted and essentially receive no perinatal care.  'Some access' 
means that chloroquin is available when the aid post is functioning 
properly. Sores can be treated, but that birth assistance and perinatal 
care may not be available. 'Fair access' means that birth assistance and 
perinatal care is expected to be available, as is the immunisation of 
children. 
I could confidently identify twelve of the same villages in 
tabulations of 1955 patrol census data (Filer 199l :Tables 371 and 372). 
These provided a useful control sample. In 1955, the population 
structures of each community would essentially reflect the person-
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years lived before contact, not the limited medical treatment that had 
just become available. 
With this level of detail, the posi tive relationship between medical 
care and the female-to-male ratio is unambiguous and striking (Figure 
7.2) .  In 1955, as in other newly contacted areas, it is possible that some 
women and girls were hidden from patrol officers. Further 
examination of patrol diaries would throw light on this. At any rate, 
the ratio of 0.82 for the sample is below a modern 'bad' rate by a 
considerable margin . 
In 1990, the principal difference is between villages with no health 
services to speak off, and those with at least aid posts. The former are 
badly off, with a ratio of 0.91 . Figure 7.2 shows that this represents a 
deficit of some 64 'missing' females, if a benchmark ratio of 1 .02 were 
adopted as representing reasonable all-round health care. But is the 
Figure 7.2. Health service accessibility in West Awin villages by 
gender (female-to-male ratio) 
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1 .02 benchmark appropriate? If it is, what do the statistics mean for 
the neglected villages? 
The 1 .02 ratio does seem appropriate for the Awin villages; as it 
happens, this is the exact ratio seen in Awin villages close to health 
facilities with at least a nursing sister on duty (the Health Centre at 
Rumginae also has a doctor). This level of care is not always perfect­
no one will claim that a rural Health Centre can save every life-but it 
is above all where the benefits of mother-child health (MCH) clinics 
begin to be felt .  By contrast, the neglected villages continue to suffer 
with health in tervention at levels not far above those seen at contact. 
Sex selective mortality 
I should stress that female-to-male ratios are only an indicator of 
relative survival rates, and that 'missing females' are only 'missing' in 
relation to a particular level of health. While it is considered 
proportional to it, it is not a measure of the level of health itself. Thus 
if we see a ratio of 0.91, and an apparent total of 64 'missing females', 
among the vil lages with poor access to health care, we must also 
imagine the men and boys who have failed to survive because health 
care is poor for them too, and a matching number of women and girls, 
before counting the 'missing females' who are extra casualties. 
A full  discussion of the non-medical factors which contribute to sex 
selective mortality cannot be made here.  Economic, cultural and 
educational factors play a very important part. For example, with 
cleaner, more frequently used tracks and safer river crossings, village 
women run fewer of the simple risks that their environment and their 
daily round of subsistence work naturally hold for them. A simple 
improvement in the number of girls sent to school can have the effect 
of placing them closer to centres of treatment for longer periods. With 
better levels of education and economic participation, adult women 
can move to less traditional, but safer, occupations than were 
previous! y open to them. 
Provincial  reponsibi l ities and social development 
The above is a clear demonstration of the human consequences of 
allowing health issues to slide to what is obviously a very low level of 
priority in the provincial administration . However, how should this be 
seen in the context of mining benefits? 
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First, it is obvious that the ten years of royalties and other financial 
advantages provided by the mine have done little to improve health 
delivery. In fact the opposite case is easily be argued. A pattern recurs 
throughout the province. Health facili ties are rarely up to 
establishment strength anywhere . Daru Hospital made the news for its 
terminal state in 1993 and 1994, but Kiunga had no doctors at all in 
1991 ;  the UNDP, an outside aid agency, has funded two since then. 
Atkamba Health Sub-Centre had no nurse in 1992; at Haewenai 
Health Sub-Centre in 1992, my Awin field assistant, a former nurse 
tra inee, scrubbed up and delivered a baby a few minutes after our 
arrival there. At Suki, two sisters were present in 1994, but the Health 
Sub-Centre had been unstaffed through most of 1993. Where funds are 
allocated for new buildings-usually to rep lace existing ones that have 
fallen rotten due to a lack of maintenance-the plumbing is the usual 
casualty, with pipes left disconnected even from handbasins in 
delivery wards. Beds are non-existent. Drugs are intermittently 
supplied to Sub-Centres and aid posts-for example, only chloroquine 
may be available for months on end, when a full range of antibiotics is 
required. It goes without saying that record keeping at  these facilities 
is desultory and planning for a better health service is done only in the 
heads of dreamers. 
M i n i n g benefits under malad m i n istration 
I discussed mining policy in my introduction .  I ts bottom line is that 
mining must be for something. Mining is never an end in itself. In the 
context of Papua New Guinea, mining is not for supplying materials 
to domestic industries. I t  is for generating activity in the economy and 
income for individuals and governments. 
There are many sides to this that I have omitted here, notably the 
benefits to leaseholding landowners. My present focus is on the use 
which one provincial government has made of its income from 
mining. My basic question was whether there has been anything to 
show for the increased income available to the province. The answer, 
sadly, is very little indeed, all things considered. 
I differ with Jackson's comment of the province · that ' to date it has 
not known what to do with its new found wealth' .  On the contrary, 
many people have proved only too willing to find something to do 
with the 'wealth', starting with the diversion, at the top level of 
government, of the K3. 1 million 1990 Special Support Grant cheque 
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and extending down to grassroots level, with the smallest community 
joining in the clamour for its own 'project' which, as described here, is 
often only a front for direct income. However, Jackson is right in a 
conventional sense, for this kind of province simply does not have the 
staff-nor does it choose to look for them-to devise the policies and 
development plans necessary to get good value from any level of 
spending. 
I have attempted to show that cultural attitudes have taken over 
the economic management of the prov ince. A practice I have described 
as grant 'designa tion', coupled with the unexpected power of local 
groups over the bureaucracy, would appear to lend the province a 
limitless capacity for 'disappearing' any money given to it for 
development. 
A curious issue is the extent to which 'projects officers', the public 
servants who vet and authorise the project spending, go along with 
what they must know is an extraordinary wastage of public money. 
Corruption is alleged in the form of awarding contracts for kickbacks, 
photocopying legitimate tenders and selling them to technically 
incompetent bidders, and calling for tenders with impossibly short 
deadlines (because the winning bid has been decided in advance), but 
it seems to be impossible to substantiate any actual cases. The 
suspension of the provincial government as a whole, from 1992, and 
the concurrent suspension or investigation of individual officers 
within the Department of Western, have predictably led to less than 
conclusive inquiries and, during 1993 and 1994, reinstatement and 
'vindication' for those accused. 
It is arguable that corruption is irrelevant and is not the root cause 
of the Western Province malaise, since it is obvious that whoever wins 
construction contracts and however money is spent, all work must be 
inspected to see that what has been paid for has actually been 
constructed. The real crime may be that this never happens. No 
administrative superior ever appeared concerned about this; none 
ever mentioned to me that 'something ought to be done' to see that 
value for money was being obtained. 
I find the complacency of central government extremely curious. 
As at provincial level, a budgets officer in the Department of Finance 
and Planning must vet project spending lines and should have the 
right to insist on detailed and exact compliance with the government's 
own financial practices. In fact, as I have already mentioned, 
monitoring of spending is generally limited to recording statements of 
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what percentage of a budget line is exhausted. There is little insistence 
on proof that something really has been constructed in the province. 
I say this is curious because no national government has ever said 
anything other than ' . . .  the knives will be out for non-performers . . .  ' , 
' . . .  these people know who they are . . . ' , ' . . .  slackness will not be 
tolerated ... ' and so on. Again, mining policy is for benefits to be shared 
back to provinces, which ought to mean that some responsibility is 
taken to see that money is not simply poured away. 
P red ictions 
In their macroeconomic overview of the prospective mining boom, 
Parsons and Vincent (1991)  spell out a series of policy options for 
Papua New Guinea. These are predicated on an 'expected surge in 
revenue' ( 1991 :37) and include slowing down the rate of extraction, 
paying off foreign debt, lowering personal taxes or otherwise directly 
transferring wealth to citizens, and increasing public spending. The 
firs t op tion is largely discounted The second option is advocated to a 
certain degree, but mainly raised to warn against the dangerous 
consequences of doing the opposite : extending borrowing on the basis 
of temporarily increased income. 
The third and fourth options are considered more actively, but it  
wide of the mark on what has actually happened so far. 
On transfers of wealth to citizens, only a lowering of income tax is 
cited as a method . Actually, we have seen that 'agriculture grants', 
which ought to be loans in a rural credit scheme, are a covert means of 
direct transfer, since they are given out with no expectation of return 
and, with agricultural extension beggared to pay for the grants, with 
not even a pretence of a way to help farmers who might want 
technical assistance.7 
On increased public expenditure, Parsons and Vincent weigh up a 
balance between consumption expenditure, like an expanded public 
service, and investment expenditure, like new roads. 
The government has on previous occasions signalled i ts intention to 
devote a higher proportion of i ts revenues to p ublic investment in 
infrastructure, public goods and other economic sectors. It  is essential  
tha t  enhanced revenues are used this way ( 1991 :43) . 
In provinces like Western, this exhortation has turned into a bad 
joke. If only layer upon layer of new, 'special' grants were not 
earmarked for somebody's road or bridge it  might be possible to run a 
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simulacrum of a public service, complete with staff development 
programs, working policy and planning units, and health, home 
affairs and agriculture staff who actually have money to run their 
offices and buy enough petrol to do patrols to villages (Appendix 7. 1 ) .  
Pol icy impl ications 
The principal policy implication is that central government has 
mistakenly believed that cries for help emanating from Daru reflected 
a case of economic hardship and has repeatedly added more money 
without seeking greater accountability and better performance. 
Make no mistake, hardship is experienced in Western Province, but 
it is the hardship of those people so forgotten in the bush that their 
voices certainly would not reach as far as Dam, let alone Moresby. It is 
very likely that successive national governments have been 
preoccupied with other matters or have considered their position too 
weak to be ab]e to intervene. But this is a matter of will . The national 
government has a right to insist that prescribed procedures are 
followed. It seems likely that minor officials do insist, but eventually 
give way when pressured by sectional interest groups. 
The national government's apparent willingness to go on caving in 
to provinces that can cry 'poor ' may have roots in Melanesian cultural 
responses. I do not mean to say that it is uniquely Melanesian to offer 
help to people in need but it is definitely unMelanesian to make any 
demand of those you have just given a gift to. 
The implications are far-reaching if it is not recognised that reform 
must be attempted. Of the eighteen other provinces, as many as half 
exhibit the pathologies I have described for Western Province, if the 
media are to be believed. There are now four other mining and 
petroleum provinces: Enga, Southern Highlands, Gulf and Milne Bay. 
At least three others are projected to join them: Central, New Ireland 
and West Sepik. If any of the first four are already behaving like 
Western Province, and if others follow this route, the high expectations 
of villagers at the beginning of projects will deservedly give way to 
cynicism and unrest. 
This can be represented as a choice of development paths. Many of 
the problems of provincial development, I have argued, are traceable 
to cultural attitudes, not to absolute shortage of money, nor to 
intrinsically badly educated officials and politicians. Culture is 
praiseworthy-in village affairs. When it invades government, i t  leads 
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wittingly to cronyism and nepotism, and unwittingly, to structural 
imbalances that may take years to correct. 
It is often remarked in the context of village economics that hosting 
feasts and gift-giving looks like profligate consumption, but actually 
lays provision for the future by laying down social obligations that 
may be called upon later. A note should always be added that 
tradi tionally the consumption was always of renewal resources, such 
as vegetables and livestock. It is sobering to think how poorly this 
behaviour transfers to a mining economy, where the source of wealth 
is non-renewable. This is, of course, a common topic of discussion in 
the national media. 
If the choice is between these two paths, the main obstacle for 
participants is evidently tell ing one from the other. The 'Leadership 
Code' is a weak attempt to do this, but really there is little formal 
guidance at any level of public service for what is or is not fair 
practice: no Equal Opportunity legisla tion, for example, and few easy 
avenues of complaint for junior officials. Whistle-blowing, as in other 
countries, is fraught with dangers. 
I started with a discussion of mining policy and by saying mining 
must be for something. I have not discussed mining itself, and my 
analysis throws no light on the business opportunities to be had 
actually at the projects, which can be substantial . I have not considered 
the benefits of mining for well-organised provinces. My discoveries in 
Western Province re late purely to maladministered regions, whether 
they be districts, provinces of small island states. I can firmly conclude 
that mining has no benefits for economies of this type unless the 
enclave area of the projects effectively cover the whole region. 
My conclusions are just as relevant to the provision of aid. Aid can 
do little good with the degree of leakage in provincial spending I have 
described. More money will not help the backward provinces or the 
backward parts of arguably better-organised provinces. Aid simply 
becomes added to all the other special allocations, and is just as 
divorced from proper support services as all the other project 
spending. Even tying aid to projects may not improve matters. Neat 
rows of Australian provided police houses now stand at  Ningerum in 
Western Province, for example, and in many other places in Papua 
New Guinea besides. They are nice houses for the occupants for a 
time, bu t the underlying inability of the host province to commit funds 
to maintenance means that this is actually 'band-aid' .  
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It might be constructive to say that  the economy of Papua New 
Guinea should cease to be treated as a 'developing economy', that is 
one that needs a mechanical tune-up and more fuel and lubricants to 
get it going. It would be far better to call it a 'transitional economy' in 
recognition of the fact  that the shape it is in is due to the 'cul ture of 
governing' and not because of absolute shortages of resources. 
Notes 
Case material for this paper was obtained during fieldwork for the 
'Ok-Fly Social Monitoring Project' between 1991 and 1994, a project of 
Unisearch PNG Pty Ltd, the consultancy company of the University of 
Papua New Guinea, on contract to Ok Tedi Mining Ltd. Some cases 
have appeared previously in OFSMP internal reports and I am 
grateful for permission to re-use them here. However, the views I 
express in the paper are mine and cannot be taken to represent those 
of either Unisearch or OTML. 
1 The body which formerly vetted foreign business investment and 
which was generally viewed as nationalist but over-regulatory. It 
was recast as the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA) under the 
Namaliu government. 
2 A famous one was the 12 January 1990 presentation of the first, 
K3. lm, Special Support Grant cheque by the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Ted Diro, to the Premier, Norbert Makmop, at the Tabubil 
basketball courts. I t  was essentially promises made here that led to 
the 1991 Daru riot. 
3 Namely the cheque presented by Diro. The money was 'banked ' 
with a Port Moresby law firm and was never seen in provincial 
accounts. Between K360,000 and K800,000 was, so well-placed 
informants recount, charged by one partner, now in voluntary exile 
from PNG, for preparing documentation for the above mentioned 
MOA (work actually carried out by staff from Mining and 
Petroleum).  Some was used for overseas travel. Perhaps another 
K600,000-K800,000 was lost in an attempt by prominent provincial 
government identities to buy earthmoving equipment which they 
intended to win mine contracts with-but (a) this was impounded 
by customs with the import duty unpaid, (b) these contracts were 
already filled, and (c) it comprised machinery from a system 
incompatible with existing plant, spare parts, main tenance 
procedures, and operator training. I have heard only of K200,000 
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being appropriated for spending within Western-but, again, only 
for the personal patronage of a provincial member. 
4 Project examined in 1992. At that time I could not physically find 
the contractor, but I ran into him by chance at a village some 200 
kilometres to the southeast in 1994. I was not in a situation where I 
could easily cross-examine him, bu.t he admitted he had left the 
contracting business in 1992. 
5 The crashes of a Southwest Air Islander and an MAF Twin Otter 
near Selbang in the Star Mountains prompted a stoppage at Ok 
Tedi in late 1994 to protest about the lack of road building in the 
mountains. This is a fair point and, if anything, it underl ines the 
need for consistency and long-term planning by the FRPG and 
Provincial Works. 
6 Much of the l iterature quotes a 'masculinity index' in terms of 
males per hundred females. Thus 0.91 is the equivalent of 109.9 
males per 100 females. I can now see this as sl ightly misleading in 
highlighting an imagined 'excess' of males, when it is the very real 
deficit of females that is in question. 
7 It should be said that this pales into insignificance by comparison 
to the many millions expended on export crop subsidies, paid 
mainly in the highland provinces to support coffee growers over 
several years of low prices. 
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Appendix 7.1 
Axline's provincial government performance measures 
Axline (1986: 161-175) adopts five categories under which provincial 
government administrative performance can be evaluated . It is useful 
to compare Axline's commendable properties and his pathologies to 
past and present practice in Western Province: 
General planning, programming and policymaking 
'Among the [provincial governments with effective policy-making 
structures] plans have been drawn up in one or more sectors and steps 
have been taken to bring these sectoral plans together into a co­
ordinated provincial development plan' (Axline 1986: 161-162). In WP, 
a Five Year Plan was drawn up by divis ions in 1 987, bu t was basically 
discarded by the provincial assembly on its return from suspension and 
resumption of responsibility for North Fly. 'At the other end of the scale 
poorly performing provincial governments suffer from lack of 
organisation, ineffectiveness, low morale and li ttle policy direction 
policy decisions are limited to the adoption of a provincial budget. ' 
(Axline 1986: 162) .  In Axline's last two reporting years, 1 981 and 1 982, the 
nineteen provincial governments each passed an average of 3.8 legisla tive 
acts. 
Only two simply passed the budget in these two years; in each case, one 
was Wes tern Province. At project level, there is a preference for selecting 
large, expensive projects, ra ther than drawing up lis ts of valuable minor 
works or main ta in ing existing infrastructure. Some decis ions are made in the 
face of detailed advice to contrary or in a plainly illogical way (e.g. Olsobip 
road started without engineering plan, inoperable airstrip built at Ok A u, 
roads built in area with no vehicles). Finally, budget lines not matched with 
gen uine costings or quotations (e.g. budget items, including wages, 
typewriters, computer main tenance agreemen ts and standard house designs, 
rounded to neares t thousand Kina, cf. Fly River Provincial Governmen t n .d. 
[1 991 )) .  
Coordination, cooperation and communication 
'Many provincial goyemments do not have regular monthly meetings 
of division heads and there is often no established procedure for 
written reporting. In many cases, there is inadequate direction from 
the top, with division heads being bypassed in reporting from the 
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field, and little co-ordination of divisional plans' (Axline 1986: 163) . 
The frequency of divisional meetings etc in Western Province is unknown to 
me, but geographical considerations milita te against good communications 
(cf King et al. 1 990) . There are obvious lapses in communication between 
headquarters and rural posts (e.g. councils not paid, clinic records not kept or 
not remitted to headquarters, rubber extension of icer stationed at  village for 
1 2  mon tlzs witlz no planting material). 
Political cooperation and support 
'In many provinces there are serious problems in the area of pol itical 
co-operation and support [ranging from] political interference in 
administrative matters . . .  to a virtual breakdown of control by 
prov incial government .. . In one or two cases, political interference 
from the national level has contributed to conflict and disruption' 
(Axline 1986:166). Political in terference in Western Province is obvious in 
the case of the miss ing K3 . l m  1990 SSG paymen t and the dumping of the 
Five Year Plan.  David King (pers. comm.)  poin ts to the paralysing effect of 
North Fly-South Fly rivalry on the provincial assembly 's ability to consider 
legisla tion, let alone pass it; this appears to remain an intractable problem ( cf 
King et al. 1 990) . On the other hand, the national members are not notably 
involved in provincial government matters-the North Fly member is not 
Western Province born and his voter base lies essen tially with Tabubil mine 
workers. A t  the provincial-local level, the inappropriate institu tion of 'Rural 
Developmen t Funds '  for provincial  members undermines council 
responsibilities . Further, RDF subsidies are given to en terprises in the absence 
of adequate extension services or business guidance (e.g. small-scale livestock 
projects . ) .  
Administration and management 
'Generally, the quality of provincial administration and management 
is all provinces is low staff development is extremely important [but a] 
number of provincial governments have no staff development officer. 
In others the position is vacant part time [or] classified at a level too 
low to properly exercise the function' (Axline 1986: 167) . Human 
resou rces and staff development are clear weaknesses in Wes tern Province. 
The province has a very small pool of university graduates for whom 
employmen t with OTML would undoubtedly be a much more attractive 
proposition than working in Kiunga or Daru, and even properly qualified 
non-graduates are hard to find, three out four plann ing positions were 
unfilled in 1 992. Finally, a notable 'brain drain ' of experienced public 
servants from Kiunga in to employmen t with OTML at Tabubil rounds off a 
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particu larly dismal outlook for human resources. A t  the level of financial 
managemen t, budget lines are overspen t (e.g. no funds released for an 
allocated project) and, historically at least, have been underspent (cf Axline 
1 986:Table 38). Certain ly, acquittals are not made promptly, accura tely, or at 
all (e.g. previous year 's SSC not acquitted). 
Local and district affairs 
'It is at the level of local government and district administration that 
provincial government policies are most clearly related to the people 
they are meant to benefit. Local-level government is in a bad state in 
nearly every province of Papua New Guinea' (Axline 1986:1 69) .  Local 
governmen t had entirely ceased to function in the North Fly in 1 992. 
Axline's work essentially relates to the early period of provincial 
government, prior in this province's case to the temporary separation 
of North Fly from FRPG control; at the time Western Province appears 
to have been home to one of his two worst performing provincial 
governments. It is possible that other provinces have encountered 
more severe problems that Western's since the early 1980s; otherwise 
there are few reasons for wagering on an improvement in ranking if 
his evaluation were repeated today. 
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Decentralisation reform in 
Solomon Is lands 
Gordon Leua Nanau 
Decentralisation as an idea encompasses processes of deconcentration 
and the devolution of power. Decentralisation in Solomon Islands can 
be described as the transfer of powers and or functions from the 
central government to provincial governments, or from provincial 
assemblies to the area councils (Commonwealth Secretariat 1983:4) .  It 
includes the transfer of authority and responsibility within the 
bureaucracy to officials stationed outside the headquarters and at the 
same time, legally confers power to these lower levels of government 
to make policy decisions over specified matters. 
This chapter looks at the rationale behind decentralised 
government structures and identifies systems under which 
decentralisation can be practised. It describes how the provincial 
government system in the Solomon Islands emerged and was 
implemented under the Provincial Governmen t Act 1 981 . Major 
obstacles to the successful implementation of the 1 981 Provincial 
Government Act are highlighted. The chapter then ventures analysis of 
the disputed and controversial Provincial Government Act 1 996 that was 
intended to replace the Provincial Government Act 1 981 . The Provincial 
Government Act 1 996 was declared void by a High Court decision of 
the Solomon Islands High Court on 26 February 1997. The chapter 
concludes with possible solutions to the controversy before rounding 
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off with suggestions on strategies to improve decentralisation in the 
Solomon Islands. 
Justifications for decentral isat ion 
Six justifications are usually associated with decentralisation. First, 
there is an argument that decentralisation promotes and facilitates the 
participation of citizens in politics. Decentralisation has at times been 
regarded as a way of gaining citizens' support and commitment for 
the state. This is because a decentralised government responds to the 
wishes and aspirations of local communities. At the same time, it gives 
them a sense of security and relief from their fear of foreign 
domination (Ghai 1983:48) .  For instance, the Solomon Islands 
Provincial  Government Act 1 996 envisaged a system that would enable 
rural dwellers, including traditional 'big-men' to generate income from 
their resources and to manage public funds that come their way. 
Budgeting and planning would take place at the area assemblies' level 
(grassroots) instead of regional and provincial levels (Paia 1997:6) . I t  is 
also argued that the new provincial government structure is 
appropriate for Solomon Islands because local feelings and aspirations 
were taken into account when devising and documenting the system. 
From this vantage point, deciding in favour of decentralisation 
promotes popular participation in socioeconomic and political 
matters. 
Second, decentralisation is regarded a development tool. With the 
decentralisation of power and functions to local levels of governments, 
planners are able to identify different conditions and groups in these 
areas. Such differences and conditions can be accommodated into their 
plans (Rondinelli et al. 1984: 14) .  From this viewpoint, proper planning 
through decentralised structures, and being effectively carried out, 
would boost economic development in rural areas. 
Third, decentralisation is regarded as a strategy for efficient 
decision-making. When efficiency is the main consideration in 
decision-making it is often preferable to have decentralisation instead 
of centralisation (Battacharya 1 978:772) . Decentralisation facilitates 
two-way communication. That  is, those in the main administrative 
centres would be able to receive first-hand information on issues that 
require assistance in the rural areas or vice versa. When j ustifying 
these of decentralisation, Occampo ( 1991 : 195) commented that 
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. . .  [d]ecentral isation takes advantage of more precise, case-wise, and 
current knowledge, adaptive skil ls, and the smal ler, human scale of 
loca l insti tutions and communities in deal ing with their problems. 
Fourth, decentralisation is regarded as a way of uniting 
heterogeneous countries such as Solomon Islands. Decentralisation of 
government helps people to unite because such systems recognise the 
separate identity of groups or regions within the country. 
Decentralisation recognises and usually grants some kind of 
autonomy to different regions or provinces in the expectation that 
potential conflicts and tension from these distinct groups are mitigated 
or avoided . Premdas (1984: 135) argued that 
when d iverse loca l sentiments and interests are recognised as a 
legitimate part of the nation's col lective assets, via extend ing to 
provinces maximum autonomy in cond ucting their affa irs, then the 
urge to secede would be assuaged if not eliminated . 
In Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, Samana (1988:31 1 )  
pointed ou t  that decentralisation helped to  maintain unity and 
prevented the emergence of an authoritarian system1 •  Decentralisation 
is justified as a factor facilitating unity in heterogenous societies. 
Fifth, decentralisation is seen as a form of decolonisation in the 
sense that people are given the chance to determine their destiny. 
Colonisation created centralised governments that in many instances 
are alien and separate from the people it colonised. In such instances, 
the colonised were belittled and left with the self image of being 
ignorant and incapable of making decisions. For real decolonisation to 
take place, and the return of local pride, decentralisation of 
government structures and functions is favoured.  Expressing this view 
in Papua New Guinea, John Momis declared 
[p ]ower must be returned to the people. Government serv ices should 
be accessible to them. Decisions shou ld be made by the people to 
whom the issues at stake are meaningfu l, easily understood, and 
relevant.  The existing system of government should therefore be 
restructured, and power should be decentra lised so that the energies 
and aspirations of our people can play their full part in promoting our 
country's development (ci ted in Premd as et al. 1 984: 1 22) . 
Sixth, decentralisation is regarded by pluralists as a preventive 
strategy against citizens' loss of control over the actions of their 
political leaders. Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987:57) pointed out that 
decentralisation ensures that people control the actions of their 
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political leaders. To justify the Solomon Islands Provincial Government 
Act 1 996, i t  was argued that participatory democracy will be enhanced 
because the traditional chiefs or Big-men will be involved in decision­
making along with the elected members (Paia 1997:6) . The emergence 
of despotic leaders is discouraged by decentralising power to the 
people. 
Most, if not all of these, were justifications behind the 
establishment of the provincial government system in Solomon 
Islands. Decentralisation was seen as a way to enhance participatory 
democracy, as a tool in development, encouraging efficiency in 
decision-making, a uniting force in heterogeneous societies, a form of 
decolonisation and a means to the retention of local pride, and a 
strategy against democratic despotism. 
Solomon Islands Provincial Government System functions under a 
unitary rather than a federal system of government. That is why we 
have these words in the preamble of our national constitution. 
We the people of Solomon Islands, proud of the wisdom and the 
worthy customs of our ancestors, mindfu l  of our common and d iverse 
heritage and conscious of our common destiny, do now, under the 
guiding hand of God, establish the sovereign democratic state of Solomon 
Islands (my emphasis). 
Decentral isation,  democracy and development 
Decentralisation, democracy and development are often seen as 
complementing each other. Decentralisation is as much, and perhaps 
more, of an ideological principle as a means of administration. I t  has 
certain values and objectives attached to it. The political objective of 
decentralisation becomes clear when associated with notions such as 
self-reliance, domestic decision-making, popular participation in 
government, and accountability of government officials to citizens 
(Rondinelli et al. 1984:8) .  Decentralisation from this perspective cannot 
be divorced from the Western democratic principles and post-colonial 
notions of participation and self reliance. The feeling is that the 
administration of a great nation cannot be embraced by a single 
central power, no matter how skilful  it is. Those championing 
grassroots democracy would agree that  'centralisation is a threat to 
human spirit everywhere and its control is a concern of all men who 
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love freedom' (Seshadri 1978:670) . Decentralisation from this 
perspective is regarded as the democratically right thing to do, and is 
usually regarded as an end in itself rather than a means to some end. 
Decentralisation, democracy and development may be seen as 
going hand in hand. It is often argued that citizen participation in local 
government is the 'grassroots' of democracy that allows adjustments 
in society to benefit a majority of the people (Maddick 1975 :57) . If 
people can participate in decentralised systems upholding values of 
democracy, the system will help them to adjust to changes that come 
with development. 
At the same time, decentralisation is seen as facilitating the 
removal of the 'deprivation trap ' :  through decentralisation, people 
would be free from feeling powerless, poor, vulnerable and isolated 
(Ingham and Kalam 1992:375) .  With decentralisation, people would 
feel more secure .  A sense of oneness would discourage friction and 
fragmentation . Decentralisation attempts, in principle at least, to 
include people in deciding and defining their destinies, particularly in 
the areas of development most likely to affect their lives. 
It should be noted, however, that romanticising decentralisation 
and equating it with democracy may be misleading. Some people 
think that decentralisation does not always promote democratic ideals 
nor does democratic action emanate from decentralisation .  Empirical 
evidence from studies carried out in Sri Lanka showed that the 
devolution of power did not encourage regionalism, but rather 
separatism (Mathews 1987:86). 
In Papua New Guinea studies have concluded that the effects of 
the provincial government system's redistribution measures have 
resulted in the increase rather than reduction of economic differences 
between the provinces (Tordoff 1987:86) . In Bangladesh (Ingham and 
Kalam 1992:379) it was found that instead of removing people from 
the 'deprivation trap' the decentralised system has been used to 
channel development funds into the hands of better-off individuals. 
As we turn to a discussion on the evolution of the provincial 
government system in the Solomon Islands, it is important to bear in 
mind that decentralisation takes many forms. Decentralisation is a 
concept as well as a strategy, and the implementation of decentralisa­
tion is of prominent consideration. A form of decentralisation that 
works well in one country may not work in another. 
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The maki ng of the Solomon Islands provincial  government 
system 
The first form of administration practised in the SolomoR Islands was 
'deconcentration' .  This is a form of administration whereby 
administrative powers were given to officers stationed outside the 
main administrative centres to carry out functions dictated from the 
capital centre.  Since 1953, 24 local councils were established, the 
boundaries of which were based on language groups or islands. 
Solomon Islanders for the first t.ime began to be grouped outside their 
normal clan, family or village groupings. 2 It was not long before the 
colonisers realised that the local councils faced problems regarding 
their sizes and financial capabilities. For example, Malaita, the largest 
local council with a population of 50,000 people had a revenue of 
17,000 pounds per annum while Duff with a population of 150 people 
only collected a total revenue of 108 pounds per annum (Premdas 
1982:243) . 
As a remedy to these problems, a document known as the Plan of 
Operations 1 974-1977 (hereafter referred to as the Plan) was drawn up 
in the early 1970s by the British colonial government. I t  aimed to 
amalgamate the various local councils into several viable ones. At  the 
same time it was a strategy aimed at strengthening the role of chiefs 
and traditional leaders at district and subdistrict levels. It also aimed 
at transferring the control over staff and finance in the fields of district 
administration, agriculture, education, health and public works from 
the central government to local councils (Premdas 1982:246 and 
Kausimae 1978:142). By 1976, most recommendations of the Plan of 
Operations have been implemented. The 24 local councils were 
amalgamated into eight, including one for Honiara town (Bennett 
1987:326). The control of staff and finance in the areas of education, 
agriculture, health and public works were gradually transferred to the 
local councils. The Plan paved the way for what became the provincial 
government system in the Solomon Islands. In 1974, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs was established to oversee and coordinate the local 
councils. 
A few problems emanated from the Plan. The Ministry of Home 
Affairs and the Public service were hostile to the Plan of Operations 
because of their loss of functions through devolution . The prestigious 
tasks performed by those at the central government ministries were 
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taken over by the provinces (Premdas 1982:246) .  This caused 
resentment from public servants in the central government ministries. 
Moreover, traditional leaders did not want to participate in the 
administration of local councils. This was because one of the tasks 
assigned to councillors was to collect the unpopular head tax, a task 
that would degrade their status and destroy their respect in their 
respective communities. Therefore, the idea of utilising traditional 
leaders in the administration of local councils did not eventuate. 
The Plan also created larger units that govern people with different 
cultures, languages and ways of living who felt more comfortable 
looking after themselves rather than being ruled by others (Premdas 
1984:246). This of course contradicted arguments that favoured the 
native way of government. 
Despite its shortcomings, the Plan established the provincial 
government system in the Solomon Islands. I ts limitations led to the 
call by pre-independence leaders of Solomon Islands to have a careful 
study of the system. A special committee was recommended during 
the Constitutional Conference in 1977' to examine the relationship 
between the National Government, Provincial Governments and Area 
Councils and to recommend on measures to promote the effective 
decentralisation of legislative, administrative and financial powers' 
(Report of the Solomon Islands Constitu tions Conference 1977: 12) .  The 
Kausimae Committee was appointed to carry out this task and their 
recommendations were implemented under a new Provincial 
Government Act 1981 .  
The most important outcome of  the Kausimae Committees' 
recommendations was the listing of exclusive and final powers of 
provincial and central governments, in a quasi-federal system. The 
Committee came up with three lists they called A, B, and C .  List A 
contains the final legislative powers that provincial governments and 
Honiara Town Council have. It identified the areas under which the 
provincial governments could make laws on their own, and when 
their laws would prevail in any conflict with the central government. 
The items of list B includes those on which the provincial government 
could legislate, but which Parliament could review (Premdas 
1982:249). List C contains the functions transferred to provincial 
governments following the Plan, and other functions transferred from 
the other ministries (Report of the Special Committee on Provincial 
Governmen ts 1 979:41 ) .  These lists when included in the Provincial 
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Government Act 1 981 for the first time gave power to the provincial 
assemblies to make legislation. Yet since its enactment in 1981,  the 
provincial government structure has been criticised. 
Shortfal ls of the Provincial Government Act 1981 
From my fieldwork3 in two provinces, i t  becomes clear that decision­
making was not carried out by the executive but rather 'core' groups 
within the provincial executive or by individuals. The executive only 
gives its blessing to decisions that have already been made by the 
'core' group. 
The existence of informal decision-making groups within the 
provincial executive dilutes the justification that brings the provincial 
government machinery much closer to the rural populace. 
One such decision was made by the provincial core group in 1992. 
The decision was to buy a piece of land in another province belonging 
to a former national government member of parliament. The province 
bought the piece of land for SI$150,000. The other executive members 
were not informed. The transaction was only known by the core group 
and the former member of parliament. Two problems emerged after 
the money was paid in 1992. First, no improvement were made to the 
land. Second, it was later discovered that the land was jointly owned 
by the former member of parliament and a former Prime Minister. The 
area of land bought was reduced, due to demarcation although the 
money paid remained the same. Such practices within the provincial 
political circles did not amount to proper and efficient decision­
making. 
Area Councils in the country were mandated to make decisions on 
development activities within their localities. However, their effect in 
the provincial government system is hardly noticeable . Perhaps part of 
the reason that led to the central government and provincial 
governments to ignore Area Councils is the illiteracy or the low 
educational background of Area Council members. At the same time, 
there were no clear directives from the Provincial Government Act 1 981  
or the Provincial Executive as to what were the responsibilities of the 
Area Council. Consequently, Area Council members are elected and 
remained in office on fixed term basis although they do very little or 
nothing at all. The provincial government system has failed to 
acknowledge and utilise the potential of this group of people who are 
closely accountable to the rural populace. 
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Another major concern of those who framed the Solomon Islands' 
provincial government system was national unity. The national unity 
and identi ty that was to come from the provincial government system 
is not always obvious. Both national or provincial identities are rarely 
acknowledged and people continue to identify themselves at  district 
or village levels. The provincial identity only becomes obvious when 
one is in Honiara and the national identity becomes clear when one is 
overseas (Feinberg 1990 and Saemala 1982) . National unity through 
national identity is virtually non-existent despite national symbols 
such as our common currency, national flag, national anthem and our 
international boundaries. 
This lack of national consciousness and identity has led to 
suspicions, animosity and fear of outside domination . Resentment of 
'strangers' and the fear of being dominated by others, has led some 
provincial leaders to call for more legislative power in order to control 
the movement of people. Two provinces that are hosts of many 
industries that offer paid employment have been calling for more . 
Unfortunately, some who are employed in these industries engage in 
criminal activities and i llegal settlements. However, the two provinces 
call for more legislative power to control the movement of people to 
safeguard the interests and rights of the indigenous population 
contradict the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement. 
Nevertheless, provinces are calling for more power because of the lack 
of national consciousness and the feeling that the national government 
is not doing enough to protect their interests. 
Another serious problem with the present system is the tension 
between national politics and provincial politics. The first is the 
problem of national integration. Once people have identified 
themselves with a particular province, they start comparing their 
receipts from, and contribution to, the national economy against those 
of other provinces. Provincial welfare becomes more important than 
the national welfare. On his 1989 tour, the Governor-General was 
reminded that one province contributed more than any other province 
to the national economy but development p lans and resource 
allocation always favoured densely populated areas. In his reply, the 
Governor-General stressed the importance of unity and political 
stability and reiterated that equality w ould result in political 
instability (Solomon Nius 6 February 1989:5). By this he meant that  
giving more does not  mean receiving more, because if the needs of 
other provinces are not satisfactorily met, instability may occur in the 
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country. This is obviously a dilemma since similar consequences can 
be expected if provinces are giving more to the national economy but 
receiving less from it . In my 1995 fieldwork, both provincial premiers 
felt that unity in the country can be maintained only if there is 
dedication to equal treatment in terms of development and resource 
allocation from the central government. 
Another major problem with the 1981 Provincial Government Act 
is the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Provincial 
Governments and the nine provinces. In order for various provincial 
governments to carry out the plans and policies of the central 
government, there has to be a strong coordinating mechanism before 
two-way communication can take place. Provinces have been 
complaining about the lack of attention given to them by officers of 
the national ministry. For example, a memorandum on the 14 January 
1997, from one Provincial Secretary to the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Provincial Governments, complained 
I for one, find it very difficult  to work and fol low up matters wi th our 
responsible officers in your Ministry when they do not even attempt to 
acknowledge a lmost all correspondences. This is causing a lmost a very 
big gap between your office and ours.  Sometimes, we would be l ucky 
to have responsible officers answering our enquiry (sic) telephone 
cal ls, which is also costing very much for the b i l ls .  I have verbal ly 
d iscussed this matter with your CAO HQ Oct/Nov, 1 996 but have 
noticed l ittle or no change at  a l l, this is why I have to write now. 
Finally, the present structure has become cumbersome because 
levels of government often duplicate each other. The central 
government makes laws and plans for development at the national 
level, just as the provincial assemblies and area councils make laws for 
their respective areas of influence. These three levels of government 
are operating quite independently from each other. The absence of a 
coordinating mechanism means th
.
at each level of government has its 
own development plans and projects rather than the whole system 
working towards a common end. 
The Provincial Government Act 1 996 
The lethargic nature of the Areas Councils points to the need to 
improve or abolish them. This can be done through amendments to 
the Provincial Government Act 1 981  rathe� than coming up with the 
structure envisaged under the Provincial Governmen t Act 1 996 that 
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gives full recognition to area assemblies, but cannot justify the 
expenses and constitutional issues involved. It is a landmark decision 
by the High Court that will influence and direct future decisions in 
this provincial decentralised system. 
The Provincial Government Act 1 996 (hereafter referred to as the 
1996 PGA) was passed by the National Parliament of Solomon Islands 
on 8 August and was assented to by the Governor-General on 11 
September 1996, to make way for a new provincial government 
system and structure .  
The 1996 PGA aimed to establish a decentralised system closer to 
the rural populace. Area assemblies were instituted in place of  
Provincial Governments and Area Councils. The chairperson of each 
area assembly joined the Provincial Council, with a president elected 
from among their number. The President replaces the premier, and the 
area assembly chairpersons take the place of the executive, with 
approximately the same power to make laws given under the 
Provincial Governmen t Act 1 981 . 
A major difference, however, is the absence of political 
accountability due to the nonexistence of the opposition and 
backbenchers in the Provincial Council. The 1996 PGA created a 
Provincial Council that is composed of all the area assembly 
chairpersons who would remain in office until their term expires. The 
president, however, may be forced out by an absolute majority vote 
after twelve months. This vote, however, must be taken and supported 
by a declaration from the Minister of Provincial Governments. 
Furthermore, the minister can remove the president from office if a 
Commission set up to carry out that purpose decides that the 
president has conducted themselves improperly in office. The minister 
has the power to become a dictator on provincial council matters-a 
point contradictory to the justifications for decentralisation identified 
already. 
An unusual aspect of the new system is the registration of chiefs 
and elders. These chiefs are registered in the hope that they could be 
recognised as part of the area assembly. In traditional Melanesian 
societies, there is no such thing as the chiefly system. Nobody becomes 
a chief or an elder through registration or appointment. Furthermore, 
no-one becomes a chief through birth. In the case of the Big-man 
system, a person becomes a leader through his own hard work and 
through display of certain qualities such as being forceful, even­
tempered, a good speaker, and an able organiser (Hogbin 1964:63). 
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The prime qualification is on wealth in the form of vegetable supplies 
and pigs. There are a few exceptions in the Solomon Islands, 
particularly those in the Southern part of Malaita and the Polynesian 
outliers . Apart from these few exceptions, the registration of chiefs is a 
mockery and belit tlement of various traditional cultures of Solomon 
Islands. There is a serious ethical and cultural question associated with 
the 1996 PGA. 
At the same time, the notion of participatory democracy through 
representative government and universal suffrage, cannot be satisfied 
through the registration and appointment of chiefs and elders into the 
area assemblies and provincial councils. Since area assembly 
membership includes non-elected chiefs and elders, there is a 
possibility of having a provincial council that consists of all non­
elected members. This of course is not in tune with the democratic 
notions of accountability through universal suffrage. One cannot 
guarantee that  a chief or elder represents the interests of people from 
his zone, though he may represent the interests of his particular tribe 
or clan. The structure envisaged by the 1996 PGA lacks the essential 
ingredients of participatory democracy. 
Closely related is the issue of equal representation in the 
governance of the country's affairs: In Solomon Islands societies, no 
woman ever became a 'chief' .4 This means tha t  no single woman will 
have a chance of being appointed into the area assemblies as a chief. 
One of the principal rationales behind the new system was the 
decentralisation of government structure to the rural populace. When 
one has the government structure closer to the people, there is no 
guarantee that  power to make laws will also be granted . Even the 
power to make laws does not necessarily mean that the national 
authority vv il l  also give them the financial and economic power to 
carry them out. 
The 1996 PGA structure will be much more expensive than the 
administrative structure under the Provincial Government Act 1 981 . The 
establishment of headquarters for the various area assemblies and the 
expenses of maintaining a bigger public service commission, are 
moves that  are totally contradictory to current plans to reduce the 
public service and the cash flow problems of the country. 
Financial considerations weighed heavily on, for example, the 
recruitment into the public service of a Level 8 officer to fil l  the 
Principal Planner 's post of Guadalcanal Province under the 1981  Act. 
The Public Service Commissions' reply to Guadalcanal Province's 
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request ' . . .  that with the current cash-flow problems faced by the 
Government, your request for the recruitment of the above officer wiII 
hold until next year . . . as directed' (Memorandum 29 September 1996) . 
There is very li ttle chance that the new system wiII encourage trained 
personnel to go back to rural areas. This is due to financial inability on 
the part of the national government to attract qualified people to rural 
areas. 
The system envisaged by the 1996 PGA, apart from i ts 
constitutional flaws, does not deviate greatly from that established by 
the structure under the Provincial Government Act 1 981 .  The central 
government controls the resources and destinies of the rural populace 
through legislative, financial and economic powers. Solomon Islanders 
are in this sense aliens in their own homes. Decentralisation in the 
Solomon Islands may be better able to address development issues if 
political power as well as economic power is decentralised. Only then 
can dependency by provincial governments on the central government 
be minimised and development efforts become effective. 
Concl usion 
It is not the intention of this paper to say what type of structure should 
be adopted in Solomon Islands. The decision must involve a majority 
of the population in Solomon Islands because they will be affected by 
the system when implemented. Nevertheless, the following points 
should be considered when attempts are made to change or improve 
the decentralised provincial government system in the Solomon 
Islands. 
The problem with the 1996 PGA was the absence of community 
participation in its conception-its formulation and promulgation. The 
new system was created by officers in the Ministry of Provincial 
Governments and the Cabinet. The idea was originally raised by the 
National Coalition Partners (NCP) government led by the former 
Prime Minister, Francis Billy Hilly. It should be pointed out that the 
main person behind this idea in the first place was a member of 
parliament from an area where the chieftainship system was 
recognised . Unfortunately, when the present Solomon Islands National 
Unity and Reconciliation Party (SINURP) government came into 
power after overthrowing the NCP leadership, they revived the idea. 
The Bill was received without critical d iscussion and debate. At the 
same time, there has been an unfriendly relationship between 
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provincial government politicians and those in the central 
government. Unless the Ministry of Provincial Governments engage 
people in political and administrative post in the various provincial 
governments when making amendments or changes to the present 
system, this antipathetic relationship will continue and may 
eventually lead to severe political instability. 
Solomon Islands could solve the issue of the duplication of duties 
and unnecessary spending of money on the structure by making 
amendments to the Provincial Government Act 1 981 to facilitate the 
improvement or abolition of area councils. Churches, communities, 
village leaders and sports organisations could takP. care of area 
councils' tasks, as has been the case. Apart from being a cost-cutting 
measure it would also streamline decision-making. If provincial 
assembly members assumed the responsibili ties of area councils, with 
the help of non-formal community-based organisations, the provincial 
members would be more fully utilised-identifying development 
needs and reporting them directly to provincial assemblies. 
One approach to restructuring the provincial government system 
would be to link the provincial executive directly to the central 
government through the provincial affairs section. This could include 
an annual meeting with all provincial premiers and senior officers­
something more constructive than the annual premiers' conference. 
Instead of using the annual meeting as a chance to negotiate grants, it 
could be used as a time to evaluate and analyse progress in provincial 
and rural development. This would allow the Ministry of Finance and 
the Accounts section of the Ministry of Provincial Governments and 
Rural Development to give professional advice on spending and 
suggestions on improvements. This would also enable the evaluation 
of provincial plans and targets and the sharing of information on 
strategies to improve the effectiveness of the provincial government 
system, based on individual province 's experiences that year. 
The consititution of Solomon Islands should be reviewed to cater 
for new changes in the provincial government structure and a 
decentralised system of government that genuinely caters for the 
affairs of the rural populace must be put in place. The lack of national 
consciousness, and the subsequent fear of domination and land 
alienation by 'strangers' has led to provinces calling for more auton­
omy and power to control the movement of people. A Federal or 
Confederal system of political organisation would be appropriate to 
cater for the aspirations and desires of provinces. Unless the principal 
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obstacles to unity such as land issues, the movement and resettlement 
of people, and unequal distribution of benefits are addressed, 
decentralisation may not promote meaningful development of the 
Solomon Islands. 
Notes 
1 This is contradictory to the present calls by the Bougainvillians to 
attain full independence from the rest of Papua New Guinea. I t  is 
possible that devolution of political power alone is not enough to 
contain secessionist behaviour. Political devolution has to come 
with economic devolution before unity is assured as can be seen in 
this particular case. Decentralisation may encourage d isunity 
through secession when people, because of decentralisation, began 
reasserting their different identities .  
2 Solomon Islanders prior to that period were never governed in big 
groups or island groupings. It was common to find small 
communities with a few hundred members, ruling themselves in 
their own ways. 
3 Fieldwork referred to here was carried out by myself for the 
purpose of writing a Masters thesis at the University of the South 
Pacific. Most of the ideas in this chapter are borrowed from that 
piece of academic undertaking. 
4 I am using the word chief here in the context of the Big-man system 
which is widely known in the Solomon Islands. 
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The Sandline International controversy 
in Papua New Guinea1 
Hen ry lvaratu re 
On Sunday, 23 February 1997, the leader of the People's National 
Congress Party and Governor of the National Capital District, Bill 
Skate, appeared on local television and attacked the government over 
its decision to engage foreign mercenaries on the troubled island of 
Bougainville. He was responding to a newspaper report in the 
Weekend A ustralian, which quoted sources inside the government that 
the National Executive Council (NEC) had approved the hiring of 
Sandline International to plan and execute a surgical strike against the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) leaders in Central 
Bougainville. The Weekend A ustralian reported that foreign mercenaries 
had been flown to Wewak in East Sepik Province in two Russian 
military cargo planes under the flag of Bulgaria's. Air Sofia. The 
mercenaries had been training in PNG for over two weeks. Skate 
described the NEC's decision as tantamount to the introduction of a 
private army and an insult to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
(PNGDF). His views were fuelled by the failure of the government to 
finance the PNGDF's operation on Bougainville adequately, and yet 
their prepareness to spend millions on foreign mercenaries to execute 
its own citizens. The news of the mercenaries also prompted the Prime 
Minister of Australia, John Howard, to raise Australia's concern with 
the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea Sir Julius Chan about Papua 
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New Guinea's return to a hard-line approach on the Bougainville 
crisis. Only a week before the news emerged, the Australian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, had visited Papua New 
Guinea and had pledged to give A$4 million in aid to Bougainville 
through the Red Cross organisation. 
Sir Julius Chan when queried by journalists neither confirmed nor 
denied the newspaper reports. Instead, he said that since the matter 
concerned national security, he needed time to consult the NEC, the 
Minister for Defence, and the National Security Council. Nevertheless, 
his response to questions from journalists hinted the engagement of 
mercenaries. 
PNC, as a country, must think for i tse lf  on how best to keep the 
presence of the Defence Force (on Bougainvi l le) and how best to equ ip 
it  there. I mean, we have to look a t  al l  aspects of how best we can do it  
(Post-Courier 24 February 1997) . 
On the following day, he brushed aside the reports as sensational, 
inaccurate and a 'beat-up' (Post-Courier 25 February 1997). But he 
confirmed that the government had engaged Sandline International to 
provide military training and logistical support for the PNGDF as 
allegedly stipulated in a Defence White Paper.2 The PNGDF did not 
comment on the engagement of mercenaries but confirmed that 
soldiers were undergoing 'specialist training' (Post-Courier 26 February 
1997).3 
The pol itical and legal chal len ges for the state, the Pri me 
M i n ister and the govern ment 
Sir Julius' initial attempts to neither deny nor confirm the engagement 
of Sandline International, only served to increase political pressure 
from Australia and from within the country. 4 The Australian Prime 
Minister warned of the long-term damage that this deal would have 
on Papua New Guinea's international standing, maintaining that, 'any 
use of mercenaries would be absolutely and completely unacceptable' 
(Post-Courier 25 February 1997) .  The fact that Australia provided 
A$320 million in aid to Papua New Guinea meant that the Sandline 
arrangement could not be easily brushed aside. The Australian 
Democrats called for a review of the Defence Co-operation Program, 
saying that Australia was a potential accomplice to human rights 
abuses (Post-Courier 25 February 1997) .5 The issue, according to 
Senator Margetts, was not only PNG's proximity to Australia, but also 
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the level of aid provided (Post-Courier 6 March 1 997) . As the tempo in 
the mercenaries issue increased, the call for Australia to make use of 
its annual foreign aid allocation as a bargaining chip also increased . 
The Australian Prime Minister 's comment below on Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation's Radio National appears to have been 
motivated by this argument for using aid as a diplomatic weapon. 
I don't want anybody to doubt that we have put that view very 
strongly to the PNC cabinet. But i t  [PNC] is an independent country 
with a l l  the sensitiv i ty of a former colony to a former colonial power. I t  
i s  a lways going to be a relat ionship that  has to  be handled with tact, 
care, and sensitivity (Post-Courier 6 March 1 997) . 
The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs was especially 
concerned that insensitive and tactless public comments regarding 
Australian aid to Papua New Guinea, such as those posed by the 
Opposition spokesperson for Foreign Affairs Laurie Brereton, could 
spark unwelcomed setbacks (Pos t-Courier 6 March 1997) .6 
Nevertheless, political pressure continued to come from both 
government and non-government sectors to review Australia's aid 
package to Papua New Guinea.7 Sir Julius and the Minister for 
Defence, Mathias !jape, further a ttempted to quell the critics by stating 
that the mercenaries would not be deployed to the front-line in 
Bougainville. Instead, Sandline International personnel would assume 
the role of 'consultants and trainers' (Post-Courier 24 February 1997) .  
This failed to  convince the Australian Prime Minister. Moreover, his 
senior Cabinet colleague, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Alexander Downer confirmed that organisers of the mercenary force 
had written to the Cairns Base Hospital in Australia, seeking facilities 
to handle casualties (Post-Courier 28 February 1997). 
On Sunday, 9 March 1997, the Australian Prime Minister, John 
Howard, met Sir Julius in Sydney as part of his ongoing effort to 
persuade Papua New Guinea to abandon the mercenary deal. Howard 
appeared to renege on Australia's ban on the provision of military aid 
to the PNGDF, a provision he preferred rather than the mercenary 
arrangement, but no agreement was struck between the two leaders 
(Post-Courier 11  March 1997). Sir Julius continued to reiterate that 
Papua New Guinea was an independent, sovereign state, and had 
hired Sandline International as 'advisers and instructors' in the best 
interest of the country. In other words, Australia should not meddle in 
the internal affairs of Papua New Guinea. Sir Julius and the Minister 
for Defence also reiterated the views expressed by the anonymous 
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senior government official that Australia, in the past 21 years, has 
failed to improve the firepower and manpower capabilities of the 
PNGDF. According to Sir Julius, an Australian journalist had caused 
the current furore by using the word 'mercenaries', when the 
government had contracted 'consultants, advisers, and military 
instructors'  (Post-Courier 14 March 1997). However, the Prime 
Minister 's earlier denial that the military consul tants would not be 
deployed to Bougainville was retracted (Post-Courier 17 March 1997) . 
He confirmed that some military consultants would be deployed to 
Bougainville, especially to train PNGDF pilots to fly the new 
helicopters. Sir Julius was adamant that the Sandline International 
contract would not be cancelled. 
Other countries including New Zealand, Solomon Islands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States also joined Australia to 
condemn Papua New Guinea. Both the Australian8 and New Zealand 
Ministers for Defence indicated their intentions to have the defence co­
operation programs with Papua New Guinea reviewed (Post-Courier 
25 March 1997). The Australian Minister for Defence was especially 
keen on examining all avenues to convince Papua New Guinea into 
reneging on the use of mercenaries (Post-Courier 25 March 1997) .  
However, both countries agreed that their training programs were not 
as successful as they had hoped . Both countries stated that they 
planned to take stronger diplomatic action against Papua New 
Guinea, through the South Pacific Forum. The Solomon Islands even 
threatened to bring Papua New Guinea before the International Court 
of Justice. I ts immediate concern was on the possible far-reaching 
effects of the use of mercenaries and the destabilising effect it would 
have on the region. According to the Acting Prime Minister of the 
Solomon Islands, previous military operations on Bougainville had led 
to increases in cross-border violations into Solomon Islands territory 
(Post-Courier 28 February 1 997) .  The use of mercenaries, he believed, 
would not only increase cross-border v iolations, but also the inflow of 
civilians from Bougainville into the country. 
Senior PNG statesmen and leaders were equally critical of the 
Sandline International contract .  Amongst the most critical was the 
regional member for Bougainville, John Momis. He accused Sir Julius 
of being hypocri tical in publicly proposing and supporting a peace 
plan, while secretly plotting a military operation (Post-Courier 26 
February 1997) .  He later described the Prime Minister 's action as an 
insult to the security forces and the people of Bougainville for 
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allocating K33.6 million for a rambo-type operation when 
Bougainvilleans suffered from a lack of essential services and while 
the security forces suffered a lack of proper logistics . In contrast, the 
Leader of the Opposition, Roy Yaki, su"pported in principle the 
government's initiative but only if they were genuinely engaged in 
military training and development (Post-Courier 6 March 1997) .  
Australia's intense interest in the Sandline International contract 
initially angered two senior Members of Parliament-Roy Yaki 
(Leader of the Opposition) and Bernard Narokobi (member for Wewak 
Open Electorate), both of whom labelled Australia's reaction as 
interfering and patronising. Yaki further clarified that while he 
. . .  [did]  not agree with the way the 'private government army' had 
been h ired, the Austra l ian government had no right to exert pressure 
or make threa tening overtures to Papua New Guinea (Post-Courier 27 
February 1 997) . 
Yaki, although concerned a�out the Sandline contract and its 
implications for the Bougainville crisis, was not impressed by the 
growing pressure from Australia, and accused the former colonial 
government of having a hidden agenda. As far as he was concerned, 
the decision to engage Sandline International was taken by a 
legitimate government, however right or wrong that decision might 
have been viewed. Australia's attitude and Yaki's response were 
fuelled by Sir Julius' reluctance to provide access to all the information 
regarding the mercenaries. Yaki was also critical of Sir Julius over 
what he termed as 'jumping to another ad hoe initiative, in 
desperation to solve the Bougainville crisis, instead of attempting to 
identify other peaceful initiatives' (Post-Courier 27 February 1997). He 
also challenged the Prime Minister in the following statement. 
What [had] happened to the government's peace init iative [for w hich] 
i t  had pumped so much money and effort . . . ? [Had] the government 
abandoned all of it for another tactica l mi l itary operation? What is the 
guarantee that any mi l i ta ry operation will not achieve i ts desired 
results before it would be called off l ike Operations H igh Speed I and 
II? We have w itnessed so much money [that had been] a llocated to the 
Bougainvil le operations go down the drain without achieving any 
satisfactory result-all  because there is no real political wil l  and 
commitment by the leadership of this country (Post-Courier 27 
February 1 997). 
Senior Bougainvilleans inside Bougainville observed the Sandline 
contract with caution. The Premier of the Bougainville Transitional 
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Government (BTG), Gerard Sinato reminded the government about 
the Mirigini Charter which sought consultation with the BTG (Post­
Courier 25 February 1997). Also supporting the call for peaceful 
negotiations on Bougainvil le, yet in another form, was Archbishop 
Karl Hesse, the Roman Catholic Church leader of the largest religious 
following on the island . 
The exposure of the Sandline International contract posed a serious 
threat for the government's peace initiative-the Peace Strategy for 
Bougainville. This peace strategy, which is an initiative of the Minister 
for Provincial and Local-Level Government, Peter Barter, ca lls for the 
opening of dialogue amongst all Bougainvilleans involved in the 
conflict, the restoration and recognition of the authority of the chiefs, 
and the restoration of essential services. Also referred to as the three­
Rs policy, this peace plan seeks to reconcile, restore, and rehabilitate. 
In the midst of the Sandline controversy, the Prime Minister, 
suddenly announced early in March 1997 the government's intention 
to purchase the Panguna Mine on Bougainville (Post-Courier 3 March 
1 997).9 The Prime Minister alleged that  he was forced to make a 
premature statement about the government's plans because of 
increasing press speculation, resulting from the leaked government 
plans to the media. The Deputy Prime Minister also confirmed Sir 
Julius' plans when he told reporters that he had been in Hong Kong, 
where the terms of reference for the buy-out were set with the b.rokers, 
Jardine Fleming of Hong Kong. 10 Sir Julius stated that his government 
planned to purchase 53.9 per cent of RTZ-CRA's interests, and gain 
control of the mine.The Panguna mine, according to Sir Julius, was the 
root of the Bougainville conflict, and therefore, the government's plan 
to purchase majority shares in the copper mine was crucial for a fair 
and lasting solution (Pos t-Courier 3 March 1 997) . The Pos t-Courier 
reported RTZ-CRA had asked for a firm proposal from the 
government, but did not received one, however, the major shareholder 
did not believe that the engagement of mercenaries would solve the 
Bougainville crisis (Post-Courier 3 March 1997) .  
Military analysts observed that companies such as Executive 
Outcomes had been used by large resource development companies 
and governments, to protect mining and petroleum assets, in return 
for mining and petroleum concessions (Post-Courier 7 March 1997) . 
Executive Outcomes apparently received oil concessions in Angola, 
and rights to diamond mines in Sierra Leone. Speculation that 
Sandline International would receive shares in the Panguna Copper 
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Mine was, however, rejected by the Deputy Prime Mini.ster (Post­
Courier 3 March 1997). Sandline International senior executive, Tim 
Spicer, also refuted claims that payments might include shares in some 
PNG resource projects (Post-Courier 7 March 1997). However, 
according to stockmarket analysts, the fact that RTZ-CRA held onto its 
shares throughout the duration of the Bougainville crisis proved that it 
was in no hurry to get rid of them (Pos t-Courier 4 March 1997). In 1996, 
the Panguna mine was estimated to be valued at about A$254 million 
(K276 million) and its worth was expected to increase to about A$551 
million (K600 million) if the mine is reopened for production. At an 
unlikely selling price of A$1 per share, this would place the market 
value of the Panguna mine at A$401 million . According the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Chris Haiveta, the government would offer between 
KSO million and KlOO million to RTZ-CRA for its 53.9 per cent equity 
in the Panguna mine, even though, the stock exchange valued the 
stake at about K135 million (A$1 25 million) ( Pos t-Courier 5 March 
1997). The government then planned to float the mine on the market 
after purchasing the RTZ-CRA shares. The public's response to the 
proposal was mixed . 11 On 6 March 1997, the Deputy Prime Minister 
revealed that RTZ-CRA had agreed to negotiate a sale price, and that 
the NEC had given its approval to secure funds, and to begin 
negotiations (Post-Courier 7 March 1997) . The Deputy Prime Minister 
also stated that a substantial number of the shares from the Panguna 
mine would be given free to landowners and other Bougainvilleans. 
However, two days after this proposal was mooted by the 
government, the Chief Executive of RTZ-CRA, Leon Davis, revealed 
that the company did not receive any offer or proposal from the 
government to purchase its maj ority shares (Post-Courier 20 March 
1997). Prior to the revelation that the government was planning to use 
mercenaries to regain control of the mine, heavy trading in 
Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) had taken place (Post-Courier 10 
March 1997) .  The Sydney Morning Herald alleged that senior members 
of the government might have been involved in the trading. More than 
one million shares in BCL were purchased for around 60 cents each on 
14, 18 and 19 February 1997. 1 2  
Sir Michael Somare and his National Alliance group were among 
the first group of leaders to call for the immediate resignation of Sir 
Julius and his government (Post-Courier 4 March 1997) .  The National 
Alliance considered the government's Bougainville initiative as the 
biggest public finance and public scandal since Independence, and 
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one that was intended to liquidate ci tizens as well as BRA leaders. 
Moreover, they contended that the decision amounted to a flagrant 
and seditious usurpation of the Constitution. The decision, according 
to them, also seriously undermined the authority of the national 
parliament on matters that affected the national budget and the Public 
Finances (Managemen t) Act with regard to decisions on major financial 
commitments. The Opposition spokesperson for Finance, Masket 
Iangalio, added to the list of those who should resign over the 
Sandline International deal, the Governor of the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea (Post-Courier 10 March 1997). The political direction that forced 
him to authorise the transaction outside the budgetary procedure was 
illegal. The Governor, according to Iangalio, would have known this 
when he authorised the transfer of K33 million to an unregistered 
company (Post-Courier 10 March 1997) .  
In a bid to stymie the Sandline contract, a private lawyer and an 
intending candidate for the 1997 National Elections, Rimbink Pato 
mounted a court challenge against the government to prevent the 
deployment of mercenary personnel on Bougainville (Post-Courier 6 
March 1997). The lawyer contended that the Prime Minister and the 
Deputy Prime Minister had hidden K33 million in a defunct company, 
the North Fly Development Corporation Propriety Limited (Roadco), 
and planned to spend it for a purpose which the national parliament 
had not heard of, or approved. He contended further, that both men 
had set out to deceive the World Bank and the IMF and had thereby 
destroyed the country's reputation for honesty and truthfulness. 13 The 
motion, which sought an interim injunction to prevent the state from 
using public funds t� hire and deploy mercenaries on Bougainville, 
was refused by the National Court on 6 March 1997, but deferred to 
the following Wednesday. The presiding judge agreed that the matter 
was of great significance and concerned the country's national 
security. The lawyers preparing legal proceedings for Rimbink Pato 
claimed that they had documents showing that K20 million had been 
remitted from the country. Due to lack of evidence the National Court 
threw out the motion filed by Pato. 
On 12 March 1997, the government sought a court injunction to 
prevent the publication of state documents on the Sandline contract 
because all documents pertaining to the mercenaries deal had been 
'sworn to secrecy' (Post-Courier 13 March 1997) .  The parties identified 
in the Secrecy Act were the Deputy Prime Minister, the North Fly 
Development Corporation Propriety Limited, and the Director of the 
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National Intelligence Organisation (NIO) (Post-Courier 27 February 
1997) . The NIO also sought a court order to prevent the disclosure of 
certain state documents labelled as 'top secret' and privileged 
information under the NIO Act, especially since the case concerned 
matters affecting national security (Pos t-Courier 17 March 1997). In all, 
seven state documents were classified as top secret. The officials 
representing the government, Warner Shand Lawyers, the Department 
of Finance, the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation, the Bank of 
Papua New Guinea, and the State Solicitor 's Office were signatories to 
the declaration of secrecy. 
Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF) also 
served a legal challenge on the government on 12 March 1997 (Post­
Courier 13 March 1997). ICRAF challenged the legality of the 
government's use of members of the PNGDF on Bougainville. In one 
of two separate applications, ICRAF sought the enforcement of Section 
57 of the Constitution for thousands of Bougainvilleans, and other 
Papua New Guineans, who have died or suffered since the crisis 
began in 1988. ICRAF argued that the Prime Minister, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, and the Minister for Defence waged an 
unconstitu tional and unlawful war that resulted in death and 
suffering and thereby deprived individuals of their rights provided 
under the Constitution. ICRAF believed that the three respondents, 
collectively or individually, violated Sections 200, 202, 203, 211, and 
212 of the Constitution. These sections of the Constitution covered 
unauthorised forces, the functions of the PNGDF, the application of 
the general law, the accounting of public finances and the generation 
of revenue and expenditure of public finances without the prior 
approval of relevant government bodies. ICRAF argued that the 
PNGDF's role is to render support to civilian power, which, as 
stipulated in the Constitution, is the function of Royal Papua New 
Guinea Police Constabulary. ICRAF argued that the PNGDF should 
not be directly engaged in internal military operations. A sobering 
warning of the jurisdictional implications in engaging mercenary 
organisations such as Sandline International came from Amnesty 
In ternational. Mercenaries, accord ing to Amnesty International, 
operate outside the normal criminal justice system, and on the fringes 
of military command structures (Post-Courier 10 March 1997). The 
human rights organisation warned that, 'if human rights violations 
result from their deployment, it is  much harder to hold them to 
account than regular members of the security force because such 
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personnel can exit from the country, and escape accountability ' (Post­
Courier 10 March 1997) .  
An impromptu survey of the general public's opinion on the 
Sandline International contract throughout the country, found the 
government's move to be highly 'unpopular ' (Post-Courier 7 March 
1997). In general, people considered the exercise to be very expensive, 
and Bougainvilleans were not enemies, but brothers. All the people 
interviewed believed that the crisis could be addressed and solved 
internally. Also at stake were the lives of the five security force 
members who were still held captive by BRA rebels at Laguai in Buin, 
South Bougainville . 
The i ntervention of S ingirok: 1 7  March 1 997 
Up to 16 March 1997, the only comment from members of the PNGDF 
on the Sandline contract came from the operations officer at Moem 
Army Barracks, who praised the quality of training and the equipment 
brought in by the 'military consultants' .  Much of the public comment 
was left entirely to the politicians-that is, until Brigadier-General 
Jerry Singirok went on the government-owned Radio Kalang talk-back 
show to announce that he had cancelled the Sandline International 
contract. During the broadcast, Singirok also issued an ultimatum to 
the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister for 
Defence to resign from office within 48 hours of his announcement, 
and to make way for a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
Sandline International contract. 
The dramatic events surrounding Singirok's action began at 6 am 
on 17 March 1997, .when he met with the Commissioner of the Royal 
Papua New Guinea Constabulary, Robert Nenta at  his residence in 
Murray Barracks, in order to solicit the Commissioner's support (Post­
Courier 24 March 1 997). Singirok believed that  Nenta had given him 
assurance of his full  support. Then at his conference room, Singirok, in 
the presence of the Police Commissioner, briefed his principal officers 
in relation to his plans. At 8.30 am, a letter written by General 
Singirok, expressed his lack of confidence in the leadership of the 
Prime Minister and was delivered by hand to the Prime Minister 's 
staff. 14 A parade of soldiers was staged at Murray Barracks at 9 am 
where Singirok told the soldiers of his plan to go public and about his 
letter to the Prime Minister. Then at 10 am, Singirok and Nenta, along 
with a truckload of soldiers, drove to Government House at 
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Konedobu, so that both men could brief the Governor-General (Post­
Cou rier 24 March 1997) . At 11 am, accompanied by both armed and 
unarmed soldiers, Singirok told the nation of his actions and issued 
his ultimatum during the Kalang program. After this historic 
broadcast, he left for Murray Barracks to prepare for a press 
conference with journalists and representatives of diplomatic 
missions. Shortly after the Brigadier-General's live broadcast, the 
National Broadcasting Commission received instructions from the 
government barring all news items on the issue. At about 1 :45 pm, 
Singirok held a press conference to explain his position, to answer 
questions from the media, and then handed out copies of the 
statement which he had read at the Kalang radio studios. He assured 
diplomatic missions that there was no military coup and tha t they 
were in no danger since earlier at midday, news of a military revolt 
had spread across the country and overseas. 
The Governor-General arranged to give a press conference at about 
3:15 pm but this was cancelled without any reason given (Post-Courier 
24 March 1997). Instead, the Prime Minister held a press conference in 
the evening at 6 pm to inform journalists that he had no intention of 
resigning. His mandate as a parliamentarian, he argued, had come 
from the people of his electorate. His mandate as the Prime Minister of 
Papua New Guinea, he continued, had come from the national 
parliament. 
The Police Commissioner, Robert Nenta, and the President of the 
Police Association, Aloyius Eviaisa, then distanced the Royal Papua 
New Guinea Police Constabulary from Singirok's actions (Post-Courier 
24 March 1997) .  Eviaisa later retracted his stand and pledged his 
support for Singirok (Post-Courier 24 March 1997). When questioned 
by the media about his role in the activities leading to Singirok's 
public statement, the Police Commissioner neither confirmed nor 
denied the allegations (Post-Courier 18 March 1997). He claimed that 
he was misquoted by the overseas media and insisted that both men 
had been playing their constitutional roles. The dramatic events that 
eventuated, as far as he was concerned, had nothing to do with him. 
Asked whether he had met with Singirok, the Police Commissioner 
replied evasively, 'All I'm saying is that you didn't hear it from me' 
(Pos t-Courier 18 March 1997) . He later retracted and admitted that he 
did meet with Singirok, but only as two professionals. He claimed that 
when Singirok raised the subject of Sandline International, he had no 
idea of the Brigadier-General's intentions (Post-Courier 19  March 1997) . 
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Nenta maintained that he refrained from participating only after 
receiving sufficient information on the proposal. That was the last 
major public statement Nenta made concerning the Sandline affair. 
Throughout the duration the Police Commissioner remained 
resoundingly silent on the subject and has kept  a low profile. 
Singirok is sacked as Commander of the Pa pua New 
G u i nea Defence Force 
Approximately one hour after the Prime Minister 's press conference, 
the NEC convened to consider the fate of Brigadier-General Singirok. 
At approximately 8:30 pm that night, the Prime Minister 's Office 
released a statement that announced that Singirok had been sacked 
and that Colonel Alfred Aikung had being appointed as Acting 
Commander of the PNGDF (Post-Courier 18  March 1997) . 
On Tuesday 18 March 1 997, a large crowd gathered outside Murray 
Barracks, forcing a section of Hubert Murray Highway to be blocked 
off at the Taurama traffic lights (Post-Courier 18 March 1997). The 
crowd was addressed by a combination of non-government 
organisations led by Melanesian Solidarity Incorporated that had 
gathered in support of Singirok's action. Singirok was issued his letter 
of revocation on that day at about noon. He maintained that the issue 
of the Sandline International contract remained open. Earlier in the 
morning, he held a military parade to ask the soldiers and officers to 
uphold the laws of the country and support the Acting Commander. 
The command of the PNGDF was handed over to Colonel Aikung at 
the Commander 's office and Singirok moved into h is residence where 
a faction of the soldiers who remained loyal to him kept vigilant watch 
throughout the crisis .  The Prime Minister later told reporters that 
Singirok had been sacked because 'he was guilty of insubordination 
which bordered on treason' (Post-Courier 19 March 1997) .  Elaborating 
further, the Prime Minister said that Singirok had acted in a most 
inappropriate manner that amounted to a military coup (Post-Courier 
19 March 1997). 
The Prime Minister confidently claimed that Colonel Aikung 
enjoyed 'popular support among his peers' (Post-Courier 19 March 
1997) . The events that unfolded revealed otherwise, and Aikung 
became isolated. In fact, he was placed under house-arrest by soldiers 
who were loyal to the sacked Commander. Four days later, his private 
vehicle was seized, driven outside the single quarters and burned, 
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again by soldiers loyal to Singirok. Out of fear for his life, he fled with 
his family from their military home in Murray Barracks (Post-Courier 
18 March 1997) . Apparently, Colonel Aikung had been previously 
linked to a corrupt deal with a Malaysian company over a PNGDF 
housing scheme (ABC Foreign Correspondent 1 April 1997) . Allegedly, 
the burned vehicle symbolised that corrupt housing deal. With an 
Acting Commander who lacked the support of the army, the National 
Executive Council was left with little alternative but to identify a new 
Commander who would win the approval of the soldiers. 
Consequently, Colonel Aikung's appointment was rescinded and he 
was replaced by the Chief of Staff, Colonel Jack Tuat on 24 March 
1997. However, the military faction that had remained loyal to 
Singirok, set up a Crisis Management Committee under the leadership 
of Colonel Alan Pinia (Post-Courier 21 March 1997). This Committee, 
although highly irregular and improper, was useful, given the volatile 
split within the military. The temporary command structure offered 
some control and discipline. Behind all this, Singirok remained the 
undisputed de facto Commander of the PNGDF. 
Singirok's al legations 
The Post-Courier published Brigadier-General Singirok's address on 18 
March 1997 in which he outlined several reasons why he chose to 
terminate the Sandline contract and why he had called on the Prime 
Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister for Defence to 
resign. First, he claimed that he was forced to go public about the 
Sandline contract because the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and the Minister for Defence had made numerous false and 
misleading statements on the matter. For example, he noted that the 
media statements by two senior politicians suggesting that he went on 
a shopping trip for military hardware in Singapore was untrue. 
Singirok claimed he had gone to the Philippines on 23 to 28 February, 
a t  the invitation of the Philippines Armed Forces Commander. Second, 
he considered the decision to engage Sandline International to carry 
out operations on Bougainville to be professionally and ethically 
improper, especially when the security forces could be re-equipped 
and their morale significantly boosted for the same money. The 
PNGDF, he argued, ·had managed to contain the uprising on 
Bougainville for the last nine years, despite the neglect by successive 
governments in providing resources and funding for vital allowances. 
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Third, he believed the use of Sandline International on Bougainville 
would be counter-productive because the arsenal intended for the 
operation was totally destructive against humans and the 
environment. The problem on Bougainville did not warrant the use of 
such a destructive arsenal. The direct consequence of this, Singirok 
claimed, would lead the people to turn against the government and 
the PNGDF. 
Fourth, he argued that the Sandline International contract did not 
cater sufficiently for the transfer of technology and skills. Furthermore, 
the military equipment did not conform to the plans outlined in the 
Defence White Paper. The equipment only served the financial 
interests of Sandline International because the PNGDF could not 
sustain their use, unless the government extended Sandline 
International's contract for a suitable duration. According to Singirok, 
the monthly contractual costs alone was equivalent to one-third of the 
PNGDF's annual budget. Such astronomical costs would be less 
transparent, if the government sought to negotiate between 
governments to provide for long-term training, and development at 
shared costs. The contract was not only tenable after the initial three 
months, but renewable for one year, which meant that the government 
would spend well over US$120 million or K166 million. Furthermore, 
arrangements between governments within military agreements are 
long lasting, and are pursued in the spirit of friendship. If the 
government purchased the military hardware through government-to­
government arrangements, the deals would be even more transparent. 
Fifth, the government's decision to engage Sandline International 
to conduct an operation on Bougainville undermined the potential of 
its own military and security establishment, and would demoralise the 
soldiers and officers who would remain after the military company 
had departed. The sixth factor, according to Singirok, was that the 
government refused to terminate the Sandline International contract, 
despite being advised by him, and other government advisers. He 
claimed that others who had assisted in finalising the contract had 
discovered major flaws. The government was bent on reopening the 
Panguna mine without consideration for the long-term implications, 
and without addressing issues of peace on the Island. The politicians 
overruled the advice of professionals. Singirok later revealed that the 
Deputy Prime Minister had placed enormous pressure on him to sign 
the Sandline International contract in September 1996. Under such 
political pressure, he doubted that his objections would have made 
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any difference but would instead result in his premature sacking. In 
September 1996, according to the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation's (ABC) Foreign Correspondent program, former 
Brigadier-General, Ted Diro was approached by Sir Julius and asked 
to return to active service and take over Singirok's job.  Singirok 
claimed that, at about this time, he informed the Prime Minister 
through the National Security Council, that he was under pressure 
from the Deputy Prime Minister. Thus, if the bureaucratic process did 
not prevent the contract from being approved, then, in Singirok's view, 
it would not have mattered whether he raised the issue earlier or not. 
Singirok claimed that Sandline International executives were given 
direct access to the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for Finance, and the Minister for Defence. Yet, the 
bureaucratic and security professionals were given no role in decision­
making and only complied with the directions issued by the 
politicians. According to Singirok 
[T]he checks and balances which fi l tered and assessed the decisions 
became mere rubber stamps in the Sandl ine Interna tional contract, 
which resulted in an expensive contract which posed serious social ,  
securi ty, economic and political impl ications for Papua New Guinea 
(Singirok 18 March 1 997) . 
The seventh factor bordered on corruption. According to Singirok, 
most of the military hardware that had been purchased from Eastern 
Bloc countries, was either obsolete, or not in high demand. Sandline 
International, he al leged, had acquired the arsen al at cheap prices, and 
sold these at exorbitant prices to Papua New Guinea. He alleged that 
high percentage commissions might have been paid to all parties who 
were involved in the deal. He also claimed that it was highly 
suspicious that the firs t transfer of US$18 million was remitted to 
Hong Kong, when the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for 
Defence were there with Sandline International executive, Tim Spicer 
between 12-1 4 February 1997. According to Singirok, this meeting 
could not be coincidental. What were they doing with Tim Spicer in 
Hong Kong at that time, he asked? The eighth factor was speculative. 
Sandline International, Singirok speculated, had used the PNGDF, as a 
front to equip a private security firm belonging to the Prime Minister.29 
He posited that, if this was true, it implied that the government no 
longer had trust and confidence in the Police Force, and would 
empower private security firms to use arms and explosives, which had 
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been intended to protect the lives and property of money-centred 
companies . 
Singirok applauded the move by the government to seek military 
assistance outside of Papua New Guinea's traditional partners 
because he felt that neighbouring countries had their own strategic 
and security interests to protect, and were less sensitive to Papua New 
Guinea's security needs. He acknowledged the government's decision 
was one that had been made by a sovereign, independent state, but 
argued that such a decision should have been guided and be based on 
the PNGDF's own schedule, as stipulated in the Defence White Paper. 
The government's reference to the Defence White Paper for the 
Sandline International contract was incorrect, and was nothing more 
than a poor attempt to justify the deal. Finally, Singirok alleged that 
the Sandline International contract was one amongst many dubious 
deals in which the government squandered large sums of public 
finances without proper accountability and transparency. 
Pol itical responses, constitutional and legal chal lenges to 
Singirok's action 
According to prominent constitutional lawyer and President of the 
Papua New Guinea Law Society, Loani Henao, Brigadier-General Jerry 
Singirok had no authority to call on the Prime Minister to resign (Post­
Courier 18 March 1997) . He was bound to obey the instructions of his 
Minister, whether he liked them or not. According to Mr. Henao and 
Sir Julius, Singirok's actions, however he viewed the instructions, only 
served to promote instability, anxiety, confusion, and unwarranted 
fear among the people (Post-Courier 18 March 1997). Australia, after 
having reacted strongly to the Sandline International contract with th� 
PNG government, assumed a cautionary stance concerning Singirok's 
claims. The Australian government was optimistic that the PNG 
Constitution and the democratic institutions that had come under 
pressure would rise to the occasion and prevail over the PNGDF 
Commander 's ultimata. The Prime Minister of Australia supported 
the PNG government's decision to sack Singirok as Brigadier-General 
but rejected any claim that Australia's campaign against Sandline 
International may have encouraged and motivated Singirok to take 
such action (Post-Courier 19 March 1997) . A delegation of senior 
Australian government officers, led by the Departmental Head for 
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Foreign Affairs was dispatched to Port Moresby on 19 March 1997 to 
hold talks with Sir Julius. Meanwhile, the Australian military had been 
placed on a 'higher state of readiness' to evacuate Australian citizens 
in Papua New Guinea if the situation worsened (Post-Courier 21 March 
1997) . 
Singirok's role appears to have been a tussle between the military 
and the democratically-elected government. The Prime Minister was 
quick to remind the public that, as a democratically-elected 
government, and as representatives of the people, the legislature and 
the executive would not be dictated to by the military (Post-Courier 18  
March 1997). Many people, both inside and outside the country 
wrongly interpreted news of the latest developments in the Sandline 
International contract as a military coup. However, the member for 
Wewak Open Electorate, Bernard Narokobi, interpreted Singirok's 
action as a manifestation of the military's lack of confidence in the 
government, democratically-elected or otherwise (Pos t-Courier 18  
March 1997). He outlined two options for the Prime Minister if he  was 
to prevent the country from being thrown into chaos. One option was 
for the NEC to recall parliament so that Sir Julius could tender his 
resignation and allow parliament to elect a new Prime Minister. The 
other option was to dissolve the national parliament and hold an early 
poll to elect a new government. 
The sacking of Singirok did not defuse the military operation, code­
named Operation Rausim Kwik-a plan to deport Sandline 
International military consultants from the country. The operation of 
the plan was designed and authorised by Singirok. A senior army 
officer, Major Walter Enuma, who had been appointed to implement 
the operation, appeared live on the local television station to state that, 
despite some objections from some Colonels, the rank and file of the 
PNGDF supported Singirok's action. In order to quell any civil unrest 
that might arise from the NEC' s decision to sack Singirok, the 
government airlifted a police mobile squad, based in Goroka, to assist 
police in Port Moresby. Public servants who worked in the Central 
Government Building at Waigani, Government House, and Police 
Headquarters were sent home because of bomb threats. The Leader of 
the Opposition, Roy Yaki reminded the Prime Minister that he had 
been warned many times that his style of leadership would bring 
disaster and chaos to the country (Post-Courier 19 March 1997) .  
Despite international apprehensions and the government's anxiety, 
Singirok's action received overwhelming public support. 15 Singirok 
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also drew popular support from the military establishment. 16 A legal 
challenge was also taken to reinstate Jerry Singirok (Post-Courier 21 
March 1997). Members of the public gathered at Murray Barracks, 
Port Moresby, where a political rally was held by non-government 
organisations. At about 11 :30 am, all government offices and most 
commercial enterprises closed in Port Moresby, fearing the possibility 
of rioting and looting. The Governor-General also weighed into the 
Sandline International contract controversy when he made the 
following statement. 
The termites of greed, corruption, manipulation, sel fishness, and 
publ ic abuse of office have reached a larming crisis. We have gone 
excessively beyond the tolerable levels for national forgiveness from 
the ci tizens of the country (Post-Courier 19 March 1997) . 
His statement was published on the same day that some members 
of the public gathering at Murray Barracks (despite attempts by the 
organisers of the rally to restrain them) seized the opportunity to loot 
shops at Taurama Shopping Centre. Chinese businesses, in particular, 
became the target of looters in Goroka in Eastern Highlands Province, 
Mount Hagen in Western Highlands Province, and Lae in Morobe 
Province. 
On 20 March 1997, members of the public converged again at 
Murray Barracks to witness soldiers deliver their petition to the 
Secretary for Defence. Others, rallied by non-government 
organisations, staged demonstrations in front of the Australian and 
British High Commissions. At about 4 pm, soldiers at Murray Barracks 
gathered to hear the response of Colonel Tuat. In an attempt to 
disperse the public, police fired tear gas into the crowd, who reacted 
by fleeing into the military compound. Soldiers were also caught in 
the tear gas fumes, causing some to conclude that police had fired at  
them. In the ensuing confusion, some angry soldiers attempted to 
retaliate and tried to force open the doors of the weapons armoury 
depot. They were prevented by a junior officer, who held back his 
colleagues at gun-point-thus averting a possible flash-point between 
the military and the police. 
Six military consultants flew out of Papua New Guinea on 20 
March 1997. For security reasons, others who were scheduled to 
depart from the country were detained at Taurarna Military Barracks. 
According to the officer-in-charge of Operation Rausim Kwik, 
Executive, Tim Spicer, flew out of Port Moresby on the afternoon of 21 
March 1997, on a chartered Air Niugini flight to Hong Kong. Spicer 
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was ordered by the Boroko District Court to remain in the country for 
illegal possession of unlicensed firearms. 
A multitude of social, economic and political pressure finally 
forced Sir Julius to submit. 17 He established a Commission of Inquiry 
into the Sandline International contract, to reconsider the contract. 
Judge Warwick Andrew was appointed by Sir Julius to head the 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the Sandline International 
contract. Two terms of reference were given 
• to investigate the negotiations and procedures which 
resulted in Papua New Guinea entering into a contract with 
Sandline International, and its engagement to deal with 
Bougainville rebels 
• to investigate contractual or other arrangements made with 
Sandline International (Post-Courier 21 March 1997) 
The Commission of Inquiry was given a period of two weeks to 
finalise its report, and to submit its findings to the NEC. However, 
these terms of reference did not satisfy the sacked Brigadier-General 
(Pos t-Courier 21 March 1997). He persisted that the Prime Minister, the 
Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister for Defence resign, until after 
the elections, as they had been implicated in the Sandline International 
contract. The primary issue in relation to the Sandline International 
contract concerned corruption which, according to the President of 
Papua New Guinea Law Society, Loani Henao, should have been 
added to the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry (Post­
Courier 21 March 1997). 
With the final national parliament sitting only a matter of days 
before the issue of writs for the 1997 National Election, the Prime 
Minister 's political future seemed to weaken when four government 
Ministers were said to have resigned. 18 The national parliament met on 
25 March 1997, and voted on a motion moved by the Leader of the 
People's National Congress, and Member for the National Capital 
District, Bill Skate after a debate that lasted for nearly five hours. The 
motion called for the Prime Minister to resign. 19 The motion, which 
was later amended for the Prime Minister to step aside, was defeated 
by 58 votes to 39 votes. Hundreds of people, including PNGDF 
soldiers, students from the University of Papua New Guinea and 
leaders of several non-government organisations protested outside the 
national parliament building. News of the motion's defeat angered the 
protesters (which included approximately 2,000 members of the public 
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and 60 soldiers), who subsequently surrounded the parliament and 
prevented politicians, parliamentary staff, and reporters from leaving 
(Post-Courier 26 March 1997). Several members, including four 
government Ministers, the Deputy Speaker, and a Highlands 
Provincial Governor) tried to escape the blockade by climbing over the 
six-metre tall metal fence that surrounded the perimeter. They were 
caught by military personnel and were forced to spend the night in 
military detention. They were later released by the soldiers at the 
request of the Speaker of Parliament, Sir Rabbie Namaliu. The Prime 
Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister were escorted out of the 
national parliament, disguised as policemen. That night, Singirok sent 
his legal counsel, Peter Donigi, and Major Enuma to assure the 
Speaker of Parliament of the safety of all the people trapped inside. 
One group of soldiers told reporters from the Post-Courier that they 
would maintain their blockade until the Prime Minister resigned (Post­
Courier 26 March 1997). 
On 26 March 1 997, the Prime Minister relented, and after an 
emotional speech, announced his decision to step aside. He also 
instructed the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence to 
step aside. Outside the national parliament building, protesters 
shouted, waved and danced in jubilation when the news of Sir Julius' 
decision reached them. Sir Julius stated that he accepted that there was 
something wrong with his government's decision to engage Sandline 
International and that the situation had become very tense. The 
fundamental factors influencing Sir Julius' decision included the 
importance of upholding the Constitution, the importance of 
Parliamentary democracy, and the need to ease tensions which had 
developed over Sandline International .  However, the fact that the 
issue triggered a nerve in the military, and led it to play a pivotal role 
in this event, sets a potentially dangerous precedent, irrespective of 
the strength of the Constitution, or Parliamentary democracy. 
At the political party level, Sir Julius was accused by a disgruntled 
Deputy Leader of his People's Progress Party (PPP), Sir Albert Kipalan 
for betraying the party because he had appointed John Giheno of the 
Pangu Pati as Acting Prime Minister (Post-Courier 2 April 1997) .  
Nevertheless, Sir Julius' decision won the approval and support o f  the 
Leader of the Opposition. Inside the legal community, Sir Julius' 
decision to step aside sparked off interpretations as to the legality of 
such a decision. According to Rimbink Pato, Sir Julius' decision to 
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'step aside' as Prime Minister was illegal as there were no provisions 
for such an action in the Prime Minister 's Act. Pato contended that Sir 
Julius should have resigned (Pos t-Courier 9 April 1997) .  
However, another prominent lawyer, Loani Henoa queried Pato's 
interpretation (Post-Courier 9 April 1 997) . The former contended that 
the Prime Minister 's Act provided for such a provision . Henao 
outlined the provisions that allowed the Prime Minister to step aside 
[W]here a Prime Minister is unable to perform duties of h is/her Office 
for whatever reason; where there is a vacancy in the Office of the 
Prime Minister; where the Prime Minister is suspended from Office; 
w here the Prime Minister is absent from the country, or where the 
Prime Minister is out of speedy and effective communication (Post­
Courier 9 April 1 997) . 
As far as Henao was concerned, Sir Julius' decision was 
constitutionally proper. 
Pato, nevertheless, remained adamant (Post-Courier 10 April 1997) .  
He persisted that since the Prime Minister had not resigned the 
position fell vacant, because he was neither suspended nor absent 
from the country, nor out of speedy and effective communication, nor 
unable or readily available. Therefore, he contended that Sir Julius' 
action to step aside rather than resign was without legal basis. He 
argued that essentially nothing prevented Sir Julius from conducting 
his Prime Ministerial duties and responsibilities. The Constitution, 
according to Pato, was intended for use by the national parliament to 
decide who would become Prime Minister if the person were being 
investigated. Furthermore, Pato argued that a person under 
investigation should not have the power to determine the terms of 
reference for a Commission of Inquiry (Post-Courier 2 April 1997) .  
However, in political terms, the precedent had been set. 
One of the first order of business for Singirok's lawyer, Peter 
Donigi was to apply to have the terms of reference of the Inquiry 
widened.  Donigi argued that al though they specifically covered the 
engagement of Sandline International, they were too narrow (Post­
Courier 2 April 1997). The issues, he contended, involved matters more 
than just the engagement of Sandline International. Donigi also sought 
to include other decisions made by the government added in the 
investigation namely, the decision to purchase the Cairns 
Conservatory in Cairns, Australia; the Oregon float; and the sale of 
New Britain Oil Palm Development Limited . Singirok too wrote to the 
Speaker of the national parliament to request that a new Commission 
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of Inquiry be instituted (Post-Courier 3 April 1997) . He wanted the new 
commission to be headed by an indigenous judge and assisted by two 
senior Magistrates, and also asked that the terms of reference be 
widened. The Commissioner rejected both Singirok and Donigi 's 
applications. He also rejected the application for Donigi to represent 
Major Walter Enuma, and some 4,000 soldiers who participated in 
Operation Rausim Kwik. The reason given was that the military 
operation eventuated after the contractual agreement between the 
state and Sandline International was concluded. 
The revelations from the Comm ission of Inquiry 
The Minister for Defence, Mathias Ij ape decided to seek military 
assistance from private companies after it became apparent that 
Australia and New Zealand were unwilling to provide the type of 
military hardware that the PNGDF wanted (Post-Courier 28 April 
1997). The military proposals from Sandline International were shown 
to Ijape, Singirok and the Secretary for Defence, James Melegepa in 
Cairns, after a peace mission between the government and 
Bougainville leaders during Easter 1996 when the peace negotiations 
failed to reach an agreement. Thirteen Security Force men were killed 
at Kangu Beach on Bougainville and five soldiers taken hostage by 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army rebels soon after the Cairns Peace 
Talks ended. The Premier of the Bougainville Transitional 
Government, Theodre Miriung was also assassinated. It was at this 
point tha t the Prime Minister and Ijape began to seriously consider the 
idea of contracting a private security company to assist the PNGDF 
and to destroy the BRA stronghold (Pos t-Courier 28 April 1997). In 
April 1996, Singirok travelled to the United Kingdom, accompanied 
by Vele Iamo (Report of Commission of Inquiry, 1997:20). Singirok met 
with Sandline Executives and was given a proposal entitled 'Project 
Contravene' .  A copy was sent to the Minister for Defence. The Prime 
Minister initially rejected !j ape's proposal to engage Plaza 107 (alias 
Sand line International). 
Sandline International (then Plaza 107) contacted the Prime 
Minister by fax on 16 July 1 996, and again on 18 July 1996. In these 
faxes, the company tendered their proposal on the Bougainville crisis, 
and suggested that they obtain part-ownership of the Panguna mine 
as part payment (Post-Courier 4 April 1997) .  Sir Julius stated that he 
rejected these propositions in September 1996 on the advice of the 
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Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister, Noel Levi .  Initially, 
Levi had asked the British High Commissioner in Port Moresby about 
Plaza 107 and was told, without much information, not to ' touch' the 
company. However, a contact in London was able to furnish him with 
information by telephone about the firm. The information, which 
included details about the operational methods of the company as 
well as its interest in gaining concessions in mineral and petroleum 
projects was submitted to Sir Julius (Post-Courier 4 April 1997) .  
Sandline International, according to Levi, was the third company to 
offer private military service (Post-Courier 9 April 1 997) .  The other 
offers were made by an organisation from Russia and by an Australian 
who has since departed from the country. Levi then went on recreation 
leave but Levi claimed that he discovered later through a briefing 
given by the Acting Secretary for the Department, and the Secretary 
for Defence that the government had, without question, engaged the 
British military firm. No one, according to Levi, told Sir Julius that 
Plaza 107 and Sandline International were the same entity (Post­
Courier 9 April 1997). 
Project Contravene took on a new life when the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Chris Haiveta visited London in late 1996 as part of the 
'Orogen Roadshow' (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1997:23). 
Tim Spicer, on learning about the 'Orogen Roadshow' contacted 
Rupert McCowan, the representative of Jardine Fleming on the tour, 
about Papua New Guinea's interest in purchasing helicopters and 
mentioned 'Project Contravene' .  Haiveta, accompanied by McCowan 
met with Spicer on 11 October 1996 in London where Spicer discussed 
'Project Contravene' .  Haiveta invited Spicer to visit Papua New 
Guinea. Spicer also contacted the Minister for Defence, Mathias Ijape 
and mentioned the name change of the company from Plaza 107 to 
Sandline International (Report of Commission of Inquiry, 1997: 24) .  
Spicer and Anthony Buckingham visited Papua New Guinea on 3 
December 1996 and met with Haiveta and Ijape and other senior 
public servants (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1 997: 24-25) .  
Subsequently, Sandline International was engaged to provide a 
detailed report on their proposal for a negotiated fee of US$250,000. 
Spicer prepared the report in London and returned to Papua New 
Guinea on 31  December 1996 with the reports. On 7 January 1997, he 
was introduced to the Prime Minister by Mathias !jape and supplied 
him with a summary of the proposal the next day.20 Spicer met the 
Prime Minister on 8 January and answered questions regarding the 
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proposal. At the Prime Minister 's request, he prepared another 
summary of what the Sandline proposal offered (Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry, 1997:25). Sir Julius noted that he had agreed 
with this proposition, but only on the condition that Sandline's role 
would be limited to that of 'back-room operators and consultants', and 
would be subjected to the approval of the Commander of the PNGDF 
(Post-Courier 24 April 1997) .  The primary desire for Sir Julius was to 
capture the rebel leaders. But, in the event of operational 
miscalculations, he hoped that there would be minimal casualties for 
innocent people. Ideally, he said, he had in mind a military victory 
without the need for discharging weapons at all.21 Project Contravene 
now had the support of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister 
and the Minister for Defence. At the request of the Minister for 
Defence, the Commander of the PNGDF prepared a submission that 
came before the NEC on 15 January 1997. 
The government, according to Sao Gabi (Secretary of the 
Department of Attorney-General, a member of the National Security 
Council), did not seek legal advice from his office when the decision 
was made to engage Sandline International (Post-Courier 17 April 
1997). He further noted that the National Security Council had not 
discussed the Sandline International contract. Somehow the approval 
to engage Sandline was taken by the National Security Council on 15 
January 1997 without Gabi's knowledge or participation. He said he 
had learnt of the decision three days later. A draft copy of the Sandline 
contract was forwarded to him on 24 January 1997, and two days 
before the contract was signed (29 January 1997), he submitted his 
views on the matter (Post-Courier 17 April 1997). 
A meeting was then arranged between the Attorney-General, the 
Acting Secretary for Finance James Loko, the Secretary for Works and 
Transport Miria Ume, and the Acting Commissioner-General of 
Internal Revenue Commission (Post-Courier 29 April 1997). Miria Ume 
was invited so that he could be shown the decision to waive the 
government's tendering procedures for the contract.22 The Acting 
Commissioner was consulted for the tax clearance certificate urgently 
required for importing the military hardware. 
The Secretary for Defence, James Melegepa revealed that the 
government negotiating team, excluding Singirok, carried out the 
discussions with Sandline International without seeing the documents 
or the proposal from the company (Post-Courier 30 April 1997) .23 The 
negotiating team comprised himself, Singirok, the Deputy Secretary 
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for Finance Vele Iamo, and the State-Solicitor Zachery Gelu. Rupert 
McCowen had also been asked by the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for Finance to facilitate contract negotiations, apparently 
conducted during a conference call with the Financial Director of 
Sandline International. Melegepa also alleged that Singirok did not 
raise any objections during these negotiations. 
Apparently, most members of the NEC ignored the advice and 
concerns raised by senior bureaucrats from the Department of the 
Prime Minister, the Department of Defence, the Brigadier-General and 
the Department of Justice . These men had recommended in a 
memorandum dated 30 January 1997 to the then Secretary for Finance, 
Rupa Mulina, that the contract be withheld until certain issues were 
addressed (Post-Courier 4 April 1997). However, the Sandline 
International contract was signed on the following day. 
Financial  arrangements 
A range of financing options was contemplated in the government 
payment of US$36 million to Sandline International. Initially, the 
government planned to fund the Sandline International contract from 
the proceeds of the government's share in the Oregon float. At the 
direction of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, 
administrative directions were issued to transfer K33.6 million initially 
from the Bank of Papua New Guinea to the North Fly Highway 
Development Company (Roadco ). However, this arrangement was 
illegal because Roadco was a de-registered company and this could 
have resulted in the prosecution of the Governor (Post-Courier 21 April 
1997).24 The government had also made an agreement with the World 
Bank and the IMF in relation to the use of the proceeds from the 
Oregon float. In order to avoid difficulties in this arrangement, the 
Acting Secretary for Finance was advised by the Governor to renege 
on the arrangement to have the Oregon float fund the project. The 
immediate need to finance the Sandline contract was met through a 
temporary advance from the Bank of Papua New Guinea as a loan by 
the Department of Finance to Roadco. Subsequently, a cheque of K33.6 
million was issued under the PNGDF vote for operational costs and 
paid to Roadco on 31 January 1997. On the same day, a cheque for K24 
million (US$18 million) was drawn for Sandlme International (Post­
Courier 21 April 1997). Financial reductions from various government 
departments, and statutory authorities were also identified to repay 
2241" Governance and reform in the South Pacif ic 
the advance from the state. The Public Finances (Management) Act 
limited the Minister of Finance 's power to re-appropriate budgetary 
allocations for only K2 million. The strategy was to legitimise the cuts 
by later having the national parliament pass and approve a Validation 
Act or a Mini-Budget.25 Assurances were given by the Department of 
Finance to reimburse all the government departments affected by the 
re-appropriations before the end of the 1997 financial year (Post­
Courier 22 April 1 997). 
In other words, the contract was funded by a temporary overdraft 
on the state's bank account, and was to be repaid by an accelerated 
payment of dividends and taxes collected by various state enterprises. 
The government estimated that K75 million would be collected by the 
Department of Finance at the end of May 1997, and this money was to 
be used to settle the overdraft account (Post-Courier 24 April 1997) .  
Taxes and dividends paid by state enterprises are normally collected 
at the end of the year. But in this case, the Sandline International 
contract acted to "accelerate ' the collection of total dividends even 
before these were declared . The Sandline International contract was 
treated as an extraordinary expenditure, and therefore subject to a 
Parliamentary Appropriation Supplementary Budget. Budget cuts 
totalling KSO million were made on all recurrent expenditure for 
various government departments to fund the payment of the Sandline 
International contract. 
Apparently, the Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan received verbal 
assurance from the Deputy Prime Minister, in the presence of the 
Acting Secretary of Finance, that the money for the Sandline 
International contract would not be siphoned off from the 1997 
National Budget appropriations (Post-Courier 24 April 1997). The 
meeting between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister 
took place before 15 January 1997. Sir Julius was informed that funds 
for the Sandline International contract could be secured from the Bank 
of Papua New Guinea in a special arrangement and packaged in a 
manner which could be considered a loan if the Panguna mine was 
reopened. Revenue collected between January and February of 1997 
had also surpassed the estimated projection of K25 mill ion. The 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, however, had 
expected to collect approximately K70 million as dividends from 
statutory authorities. In light of the positive trends in revenue 
collection, Sir Julius was confident that the Sandline International 
contract would be adequately financed. He claimed that if he had been 
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told that the Sandline contract was to be funded from the recurrent 
budget, he would have hesitated to go ahead with the contract, 
especially in view of the cost of the provincial government reforms 
(Post-Courier 24 April 1997) . Neither the Deputy Prime Minister nor 
Minister for Finance liked the idea of funding the Sandline 
International contract from the recurrent budget. But Sir Julius 
contended that the contract was an extraordinary financial item, and 
cutting expenditure from the 1997 National Budget would be the best 
available option for the Department of Finance (Post-Courier 25 April 
1997) . 
In Haiveta 's view, it was critical to obtain the funds for the military 
mission on Bougainville to proceed and to ensure that the Sandline 
International contract was concluded by 12 January 1997 (Post-Courier 
28 April 1 997). After 12 January 1997, the military mission would 
become less viable. He was adamant that he had not breached any 
laws, and was therefore blameless except, that he had tried too hard to 
implement the decis ion taken by the National Security Council, and 
the NEC. He also declared that he had conducted his responsibilities 
as a Minister of the State with a clear conscience, and vehemently 
denied receiving any personal benefit from the Sandline International 
contract. 
In the opinion of the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation 
Executive Manager for Treasury and International, James Forrester, the 
US$18 million that was paid to Sandline International by the 
government should have been handled by the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea, and not by the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation 
(Post-Courier 17 April 1997). Forrester was approached by Vele Iamo 
(the Deputy Secretary for Finance), and Rupert McCowan of Jardine 
Fleming without the necessary documents for Papua New Guinea 
Banking Corporation to seek approval from the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea to remit the money. He noted that he had raised objections to 
the proposition but was assured by the Managing Director, Rupa 
Mulina and the Governor of the Bank of Papua New Guinea, Koiari 
Tarata that the transaction would be all-right (Post-Courier 17 April 
1997). The transaction was completed around 6pm on 31 January 
1997-on the day the Sandline International contract was signed.26 He 
claimed he was never aware of what the transaction entailed, although 
McCowan had mentioned to him that it involved goods and freight. 27 
An entry in his personal diary recorded how he was annoyed and 
angered by the forceful and overbearing attitude of McCowan and 
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Spicer, and his concerns about foreign exchange controls (Post-Courier 
17 April 1997) .  Forrester was concerned that foreign exchange 
regulations may have been v iolated in remitting US$18 million to 
Sandline International in Hong Kong. The key documents-a tax 
clearance certificate, a legal clearance letter from the State Solicitor, 
Zachery Gelu, and a letter of explanation from Sandline International 
authenticating the remittance were not presented .  Soon after the first 
payment of US$18 million was remitted to Hong Kong, Vele Iamo and 
Spicer tried to get Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation to send 
the second instalment. However, the Managing Director had issued 
instruction not to remit any money until all the required 
documentation was produced (Post-Courier 18 April 1997). The Papua 
New Guinea Banking Corporation held K25,335,921 . 14 belonging to 
Roadco in a 24-hour call account.28 The government is alleged to have 
also paid a consultancy fee of US$250,000 to Sandline International for 
a report even though there was insufficient documentation to justify 
its payment and it was done outside the government's consultancy 
procedures. 29 
Singirok's reasons for termi nati ng the San d l i ne contract 
Jerry Singirok was called to give evidence to the Commission of 
Inquiry on 8 April 1 997. He submitted the US$400,000 in cash 
confiscated from Tim Spicer by members of Operation Rausim Kwik on 
16 March 1997 to the Inquiry. Singirok also produced the original bank 
cheque of K24,680,000 which had been given to Sandline International 
by the government as a guarantee for the first payment of US$18 
million. Singirok stated that members of Operation Rausim Kwik 
detained Spicer in order to protect the country's sovereignty and 
innocent citizens (Post-Courier 10 April 1997) .  Singirok noted that he 
had decided that if Spicer were allowed to remain free, he could 
potentially use the weapons in his possession against Papua New 
Guineans. 
Singirok first became aware of Sandline International in February 
1996 (Pos t-Courier 9 April 1997) .  Mathias Ijape who was then Minister 
for Police introduced the subject to him. Ijape told him that he had 
been in contact with Plaza 107, and Defence Systems Limited. As 
Minister for Police, Ijape had initiated the establishment of a Rapid 
Deployment Unit (RDU) consisting of policemen from the Royal 
Papua New Guinea Constabulary. Defence Systems Limited had 
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already provided assistance to set up the Police Tactical Force, 
replacing the RDU to protect major mining, petroleum, and other 
strategic installations. The RDU was phased out in 1994 and its 
activities assumed by the Police Mobile Squad, despite attempts to 
establish a Police Tactical Force (Dinnen, 1996: 170-213) .  !jape 
considered it important to contact Sandline International to d iscuss the 
Bougainville operation and solicit their expertise to reopen the 
Panguna mine. Singirok stated that he had assumed that !jape and the 
Commissioner of Police, Bob Nenta were aware of the company's 
operations in Africa. A proposal was made to amalgamate the Special 
Forces Unit (SFU) with the disbanded RDU and to place it under the 
direct control of the Prime Minister (Post-Courier 10 April 1997) .  
Singirok told the Inquiry that when he received the directive to 
relinquish control and command of SFU from the Prime Minister (in a 
letter from the Acting Secretary of the Department of the Prime 
Minister), he raised his concerns with the SFU. The major issue 
concerned the constitutional role of the Prime Minister assuming 
PNGDF responsibilities. With the involvement of Sandline 
International in this new establishment, Singirok feared that 
something similar to a 'Palace Guard'  under the direct control of the 
Prime Minister would have been created (Post-Courier 10 April 1997) .  
His  immediate concern regarded the issue of  PNGDF responsibilities 
being delegated elsewhere. Nevertheless, neither Singirok, nor other 
members of the National Security Advisory Council were given the 
opportunity to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister (Post­
Courier 15 April 1997). The Prime Minister argued that he proposed to 
combine the SFU with the [ then non-existent] RDU, and as a matter of 
administrative convenience, to have this body under the National 
Security Council. He claimed that he had no idea of what 'palace 
guard' meant, and contended that the proposition was nothing more 
than an idea (Post-Courier 24 April 1997). 
The primary objective of the Sandline contract was to secure the 
Panguna copper mine and reopen it. Initially, the plan was for the SFU 
to enter certain parts of Bougainville, but when the media exposed the 
military plan, the strategy was limited to securing the Panguna mine. 
Singirok told the Inquiry that he did not want his soldiers to risk their 
lives to reopen the Panguna copper mine merely for a few corrupt 
leaders. Singirok's distaste for corruption, according to a confidential 
report from the National Intelligence Organisation (NIO), was a key 
factor behind the aborted Sandline International contract (Post-Courier 
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14 April 1997) .  Singirok's actions were not condemned in the NIO 
report. Rather, it expressed that the NIO appreciated his actions (Post­
Courier 14 April 1997). According to the report, organisations such as 
the Ombudsman's Commission, the Police Fraud Squad and the NIO, 
originally set up to combat corruption, were unable to contain the 
spread of corruption. 
Singirok further alleged that, if payment were not provided to 
Sandline International, the government would have been forced to 
mortgage the Panguna copper mine in order to settle the debt. 
Singirok considered that the Ministers had acted corruptly on several 
points .  First, he felt  it was constitutionally improper for such a 
military operation to be waged on Bougainville where the lives of 
innocent people would be endangered. The arsenal to be employed in 
the operation was more likely to cause collateral damage-that is the 
justification of killing people, or the justification for the damage, and 
destruction of property within the vicinity of a military target. It was 
this kind of military attack on Bougainville that prompted Singirok to 
abort the Sandline International contract (Post-Courier 11 April 1997) .  
Moreover, he said his  conscience was troubled over the military 
mission involving precision bombing using rockets launched from 
attack helicopters, and which would cause the death of innocent 
people and as well as damage to the environment. 'How do we justify 
innocent civilians caught in this collateral damage', he asked . 
Second, he argued that the deal was corrupt given the 
government's lack of money to finance the operation and the 
possibility that Panguna copper mine might have to be mortgaged to 
settle fees for Sandline International. Third, the fact that the Ministers 
had breached the government's tendering procedures was sufficient 
evidence to suggest corruption on the part of these men. Singirok said 
he was also deeply troubled by the provision in the Sandline 
International contract which exempted foreign military personnel 
from being held accountable for war crimes, and other such atrocities 
inflicted upon innocent civilians, whereas PNG Security Forces did not 
have this exemption. 
Singirok claimed that the morale and discipline of the 4,600 
PNGDF soldiers had fallen dramatically. This situation was partly 
aggravated by the allocation of insufficient funds by successive 
governments for logistical support and for sustaining the army. 
Singirok noted that  the PNGDF did not even have sufficient uniforms. 
As a result of budgetary constraints, the PNGDF has not been 
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adequately provided with logistical support for operations on 
Bougainville and for effective operations along the border between 
Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. 
Singirok said that he began to have serious misgivings about the 
constitutionality of the mili tary strike on Bougainville early in March 
1 997 and that his personal feelings about the contract were based on 
his Christian convictions (Post-Courier 16 April 1997) .  He said he had 
confided in his wife, the PNGDF Chaplain, the second-officer-in­
command of the SFU, and Colonel Walter Salamas. Both officers, he 
claimed, also expressed similar reservations. About this time, Spicer 
told him that the Australian media had compromised Operation 
Oyster and it  was therefore imperative to deploy the SFU directly to 
Panguna mine. By then, Singirok said his Christian convictions had 
overwhelmed his professional opinions and he became convinced that 
the mission was wrong. However, he did not inform the Prime 
Minister of his decision to abort Operation Oyster and to expel 
Sandline International from the country (Post-Courier 17 April 1997) . 
On 16  April 1997, Singirok walked out of the Court room angered 
after Queens Counsel Marshall Cooke called him a liar. The lawyer 
contended that Singirok had lied when he gave a speech to members 
of the SFU in Wewak, East Sepik Province in January 1997. Cooke 
argued that Singirok had incorrectly claimed that the Sandline 
International issue had caught the army by surprise since he had been 
aware of Operation Oyster since Easter of 1 996. The lawyer also 
contended that Singirok lied when he told members of the SFU that he 
had advised the government that Sandline International was not only 
expensive, but would be using Africans and Afrikaners. Singirok 
reacted to this accusation angrily, 'Do not call me a liar ! '  and refused 
to co-operate with the Inquiry until Cooke apologised (Post-Courier 17  
April 1997) . The Inquiry resumed hearing in the afternoon without 
Singirok. Cooke refused to apologise, and Singirok's evidence was 
suspended. 29 
Final su bmissions 
New developments occurred at the Commission of Inquiry when it  
resumed for the final presentation of oral evid.ence. The Commissioner 
Warwick Andrew and counsel assisting the Inquiry, Ian Molloy 
travelled to Hong Kong where they spent six days conducting their 
inquiries. They also collected documents relating to Sandline 
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International. Marshall Cooke representing the state, having been 
informed by Molloy that some of the documents collected would 
possibly have some adverse findings on his clients, applied 
unsuccessfully for the session to be held in camera .  Cooke, however, 
successfully sought for the Inquiry to produce the raw data, 
information on those interviewed, what the interviewees said, the 
documents they perused and that the documents would be made 
available to the other parties. He also argued that Warwick Andrew 
and Ian Molloy may have breached the legal boundaries of the Inquiry 
(Pos t-Courier 13 May 1997). 
Cooke submitted that there was no evidence to prove that the 
politicians and senior civil servants received bribes or benefited 
individually from the Sandline International contract. Ian Molloy also 
reached the same conclusion. The initiative to engage Sandline 
International, according to Cooke, had been nurtured by the Defence 
Council-a body made up of the Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, the 
Secretary for Defence James Melegepa and the Minister of Defence 
(Post-Courier 15 May 1997) . He argued that Singirok had supported the 
idea to engage Sandline International up to the time the contract was 
signed. The Defence Council made the submission to the NEC and 
received its approval on 15 January 1997. The PNGDF and the 
Brigadier-General were assigned the task of implementing the 
proposal and Singirok, as a member of the Defence Council had been 
involved in the discussions and in the negotiations since early 1996. 
Cooke argued further that Singirok supported the initiative and had 
written to the Department of Foreign Affairs to have Sandline 
International personnel and equipment waived from government 
exemptions and immigration laws. 
Ian Molloy agreed with Marshall Cooke's conclusions concerning 
Singirok. He pointed out that Singirok's eagerness to engage Sandline 
International made it difficult for the Commissioner of the Inquiry to 
accept Singirok's claim that he was forced to sign a letter on 20 
January 1997-the letter which enabled the deal to proceed. He 
emphasised that Singirok's reservations before the contract was signed 
on 31 January 1997 were limited to those issues in the letter, which 
was signed along with three other members of the negotiating team. 
The Brigadier-General had expressed reservations about the 
helicopters that  were to be purchased by Sandline International. 
However, Peter Donigi, counsel for Singirok, argued that the 
Sandline International contract would never have been approved had 
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the State Solicitor, Zachery Gelu questioned the legality of the 
National Security Council's decision to hire the military firm (Post­
Courier 14 May 1997) . The contract was drafted in London and sent to 
Papua New Guinea where it was approved and executed without 
alteration, despite the efforts of four senior government officers. The 
Sandline International contract was approved because it had the 
support of the politicians. To seek approval for the contract from 
senior public servants was never considered necessary. Donigi offered 
as evidence the actions of the Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta on 
24 January 1997. Haiveta stayed for five hours at the Papua New 
Guinea Banking Corporation in h is attempt to transfer funds to Hong 
Kong, despite the fact that senior public servants had still not received 
the contract and had not been given the opportunity to consider its 
contents for negotiations. 
Donigi argued that the procedure for legal clearance, which 
seemed to be the only option that might prevent the execution of the 
contract, was not utilised due to the gross negligence of the State 
Solicitor, Zachery Gelu. Amongst other important factors which 
Donigi argued that Gelu had failed to acknowledge, was the fact that 
the state had entered into a contract with an organisation which he 
claimed lacked the status of a legal entity-that is, it could not sue, or 
be sued . A disturbing issue for concern is the government's lack of 
knowledge of Sandline International. Furthermore, Donigi accused 
Gelu of failing to request or peruse a copy of a power of attorney, and 
failing to advise the government that the establishment of an illegal 
army was unconstitutional.30 Donigi could not understand how the 
State Solicitor, Zachery Gelu, the Attorney General, Sao Gabi and the 
Minister for Defence, Mathias Ijape, all lawyers, could not identify and 
highlight the constitutional and legal implications posed by the 
Sandline International contract .  He concluded that since these 
constitutional and legal implications were overlooked, the contract 
was intentionally executed to 
• hire and finance mercenaries contrary to the 1989 
International Convention Against Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries 
• carry out activities which were illegal under international 
law 
• establish a para-military force which was prohibited under 
Section 200 of the Constitution and Section 51 of the 
Criminal Code 
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• collude and conspire to kill a person; encourage, urge or 
command the killing of another person; misappropriate 
public money; and defraud the public (Post-Courier 14 May 
1997) 
Donigi submitted to the Commission that the Prime Minister and 
the Deputy Prime Minister are all culpable and should be arrested and 
charged under Sections 52, 307, 382A and 407 of the Criminal Code. 
Donigi also submitted that matters relating to the Constitution should 
be referred to the Supreme Court for interpretation . The most 
important issue to be referred concerned the Acting Prime Minister, 
John Giheno's refusal for the state to meet Singirok's legal costs. 
Giheno, according to Donigi, had acted unfairly (Post-Courier 14 May 
1997) . 
However, Marshall Cooke contended that the NEC had acted 
within its powers to approve the engagement of Sandline International 
(Post-Courier 16 May 1997) .  According to him, there was nothing 
illegal or unconstitutional. Quoting several Sections of the 
Constitution, Cooke argued that 
the NEC, which is in effect the corporate identity of the Cabinet 
Ministers is responsible for the executive government of PNG. Making 
contracts is part of the executive government-of the executive 
power-and i t  would be appropriate in th is case if the NEC made a 
decision to engage Sandl ine (Post-Courier 1 6  May 1 997) . 
In the same vein, he argued that it is the intention of the 
Constitution that the control and direction of the police and the 
PNGDF remain with the NEC. Cooke further argued that the NEC had 
acted within its powers when it decided to engage Sandline 
International and to direct the Commander of the PNGDF to co­
operate or consult with Sandline International to execute the 
operation. 
Ian Molloy concluded that while there was no evidence of 
corruption against the Ministers or public servants involved, the role 
played in the Sandline International contract by the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister for Finance, Chris Haiveta aroused suspicion 
(Post-Courier 15 May 1 997) . Haiveta's explanations were unsatisfactory 
and bizarre at times. For instance, Rupert McCowan had allegedly 
organised a dinner meeting between three Sandline International 
executives, Chris Hiaveta and Mathias !j ape at the Peninsula Hotel in 
Hong Kong on 14 February 1 997. Yet Haiveta described this meeting 
as a coincidence explaining that he had gone to Hong Kong to hold 
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preliminary discussions with Jardine Fleming to buy-out RTZ-CRA's 
majority shares. In fact, evidence from others contradicted his denial. 
According to Ijape the dinner had been arranged to discuss the 
purchase of the shares in the Panguna mine, but just how Sandline 
International featured in the arrangement was unclear. It seems 
evident that Sandline International held a keen interest in purchasing 
BCL shares, however the key parties attempted to conceal this 
apparently obvious conclusion (Pos t-Courier 15 May 1 997) .  Since each 
of the two parties had different objectives in the military operation, the 
potential for conflic t between Sandline International and the PNGDF 
could not be ruled out. The Brigadier-General's task of commanding 
the operation would have been equally difficult because Sandline 
Interna tional would have assumed equal military status in the 
operation. 
Molloy acquired new and unverified evidence of faxes and other 
documents relating to the meeting between the two Ministers and 
Sandline International executive in Hong Kong. The objective of the 
meeting was to discuss the purchase of shares in BCL (Post-Courier 16 
May 1997). Molloy noted that information contained in the documents 
potentially contradicted the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Finance, Chris Haiveta's evidence and would therefore raise questions 
of credibili ty. The documents also posed questions about other aspects 
of Haiveta's evidence and would have raised issues of the Deputy 
Prime Minister 's credibility and honesty. However, Marshall Cooke 
countered that the question of whether Sandline International was 
interested in purchasing shares in BCL did not fall inside the 
Commission's terms of reference and that the subject of purchasing 
shares in BCL had little connection to the Sandline International 
contract. Furthermore, he suggested, the government neither 
entertained nor accommodated the proposals from Sandline 
International. 
Rupert McCowan was sacked by his employer, Jardine Fleming on 
14 May 1997. Jardine Fleming alleged that McCowan had acted 
without informing the management of his dealings with Papua New 
Guinea, and had acted beyond the scope of his duties (Post-Courier 15 
May 1997) . McCowan had assisted the government to transfer the first 
instalment payment of the contract in January 1997. Jardine Fleming 
was not engaged in respect of this transaction and McCowan' s role in 
the transfer seemed to result from his personal relationship with 
Haiveta. What McCowan was to have gained from his involvement as 
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intermediary was unclear, however, Donigi argued that it was 
doubtful that McCowan acted alone since without collaboration he 
would not have enjoyed the ease of access to government and 
Ministerial assistance (Pos t-Courier 14 May 1997) . A disturbing 
revelation which has come out of the Sandline contract is how 
McCowan, as a foreigner located in Hong Kong and not being an 
employee of the PNG government, was given access to highly 
sensitive, privileged and top military secrets of the country. Rupert 
McCowan never appeared before the Commission of Inquiry to 
explain his role in the Sandline International contract, and the absence 
of his testimony leaves forever a gaping hole in the findings and 
conclusions of the Inquiry. 
The hardware i ntended for the mission on Bougainvi l le 
The military hardware purchased by Sandline International and 
transported on a Russian transport plane was diverted to Tindal Royal 
Australian Air Force Base in the Northern Territory, Australia. 
Apparently, the Minister for Foreign Affairs sought assistance from the 
Australian government to redirect the Russian Antonov 142 plane 
carrying the military hardware form Malaysia to Australia. This move, 
although politically wise at the height of the crisis, later complicated 
Papua New Guinea's relations with Australia over ownership of the 
hardware. Relations between the two countries were further strained 
by the remarks of the Australian Opposition spokesperson for Foreign 
Affairs who suggested the idea of breaking up the military hardware 
for scrap (Post-Courier 2 April 1997) . 
Key BRA leaders on Bougainville appeared to share the same views 
as the Australian Opposi tion spokesperson for Foreign Affairs . Francis 
Ona urged other countries to pressure Australia and Papua New 
Guinea to destroy the military hardware (Pos t-Courier 4 April 1997) . 
He claimed that the PNGDF was no better than Sandline International, 
and if given the weapons, would use them on Bougainvilleans. The 
PNGDF, however, had a different opinion on the matter. At a social 
gathering organised to resolve and reconcile differences between the 
soldiers based at Murray Barracks, and Ministerial Staff from the 
Deputy Prime Minister 's office, Chris Haiveta pledged to deliver the 
military hardware to the army (Post-Courier 7 April 1997) .  He made 
this undertaking in response to the request made by soldiers not to sell 
the weapons as proposed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs . On the 
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same the day, the Minister for Defence Mathias !jape, vowed to take 
full responsibility for the decision to hire Sandline International (Post­
Courier 7 April 1997) . These public undertakings from the two 
Ministers were overruled by the Acting Prime Minister, John Giheno 
(Pos t-Courier 8 April 1 997) . Giheno emphasised that a decision on the 
future of the weapons would be determined only after the government 
had examined the weapons in storage. He also advised politicians to 
refrain from making any further statements concerning the weapons 
since the Commission of Inquiry was then still in session. A 
government delegation led by the PNG High Commissioner to 
Canberra (also a retired Brigadier-General), Kenneth Noga, travelled 
to Tindal to prepare an inventory of the weapons . The resulting 
inspection report was submitted for the government on 15 April 1997. 
According to Tim Spicer, most of the military hardware purchased 
for the government, except for two Mi-24 attack helicopters and two 
Mi-17  transport helicopters, were already in the country (Pos t-Courier 
7 April 1997) .  Spicer told the Inquiry that a large range of weapons 
systems ranging from machine guns, rockets, automatic grenade 
launchers and bombs can be installed in the attack helicopters. Other 
weapons brought into the country included 1000 57mm high explosive 
rockets designed to destroy fixed installations, vehicles or boats. 
Others included area weapons such as bombs which can be dropped 
randomly to 'plaster ' an area, electronic warfare systems, a 
surveillance platform fitted on a twin-engine CASA-21 2  aircraft, PKM 
light machine guns, RPG-7 portable shoulder held rocket launchers 
with 60mm and 82mm mortars, and tactical radio and satellite 
communication systems. All these weapons were in tended for use by a 
special force conducting counter-insurgency operations. Spicer told 
the Inquiry that the SFU unit trained by Sandline International would 
have used a spotter plane to wage psychological warfare on 
Bougainville. The aircraft was to be fitted with a loudspeaker to 
broadcast government propaganda to people on the ground. This 
military strategy was one out of a combination of military options to 
'put the BRA on the back-foot'  in order to place the government in a 
powerful position to conduct negotiations (Post-Courier 8 April 1997) .  
A 40-men assault team from the SFU had been selected to recapture 
the Panguna mine, after an airborne rocket attack was launched on 
rebel positions (Post-Courier 11 April 1997). The rocket attack was to be 
launched from two Mi-24 attack helicopters that were to be p iloted by 
two Sandline International pilots. The rebel positions would be 
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identified by sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment that 
would be mounted on a CASA 212 aircraft. The troops, armed with 
night vision equipment, AKA assault rifles and mortars were to be 
flown in by two Mi-17  helicopters. In preparation for this military 
mission, 40 Sandline International instructors provided intensive 
training to 62 PNGDF soldiers who had already experienced jungle 
warfare on Bougainville and who had volunteered for the mission. 
These soldiers had been undergoing training since early 1996. 
Professional relations between the Sandline International personnel 
and the SFU were not always harmonious. A platoon commander in 
the SFU, Sergeant Francis Jarkis told the Post-Courier that the training 
exercises provided by Sandline International was basic PNGDF 
training which new recruits undertook when they joined the army 
(Post-Courier 30 April 1 997). He alleged that a potential clash between 
Sandline International and SFU was only averted after intervention by 
officers from the PNGDF headquarters. The huge salary difference 
between Sandline International privates and PNGDF soldiers was also 
a contentious issue. According to Sergeant Jarkis, Sandline 
International soldiers of private rank earned Kll ,000 a month whereas 
privates and non-commissioned officers of the SFU earned only K700. 
The i mpact of Sandl ine on the Papua New G u i nea 
Defence Force 
Not long after the Commission of Inquiry was set up, several members 
of the PNGDF held members of the Deputy Prime Minister 's 
Ministerial Staff at gunpoint on a busy street in Port Moresby and 
detained them at Murray Barracks (Post-Courier 19 March 1997) .  Some 
PNGDF members told the Pos t-Courier that they had detained several 
men from Gulf Province in a move to protect themselves. The soldiers 
alleged that criminals had been engaged by a politician implicated in 
the Sandline contract, not only to provide security, but also to take 
revenge on members of the PNGDF who took part in Operation 
Rausim Kwik. The men told reporters that they had been detained for 
11 hours and interrogated about their connections with the Sandline 
International contract (Post-Courier 4 April 1997) .  They also said they 
had suffered beatings and wounds inflicted by the use of sharp 
instruments. 
Another incident involving members of the PNGDF occurred on 
the night of 1 April 1997. Some members of the PNGDF cornered a 
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member of the Police Special Services Division, Sergeant Jack Awek, 
after he had dropped off the Minister for Defence, Mathias Ijape at his 
home in Boroko, Port Moresby (Post-Courier 14 April 1997). Sergeant 
Awek was forced to follow the soldiers to Murray Barracks where he 
was interrogated over a period of ten hours about Sandline 
International. He stated that during the interrogation, 10 military 
officers also assaulted him. At various times during the ordeal, he 
alleged that not only did the soldiers point a cocked gun to his head, 
but beat him with a piece of metal and struck him on the head with a 
gun butt. The soldiers later took him to Boroko Police Station where 
they told the police officer on duty to lay charges against him. 
Certain elements of the PNGDF continued to harass government 
officers. One such incident took place on 7 April 1997 when a group of 
soldiers seized a vehicle belonging to the Department of the Prime 
Minister and NEC after holding-up a member of the National Security 
Council at gunpoint  (Post-Courier 10 April 1997) .  The soldiers later 
returned the vehicle after holding it for several hours. Apparently, the 
action was authorised by the PNGDF as a security measure. The army 
claimed it had acted on information supplied to them by anonymous 
sources about the use of the vehicle. In another incident, James Bryon 
Chan, son of Sir Julius and owner of Network International Security 
Services was forced to convene a press conference to plea against 
harassment and intimidation by elements of the PNGDF (Post-Courier 
10 April 1997) .  He alleged that his company had lost more than 
K70,000 in business dealings since one of his employees was arrested 
by the military police at Taurama Army Barracks. Network 
International Security Services, which provides general static guards, 
security consultancy and money escorts, had been established in 
business since January 1997. 
The success of the military operation in deporting Sandline 
International personnel helped bring several PNGDF soldiers to 
prominence and public attention . One such soldier was Major Walter 
Enuma who featured regularly in the mass media. Others included the 
Commander of the Special Forces Unit (SFU), Major Gilbert Toropu 
who had remained aloof in his dealings with the media. Major Enuma 
also met with Sir Julius Chan and assured him members of the SFU 
and Operation Rausim Kwik had no ill-feelings against him (Post­
Courier 2 May 1997) . He also pledged his loyalty to the Acting 
Commander of the PNGDF, Colonel Jack Tuat. Operation Rausim Kwik 
appears to have been one factor which forced the Secretary of Defence, 
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James Melegepa to resign, 'without regrets', after 18 years in the 
public service (Post-Courier 2 May 1997). Melegepa argued that 
although he was one of the four public servants who signed a letter 
opposing the Sandline International contract, he felt that the soldiers 
had failed to recognise and appreciate his position. Rather, he felt that 
the soldiers had grouped him along with the politicians who had 
engineered the contract even though he had been on recreational leave 
and had only entered into the issue two days before the contract was 
signed. For him, this was the final straw. However, he remained 
adamant that he and the Department Heads had acted in the interests 
of the state . The public service, as far as he was concerned, had 
become overly politicised in that public servants could not perform 
their tasks without the constant interference of politicians, and that 
politicians appeared to have become the implementers rather than 
policy makers. 
PNGDF soldiers, during and after the Sandline In ternational 
contract crisis, made frequent media statements. Most statements were 
unauthorised and as such breached the army's public relations policy. 
Under the army's public relations policy, the Chief of Staff, the 
Minister for Defence, the Secretary for Defence, and the Brigadier­
Commander were the only people authorised to release media 
statements. All others had to obtain clearance from the Office of the 
Chief of Staff. The frequent number of media statements and 
comments made by low ranking servicemen without proper 
authorisation prompted the Acting Chief of Staff, Colonel Reg Renagi 
to caution journalists and media representatives to deal only with the 
authorised spokespersons (Pos t-Courier 5 May 1997) . Colonel Renagi 
also barred all units from making or issuing comments. 
The political effect of the Sandline International controversy had 
effectively fractured the loyalty of the soldiers who were divided 
between supporting the sacked Commander Jerry Singirok and the 
Acting Commanders. Colonel Aikung was the first clear example of 
division of loyalty among the rank and file of the PNGDF. The 
appointment of Colonel Jack Tuat had restored some loyalty for the 
government's appointment but this did not establish complete loyalty 
for Tuat and relations amongst soldiers remained tense and divided. If 
low morale and poor discipline inside PNGDF had existed before the 
controversy, developments during the aftermath of the controversy 
merely served to testify to the seriousness of the problem. An 
aggravating factor all along had been the endemic lack of funds 
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stemming from the Bougainville operation. Both the fractures in 
loyalty and the funding problems had helped bring the problem of ill­
discipline and poor morale to the surface. Re-establishing command 
and control became a priority and the total ban on media statements 
was one measure taken to achieve this end . The Acting Chief of Staff 
noted that issuing a ban on public statements to the media was easy 
but ensuring that the order was followed remained a serious problem 
(Post-Courier 5 May 1997). During the crisis the PNCDF was unable to 
gain control in this respect. 
Govern ment reprisal against non-govern mental 
organ isations 
On 5 May 1997, just when it  seemed that the Sandline International 
controversy was beginning to settle down, the police raided the offices 
of three non-governmental organisations in Port Moresby-PNC 
Watch, Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF) 
and PNC Trust. The police raids, according to the Director of ICRAF, 
Powes Parkop, were nothing more than a 'political vendetta' with the 
view to silence criticisms of government activ ities and decisions (Post­
Courier 6 May 1997) .32 Explaining the police raids, the Deputy Police 
Commissioner for Operations, Ludwick Kembu and Police 
Commander for Central and National Capital District, Sam Inguba 
told reporters that the raid was a rou tine police operation in the 1997 
National Election (Post-Courier 6 May 1997) . Police had also begun 
identifying individuals and groups that helped organise the illegal 
protests during the crisis .33 The search warrants served on specifically 
empowered police to seize documents, books, computer diskettes and 
any printed matter on the Sandline International contract. However, 
the documents included handwri tten amendments to include a search 
for firearms and ammunition-contrary to the explanations given by 
Ludwick Kembu and Sam Inguba (Pos t-Courier 7 May 1997). 
The timing of the raids and arrests according to the Speaker of 
Parliament Rabbie Namaliu, raised suspicions about the motives 
behind the police actions, especially since the protests and 
demonstration had occurred two months previously (Post-Courier 8 
May 1997). Namaliu also expressed concern at the possible negative 
effects on the mutual trust and confidence that had developed 
between non-government organisations and senior politicians during 
the height of the crisis. This trust may have been weakened by the 
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actions of the police. The Member for Bougainville, John Momis also 
expressed his concern at the possible 'politicisation' of the police force, 
given the manner and circumstances in which the raids were 
conducted (Post-Courier 9 May 1997). According the Papua New 
Guinea Trade Union Congress (PNGTUC), police were retaliating 
against non-government organisations over their public opposi tion to 
the government's decision (Paska 1997) .  Under threat were the 
principles of democracy such as the freedom of speech, freedom of 
association, and the rights to exercise these liberties (Paska 12 May 
1997). The Commissioner for Police, Bob Nenta adamantly justified 
police actions in his statement about the police raid. 
The facts are that the non-governmen t organisations chose to place 
themselves at the centre of an intensely delicate situa tion which would 
seem to an ordinary person to be an extreme provocation to the police 
force from the outset of the . . .  crisis . . .  The organisations had no 
permission to conduct a march or [hold]  public meetings, and 
proceeded to hold public demonstr�tions against the advice and 
despite orders from the pol ice Commander of the Centra l and NCO . . .  
The non-government organisa tions ignored the laws of the land 
themselves when they embarked upon their course of action . . .  They 
published and widely distributed inflammatory l i terature calculated to 
cause i l l -feel ing among the people . . .  it  was nei ther possible nor 
prudent to arrest and deal with the non-government organisation 
leaders at the time of the Sandline demonstrations because of the 
prevai l ing situa tion which involved soldiers and large crowds of 
demonstra tors . . .  the fact that the a rrests of those responsible for 
incitement [were made] at a later date was immaterial . . .  (Post-Cou rier 
14 May 1 997) . 
Nenta estimated that  the cost of maintaining law and order during 
the crisis period was Kl million and that approximately the same 
amount of damage was inflic ted by looters (Post-Courier 14 May 1997) .  
Others queried Nenta's justifications. The Governor of Manus 
Province, Stephen Pokawin accused Nenta and the police of failing to 
carry out their duties and for collaborating with protesters to 
destabilise the government (Pos t-Courier 19 May 1997) .  Powes Parkop, 
however, remained unconvinced by the Police Commissioner 's 
justifications and described the actions taken by the police as 'political 
show trials' merely performed to please political leaders (Post-Courier 
14 May 1997) . In response, on 29 May 1997 Melanesian Solidarity 
Group Incorporated (MELSOL) served summons on Sir Julius, Chris 
Haiveta and Mathias !jape. The advocacy organisation urged the 
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Police Commissioner and the Public Prosecutor to take up the charges 
on the grounds that the three politicians had assisted Sandline 
International to participate in a military force which contravened 
Section 51 of the Criminal Code (The Independen t 30 May 1997) .  
Rumours that PNGDF soldiers who had been prominent 
participants in the crisis would be arrested and prosecuted led soldiers 
loyal to Jerry Singirok to take offensive action despite denials by the 
army and the police. The Acting Commander of the PNGDF had been 
assured by police that such arrests would not be made until after the 
Commission of Inquiry had completed its report (Pos t-Courier 13 May 
1997). In fact, the Commander had already proposed and discussed 
with the Acting Prime Minister immunity from prosecution for the 
soldiers who participated in the crisis (Post-Courier 12 May 1997) .  
Nevertheless, tensions grew when some members of the PNGDF 
armed themselves with weapons and set up barricades and bunkers at 
Headquarters and sealed off the main roads leading into the army 
compound . These soldiers remained loyal to the sacked army 
Commander and were acting to prevent police from arresting 
Singirok, Major Enuma and others who participated in Operation 
Rausim Kwik. On 6 May 1997, soldiers removed some of the barricades 
and returned most of their weapons to the armoury. The Acting 
Commander and the Acting Chief of Staff assured Andrew Baing, the 
Acting Prime Minister (in the absence of John Giheno) that the 
situation at Murray Barracks was now under control. 
Despite the assurances from PNGDF's senior military officers, 
other undisciplined soldiers continued to undermine the effort. An 
incident on 7 May 1997 involving soldiers loyal to the sacked 
Brigadier-General threatened the relationship between the soldiers 
and the army's civilian administration. Some armed soldiers who had 
been on duty at the main gates at Murray Barracks intercepted the 
Acting Secretary for Defence, Steven Raphael and hijacked his official 
vehicle (Post-Courier 9 May 1997) . The vehicle was later returned but 
the Acting Chief of Staff was forced to apologise to the Acting 
Secretary and staff of the civilian administration and to guarantee 
them their safety and security. Despite the guarantee, the Acting 
Secretary and his civilian staff refused to return to work in their 
offices.  In an acknowledgement of the importance of the civilian arm, 
the army issued a warning that charges of insubordination would be 
filed against soldiers who failed to return their weapons to the 
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armoury (Post-Courier 12 May 1997) .  The army's Code of Military 
Conduct was also to receive closer scrutiny and enforcement. 
Another military development saw the establishment of a 
Command Restoration Team (CRT) (Post-Courier 9 May 1997) .  The 
Team was set up to regain control, to restore order, to revi talise 
discipline and to enforce command inside the military establishment. 
The CRT is comprised of 12 Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors and is 
headed by Lieutenant-Colonel, John Navi. One of the Majors involved 
is Walter Enuma, the Commander of Operation Rausim Kwik. The 
effectiveness and strength of the CRT was tested as soon as it was 
established. It appeared unable to prevent a telephone call to the Post­
Courier by a soldier from Arawa, Bougainville who stated that the 
Sandline International controversy had captured the government's 
attention and diverted its priorities away from Bougainville to Port 
Moresby (Post-Courier 9 May 1997). The military 's effectiveness in 
exerting control, discipline and command remained probationary. 
Discipline and professionalism within the PNGDF also became an 
issue in the plans for the army's call-out to assist with security 
operations during the 1997 National Election (Post-Courier 12 May 
1997). The apparent fractures in discipline and command in the 
aftermath of the Sandline International controversy generated much 
apprehension over involving the army in the National Election despite 
the assurances made by the Acting Commander that the PNGDF 
remained intact. But again, an indiscretion from the army reversed any 
progress made. An anonymous caller, purporting to be soldier, told the 
Post-Courier that the government would be making a serious mistake if 
it appointed a new Commander (Post-Courier 13  May 1997) .  The 
anonymous soldier claimed to speak on behalf of some 4500 soldiers. 
As far as he and colleagues were concerned, Singirok remained their 
Commander. He warned that an appointment other than Singirok 
would not receive support and acceptance. 
Acting Prime Minister, John Giheno had suggested that the NEC 
was considering a number of people for the posi tion and had stated 
that a permanent Commander would be appointed in June 1997 (Post­
Courier 13 May 1997) . Giheno's proposal generated concern from two 
anonymous senior PNGDF officers. Both men confided in the Post­
Courier that they had become alarmed at the political horse-trading 
which took place every time a new appointment was to be made (Post­
Courier 14 May 1997). They also claimed that appointments of army 
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ommanders in the past had become highly politicised and that 
military qualities such as professionalism, managerial acumen and 
skill and the ability to exert authority and command had become 
secondary in importance or disregarded altogether. One officer 
warned the government against making a political appointment 
because the potential repercussions would be serious and dangerous. 
A political appointment, he warned, could undermine the work 
undertaken so far by the Acting Commander in restoring order and 
stability, reasserting discipline, and strengthening the chains of 
command. He also warned that a political appointee would conduct a 
purge and appoint his own men to key mili tary positions-a 
dangerous trend which he said could lead to 'an officer corps revolt' . 
Both men cla imed that although a small group of officers and 
servicemen wanted Singirok re-appointed, his role in the Sandline 
International contract ruled him ineligible. They claimed that most 
PNGDF soldiers preferred a 'clean break'-an apolitical appointee. 
Nevertheless, the faction of soldiers who continued to support the 
reinstatement of Singirok as Commander could not be completely 
disregarded. 
Responding to reports that some military officers had established 
links with senior politicians and were lobbying for the Commander 's 
position, the Acting Commander directed all servicemen to return to 
their Units by 7.45 am on 19 May 1997. On 13 May 1997, public 
servants at the Central Government Buildings at Waigani were 
evacuated from their offices after a bomb threat, believed to have been 
made by soldiers as protest over Giheno's plans to appoin t  a new 
Commander. A special NEC meeting held to identify funds to finance 
the call-out of PNGDF soldiers for the National Election on that day 
was shifted from the Waigani Government Building to Parliament. 
On 16 May 1997, more than 200 members of the PNGDF, the police 
and the Correctional Services convened for a social gathering at 
Murray Barracks. The purpose was to settle their hostili ties, reconcile 
their differences, and rebuild trust and respect for each other. The 
gathering also reaffirmed their loyalties to the state and to respect the 
findings of the Commission of Inquiry. Claims that order, discipline 
and command were being restored inside the military establishment 
were reiterated by the Acting Chief of Staff, Reg Renagi at this 
gathering, but were quickly undermined when Major Walter Enuma 
allegedly assaulted a senior officer on 21 May 1997. Lieutenant­
Colonel Karl Malpo laid an official complaint at the Boroko Police 
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Station where he alleged that Enuma, under the influence of alcohol 
had assaulted him while he was on his way to the officers' mess for 
morning tea (Post-Courier 22 May 1997). Enuma claimed tha t intense 
lobbying amongst officers and servicemen for the Acting 
Commander 's position incited his act ions. The Acting Commander, 
Jack Tuat was forced to take action against Enuma, who is a member 
of the PNGDF Command Restoration Team. Tuat directed tha t an 
investigation into the incident be conducted and that the appropriate 
disciplinary charges be laid against Enuma. According to the Acting 
Chief of Staff, the incident was reported in the media without any 
verification from his office (Pos t-Courier 23 May 1997) .  
Report of  the Commission of Inqu iry 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Sandline 
International contract was presented to the Acting Prime Minister John 
Giheno on 29 May 1997. Giheno said he did not want to procrastinate 
on revealing the findings of the report but he needed time to read the 
report thoroughly before making the findings public (Post-Courier 30 
May 1997) . However, during that weekend several sections of the 
report were leaked. Singirok alleged in the media that Nicos Violaris, a 
businessman and close associate of Sir Julius, handed him several 
pages of the report at a hotel in Port Moresby. Parts of the leaked 
Report claimed that Sir Julius had been cleared of any wrongdoing 
(EM TV 1 June 1997). The Post-Courier also reported that government 
officers were investigating reports that a group seeking supporters to 
demonstrate outside Parliament if the Report of the Inquiry did not 
recommend action against the key poli ticians were visiting settlements 
in the city (Pos t-Courier 30 May 1997) .  Despite Singirok's involvement 
in the Sandline International contract controversy, he was keen to 
remain a soldier and to accept re-appointment as the Commander of 
the PNGDF (Post-Courier 30 May 1997) . 
Confusion resulted in the week following the leaking of the report 
of the Commission of Inquiry. 'Sidelined' Prime Minister Sir Julius 
Chan proclaimed himself to be cleared of any wrongful doing and 
reinstated himself into office (EM TV 2 June 1997) . The Acting Prime 
Minister, John Giheno also declared that he was still in charge of the 
Office of the Prime Minister. Both men convened separate press 
conferences to assert the legitimacy of their positions. Giheno 
suddenly said he wished to widen the terms of reference of the 
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Inquiry but he had clearly underestimated Sir Julius and was overly 
confident about keeping the report confidential when he postponed 
making the Report public before adequately studying it. His calls for 
widening the terms of reference were somewhat ironic given that he 
had earlier rejected all pleas and submissions to widen the terms of 
reference after his appointment as Acting Prime Minister. Sir Julius 
seemed to have knowledge of the contents of the report and 
immediately sought his return to office. The Acting Prime Minister 
reacted by suspending the Secretary for the Department of Prime 
Minister and NEC, Noel Levi for the security breach (EM TV 2 June 
1997). He appears to have doubted Levi's loyalty since he had been 
made Department Head after Sir Julius recalled him from his 
Diplomatic Post as High Commissioner in London. Once again, 
confidential state information had found its way into unauthorised 
hands. Giheno finally relented to Sir Julius Chan's decision to return to 
the Prime Minister 's office. The other two Ministers also returned to 
their substantive posi tions. The Secretary for the Department of Prime 
Minister, who had been suspended by Giheno was also reinstated by 
Sir Julius. Similarly, James Loko, the suspended Acting Secretary for 
Finance, returned to his substantive position as Commissioner-General 
of the Internal Revenue Commission. 
Discussion 
The Sandline International con tract will be remembered as an 
important event in Papua New Guinea's political history notably 
because of the role of the PNGDF in forcing a Prime Minister, a 
Deputy Prime Minister (also Minister for Finance) and a senior 
government Minister to step aside, and for a Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate their contract. The Sandline controversy did not only 
expose fundamental challenges to the strength of parliamentary 
democracy, the Constitution, and the rule of law, but also the role of 
the military in the political affairs of the state. The national parliament 
reigned supreme over the military but the collapse of discipline, 
command and order apparent during the crisis raises grave concerns 
about the future of the military. Matters of stability, loyalty and 
coherence inside the disciplined forces (police, PNGDF, and 
Correctional Services) remain as visible challenges for policymakers. 
The challenges to sovereignty, state and security have emanated at 
the domestic and international levels. Corruption, whether proven or 
246 Gove rnance and reform in the South Pacific 
not, poses a serious threat for the institutions of the state and good 
governance. It was a central issue in the Sandline contract and one that 
precipitated the crisis. The Commission of Inquiry into the Sandline 
contract did not find evidence of corruption. Its primary purpose was 
to investigate the negotiations and procedures used which led Papua 
New Guinea to enter into a contract with Sandline Interna tional and 
the contract between Papua New Guinea and Sandline International .  
To investigate an issue or problem essentially means to conduct a 
meticulous and detailed search, and to establish the facts accurately 
and carefully. Given the specificity of the terms of reference it was 
unlikely that a decision of any great significance would emerged to 
satisfy publ ic expectations. The Commission of Inquiry has served the 
purpose for which it was established. Nevertheless, the findings of the 
Inquiry reveal that politicians and public servants negotiated a 
contract that arguably flouted the laws, procedures, and rules that 
protected the resources of the state. 
The critical issue is how ineffective these rules, procedures and 
laws have been in protecting and upholding the law. In other words, 
policymakers have displayed how easy it is to circumvent the laws 
and regulations. Future policymakers can only appreciate the 
significance of the Commission of Inquiry's findings if the laws, rules, 
and procedures are applied effectively and justly to protect state 
resources from abuse and misuse by those who have been empowered 
as elected and appointed custodians. The issue also reveals the power 
and influence of the elected custodians over public servants, and how 
vulnerable the latter have become. The Sandline controversy has also 
demonstrated how a large section of the society rallied by 
organisations or individuals with demagogic qualities protested 
against the decisions of the government. The political potential cannot 
be underestimated . 
At the international level, Papua New Guinea's sovereignty as an 
independent state also depends on its relationship with its neighbours. 
Papua New Guinea's economic security and survival as an 
independent sovereign state came under severe threat from Australia. 
The key bilateral arrangements-the Defence Co-operation Program 
and the Joint Development Co-operation-became critical instruments 
for Australia to use as ultimatums (Draft Hansard 27 March 1997:6-8) .  
Papua New Guinea's linkage to international financial institutions and 
markets also posed economic and political challenges. The brute 
reality of these international arrangements reveal the vulnerability of 
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Papua New Guinea's sovereignty and security, and it dependence on 
such linkages. 
Notes 
10 
11 
This paper was presented to Geopolitical Session of the Sth Pacific 
Science Inter-Congress, Suva, 13-19 July 1997 entitled, 'The 
Sandline International Contract Controversy in Papua New 
Guinea: Challenges to Sovereignty, Security and the State' .  
The PNG Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Kilroy Genia, 
continued to maintain that the Sandline contract only consisted of 
military experts, consultants, trainers, and advisers, who were 
engaged to train PNGDF personnel (Post-Courier, 10 March 1997) .  
Reports emerged that 40 military consultants had already begun 
military exercises and drills for a select group of elite soldiers, 
known as the Special Forces Unit (SFU), at Moem Barracks in 
Wewak, East Sepik Province (Post-Courier, 7 March 1997). 
Large resource development projects based in PNG and listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange were the first victims of the 
Sandline contract (Pos t-Courier 26 February 1997, 18 March 1997) .  
The Australian Senate went further and passed a motion by 
Senator Dee Margetts that called for a comprehensive review of  aid 
to ensure that Australian funds did not support the war on 
Bougainville (Post-Courier 4 March 1997) .  
Australia continued to hope that the PNG government would 
review its stand on the Sandline International contract, even 
without the pressure from the Federal Opposition to cut Australian 
aid (Pos t-Courier 6 March 1997) .  
One such NGO was the human rights group called Aid/Watch of 
Australia. 
Australia provides approximately A$12  million annually in 
military aid to PNG. This package includes training, military 
support, and maritime surveillance. 
Presently, the government owns 19 per cent of the mine and the 
rest is owned by minority shareholders (Post-Courier 3 March 1997). 
The government, according to the Prime Minister, never seriously 
intended to acquire majori ty shares in the Panguna mine from CRA 
(Post-Courier 24 April 1997) .  
Despite the huge odds against the government acquiring the RTZ­
CRA shares, the Premier of the BTG, Gerard Sinato, greeted the 
proposal as another important step in addressing the Bougainville 
crisis (Post-Courier 4 March 1997). The Papua New Guinea Trade 
Union Congress (PNGTUC) also embraced the idea but 
d isapproved of the government's plan to engage mercenaries, 
describing the idea as repugnant and an outright affront to the 
democratic cause and internal security (The Independent 7 March 
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1997). The Member of Parliament for South Bougainville, Michael 
Laimo, described the government plan as 'insane' (Post-Courier 6 
March 1997). He believed that such a plan should only emerge 
after peace and order had been established. Neither did the 
proposal appeal to the BRA leaders, Francis Ona and Moses 
Havini. Both men maintained that there would be no compromise 
from their demand for independence from Papua New Guinea 
(Post-Courier 5 March 1997) .  Ona maintained that the purpose of 
the war is to protect the land, the environment, and the social 
system on Bougainville. It seems that for both rebel leaders the 
purchase of the Panguna mine would (not?) guarantee a solution to 
the Bougainville crisis. 
1 2 The Australian Stock Exchange traced the trades to Morgan 
Stockbroking of Brisbane, a co-manager for the float of Oregon 
Mineral Limited in 1996 (Post-Courier 10 March 1997) .  
1 3  He petitioned the National Court to  declare that the government 
had appropriated public money without the approval of the 
national parliament. Therefore, the government breached Sections 
209, 210 and 211 of the Constitution. Moreover, the government 
had violated the procedures of handling public finances, as 
governed by the Public Finances (Managemen t) Act. He contended 
that the government had also conspired to raise an unauthorised 
military personnel, in breach of Section 200 of the Constitution. 
Finally, he contended that the government had conspired to act 
against its own citizens which is a breach of their rights and 
freedoms, under Section 35 (right to life), Section 36 (freedom from 
inhuman treatment), Section 37 (the right to full protection of the 
law) (Post-Courier 6 March 1997) .  
14 Sir  Julius later claimed he never received Singirok's letter that 
called for his resignation (Post-Courier 18 March 1997). 
15 Impromptu public opinion surveys conducted by the Post-Courier 
on 18 March 1997, in two provinces revealed that  90 percent of the 
people interviewed supported Singirok (Post-Courier 19 March 
1997) . 
16 On the morning of 19 March 1997, soldiers gathered at their own 
barracks (Pos t-Courier 18 March 1997) .  The soldiers pledged their 
support for the sacked Brigadier-General and remained in their 
barracks (Post-Courier 20 March 1997) . Approximately 600 soldiers 
signed a petition that called for the reinstatement of the Brigadier­
General within 72 hours, or they would resign from the PNGDF 
(Post-Courier 19 March 1997) .  
17 The Post-Courier reported that the shift in Sir Julius' position came 
after a ten-minute telephone conversation with the Prime Minister 
of Australia, John Howard (Post-Courier 20 March 1997) .  
1 8 The Government Ministers concerned were Deputy People's 
Progress Party Leader and Minister for Lands, Sir Albert Kipalan, 
the Minister for Agriculture and Livestock, David Mai, the Minister 
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for Works and Transport, Peter Yama, and the Minister for Police, 
Castan Maibawa (Pos t-Courier 25 March 1997) .  
19 The political parties which supported the motion included the 
People's Democratic Movement, the National Alliance (a faction of 
the Pangu Pati, the Melanesian Alliance, and the Movement for 
Greater Autonomy) and the People's Indigenous Movement (Post­
Courier 25 March 1997). 
20 Seven benefits for PNG outlined in the summary: ( 1 )  Speedy 
resolution of prob lem (2) Increase in government prestige-impact 
on election (3) Improved standing and morale of armed forces (4) 
Fully trained special forces unit (5) National strategic intelligence 
capability (6) Increased combat power projection capability (7) 
Costs recoverable from mine revenue-NB purchase of mine by 
Branch Minerals (Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 1997: 25) .  
21  Nonetheless, Sir Julius stated that he has had no regrets at all about 
engaging Sandline International to help end the Bougainville crisis, 
despite the fact that the events had been a major blow to his 
government (Post-Courier 24 April 1997) .  
2 2  According to State Solicitor, Zachery Gelu, the National Securi ty 
Council empowered the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Finance to execute the contract (Post-Courier 18 April 1997) .  
23 The Sandline International crisis later forced the Secretary for 
Defence to quit the public service on 30 May 1997 although he was 
also motivated by his decision to nominate to contest the Unggai­
Bena open electorate seat in the 1997 National Election (Post­
Courier 1 May 1997) .  
24 Roadco was quickly registered as a company to settle the Sandline 
contract. 
25 At the time this paper was being written the Validation Act or the 
Mini-Budget had yet to be passed. 
26 The payment of US$18 million was electronically transferred to a 
Bank in Hong Kong only four hours after the contract was signed 
(Post-Courier 3 April 1997) .  Spicer was paid an equivalent amount 
by cheque from Roadco on 24 January 1997, as 'security' that the 
contract was to be signed, but was told not to present it for 
payment. That cheque, according to Spicer, was confiscated by 
PNGDF soldiers, along with US$400,000 from a safe at the house 
he was staying at in East Boroko on 16 March 1997 (Post-Courier 3 
April 1997) .  
4 1 McCowan was subsequently suspended for an indefinite period by 
his employer, Jardine Fleming of Hong Kong for his alleged 
involvement as an intermediary between the PNG government and 
Sandline International, and for allegedly transferring money on 
behalf of the mercenaries to Hong Kong (Post-Courier 21 April 
1997) . 
28 The government has since redirected this money to the 
Consolidated Revenue. Tim Spicer told the Inquiry that the 
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government owed Sandline International the remaining total of 
US$18 million (Post-Courier 3 April 1997). 
29 The proper steps in such a case would have been to have the 
consultancy agreement approved by the Consultancy Steering 
Committee of the Department of Personnel Management (Post­
Courier 21 April 1997) .  Commissioner Andrew ruled that Singirok 
had given evidence for nearly a week and nothing further was 
required of him (Post-Courier 17 April 1997) .  
3 0  Section 200 (1 )  of  the Constitution forbids the establishment, 
organisation, equipment, training or participation in or association 
with a military or para-military force. Donigi argued that the 
Constitution provided for the existence of a Police Force and 
Defence Force, reserve auxiliary or special force as part of the 
Defence Force, but only in accordance with an Act of Parliament. 
Since no Act of Parliament existed to allow the establishment of 
Sandline International as part of the PNGDF, the contract itself 
amounted to prima facie evidence of the government's attempt to 
establish an unauthorised army. 
31 The military equipment purchased consisted of four helicopters. 
The Post-Courier alleged that another shipment of military 
hardware was en route to PNG on a vessel and transiting in 
Eastern Europe (4 April 1997) .  
3 2  On 12 May 1997, the Director of ICRAF Powes Parkop became the 
fourth non-government organisation representative to be arrested 
by police. He was charged with two counts of unlawful assembly 
at Murray Barracks and at Parliament House. Powes alleged that 
the government had drawn up a list of non-government 
organisation activists, students and community leaders who had 
participated in the demonstrations. He also alleged that the 
government through a major political exercise was attempting to 
end the operations of non-government organisations, an allegation 
denied by police (Post-Courier 13 May 1997) .  
3 3  Two other non-government organisation representatives, John 
Napo and John Kawowo were also arrested and charged for illegal 
assembly during the Sandline International crisis. Both men were 
released on a bail of K150 each (Post-Courier 7 May 1997) .  
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252 Governance and reform in the South Pacific 
Criminal justice reform in 
Papua New Guinea 
Sinclair  D innen 
Lawlessness and violence in many parts of Papua New Guinea in the 
form of raskolism, tribal fighting, and threatening compensation 
demands present a growing challenge to the authority of the state. 
State institutions charged with controlling crime have been 
increasingly overwhelmed by a combination of escalating demands 
and diminishing resources. In 1984 the Clifford Report warned that 
the Papua New Guinea criminal justice system was 'in serious danger 
of losing the battle to manage and process, le t alone constrain, the 
existing rates of crime' (Clifford et al. 1 984:1 36). Many observers claim 
that the battle has since been lost. Tradi tions of police violence and 
frustrations with the perceived limitations of the western model of 
criminal justice have contributed to a growth in retributive and 
militaristic responses to crime and social disorder. Distinctions 
between state and non-state violence blur when violence becomes an 
acceptable, and anticipated, response to conflict. This reinforcing cycle 
of violence-fed by both criminals and state in parts of Papua New 
Guinea-has become difficult to break. 
This chapter outlines the retributive character of state responses to 
crime in Papua New Guinea and their, often, counter-productive 
outcomes. The concept of restorative justice is introduced from wider 
criminological debates to stimulate thinking about new directions for 
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criminal justice practice. It is a concept that appears to sit well in the 
Melanesian social environment. A number of incipient restorative 
justice institutions are identified as examples of the innovative 
repertoire of strategies that have evolved in response to new 
marginalisations and the failings of retribu tive justice. Specifically, 
they indicate the potential for developing a form of restorative justice 
appropriate to Papua New Guinea social conditions. As such, they 
stand as glimmers of hope in a context where problems of order 
appear endemic and where coercive solutions have demonstrably 
failed. 
Cri m i nal  justice in  Papua New G u i nea 
The current institutional framework of criminal justice in Papua New 
Guinea dates back to the modernising reforms initiated by Paul 
Hasluck, Australia's Minister for External Territories between 1951 
and 1963. The specific blueprint  lay in the detailed recommendations 
of the 1960 Derham Report into the administration of justice in Papua 
and New Guinea (Derham 1960). These recommendations led to the 
dismantling of the old colonial system of undifferentiated 'native 
administration' and its gradual (and, in practice, haphazard) 
replacement with a centralised criminal justice system consisting of 
institu tionally distinct police, courts, and prisons. As with many other 
former colonies, Papua New Guinea inherited the key elements of the 
western criminal justice model upon Independence in 1975. Among 
these were 
• central state control of criminal justice 
• the idea of crime itself and a universal body of codified 
criminal law 
• the notion that crimes are committed against the state (rather 
than against victims or supernatural forces) 
• the establishment of a professional police with a monopoly 
over the use of legitimate force in domestic conflict 
• a move away from compensation as the dominant way of 
dealing with wrongdoing to imprisonment of individual 
offenders 
• a narrow focus on individual responsibili ty during criminal 
process and denial of the social context of crime 
• an offender-centred process in which crime victims are 
largely ignored 
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• the idea that fundamental human rights should be protected 
during criminal process (due process) .  
Critiques of criminal justice in Papua New Guinea today can be 
broadly divided into those that accept the insti tutional character of the 
prevailing system and seek to alleviate particular technical 
shortcomings, on the one hand, and more fundamentalist critiques 
that question the social foundations of the system, on the other. 
Revisionist critiques explain the low impact of criminal justice in terms 
of inadequate resources, training and coordination . Proposed remedies 
include the provision of better trained and equipped police, 
prosecutorial and correctional services. Fundamentalist critiques draw 
attention to the social inappropriateness and 'western' orientation of 
the criminal justice system. From the latter perspective, an effective 
regulatory system needs to be more closely adapted to the social 
specificities of the Papua New Guinea environment. This position is 
most clearly expressed in the Clifford Report's advocacy of official 
recognition of informal (non-state) regulatory mechanisms. 
Pol ic ing change 
The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary remains the most visible 
criminal justice agency and the one most directly involved in routine 
responses to crime and disorder. Its institutional shortcomings precede 
Independence in 1975. In that year estimated police coverage 
extended to only 10 per cent of the total land area in Papua New 
Guinea and 40 per cent of the population (Dorney 1990:296). 
Reflecting, in part, their origins as a paramilitary colonial force, 
performance in conventional policing tasks such as investigation, 
apprehension and prosecution, has been consistently poor. A growing 
population, limited economic opportunities and shortage of resources 
associated with the fiscal crisis of the Papua New Guinea state, have 
all contributed to the challenges of police work in Papua New Guinea. 
At Independence the national population was slightly more than 2 
million, the police force had approximately 4,100 personnel, and crime 
rates were generally low. This translated into a police/population 
ratio of 1 :476. By 1996, however, the population had doubled to 
approximately 4 million, police numbers remained at 5,000 uniformed 
staff and approximately 300 civilian support staff, while lawlessness 
had become a major concern in urban areas and some rural regions. 
These later figures provide a police/population ratio of 1 :800. New 
C riminal justice reform i n  Papua New Gu inea 255 
South Wales, with a similar population to Papua New Guinea, has 
approximately 1 3,000 police. 
According to present Police Commissioner, Bob Nenta, not all the 
5,000 uniformed police are available for general duties in practice 
(Nenta 1996). On a three shift basis, there would be approximately 
1 ,600 uniformed personnel on duty at any one time to cover the entire 
nation. Commissioner Nenta claims, however, that in practice there 
are only ever about 2,100 uniformed personnel available for police 
work on a three shift basis. This works out at about 700 police officers 
per shift for the whole of Papua New Guinea. Another remarkable 
figure relates to the number of personnel per police station.  Mr Nenta 
states that the average number of police at each of Papua New 
Guinea's 362 police s tations is approximately 5.8. Divided into three 
shifts, this works out at 1 .9 personnel per station at any one time! 
These shortages have been exacerbated in recent years as a result of 
the deployment of police mobile squads from mainland Papua New 
Guinea to security duties on Bougainville. 
The widespread availability of firearms in Papua New Guinea and 
their increasingly brazen use by criminal groups has added 
significantly to the challenges facing police. Shoot-outs between so­
called raskols and police have become commonplace in many urban 
centres, where the latter are often outgunned in practice. Many 
firearms are believed to be coming into the country via the drugs-for­
guns trade. High quality marijuana is being sold to Australian 
criminals in return for weapons. This trade appears to be concentrated 
around Papua New Guinea's Western Province and Australia's Torres 
Islands. In addition to their routine use in robberies and other criminal 
activities, there are also serious concerns about the likely use of high­
powered weapons in the 1997 national elections. Previous experience 
indicates a discernible trend towards violence as a key strategy of 
intimidation and retribution among certain candidates and supporters 
in the electoral context (Dinnen 1996a; Standish 1996). This is 
particularly so in parts of the Highlands. 
A related concern is the growing quantity of police and defence 
force issued weapons and ammunition ending up in criminal hands. 
In the two-hour shoot-out in Port Moresby that preceded the curfew 
imposed in November 1996, the suspected ro�bers reportedly attacked 
police with automatic weapons and a grenade fired by a launcher 
similar to those used by the defence force (National 5 November 1996) . 
Three policemen and one policewoman were wounded and two 
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suspected robbers were shot dead. In the aftermath of this incident, 
the Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan ordered an urgent 'stocktake' of the 
defence force weapons and ammunition supplies, amid concerns 
about the number of such firearms being used in serious crimes, 
particularly in Port Moresby ( Weekend A ustralian 9-10 November 1996) .  
The limited protection against criminal violence afforded by state 
policing has contributed to the massive privatisation of policing in 
recent years. While no reliable figures exist to gauge the size of the 
private security industry, a wide range of security organisations now 
operate throughout the country. These vary from large sophisticated 
operations affiliated with international companies to small firms 
providing security services for private households, commercial 
enterprises, and government departments. Concerns are expressed 
about the unregulated character of this industry and the potential for 
serious abuses on the part of its more cavalier members. Such 
concerns were accentuated by the recent murder of four youths at 
Dogura beach outside Port Moresby, allegedly by security employees 
carrying out a 'payback' on behalf of their employer (Post-Courier 31 
November 1996) . 
The inadequacies of state-provided criminal justice provides the 
basis for the substantial amount of Australian aid directed at Papua 
New Guinea's law and order sector. The largest single project is the 
Police Development Project which is now in the second of its two five­
year phases. Australian assis tance is aimed at improving the 
administrative, management, operational and technical capacities of 
the constabulary. A Correctional Services Project has also recently 
commenced and seeks to strengthen the management and training 
capacity of Corrective Institutions Service, improve prisoners' 
rehabili tation and skills and upgrade prison infrastructure.  
Retri butive practice 
The shortcomings of criminal justice in general, and policing in 
particular, have led to the supplementing of 'normal' criminal justice 
processes with extraordinary measures such as curfews (prior to 1987 
curfews could only be imposed under a state of emergency) and 
special policing operations. These have sought to restore order in 
designated areas through a combination of restrictions on movement, 
police raids and orchestrated displays of militaristic strength.  Police 
personnel are often joined by defence force soldiers and Corrective 
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Institutions Service employees. As well as being used regularly in 
urban areas, curfews and special policing operations are also resorted 
to in rural areas. Non-government organisations have complained of 
the 'militarisation of society' (Post-Courier 7 August 1992). According 
to these critics, state responses have led to the 'normalisation of 
ex treme emergency measures in the form of the Curfew Act'; the 
'increasing use of military and Corrective Institutions Service 
personnel in police duties'; and the 'increasing use of police mobile or 
riot squads in ordinary crime situations'. 
Special policing operations and police raids against urban 
settlements or rural villages reflect the failure of more routine criminal 
justice processes to apprehend suspects or detect stolen goods. Such 
raids, targeted on the basis of secondary information, often end up as 
indiscriminate 'fishing expeditions' .  Evidence of any possible crime is 
seized and local residents are often subjected to arbitrary intimidation. 
It is not uncommon, for example, for any property of value that cannot 
be accounted for with specific receipts to be confiscated by police. Not 
surprisingly significant amounts of 'crime' are uncovered, 
retrospectively legitimatising the initial decision to raid. 
At the same time, such operations frequently have counter­
productive outcomes. They are often followed by allegations of 
serious human rights abuses, ranging from fatalities, rapes, assaul ts, 
and the destruction of property and livestock, to theft. Where the 
services of a lawyer or a local law student can be procured, they may 
also result in a civil action for damages against the state .  In August 
1996, for example, the National Court reportedly awarded K103,800 to 
Wiliri and Awari people in Pangia, in the Southern Highlands, for 
damage inflicted by police in early 1990 (Pos t-Courier 14  August 1996) . 
Following the killing of man from a nearby village, police had arrested 
11 people from the two villages in question. According to the National 
Court judge these suspects were then subjected to 'cruel and inhuman 
treatment not consistent and without respect for inherent dignity of 
the human being' contrary to S.36 ( 1 )  of the Constitution. The 
inhumane treatment included forcible stripping of their clothes, 
parading them naked in public and assaulting them. The suspects 
were eventually released after five days of imprisonment without food 
and water. The police-with the active assistance of some of the 
traditional enemies of the pla intiffs in this case-also raided the 
suspects' villages. The Court subsequently held that the police had 
unlawfully entered the villages, destroyed buildings, homes, tree 
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crops, and food gardens, burnt down other properties and taken away 
livestock, pigs, cassowaries, vegetables, kina shells and cash belonging 
to the villagers. Damages were awarded for personal injuries, 
destruction of property, mental distress, false arrest, false 
imprisonment and breaches of constitutional rights. 
Incidents such as this, and popular expectations that police are 
likely to behave in this manner, contribute to high levels of mutual 
distrust between police and local communities in many parts of the 
country. This naturally undermines the cooperation necessary for 
effective investigative police work. In its submission to the 1991 
National Crime Summit, the Papua New Guinea Chamber of Mines 
and Petroleum commented that 
One of the major problems that has developed over recent years is the 
communities' distrust of the police, particularly in rural areas. Much of 
this is due to a lack of d iscip line and efficiency in parts of the pol ice 
force to the extent that the community has become more frightened of 
the pol ice than they are of the crimina ls (PNGCMP 1 991 :6) .  
Retributive policing of this kind generates a destructive, reinforcing 
momentum in police/ community interactions whereby lack of local 
cooperation is cited by police as a reason for using retributive force 
which, in turn, results in further local antagonism towards police and 
so on. In rural areas this can lead to the police being viewed as a 
hostile army of occupation. As illustrated in the above case, such 
arbitrary actions are also susceptible to capture by local groups in 
furtherance of their own parochial inter-group conflicts, thereby 
subverting the ideal of neutral policing. In the urban areas, these 
actions contribute to an escalating cycle of retributive violence 
between police and criminal groups, fuelled by the abundant supply 
of sophisticated weapons. 
Retributive justice can also strengthen criminal organisation and 
commitment. In practice, curfews and special operations serve to · 
displace hardened criminals from high crime areas to other parts 
unaffected by such measures. As such they may have the unintended 
effect of contributing to the d ispersal of criminal networks. Harris has 
also observed how Port Moresby gangs became more professional in 
response to the restrictions imposed under the 1984 state of emergency 
(Harris 1988:34) .  Violent encounters with police have become an 
integral part of raskol induction in the urban centres. Stories of police 
brutality formed a recurring theme in the rhetoric of raskol informants 
during my own fieldwork and were regularly voiced as legitimation 
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for criminal violence (Dinnen 1996b ) .  Imprisonment has also been 
incorporated into the constitution of raskol identity, providing another 
means for achieving high criminal status. At a macro level, retributive 
justice can be viewed as contributing to crime through its aggravation 
of the very marginalisation underlying the generation of raskolism in 
the first place. 
The monetary cost of large-scale militarised operations, as well as 
the damages awarded victims of police raids in subsequent civil 
actions, contributes to the fiscal crisis of the Papua New Guinea state, 
further weakening its capacity for service provision. In another sense, 
the growth of these civil cases illustrates how the state has i tself 
become progressively implicated in the cycle of lawlessness it seeks to 
break. As Filer has recently put it 
The 'strong arm of the law', which once forced people to make peace 
with each other, now merely provokes a further round of claims 
aga inst the state itself (Fi ler 1 997:1 2) .  
While the retributive character of criminal justice practice is ,  at one 
level, a consequence of the institutional weakness of the Papua New 
Guinea state and its inability to achieve desired results by other 
means, it is also a product of factors specific to the police. Some of 
these have their origins in colonial practice, while others derive from 
more recent experience. It also i llustrates the continuing high level of 
tolerance of violence as a strategy for resolving problems in Papua 
New Guinea-a tolerance which is reflected in policing practice as in 
many other areas of contemporary social relations. 
The tradition of reactive, mobile, policing originated in the early 
colonial period when the armed constabulary were the principal 
agents of pacification. Kituai (1993) provides detailed documentation 
of coercive responses by police to resistance at local levels during 
colonial administration. The legacy of this tradition is to be found in 
the retributive actions of police in many parts of Papua New Guinea 
today. In addition to the punitive raids illustrated above, 'shoot-to-kill' 
orders in the face of localised outbreaks of disorder are issued 
regularly by senior officers, particularly in the Highlands. Port 
Moresby police were recently issued with such an order after a spate 
of raskol violence in the capital in October 1996 (Reuter News Service 24 
October 1996) .  Ironically, many features of state strategies of control in 
the post-independence period represent a return to the pacifying 
strategies of early colonial rule. 
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The ongoing conflict on Bou gain ville has also reinforced the 
militarisation of state responses. Police mobile squads are returning 
from service on Bougainville and applying techniques evolved in the 
context of civil war to mainland policing. Special equipment issued on 
Bougainville, including black uniforms and face camouflage, 
continues to be used by some of these units upon their redeployment 
(Standish 1994:80). The working culture of the mobile squads, 
particularly in the Highlands, revolves around an unbridled 
machismo and preference for 'Rambo-like' solutions. Intimidation and 
violence (including a high level of violence against women) provide 
the most frequent response to problems of order in this situation. The 
participation of all three disciplinary forces-the defence force, police 
and the Correctional Institutions Services-in joint operations on 
Bougainville and special operations on the mainland, contributes to 
the spread of this culture across agency lines. 
Where legitimation for these kinds of actions is offered by police, 
they are often phrased in terms of popular stereotypes of assumed 
cultural groups-such as 'Goilalas', 'Simbus' or 'Highlanders' . 
According to these constructions, the use of force provides the only 
effective way of achieving behavioural change among such 'bellicose ' 
and 'lawless' groups. Non-cultural stereotypes are simultaneously 
used to legitimate coercive actions against culturally heterogenous 
marginal groups in the urban setting, such as settlement dwellers and 
unemployed youth. 
Another legitimation lies in the frustrations voiced by police with 
other components of the criminal justice process (Dinnen 1992). These 
relate primarily to what the pol ice view as unnecessary and unfair 
procedural obstacles in the way of securing court convictions, the 
leniency of magistrates and judges in sentencing offenders, and the 
relative ease with which individuals escape from prison .  A recent 
television documentary captured this rationalisation in the claims of a 
young police officer that bashing suspects was the only way of 
deterring crime. 1  Retributive justice, in this sense, reflects the belief on 
the part of many police that desired results cannot achieve by any 
other means. 
Militaristic strategies have also attracted strong political support 
from leaders who, despite evidence to the contrary, view them as the 
best prospect for countering growing problems of order. The advocacy 
of elite security squads has, for example, featured regularly in the law 
and order pronouncements of politicians. Partiality for militaristic 
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solutions has recently been explained by reference to the ostensible 
success of the authoritarian solutions to internal security adopted by 
some of Papua New Guinea's northern neighbours-an explicit strand 
in the rhetoric of the so-called 'Look North' policy. Illustrations are to 
be found in the advocacy of a Ghurkha-trained National Guard by the 
Namaliu government in 1991 (Dinnen 1993a:32); the 1993 Internal 
Security Act (Dinnen 1993b); the establishment of the Rapid 
Deployment Unit to provide security at the Highlands-based mineral 
and petroleum projects under the Wingti government in 1992, and its 
proposed successor, the Police Tactical Force (Dinnen 1996b ) .  
Police violence in  Papua New Guinea occurs within an 
environment where tolerance of violence is generally high. What is 
most disturbing is the manner in which police abuses and other forms 
of violence have become enmeshed in a continually escalating cycle. 
Growing levels of official and unofficial violence have, in this way, 
reinforced the legitimacy of violence as a political strategy among both 
state and non-state constituencies. In this respect the distinction 
between legality and illegality-upon which law and order debate is 
premised-fails to capture what is going on in both state and non-state 
coercive action . The question of a monopoly of violence neither 
characterises the state nor legitimates its actions. In practice it  is often 
difficult to distinguish between the strategies of v iolence employed by 
state and non-state constituencies. 
From retributive to restorat ive justice 
Over the past decade there have been numerous reports call ing for 
criminal justice reform in Papua New Guinea. These have been based 
on the failure of existing strategies and have usually advocated a more 
community-oriented approach, as well as the incorporation of 
informal local structures. Reforms of this kind were, for example, 
proposed during the 1991 National Crime Summit (FLOJ 1991 )  and 
the 1992 Crime Prevention Week (FLOJ 1992a). Institutional 
proponents have included the Foundation for Law, Order and Justice 
(FLOJ 1992b ), the joint Papua New Guinea/ Australia Law and Order 
Sectoral Review (Papua New Guinea / Australia Development 
Cooperation Programme 1993), the National Law, Order and Justice 
Council (NLOJC 1993), as well as a number "of external Reports.2 
Australian aid to the law and order sector has now moved some 
way beyond i ts former exclusive focus on state institutions. In 
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addition to the projects mentioned above, AusAID has recently 
initiated a Community Law and Order Initia tives Survey. This will 
identify ways of supporting the work of community-based and non­
government organisations in reducing law and order problems and in 
developing services for victims and perpetrators. Other aid projects 
being considered include a Legal Institutions Project Prefeasibility 
Study to assess op tions for supporting the integra tion of law and order 
activities and delivering improved legal and judicial services, while 
promoting respect for individual rights and freedoms. 
For successive Papua New Guinea governments, however, as well 
as for the police themselves, practical responses to lawlessness have 
remained the familiar and dated, western ones. In essence, these entail 
calls for 'more of the same' -more police, increased police powers, 
more prisons, heavier penalties and so on. While the crisis of criminal 
justice is clearly a global one, policymakers elsewhere have generally 
been more open than their Papua New Guinea counterparts to the 
findings of criminological research exploring alterna tive strategies for 
the management of crime. Ironically, many of the restorative justice 
initia tives being developed internationally expressly draw on 
traditions of conflict management attributed to small-scale indigenous 
societies (Maoris in New Zealand; native Americans in North 
America). Given the obvious richness of local organisation in Papua 
New Guinea, it is surprising that more imaginative and socially 
appropriate responses have not been officially explored. 
A variety of labels are found in the international literature to 
describe what is most frequently referred to as restorative justice.3 The 
concept focuses primarily on the need to restore individuals who have 
been injured or otherwise suffered loss as a result of crime. Other 
formulations extend to the need to restore the perpetrators of crime 
whose offending is viewed as symptomatic of personal or social 
problems, usually treated as peripheral under the western criminal 
justice model. At an institutional level, restorative justice involves the 
development of a more victim-centred process, as well as one tha t 
actively seeks to reintegrate offenders into 'a wider web of community 
ties and support' (Braithwaite and Mugford 1994 : 139). 
In practice, the western model often relegates both offender and 
victim to passive onlookers in the criminal trial. Crimes, as stated 
previously, are officially deemed to have been committed against the 
state rather than against individual victims. Professional lawyers 
dominate proceedings using technical language and following 
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cumbersome procedures that baffle most laypeople. This is 
particularly so in Papua New Guinea given the alien origins of 
criminal justice and low levels of literacy on the part of most 
defendants. In the absence of a jury in Papua New Guinea, it is the 
magistrate or judge who single-handedly determines the guilt of the 
offender, as well as the final disposal of the case. This process 
marginalises those most directly involved or affected by the alleged 
wrongdoing, failing to address underlying grievances on the part of 
either victim or offender. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of criminal 
proceedings can lead victims and their kin to alternative solu tions. 
These, in turn, may engender further violence or conflict, as in the case 
of 'pay-back' .  Offenders subject to such an impersonal process are 
unlikely to be seriously confronted with the particular consequences 
of their wrongdoing for the victims. Likewise, broader contextual 
factors having a bearing on the specific crime-such as 
unemployment, lack of economic opportunity, family breakdown or 
poverty-are of little account in the formal decision-making process. 
Restorative justice, by contrast, seeks to situate victim and offender 
at centre stage in the disposal of a case once responsibility for a 
particular wrongdoing has been admitted or established . This is often 
done by bringing offenders, victims and their respective moral 
communities face-to-face in a controlled conference. A distinguishing 
feature of restorative justice is its espousal of deliberative democracy 
as the appropriate process for resolving conflict. This approach stands 
in contrast to the closed and artificially constrained character of 
western criminal justice procedure. Victim and offender are 
encouraged to participate actively in a discursive process in which the 
wrongdoing, its consequences and the prevention of further offences 
are fully and openly explored. As Braithwaite puts it 
The western criminal  justice system has, on balance, been corrosive of 
deliberative democracy. Restora tive justice is del iberative j ustice; it is 
about people deliberating over the consequences of a crime, how to 
deal with them and prevent their recurrence. This contrasts with the 
professional justice of lawyers deciding which rules apply to a case 
and then constra ining thei r del iberation within a technica l d iscourse 
about that rule-appl ication (Brai thwaite 1 996:8) . 
Restorative justice seeks to restore dignity and empowerment to 
the victims of crime, as well as p roviding more direct restitution for 
the injury or loss sustained. In doing so, it aims to restore harmony 
between victim and offender by arriving at a disposal that is, as far as 
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possible, acceptable to both. Contri tion on the part of the offender, 
forgiveness on the part of the victim and reconciliation between them 
form an integral part of the restorative process. As well as making 
amends to victims, restorative justice entails restoring a sense of 
dignity and empowerment to the offender. This is critical to the 
successful reintegration of offenders back into non-criminal society 
and requires acknowledgement of the frustrations and anger lying 
behind certain crimes, particularly among juveniles. 
While criminal justice processes per se will obviously never be 
capable of redressing fundamental issues of social injustice, they 
should, at the very least, avoid adding to them by, for example, 
reinforcing the marginalisation of particular social groups. Wherever 
possible, restorative justice fori should take account of these 
contextual factors when determining the disposal of particular cases. 
Where, for example, lack of economic or development opportunities 
are accepted as underlying particular kinds of crime, then an 
appropriate restorative outcome should seek to improve such 
opportunities by linking rehabilitation strategies with educational 
opportunities, vocational training, micro-credit facilities or project 
assistance. 
Exiting crime 
The above summary of restorative justice presents an ideal type and 
restorative initia tives rarely live up to this ideal in practice-whether 
in Papua New Guinea or elsewhere. It  remains the case, nevertheless, 
that the most promising strategies for dealing with raskolism in Papua 
New Guinea have been restorative in character. A number of incipient 
restorative institutions have emerged in recent years . While it  is 
impossible to quantify, there are grounds for believing that these 
informal institutions have diverted a significant number of youths 
from crime, albeit temporarily. Informal initiatives have drawn upon 
institutions of civil society-notably the churches-to mediate 
between criminal groups and the state. Dialogue, negotiation and 
reconciliation have been integral to the processes followed. They have 
sometimes involved offenders publicly acknowledging their 
wrongdoing, expressing contrition and asking for forgiveness. 
Negotiations have also sought  to address the marginalisations 
underlying raskolism and link the exit from crime to exit from 
marginalisation. This has most often involved linkages to economic 
opportunities-small-scale projects, employment, micro-credit 
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facili ties. Perhaps their most striking feature has been the high level of 
deliberative democracy entailed. Outcomes have usually been the 
product of protracted discussion and negotiation. These incipient 
institutions of restorative justice are distinctively Melanesian and have 
generally been initiated beyond the state, partly in response to the 
failings of state justice itself. Some examples follow. 
Criminal surrenders 
The mass surrender of self-professed criminals is the most significant 
and widespread restorative justice insti tution that has evolved in 
recent years. Between 1991 and 1994 local newspapers reported 
approximately 13 surrenders involving a total of 913 youths and 
occurring in 8 out of Papua New Guinea's 19 prov inces (Dinnen 1995). 
Many more surrenders are likely to have taken place in practice 
without attracting media coverage. The size of such groups range from 
a handful of youths (Post-Courier 4 September 1991 )  to an estimated 
four hundred on one occasion ( Times of Papua New Guinea 3 September 
1992). Surrendering groups often carry home-made placards written 
in English or Tok Pisin asking forgiveness and requesting assistance 
for their chosen rehabilitation strategies. Surrenders are usually the 
outcome of a process of negotiation involving the brokerage of a 
clerical worker or respected community leader. Groups from rural 
villages will often walk considerable distances to surrender in town, 
where they can attract maximum publicity and have more chance of 
connecting with government and private sector resources. 
Larger surrenders are ceremonious occasions and are likely to 
attract sizable audiences. These will consist of those surrendering with 
their support groups, government officials, local dignitaries, 
community leaders, clergy, as well as assorted onlookers. Criminal 
leaders will make speeches, recounting their criminal careers, decision 
to exit crime and chosen reform path. Weapons, ammunition and other 
implements of crime will be formally handed over, indicating the 
switch from criminal to reform paths. Contrition will be expressed, as 
will commitment to reform. Criminal and reform options a�e usually 
explicitly connected in the legitimating rhetoric, with the reform path 
addressing grievances proferred as the explanation for past crime. 
Speeches will also be given by the non-criminal participants accepting 
the surrender and offering messages of reconciliation. Surrender 
ceremonies utilise many of the symbols and discourse of evangelical 
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ritual. The voicing of contrition, forgiveness and reconciliation are 
replete with references to notions of sin, salvation, being 'born again' 
and so on. Prayers are plentiful. In some cases, mass baptism of the 
surrendering group provides the ultimate symbolic expression of the 
transformation in identity from criminal to reformed person. 
While some surrenders may have resulted in successful long-term 
rehabilitation, in many cases resources provided have been wasted or 
rapidly depleted leading to a gradual drift back to crime. Lack of 
follow-up and technical assistance for surrendering groups has been a 
serious and recurrent problem. 
Gang retreats 
Another incipient restorative justice institution is the gang retreat. Two 
major gang retreats have been held in the Port Moresby area over the 
last decade. The first was held at the Goldie River Army Barracks in 
1985 and its proceedings documented by one of the priests who 
facilitated the event (Houghton 1985) .  Approximately 75 self­
professed gang leaders and members attended the five-day retreat and 
held wide-ranging discussions with a number of national leaders 
including the Governor-General, Deputy Prime Minister and several 
Cabinet Ministers, as well as with business and community leaders. 
Gang leaders proposed a moratorium on gang crime in return for a 
range of economic, social and educational provisions. The 
deliberations at the Goldie Retreat were overtaken and, sadly, eclipsed 
by subsequent events . These involved several highly publicised crimes 
of violence in Port Moresby that precipitated the imposition of a state 
of emergency in the National Capital District. 
The second retreat occurred at Mirigeda in July 1991 where about 500 
youths were present and met with the then Prime Minister and a 
number of his Cabinet colleagues. Once again, lengthy discussions 
occurred and criminal leaders sought to extract material concessions 
from government leaders in return for exiting crime. At least one 
Minister spent the entire night in animated discussion with young 
criminals. 
Following the Mirigeda retreat the national government 
established a Kl00,000 'seedling grant' for self-help projects for Port 
Moresby youth groups (Post-Courier 14 August 1991 ) .  Where resources 
for reform have been forthcoming, however, the same practical 
problems associated with surrenders have been experienced. 
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Discussion 
Clearly there are a number of important limitations affecting these 
incipient institutions. Not least is the problem of moral hazard, 
relating to the risk that individuals commit crime in order to access the 
benefits of particular reform strategies . More significant is the failure 
of these institutions, in their present form, to address the grievances of 
individual victims. Another problem lies in the limited follow-up 
provided in practice, which invariably undermines their long-term 
survival. While it is important to recognise these and other difficulties, 
it is equally important to recognise their potential and to consider 
ways in which they might be developed into sustainable and 
genuinely restorative responses to crime. 
Both surrenders and retreats provide a glimpse of how the 
strengths of civil society in Papua New Guinea can be nurtured and 
drawn upon through the provision of socially attuned resolutions to 
crime. In the process they also hold out a prospect of exit from the 
marginalisations underlying raskolism.  Unlike current criminal justice 
practice, these informal institutions are potentially restorative 
processes that may have the capacity for breaking the vicious cycle of 
retributive violence documented above. The mass surrender, in 
particular, falls squarely within the reintegrative tradition that 
explicitly 'shames the sin and not the sinner ' .  This stands in marked 
contrast to current criminal justice practice that arbitrarily stigmatises 
the socially marginal and deploys cultural stereotypes against other 
groups, thereby legitimating their selection for coercive actions. Unlike 
current institutional practice which reinforces marginalisation, the 
surrender provides a potential vehicle for reintegrative shaming 
through the way it  can inject employment, education and social 
development options into the reform process. 
Surrenders can also empower individuals and groups to utilise 
their considerable entrepreneurial talents and energies in socially less 
harmful ways. It thus encourages less oppressive responses to crime 
than those associated with punitive politics, while opening up 
legitimate and, in theory at any rate, lasting alternatives to crime. 
Urgent attention is clearly needed on how to institutionalise major 
concerns with the level of criminal violence against women in this 
context. One possibility might be to link these two incipient 
institutions. Part of a surrender agreement could thus be a retreat, 
upon completion of the agreement, in which women of the relevant 
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communities would assess how well the agreement had been 
honoured from their perspective. 
The surrender provides the gift of amnesty or leniency and, 
possibly, material resources in the form of jobs and projects to the 
surrendering group . As such, the surrender provides a point of entry 
into legitimate economies (gift and commodity) for marginal people. 
In this way it addresses one of the major sources of marginalisation 
most frequently voiced by raskols themselves. More attention needs to 
be given to the regulation of surrender agreements. Amnesties, parole, 
resources and other benefits provided through the surrender are, in 
theory, conditional on the fulfilment of the terms of the surrender 
contract. Where these terms are not met, surrender benefits should be 
withdrawn. 
The surrender and, more clearly, gang retreats, encourage a 
participatory process comprising consultation and negotiation 
between marginal groups and state officials, mediated through the 
office of a brokering party. The role of broker is critical in nurturing 
the level of trust required to make this process work, and in moving 
beyond the mutual antagonism that has developed between the 
marginalised and state police in recent years. The process of 
deliberative democracy in the surrender also provides an important 
way of constituting civil society. 
Church groups have played an important role in brokering retreats, 
as they have in the case of the mass surrenders. At one level this 
reflects the prominence of Christian beliefs within the spiritual 
environment of Papua New Guinea and, more significantly, the key 
role of church institutions in civil society. It also reflects the moral 
entrepreneurship of particular churches and individual evangelists 
who have adopted active roles in the field of criminal rehabilitation, as 
well as reflecting the neutral status accorded the church by marginal 
groups. More instrumentally, surrenders and other reform strategies 
often open up new careers for ex-criminals-crime creates new 
opportunity structures. Many evangelising crusades, for example, are 
led by born-again criminals actively engaged in searching out the 
'unwanted and lost' (Life Outreach Ministries 1 989 : 1 ) . 
Surrenders and retreats are distinctively Papua New Guinean 
modalities of restorative justice . They have sprung up in the Papua 
New Guinea environment, against the background of the country's 
institutional failures and its critical material needs. They also show the 
possibility of a local response to these needs. In many cases, at least in 
C riminal justice reform in Papu a  New Guinea 269 
the short term, they have helped marginal people. In practice non­
state responses will continue to evolve irrespective of what is 
happening at the state-level. There is no guarantee, however, that such 
responses might not add to existing marginalisations and gender 
inequities. We have seen how existing state responses to crime and 
violence in Papua New Guinea are failing in terms of deterrence and 
control, are consuming large amounts of scarce resources, and are 
often leading to counter-productive results. The challenge is to 
develop a system of socially appropriate restorative responses that 
avoids these disintegrative outcomes. The institutions of surrender 
and retreat provide some clues in that direction. 
Notes 
A different version of this paper has been published in, 1997. The 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 25:245-67. 
1 .  Advertising Missionaries, produced by Chris Hilton for Aspire Films, 
Sydney. Screened by ABC on 1 7th October, 1996. 
2 .  See, for example, UNDP / ILO, 1993:257-75. 
3. These include: reconciliation (Dignan 1992; Marshall 1985; Umbreit 
1985), peacemaking (Pepinsky and Quinney 1991 ), redress (de 
Haan 1990), reintegrative shaming (Braithwaite 1989), republican 
criminal justice (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990) . 
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Women and democratic politics in 
Papua New Guinea 
Orovu Sepoe 
Structural conditions constitute major impediments to the 
achievement of equal participation by women in all spheres of 
national life in Papua New Guinea, as elsewhere in the world . 
Political participation can be defined as access to positions of 
political power and the ability to exert influence in decision-making 
processes at the level of community and formal institutions. There 
seem to be two concerns in discussions about political participation. 
First, increasing the number of a target group in positions of power 
and second, increasing control and self-assertion. That  is, the issue of 
political participation has to be understood to possess both the 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions (Karl 1994; Bystydzienski 
1992). They are not mutually exclusive. 
Community politics must be seen as an alternative model of 
political representation. The proximity of community politics to the 
majority of its constituents and the bases of its emergence makes it a 
lot more representative of people's interests. It caters for and captures 
the reality of grassroots people and women's lives. Concrete evidence 
to date in the developing countries suggest that this form of 
representation is more meaningful and of great significance for the 
poor. The remarkable expansion of women's grassroots groups, who 
comprise the majority of the poor, is a reflection of the limits of 
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institutional politics . The increasing importance of community politics 
challenges the institutional model of representation . The latter model 
is inadequate and primarily serves the interests of only a minority, 
especially those with power and access to other vital resources. 
There is no doubt that globally, institutional politics have been, and 
still are, the domain of men. Women comprise a mere five to ten per 
cent of the leadership in the top echelon of formal institutions (Nelson 
and Chowdhury 1994: 15) .  This is not to say that d isadvantaged men 
have enjoyed the same privileges as the rich, but only that their 
position has been relatively better compared to that of women. Hence, 
to argue for men's empowerment and representation in this sphere of 
politics would only serve to reinforce and consolidate existing male 
bias and dominance . Obviously this would not be in the best interest 
of women. 
The reality of the majority of women's lives does not permit them 
to be actively and consistently involved in the formal national and 
international political arenas. However, this should not justify 
women's absence at this level. The formal legal guarantees of women's 
rights in the constitutions of most countries do provide a starting point 
for women's increased participation . Thus, women who have the 
resources (such as ability, time, funds, and energy) and who can afford 
to compete and challenge the male-dominated sphere should be 
encouraged and given the opportunity to engage in politics at this 
level. It is essential for the purpose of creating a '  . . .  greater awareness 
of political power and of the need to assess poli tical institutions 
through a gender-sensitive lens' (Tinker 1990:53) .  This is most 
probable i f  and when, some women operate side by side with men at 
all  levels, local, national and international, of institutional politics. 
Because of male dominance in institutional politics, issues that 
affect mostly women, such as violence, reproductive and family 
health, receive minimal attention. 
'Too often, very l i ttle happens in large measure because women are 
barely visible in forma l  pol it ical institutions. Pol itica l institutions, 
whatever the ideology, form, and mobi l isa tion capaci ty, rest on the 
virtual exclusion or margina lisation of women from formal pol i tics '  
(Nelson et a l .  in Nelson and Chowdhury 1 994:3) . 
In view of this disparity, a number of strategies have been utilised 
to achieve changes at the institutional level. 
The 'cultm:e of women' has been instrumental in effecting change. 
Women politicians, with the aid of women's groups outside the 
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legislative arena in Norway, Japan, Canada, and the United States 
have raised and articulated specifically women's issues such as 
reproductive health, successfully bringing about changes. In Palestine, 
Uganda and India nationalis t and economic struggles have been 
fought with women's contribution through women's activities such as 
cooking and care-giving (Bystydzienski 1992) . 
Another strategy for empowerment is though increasing the 
number of women in formal politics. In Norway and Japan, access has 
been made possible with left-wing parties and political culture 
strongly based on the values of equality and group rights. More 
women in the formal arena have contributed to the transformation of 
agendas and structures and the infiltration of feminine values, 
experiences and atti tudes (Bystydzienski 1992) . However, it is 
important not to overemphasise the representativeness of women in 
legislatures . Women leaders or Members of Parliament may not 
necessarily be gender aware to pursue and articulate women's 
concerns and interests. 
The case for women's empowerment in community politics is 
based on the recognition that women do possess a certain kind of 
power which they only need to utilise. However, the act of utilising 
this power must be accompanied by heightened awareness and 
sensitivity of women to their situations (Wieringa 1994:33). Women 
need to use their human faculties or rationality to combat gender 
inequality. Since formal institutions of government are male­
dominated and exclusionary, and given women's inadequate resource 
base, women find themselves much more involved in community 
politics. Institutional politics is too complex, too distant and alien for 
the vast majority of women, so that for these women political 
participation within their immediate environment is a more 
meaningful and practical option. 
Community politics is  necessary to raise women's level of 
consciousness and it helps establish women's self-identity. I t  gives 
them an alternative space to articulate their perceived interests and 
address their own circumstances. This is a far more viable, sustainable 
and effective strategy for change than those where the initiative is 
handed down by 'outsiders' or from the top-down. Community 
politics is an arena of grassroots popular participation whereby there 
is minimal external intervention. In many developing country 
societies, common problems of poverty and destitution lead men and 
women to mobilise and struggle side by side for change. 
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Community politics is an arena for women to be independent, 
autonomous, and act collectively for their own benefit as well as their 
families. The empowerment of women at the community or grassroots 
level is not necessarily for the good of the wife or the mother alone, 
but for her children and husband too. It represents women as 
individuals but simultaneously forges a group identity. Grassroots and 
poor women pr€fer informal methods of organising around issues that 
they themselves perceive as their needs and interests. Where women 
are involved, politics is non-violent and peaceful. This quality is 
greatly needed at the national and international levels. 
What are the implications for bridging the two spheres of politics? 
To isolate community politics from institutional politics is unrealistic 
and self-defeating in terms of promoting the status of women and 
addressing their concerns. Community politics should be seen as a 
stepping stone towards influencing certain aspects of 'big politics', 
whether national or international. There are all sorts of issues which 
affect women that need the attention and action of both national and 
international institutions and organisations such as the environment, 
population and structural adjustment. The structures of 'big politics' 
are primarily responsible for the many predicaments women face in 
their lives. Thus, there is no need for such a dichotomy in politics. 
The rest of this chapter looks at the marginal posi tion of women in 
formal institutional politics of Papua New Guinea, and the 
possibilities of developing stronger links with the concerns of women 
outside. 
It begins with sketching the political and economic background to 
overall gender inequality and the consequent struggle to organise for 
change in Papua New Guinea. 
Gender and the economy s ince colon isation1 
Women are, more frequently and consistently than men, adversely 
affected by economic change. The division of labour in Papua New 
Guinea during and since the colonial era has accentuated the 
inequalities between men and women. 
The need for labour in colonial cash crop plantations drew mostly 
men away from their villages. Their resulting long absences left the 
women who remained behind in villages with increased workloads. 
Men were taught the skills, the language, and acquired the tools to 
enable them to fit into the new socioeconomic and political order. The 
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development model aspired to upset the pre-existing order and 
subsequently left women out of the imposed order. 
In the first four years of statehood, 1976-79, Papua New Guinea 
enjoyed a healthy economic condition in the favourable world 
economic climate at that time. The harsh realities of integration into 
the global economy started showing up in the early 1980s with the 
second major oil price rise and the subsequent global economic 
recession. From 1980 onwards, Papua New Guinea's level of 
indebtedness and the burden of debt servicing increased. Drastic falls 
in primary commodity prices and the production decline of 
Bougainville Copper Limited induced the government to adopt 
policies appropriate to maintaining 'a healthy balance of payments 
and a manageable external debt burdens' (National Public 
Expenditure Plan 1982: 1 ). Export-led and growth maximising 
economic measures have become the overriding concerns in Papua 
New Guinea's development strategies since the early 1980s. In spite of 
poor price prospects for Papua New Guinea's major exports such as 
copper, gold, coffee, and cocoa, the country continued to pursue an 
agricultural and mineral export-led economic development model. It 
had been advised that ' [i]mproving agricultural sector performance 
has the highest priority for sustaining economic growth in PNG'.2 By 
1981, the government had clearly committed itself to 'increasing 
economic production', which received by far the largest of project 
expenditure-40 per cent of the total budget compared to the 29 per 
cent allocated to welfare or service-oriented 'strategic objectives' .  The 
implications for Papua New Guinea's redistribution policies were that 
these were not amongst the government's priorities. 
With the onslaught of neo-liberal economic reforms in the early 
1990s, the economic situation has resulted in user-pay policies. Higher 
school fees are applied at all levels of the education system, with 
reductions in the provision of basic social services such as health . In 
common with many other developing countries, the ensuing economic 
crises and the subsequent IMF and World Bank Stabilisation and 
Structural Adjustment Programmes have placed severe strains on the 
availability of basic services for the deprived and marginalised. 
The adverse effects on women of 'economic efficiency' 
development models such as those pursued by successive 
governments in Papua New Guinea is now widely documented. 
Cutbacks in public sector expenditure have meant that the private 
sector is expected to take on the responsibilities for provision of basic 
Women a nd democratic polit ics in Papua New Guinea I 277 
services. Hunt ( 1993:5-6) tells a story very typical of many rural 
women and families in Papua New Guinea today. 
I f  government spending on hea l th is reduced and a local  hea l th cl inic 
closes, a women inevitably wal ks further with a sick child to get help 
or nurses her longer. As publ ic expend iture on educa tion has been cut, 
schools have cal led on student's fa mi l ies to contribute more to 
mainta in meagre educational services. The cost may well be borne by 
the girl in the fa mily dropping out of school a l together, as boys are 
given priori ty, and the vicious circle of women's poverty carries into 
the next genera tion, with low levels of li teracy for women. 
Continued negligence of the unpaid and undervalued work of 
women in the subsistence sector further disadvantages the already 
overworked woman, whose health may suffer as a result. Women's 
perspectives are not incorporated into structural adjustment 
programs, with the result that women remain where they have always 
been, responding through the informal sector and other means for 
survival. Their lives have yet to be accounted for by those in positions 
of power and influence, and in control of resources. 
Pol itics and the 'bargain ing process'3 
At Independence, Papua New Guinea inherited a Westminster 
parliamentary system of government, based on the princip les of 
constitutionalism, and multi-party politics. These institutional 
formalities aside, politics in practice is Papua New Guinea's very own 
creation . The style of politics which has developed and persists in 
Papua New Guinea today is a 'bargaining process'. It is essentially 
pragmatic and opportunistic (Saffu 1 982). Actors or participants in the 
process do not set much store by principles if these do not gain them 
access to the centre of political power. Poli tical parties are particularly 
interesting because of the impact they could have on other actors and 
on the political process-Papua New Guinea has had coalition 
governments since 1973. In Papua New Guinea, political parties are 
immensely fragile and range from no-ideology to a nearly non­
ideological grouping. The parties lack firm political commitments. If 
political parties were a more formidable force in formal politics, and 
showed sure commitment to advancing women in the sphere of 
formal politics, women members of parliament would not be as rare as 
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they have been, and redistributive development goals would have 
received much more concrete politica l  support. 
Policy issues are not important in Papua New Guinea politics 
(Oliver 1989). Numbers matter more than policy issues. Whether or 
not women candidates explicitly voice women's issues, they implicitly 
manifest them by contesting elctions. Their participation in the 
electoral process reflects their image as women in what is already a 
firmly established male domain. But unless the population is sensitive 
to policy issues, women's issues are unlikely to have much impact in 
electoral politics. 
In the early days, politics was not obviously an avenue to rapid 
wealth . In Papua New Guinea, as elsewhere, it now takes money to 
even enter politics. So, where are the women with thousands of kina in 
their own right to compete in electoral contests? The party system 
appear to be irrelevant for attracting votes, though parties are not 
endorsing women candidates in the first place. There is a notable 
absence of women in the highest decision-making forum. 
Because only a minority of elite women are conscious of the gap in 
the institutional political life of the country, they make special efforts 
to be involved in electoral politics. These are the women who are able 
to verse themselves with the processes and structures of the formal 
sector. They decide to contest elections in the hope that their presence 
will reflect the broader image of women's active participation in 
national politics. Rural women are effectively left out in the decision to 
participate as candidates themselves or to lend support to these elite 
women who contest. The potentially greatest support base-rural and 
non-elite women-is sawn off, so to speak. Overall, women's formal 
political participation at the national level remains thwarted. 
Currently there is not one single women member of parliament in 
Papua New Guinea. This has been the case since 1987 (Table 1 1 . 1 ) . 
Since Independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea has held four 
national elections, and only three women have become members of 
parliament. In the first post-Independence election of 1977, a total of 
ten women candidates contested and only three won seats. In the 1982 
election, seventeen women contested. One won but only after a 
successful appeal to the Courts of Disputed Returns. In 1987, 19  
women contested but none succeeded in  winning a seat. In  1992, 16  
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women contested but, once again, none won. The 1997 election has 
seen a threefold increase in the number of women candidates. 
Com mun ity-based pol itical partici pation 
The Papua New Guinea Association of Women In Politics (WIP) was 
set up in 1986. The group was a brainchild of a small group of women 
who saw the importance of increasing women's participation in 
formal decision-making. Its founding members were amongst the 
country 's small but growing number of professional women, or those 
belonging to the socioeconomic and bureaucratic elite. 
The group 's motto is 'For Greater Participation in Politics' . The 
objectives of WIP are 
• to provide technical, moral and, where resources allow, 
financial support for women candidates contesting public 
offices at all levels of government in the country 
• to advocate and bring about equal educational and other 
opportunities for members of the Association, and for 
women of Papua New Guinea generally 
• to provide a forum for members to meet and discuss, or deal 
with, matters of political of common interest, and 
• to disseminate information on political and other activities in 
any way the Association considers proper. 
Table 1 1 .1 Female candidates and members of par liament, 
1 972-92 
Total Number of Per cent Female 
candidates female female 
candidates candidates 
1972 608 4 0.66 1 
1977 880 10 1.14 3 
1982 1,124 17 1.51 1 
1987 1,515 19 1.25 0 
1992 1,653 16 0.97 0 
Source: Sepoe 1 995, 'Women in the election: casualties of Papua New Guinea 
Political culture' in Y. Saffu (ed . ) ,  The 1 992 Election, University of Papua New Guinea 
Press, Port Mor.esby. 
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Between the la te 1980s and early 1990s, the group fa ltered a long 
the way for various reasons, including financial and management 
problems. In December 1993, a special meeting was convened to make 
a fresh start. The outcome of this was a general meeting the following 
year and the election of Au Aruai as  the President. During Aruai 's 
term as President, WIP conducted some research into wha t the group 
saw as impediments to women's greater participa tion at all levels of 
government, with greater emphasis a t  the national level. 
The political, economic, and social conditions in Papua New 
Guinea provided an impetus to the formation of WIP. From its 
formation, it is the WIP member 's belief that a requisite number of 
women in the national PNG Parliament can make a difference to the 
way the country is being governed. The desire to participate actively 
in decisions affecting the lives of women is of utmost importance to 
the group. However, the socioeconomic background of WIP reveals its 
limitations. The founding members and a bulk of the association's 
membership comprise educa ted, professional, and business women 
whose world views and lifestyles bear li ttle resemblance to the 
majority of women who live in rural areas and whose daily existence 
bear the mark of customs as well as a lack of rights and opportunities 
in contemporary Papua New Guinea. An over-emphasis on the 
relative elitism of WIP members, however, ignores the qualita tive 
difference this form of political participation could mean for the 
marginalised. 
WIP is a classic case of 'women organising' as the route to power a t  
the centre. The notion of  'women organising' generally refers to  all 
forms of collectives, structured and unstructured, concerned with 
addressing gender issues in society, or effecting changes to women's 
situation generally. 'Women organising' is a form of political 
participation which throughout history has challenged gender 
relations in significant ways. This form of participation has occurred in 
both community organisation where women are also active 
participants a longside men and in women-only organisations. 
However, WIP's currently n arrow conception of political participa tion 
must be enlarged or expanded to include the situation at the 
household, national and global level. After a ll, decision-making does 
not j ust take place in public offices. It starts at home, in villages, and in 
churches.  The activities of WIP and other concerned groups must 
extend beyond the confines of the capital and the provincial 
headquarters into the villages. 
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While the driving force for the group's formation was the absence 
of women in Parliament, a lack of broader understanding of political 
participation has limited WIP's potential to realise a broader basis of 
societal support for its goals. The process of organising must in itself 
be empowering . In reaching out to the grassroots or in communicating 
and raising awareness at the lower levels, women must be directly 
involved . WIP must work through the majority of women at the 
grassroots level. This means reorienting our way of thinking from 'the 
educated know best' or 'we are the experts' to a perspective whereby 
we involve grassroots women and acknowledge their abilities and 
knowledge. A top-down strategy will not achieve much. Let the 
information flow in both directions. In this way, WIP can provide the 
link between women's concerns and mainstream political arena. 
Women's groups are central organs of family and community 
interests. Local communities throughout the entire country have 
played an invaluable role in the sustenance of their respective families 
and communities, with very limited resources. Women speak through 
their organisations but their voices often go unheard. Supposing there 
was no National Council of Women (NCW), where would Papua New 
Guinea women be now? 
Structural problems have been seen to be a major cause of the 
limitations of the Papua New Guinea National Council of Women. 
However, an overemphasis on its bureaucratic and management 
structure has meant that the changes for women have been largely 
underestimated. I do not want to put forward hard and fast rules on 
how to change the structures or forms and strategies. Instead we need 
to change the way women's organisations are perceived. The crux of 
the problem with 'women and development' is not how to get women 
actively involved but rather to recognise and support their various 
roles and activ ities. This suggests a shift from models of women's 
organisations that seek to address the question of 'how best' to 
organise women in a framework which accounts for the work women 
are actually doing collectively. The focus should be on the roles 
women already perform in society, individually and collectively, 
rather than forms of women's organisations. 
For far too long, women's groups have been made to operate on 
the margins. Though marginalised and made invisible, women's 
groups perform a very crucial political role of representing women. 
There is a need to recognise and accept women's groups as an 
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alternative form of political representation, thereby bridging the gap 
between the conceptual and practical divide in what is 'political' . 
The more progressive women's groups are already engaged in this 
political strategy of bridging grassroots politics with national politics. 
It is hoped that in the hundreds of groups throughout the country, a 
great majority of their members will become part of this bridging 
process. In September 1996, WIP conducted a workshop for intending 
candidates for the 1997 national election. Most of the participants were 
established figures in their respective women's groups. The WIP 
workshop was a splendid example of trying to create linkages 
between community-based politics and formal politics. Such efforts 
crea te linkages between politics where women are predominant and 
politics where men predominate. A similar workshop was conducted 
by the Catholic Women's Group on 'women in politics', held in 
Wewak, East Sepik Province around the same time. Such activities 
signal a breakdown of the distinction between community-based 
poli tics and formal or institutional politics in Papua New Guinea. 
Women 's experiences and perceptions of their  l ives 
Are rural or grassroots worn.en aware of their situation as depicted in 
statistics? Do they have they anything to say about their own lives as 
they see and perceive it? Are women of different social and economic 
positions in present day Papua New Guinea being accounted for? 
Accounting for perceptions of women is, in essence, being inclusive in 
the theory and practice of development. Here is a very strong and 
clear message from a rural-based women's group in Papua New 
Guinea. 
Reports, case stud ies and complicated ana lyses of 'women and 
development' appear on the world market wi th increasing frequency. 
Based on these, there is a growing theory of the principles and practice 
which promote equal participa tion in development. There is a lot of 
personal  power, prestige and credit to be gained from presenting 
manuscrip ts and publishing such material for international audiences 
and consumers of development documentation dossiers. As this 
practice proceeds and gains popularity there is less and less chance to 
prove the val id ity of these apparently informed and scholarly 
documents. The publications of development consultants and scholars 
are rarely sighted by, and anyway can seldom be read by the objects of 
the study and observation-the people at the very base of the 
theorising . . .  Academics who document women and development often 
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do not share their ' ins ights' with the women who are their 
subjects . . .  There is a need to record and document directly women's 
own sta tements on what they have done and experienced in the name 
of development ('East Sepik Women's Development Documentation 
and Communication Project' 1 987) .  
Women's groups apparently operate separately within 'their ' 
sphere of politics, but in practice have forged links with the 
institutional sphere of politics. An increasing number of women 
contesting elections over the years have began their public life with 
women's groups. Women's groups have served as training grounds for 
leadership skills and qualities of most women who decide to enter 'big 
politics' .  
Furthermore, the issue-oriented and non-partisan approach of 
women organising in Papua New Guinea fills a vacuum at the 
institu tional level of the poli tical process, with its appall ing lack of 
commitment to addressing specific development issues of concern to 
women. Apparently, even the most isolated women are not apathetic. 
Women, individually or collectively, do have something to say to office 
holders in government institutions. 
'Women today'4 in Papua New G u i nea 
The fol lowing section is an anecdotal account of women's experiences 
and perceptions of the changes in Papua New Guinea today. It tells the 
stories of individual woman and women's groups from different 
socioeconomic backgrounds throughout the country so that their 
voices can be heard and their lives understood. 
Case one 
'Many boys in my class teased me for taking up woodwork; to make 
things worse, I was the only girl in the class but I did not let the boys 
get away with it-I showed them that I could do what they were 
doing' . This is the 'voice' of Alice, a young teenage girl, who after 
completing grade six of primary school went on to do carpentry at a 
church-run centre for school leavers. While all the other girls took up 
sewing and cooking, she had to convince her father that this Was her 
choice. At the end of the course, she will receive a trade certificate but 
is uncertain where she can find a job (Post-Courier 21 November 1996) . 
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Case two 
Vai, 30 years old and married with two children, is a technical officer 
with Post and Telecommunications Business Services. Carrying 
ladders, fixing cables and climbing roofs and walls is all part of being 
a technician. Her story was captioned with the heading 'Women 
taking on the tough jobs of men'. She admits it was hard at first but 
has succeeded and says the job is no longer male dominated and 
encourages more women to take up work in this area (Pos t-Courier 25 
April 1996). 
Case three 
Misima is a gold-rich Island in the Milne Bay Province. In a mining 
agreement signed in 1990, women were not involved in the decision­
making. Their society is matrilineal so women had the right to land 
matters and other events of significance, and that traditionally men 
would respect them. Representing women from villages in and around 
the vicinity of the gold mine, two women leaders from the area says; 
'our men had forgotten the tradition when they left us out [ in the 
mining agreement] and we and our children are now victims of the 
effects of the mine. If we were included in the decision-making, we 
would have demanded a better deal ' .  The government is to be blamed 
for not creating community awareness on the impact of the mine prior 
to its operation. Women are now feeling the impact, much of which is 
negative from their point of view. Their lifestyle, including their way 
of dress (which is basically a grass skirt, leaving their top parts of the 
body bare); use of natural herbs and plants for curing and prevention 
of illnesses; local dietary habits increasingly replaced by imported 
food stuff; marriage problems; and emerging prostitution. 'We see our 
traditional culture like skills, rituals, dances, herbs and marriages fast 
diminishing because of what the money from the mine is doing' (The 
National and Post-Courier 4 July 1996) . 
Case four 
In October of 1996, police raided an illegal 'brothel' in Port Moresby. 
Altogether 40 men and women were arrested . The women's age 
ranged between 1 7-35 years, some of who were married with 
children. Economic hardships in the city had forced women to resort 
to this means for survival. In court, the women pleaded guilty and 
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were fined K200. One woman amongst them claimed that she charged 
between K40-50 per client and made between K250-K300 a day. 
Their clients included middle-class and highly placed male citizens. 
All those women knew it was illegal, and knew of the health risks, but 
that was the easiest option for survival in an urban context where jobs 
are rare and other opportunities for earning income are circumscribed. 
'Of course we knew the dangers of contracting sexually transmitted 
diseases . . .  , particularly the AIDS virus, but we have to make a 
living . . . ' (Post-Courier 22 November 1996) . 
Case five 
In the sub-district of Oslobib, several kilometres from the mining 
township of Kiunga in Western Province, there is a Catholic women's 
group. In one of their houses, the women wait turns to sew with a 
handful of sewing machines. The clothes sewn are then sold for money 
for their club. In another shelter with walls made from woven 
bamboos and roofed with corrugated iron, literacy classes are 
conducted for adult women. The literacy teacher is Ann, who is not 
formally educated but has long been a community leader. She has 
been invited on occasions to the Summer Institute of Linguistics in the 
Eastern Highlands Province, where the bible has been translated into 
their local language. Given her exposure, she says it  is her motivation 
to help people that makes her take up the leadership role (Post-Courier 
2 May 1996). 
There are several broad themes emerging from the stories above. 
First, women are not a homogeneous group. They are divided by class, 
education, age, religion and, therefore, bear different messages for 
their lives. These differences need to be acknowledged in efforts 
towards 'women's advancement' .  Second, it's not all 'gloom and 
doom' for women who, despite considerable barriers, carve out spaces 
and create (or seize) opportunities, to do something for themselves. 
With very limited resources, some achieve tremendous success, while 
others continue struggling. Third, the resilience and bags of energy of 
women continues throughout any women's life, yet they are still 
unacknowledged and undervalued. Are they worthy of being called 
passive victims? Are they not the real actors in development? 
Conclusion 
Women's organisations can and should be seen as political. I t  is a form 
of political representation and has the potential to facilitate social 
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changes. With the absence of women poli ticians, and only 11 per cent 
of formal decision-making positions filled by women in Papua New 
Guinea, how have women's perspectives and visions of national 
development reached the higher echelons of decision-making? 
This chapter has argued that i t  is women's activities, agendas and 
demands at the collective level that have contributed to the changes 
achieved thus far in Papua New Guinea. There are conscious and 
continuing efforts to establish and sustain women's collective action 
and forge l inks with the state. This relationship is a positive 
development because it marks the beginnings of a link between 
-community politics and institutional politics. 
Why consider women's groups as political agents? In the absence 
of women's voice in all centres of decision-making, women's collective 
priorities and agendas, and their activities are political messages 
which need to be recognised as such. These messages are projected 
where women participate most, in their groups. The expectations of 
power wielders that women should channel women's concerns into 
one single body, the National Council of Women or such other body, 
are unrealistic. Women's organisations target gender inequality, 
directly by the elite and more often indirectly by the great majority of 
women when they sustain family welfare, and cater for community 
concerns. And yet much of these efforts remain undervalued and 
unrecognised, both in development theory and practice in Papua New 
Guinea. 
Notes 
1 .  The sources of information on post-Independence macroeconomic 
trends in this section PNC Coun try Economic Memorandum (n.d) and 
the National Public Expenditure Plan1984-1987. 
2 .  PNC Country Economic Memorandum (n.d) :54. 
3. The discussion here has been drawn, again, from my contribution 
to Papua New Guinea's 1 992 National Election study. 
4. Women Today is the name of the section in the Post-Courier, a major 
national daily in Papua New Guinea; one of the sources of stories 
of womert presented here. 
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The price of e lection cam paigning 
in Samoa 
Asofou So'o 
Political parties in Samoa select their candidates for the elections, pay 
their candidates' nomination fees, and are collectively responsible for 
the party's manifesto, but the bulk of the campaign is left to individual 
members of parliament. There are generally two phases of any party 's 
campaign. The first involves the party as a whole. The second, 
discussed here, relies solely on the individual member. 
As the competition for parliamentary seats intensified during the 
1980s, the economic resources required by high-ranking titleholders 
became increasingly difficult to obtain . There was also a gradual 
realisation of the need to have candidates with formal education. 
These factors gave rise to the notion of accepting a candidate who was 
a lower-ranking titleholder who had some kind of formal education 
and economic resources for political campaigning. At the same time, 
the embarrassment of a high-ranking titleholder being defeated by a 
lower-ranking titleholder would be avoided . Should the lower­
ranking titleholder be successful, on the other hand, he/she was 
nonetheless a member of the family who would therefore help 
maintain the traditional rank and recognition of the family's highest­
ranking title within the village and constituency, and nationally. 
Mr X's political career will be discussed to show how political 
support in the present political setup in Samoa is obtained. The 
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campaign strategies he adopted are common campaign tactics used by 
candidates in parliamentary elections. The case gives an insight into 
the roles played by the village councils and cultural aspects that the 
candidates have to take into consideration in their campaigns. 
Furthermore, i t  also shows the kinds of expenses parliamentary 
candidates have to meet in their quest for political success. 
Mr X's campaigns 
Mr X contested for the first time the seat for Y constituency in the 1982 
general elections. He had married a woman whose family was in one 
of the villages in the constituency. Mr X' s wife's family was descended 
from one of the four highest-ranking alii in the village. Before the 1979 
general elections the holder of the family's highest ranking title 
decided to confer one of the family's titles on Mr X. Among other 
reasons, the decision was made with the intention that Mr X contest 
the parliamentary seat for Y constituency in the 1979 elections. Only 
once in the mid-1930s was a holder of the family's main title 
recognised in government circles, when he was appointed as one of 
the assessors of the Land and Titles Court in July 1 935 (WSG, 87, 2 
May 1935) .  The family's main titleholder had intended Mr X to contest 
the constituency's seat so that the family's name and traditional socio­
political status be maintained, if not enhanced. 
The decision that Mr X contest the constituency's parliamentary 
seat was unusual in the cultural context because in-marrying spouses 
do not normally hold high status (if they have any status at all) in the 
families of their spouses. Moreover, the title conferred upon Mr X was 
one of the family's lower-ranking titles. However, Mr X was not only 
the incumbent head of the administration section in one of the 
government departments, but he had two shops in the country's only 
town, Apia. Mr X was thus looked upon as someone with experience 
of the modem world. Most importantly, he had at his disposal the 
necessary financial resources for election campaigns. Mr X decided 
against running in the 1979 general elections because he thought he 
was not ready for it . Before the 1 982 general elections the family's 
main titleholder conferred other titles on other members of his family 
with the intention of improving Mr X's chances of being elected, 
although the decision simultaneously enabled other older members of 
the family to attain matai status befitting their ages. Mr X won the 1982 
elections, having polled 34 votes-according to him was the exact 
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number of matai of his wife's family who cast votes in the elections. 
Except for six ballots that were rejected, the other 141 ballots were 
shared among the other seven candidates. Since then, Mr X has 
remained constituency Y's member, up to the present.  
Because Mr X resided permanently in Apia while his constituency 
Y was in a different part of the country, he decided to return to the 
constituency a few months after his win in the 1982 election was 
confirmed to show the voters his apprecia tion for being elected . The 
local newspaper Samoa Times (14 May 1982) has recorded that Mr X 
provided his constituency with six cattle, a number of kegs of salt beef, 
many cartons of tin fish, and cash totaling more than WS$2,000. A 
repeat of the procedure in the period leading up to the 1985 general 
elections enabled the author to observe the amount of money spent on 
purchases of presents for the constituency and the manner in which 
the various articles were distributed . 
Constituency Y comprised six villages (hereafter referred to as Vl­
V6 respectively) .  Every village had its own village council. In the 1985 
election campaign the following procedures were followed. About 
three months before the elections, Mr X invited about ten matai from 
the constituency to his residence in a village about five miles from 
Apia. The matai (hereafter referred to as the Main Campaign 
Committee (MCC) comprised about half those who resided 
permanently in the constituency. The other half resided in villages on 
the island on which Mr X resided, although most of the matai in the 
latter group resided in villages around the Apia area from where they 
commuted to work in Apia. The secretary of the MCC was the eldest 
son of the main titleholder of the family of Mr X's wife (hereafter 
referred to as Mr Z). 
Mr Z was the ideal person to be the MCC's secretary. He held one 
of the high-ranking tulafale titles in the village where his father held 
the family's highest-ranking alii title. He also held one of the two 
highest ranking tulafale titles at his mother 's village, which was a 
different constituency on the same island. He resided permanently at 
the latter village, where he was the principal of that village's primary 
school. Mr Z was not only well known in his father 's village, but the 
fact that he was a primary school principal as well as a holder of 
another high-ranking tulafale title (a nationally recognised one), helped 
him win over the voters to Mr X. Most importantly, from Mr X's point 
of view, Mr Z was a trusted person because he was related and had 
the best interests of the family at heart. One of the reasons Mr Z would 
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not dissociate any personal ambitions he might have had from those of 
Mr X were the words spoken by his father when deciding to confer the 
family's title on Mr X. As Mr Z's father had since passed away, he 
wanted Mr X to keep winning the constituency's seat in order to keep 
alive his father 's dream. 
Chaired by Mr X, the MCC resolved that its members residing  
around the Apia area would be  responsible for identifying all the matai 
of the constituency there and on the island in general. Thereafter they 
would maintain contact with these voters in order to win over their 
support to Mr X and to maintain that support should other candidates 
try to lure them away. Having returned to the island where they 
resided permanently, Mr Z and his sub-committee (SCl )  tried to 
identify the voters residing in villages outside the constituency and to 
organise them, as the Apia sub-committee (SC2) was doing with 
prospective voters on that island.  Included in SCl was at least one 
matai from each of the six villages of the constituency. Usually these 
village representatives held positions of influence in their respective 
villages, as pulenu u  (village mayors), highest ranking tulafale, highest 
ranking alii, retail shopkeepers, and so forth. Through these 
representatives, Mr X's wish to contest the seat would be informally 
made known to the different villages. 
The best result the representatives in the six villages could achieve 
would be to get their respective v illages to agree unanimously to Mr X 
as the constituency's member of parliament. At the village level the 
issue of supporting Mr X as the consti tuency's member would be 
discussed in the village council. Normally, however, the decision 
would be swayed by the opinions of the high-ranking titleholders. 
Usually, holders of these titles would make up at the most about a fifth 
of their respective villages' matai population. Should a village attain 
unanimity, the village council would normally have two opinions: 
they would either pass a formal resolution that all its matai population 
would vote for Mr X without attaching to the resolution any sanction 
should some matai decide to vote for other candidates, 1 or they would 
make it  a part of the resolution that any village matai  voting for 
another candidate would face village sanctions after the elections. 
Adherence to the first resolution would depend on such factors as the 
matai 's respect for the village council's decision, genuine support for 
Mr X, or both .  The second resolution would usually be agreed upon if 
some of the matai  were suspected of supporting another candidate. In 
the absence of unanimity, the committee representatives would at least 
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get a feeling of the extent of support for their candidate, or otherwise, 
in their villages. 
With all this information relayed to the MCC, and to Mr X, the next 
stage of the campaign was to set a date on which Mr X would visit all 
the villages in the constituency to officially notify them of his intention 
to be their member again. The date set, the six villages were notified 
through the SCl members. On the day Mr X was to visit his 
constituency, two trucks were loaded full of goods and another vehicle 
was set aside for Mr X's personal use and to carry members of his 
immediate family who would help in the distribu tion of goods. The 
goods included some to be used by Mr X's visiting party (who would 
be there for a least two days), the members of the family of Mr X's 
wife, and other family friends who were awaiting the visiting party to 
help in the distribution of goods to the villages. The visiting party left 
in the late afternoon so they could arrive at night and be ready early in 
the morning for the task they had set out to do. 
Having had breakfast the following morning, the distribution of 
goods began. Vl was the first village to be visited. Immediately upon 
arrival, the kava ceremony to welcome the party began. The kava 
ceremony was followed by speeches. The first was a ·short speech 
given by the secretary of Mr X's MCC to introduce Mr X. Mr X then 
briefly outlined the government's development projects both 
completed and in progress. He also gave a brief summary of the 
general trend in government policies and the government's 
achievements to date. The next part of Mr X's speech was handing 
back to the village the constituency's seat he had held for the last three 
years. This was followed by his request to be the constituency's 
member again for the next three years. Mr X's speech concluded by 
wishing the village council and all the members of the village good 
health. 
Responding to Mr X's speech was the matai representing all the 
matai and members of Vl .  The speaker was a holder of the highest 
ranking tulafale title of Vl . His speech thanked Mr X for representing 
the constituency well in parliament, and conveyed to Mr X that Vl 
had unanimously agreed upon having Mr X as the constituency 's 
member again for the next three years. Mr X's secretary responded 
with a word of thanks before the visiting party proceeded to the final 
stage of the visit, which involved the presentation of gifts. 
Speaking on behalf of Mr X, Mr Z, in accordance with custom, gave 
the tulafale who spoke on behalf of Vl a present of WS$100. Each of the 
The price of election campaigning in Samoa 293 
five matai of Vl  who contested the customary right to deliver the 
speech on behalf of the village (jaatau) was each given a present of 
WS$20. In accordance with custom, another WS$100 was given as a 
present to all the Vl people who participated in the lalVa ceremony. 
Finally, Mr Z presented to Vl what Mr X had prepared as a way of 
thanking them for letting him hold the constituency's seat in the last 
three years. The present comprised 10 kegs of salt beer, 10 cartons of 
tin fish, a whole cow and WS$1,000 in cash. The present package did 
not include five cartons of biscuits, five blocks of butter and a 30-
kilogram bag of sugar for the village council's breakfast .  Having 
unloaded the goods in front of  the meeting house, the visiting party's 
truck hurried back to the houses of the family of Mr X's wife, which 
had been established as the visiting party's headquarters, to reload 
ready for the visit to V2. 
From V2 to V6 the same procedures were followed and the same 
quantity and types of gifts were presented, with a few minor 
variations depending on the number of matai who contested the 
customary right to respond to the visiting party on behalf of their 
respective villages and the matai who eventually gave the speech. For 
example, at VS the matai who gave the village's main speech was an 
influential and well-known tulafale. He had been the constituency's 
member in the 1967-69 parliamentary term, the holder of one of the 
subdistrict's highest ranking tulafale titles, and was also one of the 
oldest traditionally recognised tulafale in the constituency. Moreover, 
as one of the nationally recognised authorities on traditions and a 
reputed orator, his speech greatly impressed Mr X and his visiting 
party. Mr X decided on the spot to give him WS$200 instead of the 
sum that was given to representatives of the other villages who did 
the same task. 
Tables 12 . 1 and 12.2 summarise the approximate amount of money 
that was spent during Mr X's v isit to his constituency in December 
1984, in preparation for the general elections to be held on 22 February 
1985 (So'o 1996) . 
Samoa's 21 ,400 people in salary and wage-earning jobs in 1984 
constituted 13.6 per cent of Samoa's population, based on the 1 986 
census.  Their average gross salary /wage was WS$2,300. Thus, a 
Samoan earning the average wage /salary would have to save all his/ 
her salary, without tax being deducted from it, over about seven years 
before he/ she could afford the presents Mr X gave his constituency in 
one day. By Samoan economic standards, Mr X's expenditure on 
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Table 1 2. 1  Quantity o f  items presented as gifts to the six villages 
in constituency Y 
Vil lages Kegs of Cartons of Whole Food fo r Cash 
salt beef tin fish cattle counci l 's meal (approx. I n  WS$) 
V1 10 10 Yes 1,300 
V2 10 10 Yes 1,300 
V3 10 10 Yes 1,300 
V4 10 10 Yes 1,300 
V5 10 10 1 Yes 1,300 
V6 10 10 1 Yes 1,300 
Total 60 60 6 7,800 
presents to his constituency was exorbitant, and the quantity of his 
presents had increased from one general election to the next. 
Mr X's source of fina nce 
Mr X had two main sources of finance. The first source was his own 
money. This included money he saved from his salary, being a member 
in the current parliament, and money he earned from the sale of goods 
in his retail shop. The second source of finance was donations, which 
were of two types: those from Mr X's brothers, sisters, and friends; and 
those from Mr X's children. At a different general election, Mr X's 
children donated between WS$2,000 and WS$5,000 each, excluding 
cartons of tin fish and kegs of beer. Mr X's friends, sisters, brothers, 
and children resided in Samoa and abroad. 
Table 1 2.2 Approximate cost of items presented as gifts to the 
six villages in constituency Y 
Items 
Keg of salt meat 
Cartons of t in f ish 
Whole cattle 
For counci l 's meal 
Cash 
G rand total 
Total cost fo r V1-V6 (Approx. I n  WS$) 
30 x 10 x 6 = 1,800 
50 x 10 x 6 = 3,000 
500 x 1 x 6 = 3,000 
butter 3 x 5 x 6 = 90 
sugar 10 x 6 = 60 
biscuits 8 x 5 x 6 = 240 
7,800 
15 ,900 
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Having visited all the villages of the constituency, Mr X and his 
party returned to Apia. With that stage of the campaign out of the way 
the work of the two sub-committees continued until the day on which 
the general elections were held . Both sub-committees not only 
identified the matai belonging to constituency Y and kept in touch with 
them, but were also responsible for bringing to the registration officers 
those whose titles had not yet been registered on the constituency's 
matai roll. Such tasks involved meeting the expenses to transport the 
matai  to the registration offices and back to their places of residence. 
As such nzatai could be residing anywhere throughout the country, the 
time and expenses involved in such activities could often be very 
substantial. These activ ities were continued up till election day.2  
O n  elect ion day 
Another important  part of the campaign took place on the actual day 
of the elections. Section 59 of the Electoral Act 1 963 provided that 
voters in the 41 Samoan constituencies were to cast their votes at the 
polling booths to be established in their respective constituencies. 
Normally, a large number of voters resided in villages outside their 
titles' places of origin, that is, outside the constituencies for which they 
voted. Organising these voters in pick-up places and transporting 
them to the polling booths and back to their homes required a lot of 
planning and time, and most importantly expenses, for which the 
parliamentary candidates were responsible. The candidates either 
paid these expenses personally or the money was given to members of 
the campaign committee who had brought the voters in to vote. Once 
these voters arrived at the polling booths, the transportation effort 
concentrated on voters who resided within the constituency. The more 
vehicles the candidate had the better. These were the critical last 
moments of the electoral campaign. Sometimes the candidate who 
provided the most transport had the edge over others, as voters might 
decide to vote for the candidate whose vehicle transported them to the 
polling booths. In the 1985 elections, Mr X and his campaign 
committee were aware of these factors. They made available three 
pick-up trucks, a van, two buses and a removal-size truck. Mr X 
travelled around in his own car. 
As voters had been transported to the polling booths from all over 
the country, Mr X had to provide food for them. The majority of those 
who had travelled to the constituency from afar, in particular those 
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who had travelled from the other island, arrived the day before and 
throughout the night before the elections. They all stayed at the houses 
of the family of Mr X's wife. Having cast their ballots, the voters 
returned to Mr X' s campaign headquarters for nourishment. This was 
the time when the voters exercised their freedom to choose the 
candidate whose food they would eat. Usually, however, only the 
loyal supporters of Mr X would turn up at Mr X's headquarters for a 
meal and a few drinks. Among them were the matai from Vl and V2 
who had told Mr X on the day he visited the six villages of the 
consti tuency that their villages had agreed unanimously upon Mr X. 
The older matai and Mr X's ardent supporters would wait around until 
the election officers at the local polling booths had read out the results. 
Regardless of the results (in the last four general elections Mr X had 
always been successful), an after-election party would then begin. This 
was another source of expense. Unsuccessful candidates who intended 
to contest the nex t elections dare not neglect the voters at this point 
because voters could hold this against them. Moreover, should the seat 
be declared void after a successful election petition, and should the 
same candidates stand in by-elections,3 the candidates who neglected 
the voters after the general elections would pay dearly for that neglect. 
After the party, Mr X and his MCC returned to Apia. It was the time 
for Mr X to show the MCC his appreciation for the effort that had gone 
into the campaign in the last five months. Clearly, the electorate can 
extend some leverage and 'extractive capacity ' over the candidates at 
election time. 
Reciprocatin g  members of the campaign comm ittee 
The relationship between candidates and members of their respective 
campaign committees varied from one candidate to another. In Mr X's 
case, some members of the committee were given cash ranging up 
from a minimum of three hundred dollars. This was to help members 
of the committee with their travelling expenses and expenses involved 
in identifying voters, maintaining contact with them, transporting 
them to the registration offices and back to their homes, and providing · 
food and drinks during the registration process. Mr X had no choice 
but to trust the honesty of his committee members in the manner in 
which the money given to them had been spent.  Mr X took into 
account all these factors, and as he had no reason to believe that 
money had been abused by the committee members, 4 they had to be 
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thanked for their effort. Presents of this nature were not exactly the 
sorts of things that would be made public. The author knows of one 
candidate in the 1985 general elections who gave a quarter-acre piece 
of land he had recently brought as a present to one of his campaign 
committee. Pieces of freehold land for sale were not only hard to get, 
but their average costs was beyond the financial capacity of most 
Samoans. The market price of a quarter-acre piece of land at the time 
was WS$15,000. According to rumour, another candidate in the same 
general elections had paid the entire cost for the construction of a two­
storey building belonging to a prominent member of his campaign 
committee. The author also knows of one candidate in the 1991 
general elections who gave his pick-up truck as a present to a 
prominent member of his campaign committee. In the case of Mr Z, 
not only was his trust and contribution to Mr X's election victory 
sufficiently reciprocated at the 1985 and all other elections, but he was 
appoin ted an assessor of the Land and Titles Court. As a member of 
parliament of the political party in office, Mr X had lobbied 
successfully in government circles for the appointment of Mr Z. With 
Mr X as Constituency Y's member, and Mr Z an assessor of the Land 
and Titles Court, the dream of Mr Z's father to maintain the traditional 
status and recognition of his family seems to have become a reali ty. 
An estimate of Mr X's campaign expenses in the months leading up 
to the elections (excluding expenditure on the day he visited the six 
villages in the constituency) would be at least WS$15,000. Generally, 
expenses in the months leading up to the general elections were only 
part of what was spent in the three years during which a member held 
his seat. As one high profile member has said 
A member is h is constituency's bank; birth certi ficate person; loan 
officer; the financier for the construction and repair of his 
constituency's schools, hospita ls, churches, and so forth; the provider 
of school fees; the host for the consti tuency's visiting parties that may 
happen to a rrive a t  Apia at  any t ime throughout the three year 
parl iamenta ry term; among other cultural ly-related activi ties 
( Interview, 8 October 1 993). 
Not surprisingly, Polataivao Fosi, currently (1992-95) a minister of 
cabinet who has held the seat for the Gagaifomauga No. 3 
consti tuency since 1964 except for his only defeat in the 1979-81 
parliamentary term, has said that  he must have spent about four 
million dollars on his constituency. 'That is why I have been in 
parliament for over thirty years', he told the present author (Interview, 
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30 September 1993). Regardless of whether or not Polataivao carefully 
recorded the amount of money he had spent, his sta tement suggests 
that campaigning to be a politician is an expensive exercise in Samoa. 
Being elected unopposed may be a great help but the member is still 
obliged, in accordance with custom, to reciprocate his constituency's 
faith in him. For aspiring and incumbent members, this requires a 
secure financial base. As the number of members elected unopposed 
declines and the competition for parliamentary seats intensifies, so 
have the aspiring member 's campaign expenditures increased, 
primarily to satisfy existing indigenous institutions and the various 
customs and cultural values associated with them. 
Given that so much money is spent in the context of vil lage 
governments, the question that must be asked is: is it worth the effort 
in terms of obtaining political support? 
The answer is yes. The substantial majority of Samoans see it 
proper in accordance with tradition that any candidate wanting to 
contest a parliamentary seat go through normal procedures. This will 
involve channeling all campaign efforts through village councils. As 
long as members of the village are satisfied, there is a good chance that 
its members will filter down the word to their family members and 
friends on the choice of candidate to support. In some cases, the 
village council makes a ruling with sanctions attached that all village 
members vote for a particular candidate. In this way vil lage 
governments are important political assets for both incumbent and 
aspiring members. 
Impl ications of gift giving 
What are the implications of gift presentation in terms of acquiring 
collective political goods? One of the developments associated with 
liberal democracy is the acceptance of the ideals of collective good and 
the impersonal nature of the political market. Clearly, gift giving 
belongs more to the realm of clientelism than to the ideal of 
impersonal market forces. On these grounds it is doubtful that gift 
giving would result in the attainment of the collective good. What it 
does in the context of Samoan politics is  to encourage the tendency for 
successful candidates to pursue their own political aspirations after 
being elected . The justification for this attitude is that one's political 
success has relied heavily on one's own financial effort. The operation 
of the party system in terms of providing alternative policy statements 
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is a positive step towards realisation of collective goods, rather than 
food and cash for the short-term satisfaction of voters in the quest of 
politicians for support. 
What of such traditional values as maintaining title and village 
rank, and maintaining family harmony and unity? Clearly the 
intensity of the competition for political support in which economic 
resources play a vital role has meant that title rank without financial 
support is an incomplete formula for poli tical success. The temptation 
of presents in the form of cash, liquor and other items have been 
helpful in ensuring that family members abide by the word of the 
family matai or the village council. Among other things, the 
introduction of universal suffrage has contributed to the erosion of 
these traditional values. 
The 1 991 general elections 
The 1991 general elections were the firs t to be conducted under 
universal suffrage . These elections, and by-elections thereafter, saw the 
addition of another dimension to candidates' campaign strategies. 
Returning, for illustration, to Mr X's campaign: before the adoption of 
universal suffrage, Mr X would visit the six villages in his 
constituency and distribute the presents he had brought. The goods 
were presented officially to the respective villages' councils of matai; it 
was the village councils' responsibility to distribute the goods to the 
people by whatever method they chose. Following the adoption of 
universal suffrage, however, the procedure became more complicated 
and more expensive from the candidates' point of view. Not only 
would goods be presented to the council of matai, who normally 
occupied one house, but also to the rest of the sub-organisations in the 
village. From the perspective of members of these sub-organisations, 
presenting gifts to the council of matai only would imply that they 
were neglected by the candidates. The candidates had to make sure 
that other members of the village did not feel this way. This meant that 
the procedures normally conducted in the house occupied by the 
village matai had to be repeated several times until the other sub­
organisations such as Faletua ma Tausi (wives of alii and tulafale 
respectively), A ualuma (unmarried village girls and those whose 
husbands had died), Taulelea (untitled men) and Fafine laiti (wives of 
untitled men) were presented with gifts as well .  In short, the candidate 
dare not ignore any voters during this campaign. Before the adoption 
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of universal suffrage, it was mainly the matai who came to the 
candidates asking for things such as money for various cultural 
activities, most noticeably in the period immediately before the 
elections. Following the adoption of universal suffrage, it was the non­
matai who seemed to dominate the exercise of this rare political 
privilege.5 
The passing of the Electoral Amendment Act 1 990 not only 
introduced universal suffrage but brought a number of changes in 
voting procedures. Among these were provision for special voters, and 
the requirement that all voters hold valid certificates of identity 
(Section 31 . 1 ) . The special voters provision enabled 'a person who is 
qualified and registered to vote at any election in any constituency . . .  to 
cast his vote for that constituency . . .  as a special voter at a polling place 
outside that constituency' (Section 27). Previously, polling places were 
located only in the constituencies and there was no requirement for 
voters to have ID cards (Electoral Act 1 963, Sections 59, 135). In order 
to make sure of the prospective voters they had transported to and 
from the registration offices (to have their names registered on the 
electoral rolls), some candidates and their campaign committees held 
on to the voters' ID cards until just before the voters cast their ballots 
on election day. Candidates did not want 'their voters' won over by 
rival candidates before the elections. 
Concl usion 
The competition for political support can be discussed in relation to 
the role of political parties, and in relation to its effects on both 
democracy and indigenous institutions. The competition for votes has 
involved strategies described in both the political enterprise and the 
clientelist strategies. The first strategy includes the publicising of party 
manifestos between general elections and before by-elections. The 
existence of indigenous institutions, such as village governments and 
the matai system in general, and traditional values associated with 
them, have been partly responsible for the use of clientelist practices. 
The extent to which voters' choice of parliamentary candidate is 
influenced by party policies, individual member 's gifts, title rank etc. ,  
is a complex issue. I would argue that while party policies may help 
create a favourable impression among the informed voters of parties, 
the ultimate factors in determining candidates' electoral success are 
individual campaign efforts and personal relationships with voters. 
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One of the most experienced politicians and the leader of the Samoa 
Liberal Party, Nonumalo Sofara, has said: 'The electorate will never 
vote on party lines, nor on issues . .  .I don't think we've reached the age 
where people will vote for a candidate because he's a HRPP or a 
SNDP member ' (quoted in Samoa Newsline, 4 February 1996) . As the 
competition for parliamentary seats has intensified, so has the cost of 
candidates' individual campaigns. It suggests the question: what is in 
it for the politicians? 
As Max Weber explains, poli ticians get extrinsic and intrinsic 
benefits from their chosen careers. Extrinsically, a politician's electoral 
success enables him /her access to positions of influence and 
information which can be put to both personal use and the use of 
people associated with the politicians, such as relatives, friends, 
villages, and so forth. The electoral success of a politician brings pride 
to people associated with him/her and those associated with the title 
the politician holds. Intrinsically, there is satisfaction associated with a 
sense of empowerment, personal recognition, increased status and 
prestige, and being in a position of power. For the foundation 
titleholders and people associated with them, democratic competition 
has been another means of main taining and enhancing their titles' 
traditional status. 
What of the effects of competition for political support of 
indigenous institutions? Among the effects of intensifying competition 
for parliamentary seats is the disappearance of the practice of 
unopposed elections and bloc voting, through which village councils 
used to exercise power in determining which candidates village 
members should support. I t  also means that traditional respect 
associated with title and village ranks as means of obtaining political 
support now competes with other means of gaining support, such as 
education and wealth. Gifts and other incentives associated with 
competition have contributed to the weakening of traditional bonds 
between parents and children, matai and family members, and village 
councils and villagers. 
What of the effects of competi tion for political support on 
democracy? Although the incentives associated with competition are 
perceived as culturally degrading, they have nevertheless drawn into 
the political arena more members of the public. This too is not 
necessarily good from a traditional perspective.  It is not easy for 
people under traditional influence to accept new competition from the 
newly enfranchised. The logic behind competition is for elites to earn 
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support. To earn that  support they have to appeal continuously to 
voters. In this way voters exert pressure to cater for their interests. In 
this way the erosion of tradition in order to earn support has been a 
democratic achievement. The generally negative attitude towards 
political parties will gradually diminish as political parties deliver the 
collective political goods in terms of various infrastructure 
developments. 
The intensity of competition can also have a negative effect upon 
the successful candidates who put in so much effort in their 
campaigns. Increasing competition for parliamentary seats partly 
explains the constant shifting of party allegiance among members. 
One of the most important factors which has influenced the behaviour 
of successful  parliamentary candidates has been the time and effort 
and money that have gone into the campaign. Moreover, there has 
been a general feeling among the successful candidates that their 
election successes have been due mainly to their personal financial 
resources. The effort and time of their respective campaign committees 
have been reciprocated. Therefore, at the end of the day, the election 
victory has been the candidate's personal victory, and not necessarily 
that of the voters who supported him/her. Consequently, the issues of 
which political party the successful candidates join and which 
prospective Prime Minister they attach themselves to are their 
personal decisions, not those of their constituencies. Joining the 'right 
political party' or the 'right Prime Ministerial candidate' enhances the 
member 's chances of getting a ministerial post or another political 
position. 
Notes 
For an example of this kind of resolution in the context of the 
Palauli West constituency, see So'o 1996. 
The sixth Development Plan of Western Samoa, 1988-90, 
Department of Economic Developments, Apia, December 1987:7. 
There was low voter-turnout (66.6 per cent of votes cast in the 1991 
general elections) in the 1990 plebiscite to determine whether or 
not Samoans wanted to adopt universal suffrage. Unlike the 
campaigns for parliamentary seats (where the candidates went out 
of their way to identify prospective voters, transport them to the 
polling booths to cast their votes, and transport them back to their 
places of residence), much willingness to identify prospective 
voters, etc. ,  was absent until the day on which the p lebiscite was 
held . 
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I have not known of any election results where the electoral officers 
and the electoral system had been blamed for the defeat of 
candidates. However, a lawyer who was involved in an election 
petition case said that few nzatai have lied in court about the 
candidates they voted for. Only when the ballot boxes were opened 
in court was this discovered. A situation like this often arises when 
voters want to maintain friendly relationships with certain 
candidates, or have obtained from candidates presents and other 
favours, but have decided to vote for other candidates. 
In the 1985 general elections, a prominent member in the campaign 
committee of one of the parliamentary candidates in a different 
constituency confided in the author that at one stage he was given 
about a WS$1,000 cash to help win over voters' support to his 
candidate. However, he admitted, he must have spent about 80 per 
cent of that money for his own personal use; the candidate knew 
nothing about this. The candidate was unsuccessful in the 1982 and 
1985 general elections, but eventually successful in 1988. 
The figures for this general elections do not include those from two 
constituencies (Aleipata-Itupa-i-Luga and Anoamaa East) whose 
results are missing from The Wes tern Samoa Gazette (14[3] ,  2 March 
1985) .  
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The role of media in relations between 
Australia and Papua New Guinea 
Rosaleen S myth 
The media have a pervasive influence in opening up the foreign policy 
process to non-government players, and enabling governments to go 
beyond formal diplomatic relations to reach the people of other 
nations over the heads of their governments. Here I examine two ways 
in which the media have been used as a site of political struggle in the 
foreign policymaking process in Papua New Guinea and Australia. 
I first look at why in 1995 and 1996 the Papua New Guinea and 
Australian governments criticised each other through the media rather 
than through traditional diplomatic channels. The increasingly bitter 
debate led to an editorial in The A ustralian declaring on 13 September 
1996 that Australia's relations with Papua New Guinea were in urgent 
need of repair. Second, I consider how, in 1995, students at the 
University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) used the media to launch a 
grassroots activist campaign to arouse public opinion against the 
World Bank/ IMF structural adjustment program-particularly as it 
related to land mobilisation. 
Public opi n ion and foreign pol icy 
In 1995-96 relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea went 
through some rough patches, with both sides using the media to air 
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some very public criticisms. Each side, on occasions, demanded to 
know why the other was using the media to publicise their grievances 
rather than voicing them through normal diplomatic channels. In 
making such comments both sides chose to ignore the great changes 
that have taken place in how government-to-government relations 
have been conducted since the rise of mass democracy and the 
communications revolution, which have given greater power to public 
opinion to affect the behaviour of governments. In earlier times 
governments needed only to converse with governments. Today the 
political process is much wider. A government has to consider its 
domestic audiences, particularly those groups who have an active 
interest in foreign policy issues and use the media to publicise their 
views and bring pressure on a government. In commenting on the 
'collapse of reticence and privacy in negotiation', the former Israeli 
foreign minister Abba Eban noted 
The intrusion of the media into every phase and level of the 
negotiation process changes the whole spirit  and nature of diplomacy. 
The modern negotiator cannot escape the dua lity of his role. He must 
transact business simultaneously with his negotiating partner and his 
own public opinion. This involves a tota l modi fication of techniques. 
Whether this is a favorable development or not is i rrelevant; i t  is 
certainly irreversible ( 1 983:345) .  
A government has also take into account the opinions of influential 
people in other countries where it has policy interests, for these people 
in turn bring pressure on their own governments. A new term was 
coined in the United States in the 1960s to take account of the role of 
the public in the foreign policy process-public diplomacy. 1  'The 
essence of public diplomacy', former Australian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Gareth Evans, told the Australia-Asia Association 
in 1990, 'is the shaping of attitudes in other countries in a way which 
is favourable to our interests' .2 
Austral ia's relations with Papua New G u i nea 
Australia has long had what has been characterised as a 'special 
relationship' with Papua New Guinea, derived from Australia's role as 
the colonial power. After more than 21 years of independence the 
relationship is now described as 'mature' (Evans 1995: 13),  but this so­
called maturity is complicated by Papua New Guinea's financial 
dependency on an annual Australian aid injection of A$300 million, 
306 Governance and reform in the South Pacif ic 
plus an added A$20 million earmarked for defence. In 1995 when the 
public bickering was at its height the PNG government was in 
straitened financial circumstances. 
Relations first began to tum sour in 1992 when Australia began to 
move away from direct budget support, to aid tied to specific projects 
and economic sectors. There were domestic concerns about how the 
money was being spent: too much was being absorbed by the 
bureaucracy and not enough on improving the living conditions of 
ordinary Papua New Guineans in the villages and towns (Parliament 
of Australia 1991 : 140). 
The Papua New Guinea Government did not welcome this change . 
In 1993 at the PNG-Australia Ministerial forum in Mount Hagen Sir 
Julius Chan, then Finance and Planning Minister in the Wingti 
government, accused Canberra of having a neo-colonial attitude. He 
said most of Australia's money went back to Australia. The switch 
from direct budget aid to project aid,, said Chan, was paternalism and 
a threat to PNG sovereignty (Forbes 1994) . 
The Australian Government not only stood firm against the 
criticisms,, but went on to make a dramatic change in its method of 
handling its relations with Pacific Island governments, including 
Papua New Guinea, publicly criticising them for failing to bring about 
economic development. The chosen method to introduce the new 
hardline approach was an address on 15 June 1994 by the then 
Minister for Pacific Island Affairs, Gordon Bilney, to the Foreign 
Correspondents' Association. It was broadcast by satellite to the 
Pacific Islands. Bilney warned 
it is on ly reasonable to assume that the preparedness of investors and 
aid partners a like to continue to play a role in the South Pacific wi l l  
depend on how well individual countries formulate and implement 
the economic and structural reforms necessary for susta inable 
economic development (Bi lney 1 994:3) .  
This speech to an assembly of foreign correspondents, relayed by 
satellite was obviously a carefully calculated strategy. To what target 
audiences were these messages being directed?  It  was to be expected 
that the speech would be widely publicised in the Pacific Islands so 
the speech was being used to alert the citizens of these countries to the 
shortcomings of their own governments. And what of a domestic 
audience inside Australia? There is an attentive audience with an 
interest in Pacific Island affairs in the academic and business 
community and amongst non-government organisations. And there is 
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the broader Australian populace which is growing increasingly chary 
of money being spent on overseas aid. As the Commonwealth 
Parliament's Joint  Committee On Foreign Affairs Defence And Trade 
pointed out: 'The Australian taxpayers (and their elected 
representatives) demand transparency and accountability' (Parliament 
of Australia 1991 : 140). The changed international circumstances 
brought about by the end of Cold War, with the Soviets no longer 
perceived to be hovering in the Pacific looking for levers of influence, 
certainly made it easier for the Australian Government to adopt a 
more aggressive tone in its public communications with Pacific Island 
leaders. 
The financial state of Papua New Guinea worsened in the months 
following Bilney's speech. Australia came to the rescue with 
'extraordinary balance of payments assistance' in addition to the 
ongoing aid program. In September 1994 the PNG government was 
rescued from financial collapse when the Australian Prime Minister, 
Paul Keating, agreed to bring forward November and December 
budget support payments to 1 October. And in October 1994 and May 
1995, the Australian Government agreed to the Reserve Bank of 
Australia providing bridging finance facilities on condition that the 
PNG Government agree to an IMF /World Bank structural adjustment 
program.3 
Some bridging funds were provided but in July 1995 the PNG 
Ambassador to Australia, Sir Frederick Reiher, created a diplomatic 
stir when he told the Canberra Times that Australia was refusing to 
provide the full amount requested by Papua New Guinea for a 
bridging loan until terms and conditions on the structural adjustment 
package were agreed with the World Bank/IMF. 'Australia has told us 
we are naughty boys, has hit us on the backside and is leaving us to 
solve our own problems', said Sir Frederick. The Ambassador 's 
comments provoked the then head of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Michael Costello, to summon him to the 
Department for a 'please explain' session, a version of which appeared 
on the front page of The National headed: 'Aussie anger: PNG envoy 
summoned to explain criticism of Canberra ' (The National 12  July 
1995.)  
The National reported that Sir Frederick h�d refused to apologise. 
He said he was only conveying the feelings of the people of Papua 
New Guinea. Costello was reported to have been particularly upset 
because the High Commissioner chose to use the media rather than go 
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through diplomatic channels. Australia gave considerable financial 
assistance to Papua New Guinea but was continually the subject of 
criticism. The head of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade was reported to have spoken of his government's dismay 
over newspaper advertisements by PNG Commerce and Industry 
Minister, David Mai, attacking Australia 's import of cement for its 
Chancery building and remarks by the member for Rabaul, John 
Kaputin that Australia was giving '30 pieces of silver and getting 
much more' from Papua New Guinea. The front page story went on to 
comment on the souring of relations between the two countries, noting 
that PNG Prime Minister Julius Chan had been 'vocal about the level 
of aid to Papua New Guinea and the manner in which it ought to be 
distributed', and that 'Evans and Bilney had seized every opportunity 
to criticise the economic and financial management of the country' .  
The story concluded 
?NG sees great insult in Austra l ia's insistence that the remaining K20 
mil lion of a K40 mil l ion support from Austra l ia would only be 
released once PNG had introduced World Bank and IMF sponsored 
programs despite Sir Ju l ius' meeting w ith Austra l ian Prime Minister 
Paul  Keating in Cairns earlier (The National 12 July 1995). 
Further on in the paper 's 'Letters and Opinion' section, Australia 
was accused of betraying Papua New Guinea in its hour of need 
The feeling in Papua New Guinea is one of betrayal .  In i ts hour of 
need, one i f  its closest friends and a l l ies turned away from it. 
Austra l ia  has unbelievably turned off the tap. I t  will not reopen i t  until 
and unless PNG conformed to some conditions set by the World Bank 
and IMF. 
This has turned sour a special relationship that has spanned ha l f  a 
century. It was closer than friendship .  
They were l ikened to brothers. Austra l ia  was the b ig brother, gu iding a 
l i ttle and mostly spoi l ing i ts kid brother beyond maturity (The National 
12  J uly 1 995). 
In the same week papers were carrying a story that Australia and 
Indonesia were to meet to discuss plans in case there was a 
breakdown of law and order in Papua New Guinea .  A senior PNG 
member of parliament, Ben Micah responded by taking out paid 
newspaper advertisements accusing Australia and Indonesia of 
'suppressing the rights of Melanesians and other black minorities in 
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their own countries, and planning a similar fate for PNG' (Sheridan 
1995) .  An editorial in the Post-Courier had commented 
Whatever the motive might be, the Government should seek 
explana tions from both I ndonesia and Austra l ian governments on the 
nature of talks between their officials on how to deal with a PNG 
breakdown (Post-Courier 1 1 July 1 995: 1 0) .  
In April 1 995 in what Papua New Guinea's Post-Courier saw as a 
counter-attack on 'Canberra critics', Defence Force leaders 
Commander Tony Huai and Chief of Staff, David Josiah, called for a 
review of Australia's defence aid to Papua New Guinea. They 
described it as 'boomerang' aid because too much of it ended up in 
Australian pockets. Brigadier-General Huai was reported to have said 
that 'administration of funds from Canberra meant the PNG force had 
little say in spending what little was left after the Australians paid for 
their own allowances and expenses'(Philemon 1995 : 1 ) .  
The number of  complaints suggests a strategic use of  the media to 
embarrass the Australian Government and win sympathy and support 
from attentive publics within Australia. Australia was, after all, the 
former colonial power, and there was a sense of guilt in some quarters 
about the timing of Australia's departure and the level of 
development of the colony at the time of that departure, as is 
demonstrated in these quotations from the report, Australia 's Rela tions 
with Papua New Guinea 
We were . . .  diffident colonisers who governed with casual practical ity 
and who departed with alacrity and too little care . . .  
A lingering sense of responsibility, bred of our rapid departure, 
governs our commitment to aid . . .  
Ours was a stewardship that saw Papua New Guinea gain 
independence with insufficient infrastructure, particularly in human 
resources (Parliament of Austral ia  1 99l :xxv). 
The PNG government's media onslaught on the Australian 
Government could also have been designed to impress a PNG 
audience by demonstrating that Papua New Guinea was not going to 
let itself be pushed around by 'Big Brother ' Australia. 
The carpeting of the Ambassador by the head of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade indicated that the media attacks were 
getting under the skin of the Australian Government. This was made 
patently obvious in August 1 995 when Gareth Evans chose to deliver a 
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public warning to the PNG Government through the pages of The 
Australian, in an article titled 'Australia and Papua New Guinea: 
beyond paternalism'. It was illustrated, for extra emphasis, with an 
Australian flag up a pole above some palm trees being pierced by a 
number of arrows. 
Public attacks on Austra l ia-of the kind that have been made recently 
by several ministers , the defence force commander and high 
commissioner for Austra l ia-wil l  not make us diverge from pursuit of 
the interests and policy objectives we have identified . I f  their aim is to 
influence us, publ ic criticisms, accusat ions or blame directed at 
Austral i a  by senior government representatives, rather than 
representations made frankly and privately in the normal course of 
government-to-government relations, are misconceived and ineffectual 
(The Australian 4 August 1 995:1 3). 
There also appeared to be a warning to those attentive publics 
inside Australia who might be sympathetic to the arguments of the 
PNG government. As Evans went on to say in the past these 'public 
criticisms' might have had an impact, ' because of a sense of special 
obligation to Papua New Guinea felt in many quarters in Austral ia­
that sense may have been well motivated but it was essentially 
paternalistic and patronising. Those days are over. '  
And just in case anyone missed the message in  the Evans' article, 
foreign editor, Greg Sheridan, reinforced it in the same issue writing, 
'Senator Evans has sent a clear message to Port Moresby that it must 
desist from its public campaign against Australia or risk a wind back 
in aid, which now totals $320 million a year. I t  is the bluntest message 
yet, by Canberra, that Australia will not tolerate constant abuse from 
PNG (The Australian 4 August 1995) .  
A new govern ment i n  Can berra 
The Howard Coalition Government which replaced the Keating Labor 
Government at the Federal election in March 1996 has continued to 
use the media as well as traditional diplomatic channels to 
communicate with the PNG government. In July 1996, Foreign 
Minister Downer issued a warning that the annual $A20 million 
Defence Cooperation Program was at risk if Papua New Guinea 
continued to use Australian-donated helicopters as gunships. 
(O'Callaghan 1996) .  The PNG Government, in turn, said Australia 
must also share the guilt for the killings on Bougainville as it  had 
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failed to act against Sydney-based supporters of the Bougainville 
rebels. Papua New Guinea would review Australian aid programs, 
with the Prime Minister describing the defence program as a form of 
post colonial bondage (Callick 1996). Sir Julius also said that he did 
not need criticism from Australia delivered via the media. There were 
a number of PNG diplomatic offices in Australia and there was no 
reason why a diplomat could not be called rather than the media, if an 
Australian leader wanted to talk to PNG (Fraser 1996). 
This use of the media to broadcast government views was not 
going to cease just because government expressed a preference for the 
'normal' diplomatic channels. Conversations between government 
officials and diplomats continue behind  the scenes in the traditional 
diplomatic mode but governments also make strategic use of the 
media because to reach non-state players who have an influence on 
the foreign policymaking process at home and abroad. 
I have suggested that the government's series of public criticisms 
may have been seeking to influence groups in Australia who have a 
sense of special obligation to Papua New Guinea and to impress its 
own domestic constituency with its capacity to stand up to the former 
colonial masters. Evans, in choosing to respond in the pages of The 
Australian to the barrage of criticism by PNG leaders, was seeking also 
to reach those among the readership of that paper who may have been 
sympathetic to the PNG government's position. I have also suggested 
that Bilney, in choosing to broadcast by satellite to the Pacific Islands 
the Australian Government's message about good governance, was 
seeking not only to tel l  aid-dependent Pacific Island governments that 
they should implement economic and structure reforms-that 
message, after all, can be conveyed by more traditional diplomatic 
means-but was also aiming at other audiences: Australian taxpayers 
and Pacific Island voters. The latter were being informed by the major 
aid donor in the region of the shortcomings of their governments. As 
voters in their national elections, they, in tum, would be in a position 
to demand greater accountability, and, exercise their ultimate option of 
voting their governments out of office. While the Australian 
Government may not have raised the question of nationai
"
elections in 
this and other public statements about the performance of Pacific 
Island governments, an editorial in the A ustralian Financial Review on 2 
August 1996 was much more blunt .  It declared that Australia should 
take up Papua New Guinea's idea of a review of aid arrangements 
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to redep loy Austra l i a 's assistance more stra tegica l ly in the Asia Pacific 
region, taking into account how welcome i t  is to the recipients. Then at 
the next J une election, the country's v i l l age-dwel l ing majori ty wi l l  be 
able to record i ts own verdict on i ts government's performance. 
This analysis of the way the media has been used by both the 
Australian and governments in the conduct of the relations between 
the two countries has demonstrated how much traditional diplomacy 
has been altered because of the way public policy is made in 
democratic countries. While Aba Eban in the quotation above, said the 
modern government negotiator transacts business simultaneously 
with his (or her) negotia ting partner and his (or her) own public 
opinion. This case study shows something a little more complex; there 
are not two conversations going on but three. The modern negotiator 
must transact business simultaneously with his negotiating partner 
and his (or her) own public opinion but also with public opinion in the 
country with which the negotiation is taking place. Public diplomacy 
has not replaced government-to-government diplomacy. Both forms 
co-exist, but tradi tional diplomacy is now, however, a much more 
open process because of the role of the media and public opinion in 
what were once private negotiations. 
G rassroots activism in Papua New G u i nea 
The relationship between the news media and a grassroots activist 
movement is dynamic. The news media need stories that are full of 
drama and conflict to attract and boost circulation and ratings. The 
leaders of activist movements need publicity to command attention 
for their issue, attract grassroots support and persuade decision­
makers to adopt their solution to the problem. Here I focus on that 
process at work in Papua New Guinea in 1995 when students at the 
University of Papua New Guinea, members of PNG non-government 
organisations in Port Moresby and others used the media to launch a 
grnssroots activist campaign to arouse public opinion against the 
World Bank/IMF's structural adjustment program-particularly as it  
related to land mobilisation. 
'The power of the news media' as many including Jamieson and 
Campbell have noted, 'results from their capacity to select what is 
reported and to shape the content of news stories' (Jamieson and 
Campbell 1992:98) .  The media, through the selection of issues for 
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coverage, can often trigger public discussion of certain issues. The role 
of the activist is to package an issue in a way that will obtain 
maximum media attention. One means is the manufacture of 
newsworthy events such as protest marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, 
and publicity stunts. Public rela tions and media relations textbooks as 
well as handbooks for grassroots campaign organisers carry ad vice 
about ways to create news (Ryan 1993:98-124) . Greenpeace has 
demonstrated on many occasions, what Holsti calls 'a sudden, 
dramatic act' is the best way to capture instantaneous headlines 
( 1992: 160). 
Grabbing the headline, however, is only the first step. It is not 
enough to get your issue on the media's agenda, it is also important to 
be able to manage public understanding of the issue by getting your 
interpretation accepted as dominant. 
Given that no single defini tion of a problem is uniquely accurate, the 
power to control the framing or defining of an issue is of paramount 
importance if an organiza tion is to gain acceptance of i ts proposed 
solu tion (Salmon 1 989 :24-5). 
In the narrative that follows I suggest that not only did some 
students at the University of Papua New Guinea, in alliance with non­
govemment organisations and others, succeed with the aid of a 
sudden dramatic act in capturing instantaneous headlines for their 
cause but they also had some success in framing the issue. They were 
assisted by the fact that there is considerable freedom of the press in 
Papua New Guinea, and that there was sympathy for their cause 
amongst sections of the media, some university staff and, even PNG 
political figures. It will also be suggested that their cause was not 
damaged by the fact that they had a sympathetic audience in the 
wider global communications village where there is considerable 
activist hostility to the World Bank/ IMP structural adjustment 
programs in developing countries. Students and Papua New Guinea 
non-government organisations were able to use this rhetoric in the 
framing of the issue while a sympathetic audience linked through the 
Internet monitored the progress of their protest. The progress of this 
activist movement is tracked through the five stages in the life cycle of 
an issue as outlined by Heath and Nelson: 'strain, mobilization, 
confrontation, negotiation and resolution . '  ( 1986:204) .  
Students at the University of  Papua New Guinea represent a key 
section of the community not only because they will go on to 
influential positions in politics, academia, business and the media but 
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because they are already an influential force in the country's politics­
sometimes assuming the role of a de facto opposition. The PNG 
government's party structure is weak: a Westminister style political 
system imposed on a collection of Melanesian tribal groups. Leaders 
are as much power brokers as policymakers. Power blocs are formed 
along parochial rather than ideological lines. Leadership has often 
changed through the shifting of party allegiances rather than through 
the ballot box and there is widespread popular distrust of the political 
process. In this situation students have been to the fore in protesting 
against unpopular government measures. 
In July 1990 there were strikes and protests over corruption and 
over proposed pay rises for MPs (Parliament of Australia 1991 : 140) . In 
May 1995 students marched on Parliament to protest against the move 
by the government to increase the Electoral Development Fund, 
popularly known as the slush fund, to conduct projects in their 
electorates (Matthew and Elijah 1995; Kewa 1995). And in July 1995 
the students were again on the march, this time, against the acceptance 
by the PNG government of the IMF and World Bank's structural 
adjustment programs as a basis for economic reform, and, particularly, 
a proposal for the registration of customary land . 
Customary land tenure in Papua New Guinea covers 97 per cent of 
all land and supports more than 85 per cent of the population. Foreign 
consultants, including those from the World Bank and some members 
of PNG business and political elites see this system as holding up 
economic development. They have long been calling for the 
registration of customary land so that it can be used for commercial 
development. Preparatory work had been done towards land 
mobilisation under a World Bank project to which Australia's 
contribution was the mapping of the land. However, progress has 
been slow not least because of the strong identification with the land 
of the population and the likelihood of a powerful emotional response 
to any suggestion of change in land tenure arrangements. Opponents 
of land registration consider that land registration would be the first 
step towards the creation of a landless peasantry. They argue that the 
customary land tenure system has provided subsistence security in a 
country without social security systems which are a feature of more 
developed western countries. According to Andrew Lakau, land 
tenure specialist and then a lecturer at the University of Technology in 
Lae, the customary land tenure system has preserved the way of life 
which the people know best. Because of it, people have remained on 
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returned to the land, rather than drift to remain in a stagnant urban 
�tor. It has also prevented the rise of a tenant-landlord class of 
people (Lakau 1995a, 1995b). It is obvious that any campaign to 
promote the registration of customary land would have to be handled 
with great care. 
In April 1995, the Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, thrust the land 
issue into the spotlight when, on his return from a visit to Cairns in 
Queensland, to obtain financial assistance from the Australian Prime 
Minister, he announced that the next issue he intended to address, 
after the provincial government reforms,4 was land mobilisation 
(Avorosi 1995 :5) .  The Prime Minister 's statement followed on from an 
editorial in the Malaysian-owned PNG newspaper, The National, 
which called for state ownership of land. The student newspaper, Uni 
Tavu r, in a page feature, 'The Hot Issue of Land ', warned that the 
people of Papua New Guinea would 'do anything to protect and 
safeguard their land if they feel that their right to the land is 
threatened. In fact, many regard it as foolhardy for anyone-even for 
the state-to consider trying to register land and wrest ownership 
from the people of this country' (Avorosi 1995:5). In the life-cycle of an 
issue this was at the 'strain' stage when the issue had been identified 
by a small group who saw a potential problem emerging but had not 
yet organised to do anything about it .  
The pace quickened in July 1995 when World Bank officials visited 
Papua New Guinea for discussions on the reforms that would need to 
be implemented in order to ob tain structural adjustment funding. On 
8 July The Saturday Independen t reported that one of the requirements 
being demanded by the World Bank would be 'Complete framework 
legislation for customary land registration' (Yadi 1995 : 1 ) .  Also in early 
July the Port Moresby legal firm, Henao Lawyers, employed by the 
PNG government to draft a land mobilisation Bill, were visiting 
various provinces explaining the proposed Bill to business houses, 
public servants, local government councils and villages and other 
influentials . The Bill would give legal rights to customary landowners 
who were prepared to register their land and enter into commercial 
arrangements. And then, according to Deputy Prime Minister and 
Finance Minister, Chris Haiveta, people would be able ' to use it as an 
asset and collateral under family or business groups for timber, 
fishing, gardening and other economic activity. '  (Temane 1995a) . 
The issue had now advanced a stage further in its life-cycle and 
there was sudden pressure for 'mobilisation' as an 'activist public' 
3 1 6  Governance and reform in the South Pacific 
emerged. Larissa Grunig defines an activist public as 'a group or two 
or more individuals who organize in order to influence another public 
or publics through action that may include, education, compromise, 
persuasion, pressure tactics, or force ' (Grunig 1992:504) The land 
mobilisa tion initiatives alarmed some University staff, students and 
members of non-government organisations who are part of the 
National Alliance of NGOs (NANGO). On 12 July the University's 
Language and Literature Department conducted a seminar 'on the 
World Bank/IMF plan and its impact and implications on the social 
education and economic life in PNC. '  (Waibaru 1995:2) .  There 'the 
general secretary of Melanesian Solidarity Group (Melso!), Peti 
Lapanama, claimed the World Bank/IMF had gained effective control 
of Papua New Guinea's economy . . .  when the Government approved 
24 out of 27 policy measures required under the World Bank regime. '  
Lapanama told the seminar: 'These big international financial 
institutions have left shameful records of disaster in human welfare 
and economic prosperity in almost all the countries they have set foot 
in ' (Baru 1995:3) .  On Thursday 13 July at a Student Representative 
Council meeting the students decided to hold a forum the following 
day to launch a campaign against the land mobilisation program. 
Posters were put up around the university announcing the meeting 
and on Friday 14 July, students gathered at the forum with speakers 
denouncing land mobilisation. One student activist was reported as 
saying that ' the lessons from other countries suggest that such land 
mobilisation programs throw indigenous people in to poverty and 
despair once they give away land rights to the State or big 
corporations' (Temane 1995b:213). Passions were ignited . Some 
students seized government and statutory authority vehicles on the 
road outside the campus and drove them into the forum area where 
three were damaged and one set one alight in what one newspaper 
subsequently described as 'a violent outburst reminiscent of the 1991 
protest'. The protest had reached the 'confrontation' stage-'that 
moment when the group attempts to force a corporation or 
government agency to recognize the group and implement its 
demands' (Heath and Nelson 1986:213). 
The burning car incident won front page coverage of the protest. 
'Students on rampage over World Bank reforms' announced the front 
page of The Saturday Independent on 15 July. The front page of The 
National of 17 July had a colour photo of a burning vehicle with a 
caption 'Car ablaze in campus riot . . .  A government car burns in 
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University of Papua New Guinea's forum square after it was set on 
fire by students protesting against the Government's push for land 
reforms under the World Bank-sponsored land mobilisation program. 
The burning vehicle a lso made the front page of the Pos t-Courier. The 
drama of vehicle burning and destruction captured headlines and was 
newsworthy in itself but vehicle burning also carries with it a special 
symbolic significance and cultural resonance in a country l ike Papua 
New Guinea where a vehicle is a symbol of the wealth and status to 
which many aspire. 
Henao lawyers were warned to stay away from the provinces and 
student protesters fanned out through the streets of Port Moresby 
taking up a collection for funds to support student emissaries who 
were to be sent to the provinces to raise awareness about the land 
reform. This aspect was captured in a photograph later published in 
Uni Tavur on 21 July captioned 'Student protesters educate the public 
on the land issue this week'; it showed students carrying banners in 
Tok Pisin and English, one with a message telling the World Bank to 
'Go home'(p.3) .  
Student spokespersons interviewed spoke to the media of their 
d isgust with the way Papua New Guinea had been handled by 
politicians, and framed their protest in the wider context of what they 
claimed was the dubious record of the World Bank/ IMF in other 
countries where structural adjustment reforms had been implemented . 
The protesters were aided by the fact that as one of their leaders, 
lawyer and lecturer, Powes Parkop, had noted (Parkop 1994: 1 33) ' the 
PNG press is indeed independent and free compared to many 
developing countries'. Parkop told the Post-Courier ' Papua New 
Guinea has been destroyed by our politicians more than enough and it 
was time to look to straighten this mess. Twenty years of destruction is 
enough' .  He went on to say that now 'the National Alliance of non­
govemment organisations (NANGO) and the various trade unions 
(about 21 altogether) have formed a coalition to tell the government 
that they do not agree with the way it is bowing down to the World 
Bank and IMF directives and in tum selling the sovereign Papua New 
Guinea. Parkop 'gave Philippines as an example where World Bank 
and IMF had run that nation into destruction by dividing the people 
under the leadership [of] President Marcos for 30 years' .  He went on 
to say that 'in the past i t  had always been students and non­
government organisations speaking out', but for this issue we will 
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make sure the nation goes against it' . While not condoning the vehicle 
burning and destruction Parkop said 'it was an indication of how 
frustrated people are about what is happening'(Pamba 1995a) . 
Some inside government were also critical. The Minister for 
Commerce and Industry, David Mai, said that the proposed reforms 
would undermine Papua New Guinea's sovereignty. Mai took out full 
page advocacy advertisements in the local press to get his message 
across'5 for which he was rebuked by the Prime Minister (Waram 
1995:2). Advocacy or idea-issue advertisements are favoured by 
organisations from corporations to pressure groups when they want to 
ensure that they get their message published intact unmediated by 
journalists (Sethi 1987). BHP used advocacy advertisements, for 
example, in 1995 when it  was being sued in the Victorian Supreme 
Court by PNG landowners over pollution from the Ok Tedi mine and 
competing with the plaintiff 's lawyers, Slater and Gordon, to have its 
framing of the issue predominate in the media. 
The use of advocacy advertisements by a dissident politician in 
Papua New Guinea again underscores the relative freedom of the 
press from government controls in this developing country. Mai 
received support from Ialibu/ Pangia member Roy Yaki who described 
his stand as 'courageous' (Waram 1995) and former diplomat Sir 
Paulias Matane who also congratulated the students for raising 
awareness among the people. He said 'Papua New Guinea should be 
very careful when dealing with international financial organisations 
which he claims have contributed to the downfall of many countries in 
the developing world' (Post-Courier 21 July 1995:2) .  
The student protest won some support within the University 
hierarchy. Acting Vice-Chancellor, Nick Kuman, told students, that he 
would 'support in principle' their protest, 'due to the constraints' he 
was under. 'Morally and mentally I am in support of you'. And while 
urging them not to take the law into their own hands, he told the 
students that 'the conscious actions you take will be far reaching' and 
that ' the need to inform people of what is happening in the country 
was vital . . .  the media has failed in many areas "probably because of 
the constraints they have. So the student voice needs to go out'" 
(Pamba 1995b) .  
A number of  articles were critical of the students' arguments. The 
violence was universally deplored but there was widespread 
agreement that there was a need for much more open discussion about 
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the land mobilisation proposals and, even, that the student protest had 
provided the window of opportuni ty. One example is this extract from 
the editorial in The Sa turday Independent of 15 July 1995. 
The rowdy demonstra tion by University of PNG students yesterday 
was unfortuna te. One wou ld have thought that  as students of the 
highest learning institution in the country, they could have pursued 
other avenues, other than violence, to put their concerns across to the 
government. 
But again the protest brought to surface more concerns about the 
effects of the structural adjustment reforms tha t the government and 
the World Bank have agreed to imp lement to try and revive the PNG 
economy. 
The students' concern is that the World Bank has gone too far in 
forcing the reforms down PNG's throat .  Certa in aspects of the 
adj ustments and especial ly on land reforms have fa l len foul of many 
academics, non-governmenta l organisations, commenta tors on 
national  affa irs and even pol it icians. 
The World Bank people are here to appraise the reforms related to the 
first loa n. Hopeful ly, they also, wi l l  see and feel how strongly Papua 
New Guineans feel about their l and, their rights and their heritage. I t  
should be used as a guide to their  del ibera tions and should not be 
used against Papua New Guinea (The Saturday Independen t 15 July 
1 995). 
While understanding the strength of the students' emotions, an 
editorial in the Post-Courier said the violence was 'uncalled for ' and 
what was needed was 'rational debate', suggesting that it would have 
been preferable for the students to invite the lawyers to the campus to 
explain reforms. 
Land is the most important asset owned by the people of Papua New 
Guinea . 
So any discussion on land is bound to arouse emotions among those 
pa rticipating.  
I t  is not surprising that  students of the UPNG feel anger at  any 
attempt to register customary land, much of which has never been 
touched by governments or developers unless there is reason to do so 
(Post-Courier 17 Ju ly 1 995). 
The students succeeded in arousing the provinces against the 
Henao lawyers ·who were forced to abort their nationwide tour as they 
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were threatened by a crowd in Wabag and had to be secretly flown out 
of Mt Hagen as some of the highlanders became convinced that the 
government was trying to take over their customary land (Kone 1995) .  
After the Frid.ay demonstration, World Bank officials agreed to 
meet with student and non-government organisa tion representatives. 
The meeting was cancelled however, when the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Chris Haiveta ruled against it, accusing the World Bank of breaking 
with Protocol in arranging such a meeting. He said 'PNG did not go 
meddling in Australia's or other countries' internal affairs' as it would 
seem that the World Bank and the IMF had done in arranging the 
meeting (Tannos 1995a) .  
Protests continued the following week. Classes were boycotted at 
the Waigani campus and Tuesday 18 July was a 'a day of protest' (The 
National 19 July 1995), when the student and non-government 
organisation leaders led a crowd of about 4,000 people from all over 
the city and outside in a march to the Parliament ' to demand answers 
from the Government' . Scenes of people marching through the streets 
of Port Moresby carrying placards, of police confronting protesters, of 
the demonstration leaders at the Parliament gates and of Deputy 
Prime Minister Chris Haiveta addressing the crowd outside 
Parliament were featured in the press and on televison. A delegation 
of about 55 were allowed inside the Parliament to talk with the Land 
Minister, Albert Kipalan, Haiveta and other officials (Post-Courier, 19 
July 1995: 1 ) .  The issue had now reached the 'negotiation' stage as 
Kipalan gave an undertaking to withdraw those aspects of the land 
mobilisation program with which students disagreed and the 
students, in turn, agreed to return to classes. However, violence flared 
up again on Thursday 20 July after the Prime Minister defended the 
structural adjustment program, saying, 'Beggars can't be 
choosers'(Tannos 1995b:3) .  The 'beggars' remark was said to have 
triggered further protests at the university, with more cars being 
burned and the boycott of classes extended. Students returned to 
classes the following week. 
Prior to leaving Papua New Guinea on 19 July the World Bank 
team leader, Pirouz Hamidian-Rad, commenting on the land reforms, 
said that his team were 'pleased that consultation had taken place 
between the government and the university students, non­
governmental organisations and other concerned groups over the 
reforms' (The Saturday Independen t, 22 July 1995:3) .  Shortly afterwards 
the World Bank announced land egistration was not part of the 
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structural adjustment program. The issue had arrived at the fifth and 
final 'resolution' stage. With the aid of the media the students, non­
government organisations and their supporters had been able to 
magnify their influence and arouse opinion nationwide against the 
land mobilisation proposals and have them omitted from the 
structural adjustment negotiations. 
In the broader scheme of things, however, while the students and 
non-government organisations had a victory over the land 
mobilisation proposals it needs to be pointed out that while the glare 
of the media spotlight was trained on the land mobilisation proposals 
the World Bank/IMF and the PNG government did finally conclude 
negotiations on the structural adjustment proposals which included 
other conditions unpalatable to many. 
This case demonstrates the power of grassroots activism, 
particularly when there is a sympathetic media and a relatively free 
press. That power is particularly potent in Papua New Guinea because 
of the weak political structure and the lack of an effective 
parliamentary opposition on which a properly functioning 
Westminster-style government is premised. There is a vacuum in 
Papua New Guinea which allows grassroots style campaigns to have 
some success. 
Another aspect of this grassroots activist campaign to note is that it 
provides a poin ter to future local grassroots campaigns which can tap 
into cyberspace activism. In this new era of electronic networking and 
global issues activism, grassroots movements in one country may not 
have to walk alone. If the local issue can be linked to one of those 
global multilateral issues such as human rights or the environment 
then the local campaign may be taken up in cyberspace by 
international non-government organisations who can alert 
international opinion to also bring pressure to bear on the local 
government. There is a world audience linked on the Internet and by 
email who may assist with the framing of the issue in local and 
international media and provide moral support, and lobbying to 
inflect public opinion round the world to the cause. 
The PNG students' campaign was monitored in cyberspace by the 
Ecological Enterprises network which in early 1994 commenced a 
'Forest Campaign News/Worldwide Biodiversity' project aimed at  
saving 'Papua New Guinea and other adjacent Melanesian countries' 
rainforests and cul tures from industrial logging'. This was to be done 
through bring
-
ing together information found on the Internet and 
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recirculating material via email and electronic bulletin boards to 
activists around the world . The project was explained to UPNG 
students and others by the project's d irector, Glen Barry of the 
University of Wisconsin, in the March 1995 issue of ITA DIBA; Let Us 
Know, the newsletter of the South Pacific Centre for Communication 
and Information in Development at UPNG. 'These materials in the list 
are unabashedly activist in content and scope: hop ing to provided 
opportunities for North /South partnership; primarily concerned with 
forest and biodiversity protection issues' (Barry 1995a) .  People linked 
in the network via the internet or email are 'encouraged to u tilize this 
information for personal campaign use; including writing letters, 
organising campaigns and forwarding' (Barry 1995b) .  
Ecological Enterprises took a particular interest in the UPNG 
campaign against land mobilisation, informing the cyberspace 
congregation of the progress of the campaign through relayed articles 
from the PNG press and the InterPress Third World News Agency. In 
an Action Alert dated 24 July 1995, 'PNG Says No to "Terrible 
Twins"-World Bank and IMF', and relayed from econet's 
reg.newguinea conference, AID/WATCH of Australia urged 
Austra l ian people and Organisa tions to send messages of support to 
groups in PNG mobil ising aga inst the World Band and I M F  structural 
adjustment package. NANGO and the Students' Representative World 
Council and the Universi ty of PNG have been instrumental in many of 
these protests. 
Readers were provided with the addresses of Martin Pat, President 
of the Student Representative Council and Richard Brunton, Interim 
Secretary of NANGO, based at  UPNG and also with the addresses of 
the international financial institutions and the Australian Minister for 
Development Cooperation who were also to be included in the write­
in public relations campaign (Lee 1995). AID/WATCH continued its 
grass roots activism with the publication of the reports, 'Papua New 
Guinea and the Terrible Twins' in August 1995 and in April 1996, 
'Pawa na Pipel! People and Power in Papua New Guinea'. 
Notes 
1 The term is reported to have been coined in 1965 by Edmund 
Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
University (Malone 1988: 1 2) .  
2 'Australia and Asia: role of public diplomacy', address to the 
Australia-Asia Association, Melbourne, 15 March 1990:15. 
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3 Treasurer, Press Release, ' Australia Provides Additional Assistance 
For Reforms In Papua New Guinea', Canberra, 30 August 1995. 
4 Elected provincial governance were abolished by Papua New 
Guinea's national parliament in June 1995. 
5 'Public statement, by Honourable David Mai, member of 
parliament, Minister for Commerce and Industry, serious negative 
implications of structural adjustment program being imposed upon 
Papua New Guinea's economy by World Bank/IMF', The National, 
19  July 1995: 10. 
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326 Governance and reform i n  the South Pacif ic 
Aid donors increasingly believe that development depends on 'good 
governance' . Recipients of grants and loans are scrutinised for their 
adherence to democracy, the absence of corruption, and their 
willingness to carry out public sector reform. 
This book is about issues of'governance' and 'good government' in the 
South Pacific, where small, mostly democratic, developing countries are 
relatively dependent on foreign aid. Issues of good governance are 
prominent in the recent unrest over the Sandline mercenaries contract 
in Papua New Guinea, and in the review of Fiji's constitution that led 
to its readmission to the Commonwealth. They are also expressed in the 
increasing international pressure for public sector reform. 
The chapters report on recent research by scholars from the South 
Pacific, and from outside. Macdonald's opening chapter considers 
whether the World Bank's 'good governance' criteria· are applicable to 
the region. Kavanamur and the Macphersons analyse Structural 
Adjustment Programs, while Kubutaulaka looks for the causes of 
forestry mismanagement. Nanau and Burton criticise the results of 
decentralisation. Ivarature analyses the Sandline affair, and Dinnen 
interprets gang surrenders as non-state solutions to crime. Sepoe urges 
elite women to work with NGOs. So'o gives details of election 
campaign financing. Smith describes how governments, and activists, are 
making use of the media. Good governance is a global issue, and May 
compares Papua New Guinea with Africa. 
The book is published as part of the Australian National University's 
project on 'State, Society and Governance in Melanesia' . 
